2016wesp Ch1 en

and
World Economic
Situation
Prospects
2016
United Nations
World Economic Situation

andProspects 2016
asdf
United Nations
New York, 2016
Chapter I
Global economic outlook

Prospects for the world economy in 20162017
Global growth stumbles
The world economy stumbled in 2015, amid weak aggregate demand, falling commodity
prices and increasing financial market volatility in major economies. The world gross product is projected to grow by a mere 2.4 per cent in 2015 (figure I.1 and table I.1), marking a
downward revision from the 2.8 per cent forecast in the World Economic Situation and Prospects as of mid-2015 (United Nations, 2015a). The growth rates of gross fixed capital formation and aggregate demand continue to remain subdued. The world economy is projected to
grow by 2.9 per cent in 2016 and 3.2 per cent in 2017, supported by generally less restrictive
fiscal and still accommodative monetary stances worldwide. The anticipated timing and
pace of normalization of the United States monetary policy stance is expected to reduce
policy uncertainties, while preventing excessive volatility in exchange rates and asset prices. While the normalization will eventually lead to higher borrowing costs, rising interest
rates should encourage firms to front-load investments in the short run. The improvement
in global growth is also predicated on easing of downward pressures on commodity prices, which should encourage new investments and lift growth, particularly in commoditydependent economies.1
Figure I.1
Growth of world gross product and gross domestic product by country grouping,
20072017
10
Percentage
8
6
4
2
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
-2
-4
-6
Developed economies
Developing economies
Economies in transition
World
-8
1
The key assumptions underlying this outlook are detailed in the appendix to this chapter.
Source: UN/DESA.
Note: Data for 2015 are
estimated; data for 2016 and
2017 are forecast.
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016
Table I.1
Growth of world output, 20132017

Change from WESP
as of mid-2015
2013
2014
2015a
2016b
2017b
2015
2016
World
2.3
2.6
2.4
2.9
3.2
-0.4
-0.2
Developed economies
1.0
1.7
1.9
2.2
2.3
-0.3
0.0
1.5
2.4
2.4
2.6
2.8
-0.4
-0.1
Japan
1.6
-0.1
0.5
1.3
0.6
-0.7
0.3
European Union
0.2
1.4
1.9
2.0
2.2
0.0
-0.1
0.1
1.2
1.8
2.0
2.1
0.0
0.0
1.2
2.7
3.2
3.0
3.2
0.4
-0.2
-0.3
0.9
1.6
1.9
2.0
0.0
0.0
Annual percentage change
United States of America
EU-15
New EU members
Euro area
Other European countries
1.5
2.0
1.2
1.4
2.0
0.7
0.1
2.1
0.9
-2.8
0.8
1.9
-0.8
-0.1
South-Eastern Europe
2.4
0.2
2.1
2.6
3.0
0.7
0.1
Commonwealth of Independent States

andGeorgia
2.0
0.9
-3.0
0.7
1.8
-0.9
-0.2
Russian Federation
Africa
1.3
0.6
-3.8
0.0
1.2
-0.8
-0.1
4.6
4.3
3.8
4.3
4.8
-0.6
-0.5
3.3
3.4
3.7
4.4
4.4
-0.3
-0.4
North Africa
1.1
0.7
3.5
4.1
4.1
0.7
0.1
East Africa
6.9
7.0
6.2
6.8
6.6
-0.4
0.1
Central Africa
0.9
3.7
3.4
4.3
4.2
0.0
0.0
West Africa
5.7
6.1
4.4
5.2
5.3
-1.4
-1.0
Southern Africa
3.1
2.5
2.5
3.0
3.3
-0.4
-0.7
East and South Asia

East Asia
China
6.1
6.1
5.7
5.8
5.8
-0.5
-0.3
6.4
6.1
5.6
5.6
5.6
-0.4
-0.4
7.7
7.3
6.8
6.4
6.5
-0.2
-0.4
4.9
6.4
6.0
6.7
7.0
-0.7
-0.2
6.5
7.2
7.2
7.3
7.5
-0.4
-0.4
Western Asia
2.0
2.6
2.0
2.4
3.0
-1.0
-1.2
Latin America and the Caribbean
2.8
1.0
-0.5
0.7
2.7
-1.0
-1.0
South Asia
India
South America
3.1
0.5
-1.6
-0.1
2.4
-1.2
-1.2
2.5
0.1
-2.8
-0.8
2.3
-1.7
-1.3
Mexico and Central America
1.7
2.5
2.5
2.9
3.4
-0.5
-0.3
Caribbean
3.1
3.3
3.4
3.6
3.3
0.3
-0.1
Least developed countries
5.1
5.6
4.5
5.6
5.6
-0.4
0.0
World tradec
3.1
3.3
2.7
4.0
4.7
-1.1
-0.8
World output growth with

PPP-based weightsd
3.2
3.4
3.0
3.6
3.9
Brazil
Memorandum items
Source: UN/DESA.
aEstimated.
b Forecast, based in part on Project LINK.
c Includes goods and services.
d Based on 2011 benchmark.
Chapter I. Global economic outlook
Since the onset of the global financial crisis, developing countries generated much of
the global output growth (figure I.2). China, in particular, became the locomotive of global
growth, contributing nearly one third of world output growth during 2011-2012. As the
largest trading nation, China sustained the global growth momentum during the post-crisis
period, maintaining strong demand for commodities and boosting export growth in the
rest of the world. With a much anticipated slowdown in China and persistently weak economic performances in other large developing and transition economiesnotably Brazil
and the Russian Federationthe developed economies are expected to contribute more to
global growth in the near term, provided they manage to mitigate deflationary risks and
stimulate investment and aggregate demand. On the other hand, bottoming-out of the
commodity price decline, which will contribute to reducing volatility in capital flows and
exchange rates, will help reduce macroeconomic uncertainties and stimulate growth in a
number of developing and emerging economies, including in the least developed countries
(LDCs) (box I.1). Developing countries are expected to grow by 4.3 per cent and 4.8 per
cent in 2016 and 2017, respectively.
Box I.1
Prospects for the least developed countries

