ANGELES v.

CALASANZ
135 SCRA 323
Petitioner: Buenaventura Angeles, et al.
Respondents: Ursula Torres Calasanz, et al.
FACTS:
On December 19, 1957, defendants-appellants Ursula Torres Calasanz and
plaintiffs-appellees Buenaventura Angeles and TeofilaJuani entered into acontract
to sell a piece of land located in Cainta, Rizal for the amount of P3,920.00 plus 7%
interest per annum. The plaintiffs-appellees made a downpayment of P392.00 upon
the execution of the contract. They promised to pay the balance in monthly
installments of P41.20 until fully paid, the installment being due and payable on the
19th day of each month. The plaintiffs-appellees paid the monthly installments until
July 1966, when their aggregate payment already amounted to P4,533.38.
On December 7, 1966, the defendants-appellants wrote the plantiffsappellees a letter requesting the remittance of past due accounts. On January 28,
1967, the defendants-appellants cancelled the said contract because the plaintiffs
failed to meet subsequent payments. The plaintiffs letter with their plea for
reconsideration of the said cancellation was denied by the defendants. The plaintiffsappellees filed a case before the Court of First Instance to compel the defendant to
executein their favor the final deed of sale alleging inter alia that after computing all
subsequent payments for the land in question, they found out that they have already
paid the total amount including interests, realty taxes and incidental expenses. The
defendants alleged in their answer that the plaintiffs violated par. 6 of the contract to
sell when they failed and refused to pay and/or offer to pay monthly installments
corresponding to the month of August, 1966 for more than 5 months, thereby
constraining the defendants to cancel the said contract. The Court of First Instance
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
(1) Has the Contract to Sell been automatically and validly cancelled by the
defendants-appellants?
RULING:
(1) No. While it is true that par.2 of the contract obligated the plaintiffs-appellees to
pay the defendants the sum of P3,920 plus 7% interest per annum, it is likewise true
that under par 12 the seller is obligated to transfer the title to the buyer upon
payment of the said price
The contract to sell, being a contract of adhesion, must be construed against
the party causing it. The Supreme Court agree with the observation of the plaintiffs

appellees to the effect that the terms of a contract must be interpreted against the
party who drafted the same, especially where such interpretation will help effect
justice to buyers who, after having invested a big amount of money, are now sought
to be deprived of the same thru the prayed application of a contract clever in its
phraseology, condemnable in its lopsidedness and injurious in its effect which, in
essence, and its entirety is most unfair to the buyers.
Thus, since the principal obligation under the contract is only P3,920.00 and
the plaintiffs-appellees have already paid an aggregate amount of P4,533.38, the
courts should only order the payment of the few remaining installments but not
uphold the cancellation of the contract. Upon payment of the balance of P671.67
without any interest thereon, the defendant must immediately execute the final deed
of sale in favor of the plaintiffs and execute the necessary transfer of documents, as
provided in par.12 of the contract.

ROQUE v. LAPUZ
96 SCRA 741
Petitioner: Felipe C. Roque
Respondents: Nicanor Lapuz and the Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Sometime in 1964, prior to the approval by the National Planning Commission
of the consolidation and subdivision plan of plaintiff's property known as the Rockville
Subdivision, situated in Balintawak, Quezon City, plaintiff and defendant entered into
an agreement of sale covering Lots 1, 2 and 9, Block 1, of said property, with an
aggregate area of 1,200 square meters, payable in 120 equal monthly installments at
the rate of P16.00, P15.00 per square meter, respectively. In accordance with said
agreement, defendant paid to plaintiff the sum of P150.00 as deposit and the further
sum of P740.56 to complete the payment of four monthly installments covering the
months of July, August, September, and October, 1954. (Exhs.A and B). When the
document Exhibit "A" was executed on June 25, 1954, the plan covering plaintiff's
property was merely tentative, and the plaintiff referred to the proposed lots
appearing in the tentative plan.
However, aside from the deposit of P150.00 and the amount of P740.56 which
were paid under their previous agreement, defendant failed to make any further
payment on account of the agreed monthly installments for the two lots in dispute,
under the new contract to sell Defendant was likewise requested by the plaintiff to
sign the corresponding contract to sell in accordance with his previous commitment. .
And plaintiff relied on the good faith of defendant to make good his promise because
defendant is a professional and had been rather good to him (plaintiff).
On or about November 3, 1957, in a formal letter, plaintiff demanded upon
defendant to vacate the lots in question and to pay the reasonable rentals thereon at