The group of least developed countries (LDCs) is experiencing a modest slowdown of their economies,
with growth rates falling from 5.1 per cent in 2014 to an estimated 4.5 per cent in 2015. Weaker export
demand from emerging economies, lower commodity prices, net capital outflows, and weak investment
growthand, in some cases, military conflicts, natural disasters and adverse weather effects on agricultural outputexerted downward pressure on growth this year. A rebound to 5.6 per cent growth in
both 2016 and 2017 is projected, underpinned by stronger demand from developed economies, growing
domestic demand and stabilizing commodity prices. Lower commodities prices (particularly oil) have reduced the import bills of resource-importing LDCs and contributed to lower inflation, although in some
countries the gains have been partially offset by depreciating exchange rates.
Bangladeshthe largest LDC in terms of both the population and size of gross domestic product
(GDP)is expected to benefit from the recovery in the developed economies, and is projected to grow
by 6.5 per cent in 2016, largely driven by private consumption, investment and additional export demand from Europe and the United States of America. Government spending on power, water and transportation infrastructure projects is expected to increase significantly, supporting growth in the short
term, but likely to result in a larger budget deficit. In Nepal, the economy is expected to see a gradual
recovery in 2016, in part driven by reconstruction efforts after the devastating earthquake of April 2015.
GDP growth is projected to strengthen from an estimated 3.3 per cent in 2015 to 4.6 per cent in 2016,
but will remain below potential, partly reflecting the subpar monsoon, which is likely to result in weak
agricultural output. Meanwhile, Yemen remains mired in a complex military conflict. In 2015, the United
Nations declared the situation in Yemen as a high-level humanitarian emergency, with about 80 per cent
of Yemens population in need of humanitarian aid. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), the
risk of famine in Yemen is now imminent, given that the country already had the highest level of poverty
and malnutrition in Western Asia before the onset of the crisis. As a result of the ongoing conflict, oil and
gas production have been suspended, which partly accounts for the nearly 10 per cent contraction of
real GDP in 2015. Fiscal conditions, which were already challenging before the conflict, are expected to
become unsustainable without external support, as public revenue becomes scarce and expenditures for
repairing damage from the conflict rise.
The decline in commodity prices has had a significant impact on the terms of trade for a number of the LDCs in Africa, given their excessive dependence on commodity exports. Many LDCs remain
highly dependent on the natural resource sector, with commodity exports representing, on average,
16 per cent of their GDP. Commodity exports are also highly concentrated in one or two products. LDCs
that are highly dependent on fuel exports have clearly seen a pronounced decline in their commodity
(continued)
Developed economies are

expected to contribute
more to global growth
Box I.1 (continued)
Figure I.1.1
Commodity exports as a share of GDP and share

of the top commodity group in total commodity exports for the LDCs, 2014a
Percentage
Source: UN/DESA calculations

from UNCOMTRADE and
United Nations
Statistics Division.
a This includes all LDCs
monitored for this report.
Note: See table J in the
Statistical Annex to this
publication for definitions
of country codes.
TUV
BGD
HTI
NPL
COM
AFG
BDI
STP
KIR
VUT
CAF
DJI
SDN
UGA
ERI
KHM
TZA
RWA
ETH
GMB
BTN
SEN
MDG
NER
MLI
GNB
TGO
BFA
BEN
LAO
LBR
MMR
LSO
YEM
GIN
MOZ
MWI
SLB
ZMB
TCD
SLE
MRT
AGO
GNQ
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Share of the top commodity group in total commodity exports

Commodity export as a share of GDP in 2014
(continued)
terms of trade. By contrast, LDCs reliant on exports of agricultural, food and metal products registered
an improvement in their terms of trade, as fuel often constitutes a major import component for these
economies. Both the narrow export base, which often relies on a single commodity, and the high share
of commodity trade in GDP highlight the economic vulnerabilities of LDCs and underscore the need for
appropriate policies and strategies for diversification. Commodity-dependent LDCs are likely to benefit
from diversification strategies that promote higher local value addition through backward and forward
linkages in their resource sectors (see also chap. IV, box IV.3).
Haitithe lone LDC in the Americasis projected to grow by 2.4 per cent in 2015, before accelerating slightly to 2.7 per cent in 2016. The medium-term growth outlook for Haiti is rather low by the
LDC benchmark. While private consumption and export growth are likely to remain resilient, difficulties
regarding government spending and political uncertainties will prevent economic activity from gaining
further momentum. Scaling up infrastructure investments and implementing structural reforms will remain essential to boosting growth in the medium term.
Box I.1 (continued)
Figure I.2
Contribution to global growth, 20072017

5
Percentage
4
3
2
1
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
-1
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Developed economies
Other developing economies
China
-2
-3
Source: UN/DESA.
Inflation remains benign

Average global inflation continues to decline amid persistently subdued economic activity,
modest wage growth and lower commodity prices. In 2015, global consumer price inflation
is projected to fall to 2.6 per cent, the lowest level since 2009, owing to reduced oil and
commodity prices (figure I.3).2 Inflation in developing countries is expected to rise moderately in 2016, mainly driven by higher levels of inflation in transition economies.
Risks of deflation, however, still persist in developed countries, mainly in Japan and
the euro area, and to a lesser degree in the United States, where average inflation hovered
at about 0.2 per cent during the past four quarters. Across a large number of economies,
low quarterly inflation has coincided with higher levels of volatility in quarterly growth in
developed economies (see the section on persistent macroeconomic uncertainties and vola2
Inflation figures in this section exclude the recent sharp increase in the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela; for 2015 and 2016, inflation there is projected to rise above 150 per cent.
Deflation risks linger
Figure I.3
Global consumer price inflation, 2006-2017a

18.0
Percentage
World
Developed economies
16.0
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
Source: UN/DESA.
Figures for 2015 are partly
estimated and figures for 2016
and 2017 are forecast. Figures
exclude inflation figure in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
a
4.0
2.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
tility). This shows that price stabilitywhich is synonymous with low levels of inflationis
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for reducing volatility in real activity or for
stimulating economic growth. While average quarterly inflation fell relative to the pre-crisis
period in almost all major economies, volatilities of both inflation and growth increased in
a majority of the economies (table I.2) amid persistently weak aggregate demand.
Unemployment challenges persist

The employment
gap widens
Long-term unemployment
is on the rise in developed
countries
The moderate pace of global growth, in an environment of weak investment growth, has
failed to create a sufficient number of jobs to close the gap in the employment rate (employment-to-population ratio) that opened up during the global financial crisis. The employment gap is estimated to reach 63.2 million in 2015 (figure I.4). The average rate of job
creation has slowed to about 1.4 per cent per annum since 2011, compared to an average
annual growth rate of about 1.7 per cent rate in pre-crisis years. As a result, unemployment
figures remain high in many regions, even though they have improved in several developed
economies. Globally, the total number of unemployed is estimated to have reached 203
million, increasing by 2 million this year (figure I.5). Youth unemployment accounts for
36 per cent of all unemployed worldwide. Global employment growth is expected to continue at the relatively modest pace during the forecast period. Unemployment rates in most
countries are expected to stabilize or recede only modestly in 2016 and 2017 against the
backdrop of a moderate improvement in investment and growth during the forecast period.
After some improvements in 2014, the growth rate of employment decelerated in
the majority of developed economies during the first half of 2015. Consequently, unemployment in developed economies remains well above the pre-crisis level, despite recent
improvements. In Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Figure I.4
Global employment gap, 19992019

3,500
Total employment, millions of people

2015
63.2 mil
3,400
2019
80.2 mil
3,300
2010
57.0 mil
3,200
3,100
Pre-crisis
3,000
2,900
Upper and lower bound

of the confidence interval
around the
Estimated/
baseline forecast
Forecasted
2,800
Source: International Labour

Organization, Trends Econometric Models (November 2014),
presented at the UN/DESA
Expert Group Meeting on the
World Economy, held from 21-23
October 2015 in New York.
2,700
2,600
2,500
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
Figure I.5
Total unemployment by regions, 20072019

225,000
200,000
Thousands of people
170 mil (5.5%)
Youth 11.7%
201 mil (5.9%)

Youth 13.0%
197 mil (6.1%)

Youth 12.9%
210 mil (5.8%)

Youth 13.1%
201 mil (5.9%)

Youth 13.1%
175,000
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa
Middle East
150,000
125,000
South Asia
100,000
South East Asia and the Pacific
75,000
East Asia
50,000
Central & South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) & CIS
25,000
0
2007
Developed economies and European Union
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
countries, an estimated 44 million workers are unemployed in 2015, about 12 million more
than in 2007. The duration of unemployment has been abnormally long in many developed
economies (United Nations, 2015b), bringing long-term unemployment rates to record
highs, including among youth. In OECD countries, one third of unemployed individuals
were out of work for 12 months or more in the last quarter of 2014, representing a 77.2 per
cent increase in the number of long-term unemployed since the financial crisis.
Source: International Labour

Organization, Trends Econometric Models (November 2014),
presented at the UN/DESA
Expert Group Meeting on the
World Economy, held from 21-23
October 2015 in New York.
Large informal sectors

mask the actual level of
unemployment in many
developing countries
Despite slower employment growth, unemployment figures remained relatively stable

in developing countries in 2014. In a group of large developing economies and economies in
transition,3 employment growth slowed from an average of 1.4 per cent per annum between
1999 and 2007 to 1.0 per cent between 2009 and 2014, reflecting both a slowdown in average GDP growth in these economies and a simultaneous decline in the employment intensity of growth. Demographic factors, changing economic structures, increasing automation
and capital intensity also partly explain the slowdown in employment growth.
The relatively stable unemployment numbers in developing economies are also partially explained by declining labour force participation, particularly among women and
youth. The real transition from employment to unemployment is not always reflected in the
unemployment rate in many developing economies, because of the large informal sector in
these countries. In the developing world as a whole, employment opportunities are estimated to have deteriorated in 2015, given the sharp economic slowdown in several economies.
In developed economies, the pattern of work has been shifting considerably towards
more part-time employment. In the euro area, part-time employment represented 21.9 per
cent of total employment in the second quarter of 2015, a 3.0 percentage point increase
since the beginning of the crisis. The main concern with involuntary part-time employment
is the repercussion on job security, working poverty and low long-term earnings.
In addition to slow employment growth and high unemployment rates, wages and
earnings were also adversely affected by the financial crisis, signalling an overall worsening
of labour market conditions worldwide. In OECD countries, the annual real wage growth
was about 0.5 per cent between 2008 and 2014, significantly slower than the 1.8 per cent
between 2000 and 2007. On the one hand, wage adjustments may have helped to avoid
higher job losses during the financial crisis and facilitated job creation in some countries
more recently. At the same time, wage adjustments, which were predicated on slowing
productivity growth, increased hardship at the household level and weakened aggregate
demand. Increases in part-time and temporary jobs, especially in developed economies, and
a gradual shift from salaried work to self-employment in some developing regions, such as
in Latin America and the Caribbean, have contributed to increasing job insecurity in many
parts of the world.
Employment growth and decent work critical for realizing

the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
The persistent employment gap, unemployment (particularly youth unemployment), growing prevalence of part-time employment, job insecurity, and stagnant real wages will seriously undermine the global efforts for promoting inclusive and sustainable economic
growth, employment and decent work for all, as envisaged in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, General Assembly, 2015a, p. 4).
Headwinds impede global growth

Global growth prospects face considerable headwinds in the near term, amid a macroeconomic environment of falling inflation and weak employment generation. Five major
headwindsboth cyclical and structuralwill continue to shape the near-term outlook of
the global economy as well as its long-term prospects:
3
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.
Persistent macroeconomic uncertainties and volatility;

Low commodity prices and declining trade flows;
Rising volatility in exchange rates and capital flows;
Stagnant investment and diminishing productivity growth;
Continued disconnect between finance and real sector activities.
Persistent macroeconomic uncertainties and volatility

Persistent uncertainty has been a legacy of the global financial crisis that began in the third
quarter of 2008. The policy deliberations in the United States Federal Reserve (Fed), for
example, have repeatedly identified macroeconomic uncertainty as a key factor affecting the
subdued economic performance during the post-crisis period. While lax regulations that
allowed the financial sector to take excessive risks precipitated the financial crisis, persistence of macroeconomic uncertainty continues to adversely affect aggregate demand and
investment in the post-crisis period.
In an economy, households and firms make decisions to consume or invest today
based on the expectation of a future outcome. The change in the probability of a future economic outcomeincome, profit, etc.represents an uncertainty shock. Unlike an income
or productivity shock, an uncertainty shock does not directly affect the level of income or
wealth. It can, however, change the probability distribution of future income, which in turn
can affect economic behaviour and the welfare of households and firms (see Knotek and
Khan, 2011).
Uncertainty shocks persist