the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955. (Exh. "B"). Notwithstanding the
receipt of said letter, defendant did not deem it wise nor proper to answer the same.
Both parties are agreed that the period within which to pay the lots in question is ten
years. They however, disagree on the mode of payment. While the appellant claims
that he could pay the purchase price at any time within a period of ten years with a
gradual proportionate discount on the price, the appellee maintains that the appellant
was bound to pay monthly installments.
ISSUE:
(1) There is no writing or document evidencing the agreement originally entered into
between petitioner and private respondent except the receipt showing the initial
deposit of P150.00 and the payment of the 4- months installment made by
respondent corresponding to July, 1954 to October, 1954 in the sum of P740.56.
Neither is there any writing or document evidencing the modified agreement when
the 3 lots were changed to Lots 4 and 12 with a reduced area of 725 sq. meters,
which are corner lots. This absence of a formal deed of conveyance is a very strong
indication that the parties did not intend immediate transfer of ownership and title,
but only a transfer after full payment of the price.
RULING:

After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
The Court renders judgment in favor of plain. plaintiff and against the defendant, as
follows:

(a) Declaring the agreement of sale between plaintiff and defendant involving the lots
in question (Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the approved subdivision plan of the Rockville
Subdivision) rescinded, resolved and cancelled;

(b) Ordering defendant to vacate the said lots and to remove his house therefrom
and also to pay plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60.00 per month
from August, 1955 until he shall have actually vacated the premises; and
(c) Condemning defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees,
as well as the costs of the suit. (Record on Appeal, p. 118)
(d) Declaring the agreement of sale between plaintiff and defendant involving the lots
in question (Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the approved subdivision plan of the Rockville
Subdivision) rescinded, resolved and cancelled;
(e) Ordering defendant to vacate the said lots and to remove his house therefrom
and also to pay plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60.00 per month
from August, 1955 until he shall have actually vacated premises; and
(f) Condemning defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, as
well as the costs of the suit. (Record on Appeal. p. 118)

AYSON-SIMON VS.ADAMOS
131 SCRA 439
Petitioner: Generosa Ayson-Simon
Respondents: Nicolas Adamos and Vicenta Feria

FACTS:
Defendants, Nicolas Adamos and Vicente Feria, purchased two lots forming
part of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City, from Juan Porciuncula. Thereafter, the

successors-in-interest of the latter filed Civil Case No. 174 for annulment of the sale
and the cancellation of TCT No. 69475, which had been issued to defendantsappellants
by
virtue of the disputed sale. The Court rendered a Decision annulling the saleThe said
judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court and had attained finality. Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the case above, defendants sold the said two lots to
Petitioner GenerosaAyson-Simon for Php3,800.00 plus Php800.00 for facilitating the
issuance of the new titles in favor of petitioner. The trial court rendered judgment to
petitioners favor. However, defendants could not deliver the said lots because the
CA had already annulled the sale of the two lots in Civil Case No. 174.

ISSUES:
(1) Can petitioner choose to rescind the contract even after choosing for the specific
performance of the obligation?
(2) Had the option to rescind the contract prescribed?
RULING:
(1) Yes. The rule that the injured party can only choose between fulfillment and
rescission of the obligation, and cannot have both, applies when the obligation is
possible of fulfillment. If, as in this case, the fulfillment has become impossible,
Article 1191 allows the injured party to seek rescission even after he has chosen
fulfillment.

(2) No. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that the injured party may also seek
rescission, if the fulfillment should become impossible. The cause of action to claim
rescission arises when the fulfillment of the obligation became impossible when the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 174 declared the sale of the
land to defendants by Juan Porciuncula a complete nullity and ordered the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69475 issued to them. Since the two
lots sold to plaintiff by defendants form part of the land involved in Civil Case No.
174, it became impossible for defendants to secure and deliver the titles to and the
possession of the lots to plaintiff The action for rescission must be commenced
within four years from that date, May 3, 1967. Since the complaint for rescission was
filed on August 16, 1968, the four year period within which the action must be
commenced had not expired.