A strand of economic research4 generally relies on uncertainty to explain the fluctuations in
real output. This research finds uncertainty to be highly countercyclical, rising during economic downturns and diminishing during financially stable times. Recessions indeed coincide with higher degrees of uncertainty (Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich, 2007). When
uncertainty amplifies, firms and households typically go into a wait and see mode, postponing costly consumption and investment decisions, especially if they are irreversible. The
benefits of waiting and gathering more information about potential risks usually outweigh
the cost of not doing anything when uncertainty is high. This largely explains why business
activities slow down or investments freeze during economic downturns (Bernanke, 1983).
In the short run, uncertainty may increase transaction costs and depress profitability. It may
also induce herding behaviour among firms and depress aggregate investment.
Bloom and others (2012) shows uncertainty shocks typically induce a rapid drop and
rebound in aggregate output, investment and employment, as was observed during 20092010 immediately after the Great Recession. An uncertainty shock also generates a negative
productivity shock, as uncertainty can freeze reallocation of human and financial resources
within and across firms. As such, these shocks are expected to be short-lived. Yet, seven
years since the global financial crisis, uncertainties remain elevated. While the financial
4
Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009), Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007), Bloom (2009), and
Bloom and others (2012) provide results supporting a key role for uncertainty shocks in business
cycle fluctuations.
Persistent uncertainty can

freeze investment and
paralyze growth
10
Volatility proxies for the

level of uncertainty in an
economy
and liquidity shocks have been relatively short-lived, with equity and debt markets reaching
their pre-crisis levels as early as 2010, the uncertainty shock continues to linger.
While there are compelling theoretical arguments that uncertainty can adversely
affect growth, there is no consensus on how to objectively measure uncertainty. The empirical literature primarily uses proxies or indicators of uncertainty, such as the implied or
realized volatility of stock market returns, the cross-sectional dispersion of firm profits or
productivity, or the cross-sectional dispersion of survey-based forecasts.
The persistence of uncertainty in the global economy makes a strong case for revisiting the relationship between uncertainty and output growth in the 20 large developed and
20 large developing countries and economies in transition.5 While the analyses presented
here make no claim of a causal relationship between these variables, they provide important
insights on macroeconomic volatility and the slow pace of global growth, and raise important policy questions that merit further research.
Trends in key real and nominal variables
Both real and nominal

volatilities are higher in the
post-crisis period
Both output growth and inflation have shifted downward since the global financial crisis,
representing the level effects of the crisis. At the same time, volatility of output growth has
increased in developed economies in the aftermath of the crisis.
As table I.2 shows, average growth rates of output, consumption and investment in
the 20 large developed economies registered significant declines during the post-crisis period. The sharpest decline is observed in investment growth rates. Average inflation experienced only a slight decline in the post-crisis period, while inflation volatility experienced a
sharp increase.
Surprisingly, the broad money (M2) growth also declined during the post-crisis period despite the quantitative easing (QE) policies pursued by the central banks in many
developed countries. While QE injected liquidity into the financial system, a significant
Table I.2
Key macroeconomic volatilities before and after the crisis

Developed 20
Developing 20
2002 Q3: 2007 Q4
2010 Q1: 2015 Q2
2002 Q3: 2007 Q4
2010 Q1: 2015 Q2
Output growth
Mean
Volatility
2.8
1.2
1.3
1.5
6.3
2.9
4.3
2.6
Consumption growth
Mean
Volatility
Mean
Volatility
Mean
Volatility
Mean
Volatility
2.6
1.0
4.4
4.3
1.9
0.6
7.9
2.9
1.0
1.4
0.9
4.6
1.6
1.1
3.5
2.7
6.5
2.7
10.9
8.5
6.9
3.3
20.9
7.8
4.1
3.7
5.6
7.3
6.6
2.9
14.4
5.2
Investment growth
Inflation
M2 growth
Source: UN/DESA calculations.

Note: Volatility is measured as standard deviation.
These 40 economies accounted for more than 90 per cent of the global economy in 2014. The availability of quarterly macroeconomic data determined the selection of 20 large developing economies.
11
portion of that additional liquidity actually returned to central banks balance sheets in
the form of excess reserves, which possibly explains why QE has had only limited effects
on boosting aggregate demand or investment rates in many developed countries. Between
January 2000 and August 2008, the excess reserves of banks on the Feds balance sheet
averaged $1.8 billion. The total volume of excess reserves in the Fed reached $1 trillion by
November 2009. As of October 2015, the Fed has excess reserves of $2.6 trillion (figure
I.6), which represents nearly 75 per cent of total assets purchased by the Fed since the onset
of the financial crisis. The ballooning of excess reserves since the crisis demonstrates that
financial institutions generally chose to park their cash with the Fed instead of increasing
lending to the real economy.
Figure I.6
Excess reserves of financial institutions held with the United States Federal Reserve
3000000
Millions of United States dollars
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
Source: Federal Reserve Bank

of St. Louis, Excess Reserves of
Depository Institutions.
2015-10
2015-01
2014-04
2013-07
2012-10
2012-01
2011-04
2010-07
2009-10
2009-01
2008-04
2007-07
2006-10
2006-01
2005-04
2004-07
2003-10
2003-01
2002-04
2001-07
2000-10
2000-01
The financial crisis has had similar level effects on the macroeconomic variables in
20 large developing economies, although effects have been less pronounced (table I.2). For
example, average output growth declined by about 32 per cent in developing countries
during the post-crisis period, relative to the 54 per cent decline in output growth in the
developed countries. Investment growth also declined in developing countries, albeit at
a slower pace. Several factors may explain why developing countries managed to avoid a
sharper adjustment in investment, consumption and output, with one factor being that
the financial crisis originated in the developed countries and has had only indirect effects
through trade and capital flow channels. The relative stability of growth in developing
countries is also attributable to the fact that many of them managed to implement effective
countercyclical fiscal and monetary measures to sustain investment and growth during the
post-crisis period.
The crisis also marks a shift in volatility trends. While volatilities increased in developed economies during the post-crisis period, volatilities in developing countries generally
trended downwards. Historically, developing countries experienced higher levels of volatility in output and inflation, as documented in a number of empirical studies (see Ramey
and Ramey (1995); Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001); Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005)).
12
Developed countries
experienced sharp
increases in volatility
These studies cite the lack of diversification, adverse terms of trade shocks, weak financial
and institutional developments, and exposure to financial shocks as reasons why developing
countries generally experience more output or inflation volatility.
Volatilities sharply increased in developed countries, despite the fact that these
economies are generally more diversified and have more effective institutions. Developed
countries also have more open capital and financial markets, which should have allowed
for international risk sharing and reduced variability in consumption. Social protection
programmes, transfers and unemployment benefitsprevalent in developed countries
should have also ensured relative stability in consumption growth. Yet, during the post-crisis period, developed economies experienced significant increases in consumption volatility,
reacting in a manner contrary to the findings of Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006),
which claim that countries with more open capital accounts and financial liberalizations
experience lower levels of consumption growth volatility. Instead, increased volatility in
the developed countries during the post-crisis period tends to support the view that open
capital markets do not necessarily lead to international risk sharing and that countries with
more liberalized financial and capital markets often experience higher levels of volatility in
growth (see Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2001; Agenor, 2003).
Output volatility and output growth
Volatility negatively affects

output growth
Keynes (1936) first suggested a negative relationship between output variability and average growth, arguing that businesses take into account the fluctuations in economic activity when they estimate the return on their investment. Bernanke (1983) and Ramey
and Ramey (1995), also suggest the existence of a negative relationship between output
volatility and growth. On the other hand, Solow (1956) suggests a positive effect of real uncertainty on output growth, arguing that output uncertainty encourages higher precautionary savings and a higher equilibrium rate of economic growth. Kose, Prasad and Terrones
(2005) conclude that the relationship between growth and volatility depends on the level of
economic development, where the relationship is generally positive in developed economies
and negative in developing economies.
The data show a strong negative correlation between output volatility and output
growth during the post-crisis period in developed and developing and transition economies
(figures I.7 and I.8). The strong negative relationship holds even if outliers are excluded
from the analysis. Growth volatility is affected by volatilities in investment, consumption,
inflation and money supply, given that these variables jointly determine output growth.
Consumption, investment, inflation and their respective uncertainties and volatilities
are endogenous to growth. Yet not all macroeconomic variables are endogenous. Policy
choices, institutions and interventions are typically exogenous in the short run. Effective
fiscal, monetary or exchange-rate policies can help reduce uncertainties and influence the
behaviour of firms and households. Macroeconomic policies, as such, need to be designed
and implemented more effectively to reduce uncertainties and stimulate aggregate demand
and growth of the global economy.
13
Figure I.7
Volatility and growth in developed economies, 2010 Q12015 Q2

4
KOR
POL
Average quarterly growth rate
3
AUS
SWE
CAN
USA
GBR
CHE
DEU
NOR
JPN
y = -1.4773x + 3.4514
R2= 0.4752
AUT
BEL
FRA
NLD
DNK
0.5
1.0
FIN
ESP
1.5
-1
2.0
ITA
2.5
Source: UN/DESA.
of country codes.
Standard deviation for quarterly growth rate
Figure I.8
Volatility and growth in developing economies and economies in

transition, 2010 Q12015 Q2
10
CHN
8
Average quarterly growth rate
MYS
IND
CHK
6
IDN
PER
PHL
COL
4
ISR
ARG
MEX
ZAF
TUR
BRA
THA
-2
RUS
VEN
y = -0.8769x + 6.9601
R2= 0.3909
Standard deviation for quarterly growth rate
UKR
Source: UN/DESA.
of country codes.
14
Low commodity prices and declining trade flows
The value of global trade is

falling, while the volume is
showing some persistence
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, international trade, largely driven by demand from
China, played a critical role in sustaining global output, particularly for developing economies. During 2009-2011, high commodity prices and early signs of recovery sustained the
export income of large emerging and developing economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The downward trends in commodity prices since 2011 and sharp decline in oil prices
since mid-2014 have altered the trade dynamics of many commodity-exporting countries.
While the value of global trade has dropped sharply, trade volumes have recorded only a
moderate deceleration. The decline in commodity prices largely explains the observed divergence in the value and volume of global trade flows. The commodity price declines have
generally deteriorated the terms of trade of commodity exporters (see chap. II, box II.1),
limiting their ability to demand goods and services from the rest of the world. This apparently has had second-order effects on non-commodity-exporting economies, unleashing a
downward spiral in the value of global trade.
Global trade flows have slowed significantly in recent months, with total volumes
of imports and exports projected to grow by only 2.6 per cent in 2015, the lowest rate
since the Great Recession.6 The source of the global slowdown in trade is primarily rooted
in weaker demand from developing economies and a sharp decline in imports demanded
by economies in transition. Global exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) countries started to decline in 2014 and dropped sharply in 2015, as geopolitical
tensions, weaker oil prices and declining remittances (see chap. III) led to large currency
depreciations and erosion of real income in many of these economies. Import demand from
the United States, on the other hand, accelerated, supported by the strong appreciation of
the dollar since mid-2014 and relatively solid economic growth. Imports by the European
Union (EU) economies have also strengthened and the EU demand is now a key impetus
to the growth in world trade. On the other hand, sluggish growth, a weak yen and the slowdown in Japans key trading partners in East Asia, particularly China, has had a dampening
effect on global trade growth (figure I.9) (see chap. II for more details on trade flows).
As growth in China moderates, import growth has slowed sharply from the doubledigit rates recorded for most of the last two decades. Total East Asia imports grew by an
estimated 0.9 per cent in 2015, after just 3.3 per cent growth in 2014. The anticipated slowdown of the Chinese economy will have significant adverse effects on the growth prospects
of many economies. A larger-than-expected slowdown in China would have further adverse
effects on global trade, reducing aggregate demand and slashing global growth.
Commodity prices have registered sharp declines

The oil price has plummeted by more than 55 per cent since mid-2014, bringing down the
price of oil to levels that prevailed a decade ago. Non-oil commodity prices have continued
on the downward trend initiated in 2011, with a particularly sharp drop in metals prices
during 2015. The UNCTAD nominal price index of minerals, ores and metals (figure I.10)
dropped 13.3 per cent in the first 9 months of 2015, and the food price index dropped by
12.2 per cent. This has led to a substantial shift in terms of trade and a sharp deterioration
of GDP growth in commodity-dependent economies.
6
See table A.16 for detailed trade figures and projections by region.
15
Figure I.9
Regional contributions to world import growtha

6
5
4
Percentage points
North America
Other developed
East Asia
Africa
European Union
West Asia
South Asia
3
2
1
0
Ave 2009-2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
-1
Source: UN/DESA, based on

United Nations Statistics Division
National Accounts Main Aggregates Database.
a 2015-2017 are forecasts.
Figure I.10
Price indices of selected groups of commodities, August 2013September 2015

110
Index, August 2013 = 100
100
90
80
70
60
50
Aggregate commodity price index

Agricultural raw materials
Brent crude
All food
Minerals, ores and metals
Source: UNCTADstat.
40
Aug-2013 Nov-2013 Feb-2014 May-2014 Aug-2014 Nov-2014 Feb-2015 May-2015 Aug-2015 Sep-2015
The low level of oil and non-oil primary commodity prices is projected to remain
stable and extend into 2016 before seeing modest recovery for some commodities, as downward pressures recede in the later part of the forecast period (see the appendix to this chapter for the oil price assumptions underlying this forecast). The global oil market continues
to remain oversupplied and demand growth is not expected to accelerate in 2016, in line
with the overall weak global economic conditions, especially in China and other emerging
economies that have been the main oil and metal demand drivers for the past decade.
Commodity prices are

expected to remain
subdued in the near term
16
In the outlook period, world trade is expected to grow by 4.0 per cent and 4.7 per cent
in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Weak commodity prices, increased exchange-rate volatility
and the slowdown in many emerging economies, including China, will continue to exert
some downward pressures on trade flows, but stronger demand in the United States and
Europe will offset the downward pressures and contribute to reviving global trade growth.
Rising volatility in exchange rates and capital flows

Large swings in exchange rates
Against the backdrop of falling commodity prices, increased capital outflows from developing countries and diverging monetary policies, exchange-rate volatilities have become more
pronounced. Global exchange-rate volatility has risen considerably since mid-2014, while
many emerging-market currencies have plunged amid significant capital outflows. The
downward pressure on emerging-market currencies partly reflects deteriorating market expectations about these economies amid expectations of a rise in United States interest rates. As
illustrated in figure I.11, the weakness of emerging-market currencies against the dollar
(and other developed-market currencies) has been broad-based, but the size of the depreciations has varied substantially. The Brazilian real and the Russian rouble have recorded
the largest losses, and both countries remain mired in severe economic downturns, accompanied by elevated inflation. The sharp declines of emerging-market currencies against the
dollar have contributed to concerns over the high level of dollar-denominated debt of many
non-financial corporations in emerging markets. In the case of a sudden currency depreciation or increase in interest rates, deleveraging pressures are likely to rise along with risks of
corporate defaults in these economies (see chap. III).
Figure I.11
Exchange rates of selected emerging-market currencies vis--vis

the United States dollar, 1 September 201423 November 2015
110
Index, 1 September 2014 = 100
100
90
80
70
60
50
Source: UN/DESA, based on data
from JPMorgan.
40
Sep-2014
Nov-2014
Jan-2015
Brazilian real
Russian rouble
Turkish lira
Indian rupee
Malaysian ringgit
South African rand
Mar-2015
May-2015
Jul-2015
Sep-2015
Nov-2015
17
Between July 2014 and March 2015, the dollar index, which measures the value of
the dollar against a basket of six major currencies, gained about 25 per cent. The Feds decisions in June and September to delay its first rate hike has, at least temporarily, reduced the
upward pressure on the dollar. However, a further widening of the policy gap between the
Fed and other central banks, notably the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of
Japan, is expected to lead to a renewed strengthening of the dollar in 2016 (see the appendix
to this chapter for the key exchange rate assumptions underlying this forecast).
In line with the large movements in nominal exchange rates, real effective exchange
rates (REER) have changed significantly over the past year. The Peoples Bank of China
in August adjusted the mechanism for setting the renminbis daily reference ratea move
that resulted in a 3 per cent depreciation of the renminbi against the dollar. Despite this
decline, the renminbi is still about 10 per cent stronger in real effective terms than it was in
September 2014. On the other hand, the euro and the yen have depreciated by about 6 per
cent, while the currencies of Brazil, Colombia and the Russian Federation have fallen by
about 25 per cent in real effective terms.
These REER adjustments have been accompanied by rising exchange-rate volatility.
Figure I.12 shows a measure of REER volatility for two groups of countries: 36 developed
economies and 24 developing economies and economies in transition. Average exchangerate volatility has increased significantly since mid-2014, in particular for the group of
developing countries and economies in transition. While volatility is still much lower than
during the global financial crisis and the emerging market crises of 1997-1998, it is relatively high for a non-crisis period.
A key question, and related policy challenge, is how the large movements in real
exchange rates will impact international trade and capital flows during the forecast period.
A number of recent studies (including Ahmed, Appendino and Ruta (2015) and Ollivaud,
Rusticelli and Schwellnus (2015)) suggest that the rising importance of global value chains
The dollar remains strong

amid global weaknesses
Developing-country
exchange rates are
experiencing both
downward pressures and
increasing volatility
Exchange-rate volatilities
coincide with large swings
in capital flows
Figure I.12
Real effective exchange-rate volatility, January 1996September 2015

5
Developed economies
Developing economies and economies in transition
4
0
Jan-1996 Jan-1998 Jan-2000 Jan-2002 Jan-2004 Jan-2006 Jan-2008 Jan-2010 Jan-2012 Jan-2014

from the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS).
Note: The figure is based
on monthly BIS data for real
effective exchange rates for
a total of 60 economies. The
volatility is calculated as the
standard deviation over a rolling
12-month period of the first
difference of the logarithms of
the monthly exchange rate. The
resulting standard deviations
are weighted by the respective
countrys 2012 share in global
trade (exports + imports).
18
has dampened the relationship between real exchange-rate movements and trade flows. A
new International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2015a) analysis, however, suggests that exchangerate movements still tend to have strong effects on real trade volumes. This is expected to
lead to a significant redistribution of real net exports from the United States to Japan and
the euro area. At the same time, it provides a silver lining for some of the hard-hit emerging
economies, as their exports are likely to receive a boost from depreciating emerging-market
exchange rates.
Capital inflows to emerging economies decline sharply
Capital inflows to
developing countries
experienced a sharp decline
Capital outflows may

further impede investment
and growth in developing
economies
Sharp adjustments in commodity pricesand commensurate swings in exchanges rates, as

discussed in the previous sectionhave led to reduced capital flows to developing countries.
The prospect of an imminent increase in the United States policy rate has also affected the
volume and direction of capital flows, particularly to large developing economies. Changes
in the relative rates of return, heightened risk aversion, deteriorating economic prospects
(especially in commodity-exporting economies), and associated sharp realignments of exchange rates leave many developing economies and economies in transition vulnerable to
a sudden stop, and reversal, of capital inflows, which may adversely affect their balance of
payment and put further downward pressures on their exchange rates.
Capital inflows to developing countries have already slowed noticeably, as domestic
vulnerabilities and the effects of lower commodity prices have impacted their medium-term
investment and growth prospects. In 2015, net capital inflows to emerging economies are
projected to be negative for the first time since 2008. The current retrenchment in net capital flows to emerging markets is far more severe than that experienced during the financial
crisis, with net capital outflows expected to reach about $700 billion in 2015. While at the
global level the bulk of the absolute deterioration in net capital flows can be attributed to
China and the Russian Federation, the phenomenon is far more pervasive when considered
relative to the size of individual economies. The decline in net capital inflows since 2013 has
been associated with significant currency depreciations across a large number of economies,
including Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. Several countries
have also experienced sharp declines in equity prices and international reserves.
During the third quarter of 2015, portfolio outflows reached a record of $40 billion,
the largest withdrawal since 2008. Corporate debt in emerging economies has increased
more than four times faster than GDP growth over the last decade (Institute for International Finance, 2015), with much of the new debt denominated in United States dollars
(World Bank, 2015a). Given the appreciation of the dollar, this will increase the debt-servicing burden for many large firms. Deleveraging and a sharp reversal of bond flows remain
a risk, particularly for economies where capital inflows have been driven by global liquidity
rather than by economic fundamentals (Ayala, Nedeljkovic and Saborowski, 2015). Meanwhile, cross-border lending to emerging economies, which remains highly volatile, has also
shown signs of weakness. In the second quarter of 2015, cross-border lending posted an
annual decline for the first time since 2012 (Bank for International Settlements, 2015),
reflecting growing weaknesses in emerging economies in Asia and Latin America.
The risks of more pronounced capital outflows from developing economies and
economies in transition are substantial. In the short term, portfolio liquidity could dry
up and financing costs might rise abruptly in response to the anticipated interest rate rises
of the Fed, putting pressure on exchange rates, equity prices and international reserves.
19
Such a scenario would exacerbate the difficulties that many economies face in reinvigorating investment, as volatile capital flows tend to amplify financial and real business cycles
(Claessens and Ghosh, 2013). In the medium term, the adjustment in emerging economies
to the new global conditions, including lower financial market liquidity and commodity
prices and higher levels of risk aversion, will pose new challenges for monetary, fiscal and
exchange-rate policies.
Stagnant investment and diminishing

productivity growth
The global financial crisis has had the most pronounced negative effect on investment rates.
Notwithstanding the debates as to whether the lack of aggregate demand or the absence of
structural reforms and improved business environment inhibit new investments, it remains
clear that global investment rates have sharply declined since the onset of the financial crisis
(figures I.13a and I.13b). After an early recovery in 2010-2011, the growth rates of fixed
capital formation have sharply slowed down since 2012, exerting downward pressure on
productivity, employment and growth. The growth rates of fixed capital formation nearly
collapsed since 2014, registering negative quarterly growth in as many as 9 large developed and developing countries and economies in transition. Only a few economies, notably
Finland, France, and Greece, saw acceleration in investment rates between 2014 Q1 and
2015 Q2.
Investment in productive capital has been even weaker than the total investment
figures suggest, as dwelling and intangible assets account for the majority of investment in
developed economies. According to OECD data on fixed capital formation, investments in
intangible and intellectual property assets together represent the largest share of fixed capital formation in a number of developed economies in 2014, including in Germany (47.2 per
cent) and the United States (42.3 per cent). Acquisition of intangible assets, such as trademarks, copyrights and patents, may increase financial returns to firms without necessarily
increasing labour productivity or productive capacity. Fixed capital formation is, however,
likely to witness a moderate increase during the forecast period, supported by less restrictive
fiscal positions, an accommodative monetary policy stance and also by reduced macroeconomic uncertainty and stabilization of commodity prices. Low (but stable and predictable)
commodity prices are likely to attract new investments in the sector.
Diminishing productivity growth

Alongside declines in investment rates, productivity growth has also slowed down significantly in recent years across a large set of economies (table I.3). During the pre-crisis period,
the United States and the euro area countries registered healthy growth in labour productivity, averaging 1.5-2.0 per cent per year. Productivity growth has also slowed down in
developing economies, which underscores the need for improving infrastructure, investing in human capital and implementing structural reforms (i.e., improving corporate
governance, the business environment and competitiveness). In addition, decent work, job
security and employment benefits can also contribute to boosting productivity growth in
developing countries.
Investment growth
nearly collapsed in both
developed and developing
economies during the postcrisis period
and investment in
productive capacities has
been even weaker
20
Figure I.13a
Developed countries fixed investment growth: before and after the crisis
Average year-on-year growth rate
Source: UN/DESA.
Greece
Finland
Denmark
Austria
Norway
Belgium
Poland
Sweden
Switzerland
Netherlands
Hungary
Spain
Australia
Canada
Italy
United Kingdom
France
Germany
Japan
United States
2014 Q1 - 2015 Q2
2010 Q1 - 2015 Q2
2002 Q3 - 2007 Q4
-15
-10
-5
10
Figure I.13b
Selected other countries fixed investment growth: before and after the crisis
Average year-on-year growth rate
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Turkey
Thailand
South Africa
Russian Federation
Romania
Philippines
Peru
Mexico
Malaysia
Israel
Indonesia
India
Korea (Republic of)
Colombia
China
2014 Q1 - 2015 Q2
Chile
2010 Q1 - 2015 Q2
Brazil
2002 Q3 - 2007 Q4
Argentina
Source: UN/DESA.
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
10
15
20
25
21
Table I.3
Growth of labour productivity, before and after the crisis

Average percentage change per year
France
Germany
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
China
India
Russian Federation
South Africa
20012007
20092014
1.5
1.3
1.6
2.2
2.0
9.5
4.4
5.4
3.1
0.9
1.2
1.2
0.3
0.9
7.4
7.0
2.0
1.5
A composite growth accounting for 128 economies (representing over 95 per cent
of the world economy) shows that the combined contribution of labour quality, labour
quantity and total factor productivity to total global growth declined from 52.5 per cent
during the period 2002-2007 to 16.8 per cent during 2009-2014, marking a commensurate
sharp increase in capital intensity of growth (figure I.14a). In 26 developed economies, the
contribution of these three factors declined from 44.9 per cent to 10.8 per cent, with the
quantity of labour contributing negatively (-9.2 per cent) to output growth in these economies during the post-crisis period (figure I.14b).
While investment growth remained stagnant or fell in many economies, the contribution of capital to total growth increased worldwide during the post-crisis period, which presents a growth accounting puzzle. In a growth accounting framework, the contribution of
capital to total output includes capital services rendered by existing capital stocksin the
form of depreciation and depletionand also new capital investments. With both labour
inputs and investment growth falling since the global financial crisis, capital services from
existing capital stock accounted for most of the growth during the post-crisis period.
The slowdown in productivity growth is closely linked to the near collapse in investment rates. However, Gordon (2012) argues that the productivity slowdown is inevitable,
given that new innovations have been less effective in generating large-scale productivity growth compared to innovations in earlier generations. According to Gordon (ibid.),
demography, education, inequality, globalization, energy and environment, and the overhang of consumer and government debt will put downward pressure on productivity
growth in developed economies. On the other hand, Bloom and others (2012) argue that
increased uncertainty also reduces productivity growth because it reduces the degree and
pace of reallocation in the economy, which is usually one of the key drivers of productivity
growth.7 However, Bloom and others (ibid.) caution that the productivity slowdown did
not cause the recession. Instead, it was a by-product of the Great Recession.
Reversing the trends in productivity growth will be critical for putting the world
economy on a trajectory of sustained, inclusive and sustainable growth, as envisaged in the
7
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2000; 2006) show that reallocation, mainly entry and exit of firms,
accounts for about 50 per cent of manufacturing and 80 per cent of retail productivity growth in the
United States.

data from OECD and Asian
Productivity Organization.
Note: Measured as real GDP per
hour worked.
Labour productivity growth

has been stunted in recent
years
22
Figure I.14a
Growth accounting at the global level, 20092014 and 20022007

Percentage point
0.14
(4.1%)
0.26
(7.9%)
0.63
(18.6%)
2.18
(64.6%)
3.37
(100%)
2009-2014
the productivity data from the
Conference Board Total
Economy Database.
Note: The composite
contribution to world
output is weighted by each
countrys share of GDP in the
world economy. The data in
parenthesis show the absolute
contribution (%) to global
growth during the period.
0.16
(4.8%)
0.20
(4%)
0.57
(11.7%)
0.66
(13.6%)
1.64
(33.9%)
Labour quality
Labour quantity
ICT
Non-ICT
TFP
1.78
(36.7%)
4.84
(100%)
2002-2007
Figure I.14b
Growth accounting for developed economies, 20092014 and 20022007

Percentage point
0.36
0.32
-0.07
0.14
(-9.2%) (19.1%) (47.3%) (41.9%)
0.01
(0.8%)
Labour quality
Labour quantity
ICT
Non-ICT
TFP
2009-2014
the productivity data from the
Conference Board Total Economy
Database.
Note: The composite
contribution to output is
weighted by each countrys
share of GDP. The data in
parenthesis show the absolute
contribution (%) to growth
during the period.
0.22
(9.4%)
2002-2007
0.39
(16.8%)
0.42
(18.0%)
0.66
(28.1%)
0.65
(27.7%)
2.33
(100%)
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This will require extensive policy efforts and
coordination among fiscal, monetary and development policies to increase investments in
physical infrastructure and human capital. This will also require alignment of policies and
effective regulations to ensure that the financial sector facilitates and stimulates long-term
and productive investment. There also needs to be greater international policy coordination
and support to facilitate transfer and exchange of technologies, which can also help stimulate productivity growth.
23
Continued disconnect between finance

and real sector activities
A growing disconnect between finance and real sector activities is evident in the data: fixed
investment growth nearly collapsed (figures I.13a and I.13b), while debt securities (a financial instrument to raise capital) issued by non-financial corporations increased by more
than 55 per cent between 2008 and 2014, representing a nearly 8 per cent increase per year
(table I.4). One plausible explanation is the weak aggregate demand in developed economies, which has discouraged new investment. Policy uncertainties and the risk of deflation
also partly explain the collapse in investment. On the other hand, the structural transformation of economies, with most of the growth coming from the service sector, provides
another explanation. Service sectors typically require less capital inputs to produce outputs.
Frey (2015), for example, has argued that digital technologies are much less capital-absorbing, creating little new investment demand relative to other revolutionary technologies. But
there has been little or no structural transformation in the developed economies since the
financial crisis to support this argument. The share of service sectors, including ICT sectors,
has remained reasonably constant during the post-crisis period. Summers (2014) blames
low real interest rates for the growing disconnect between finance and real sector activities, which, according to him, encourages excessive risk-taking by the financial sector and
greater reliance on Ponzi finance and increased financial instability (ibid., p. 69). While
the low real interest rates since the financial crisis partly explain the rapid build-up of the
stock of financial assetsincluding the build-up of debt-securities and equity pricesit
does not explain why this did not lead to investment booms in the developed countries.
The total stock of financial assets worldwide is estimated at $256 trillion at the end
of 2014 (figure I.15), increasing from $184 trillion at the end of 2008. Total financial assets
in the worldmeasured in terms of all debt securities outstanding, equities and the stock
of bank creditexceeded the pre-crisis level as early as 2010. Given the rapid build-up of
financial assets and the decoupling of finance and real sector activities, the world economy
again faces the risk of rapid financial deleveraging, as observed at the onset of the financial
crisis between the second and fourth quarters of 2008. In G7 economies, the financial
sector deleveraging of securities averaged 6.1 per cent of GDP during those periods (figure
I.16). In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, total deleveraging
was as high as 18.3 per cent of GDP in 2008. The data also show a strong correlation
between financial sector deleveraging and GDP contraction during the last two quarters of
2008. During the years leading up to the crisis, the financial sectors rapidly increased their
Financial sector recovery

has been swift and has
outpaced real sector
recovery
Table I.4
Global debt securities outstanding

Billions of United States dollars
Total debt securities

issued by:
Financial corporations
Non-financial corporations
General government
of which:
International debt securities
2002 Q4
2008 Q4
2014 Q4
42,426
76,532
92,867
19,664
5,585
17,001
38,998
7,226
29,950
36,629
11,211
44,743
7,374
17,648
19,763
Source: UN/DESA, based on the

BIS debt securities data.
Note: The different types of
securities do not add up to the
total because of some over-laps of
securities issued by financial and
non-financial corporations.
24
Deleveraging pressure is on
the rise
leverages to finance activities, including the risky activities by non-bank financial sectors
(shadow banks). With the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, many financial
firms were forced to rapidly deleverage as their equity prices collapsed and debt-to-equity
ratios skyrocketed. Preliminary UN/DESA estimates suggest that 1 per cent deleveraging
is associated with a 0.1 per cent contraction in GDP growth in 16 developed economies,
while controlling for changes in credit flows and market capitalization (figure I.17). On the
other hand, the correlation between the net change in market capitalization and the net
contraction in GDP is very weak, controlling for net changes in leverage and credit stock.
One possible explanation is that the fall in market capitalization affects GDP only through
indirect channelsmostly wealth effectsand those, too, with a lag.
A similar deleveraging pressure may riseparticularly in developing countries
with increases in the United States policy rates, which may increase the debt-servicing
cost and the counter-party risks of borrowing firms. A sudden and disorderly adjustment
in equity prices could increase the debt to equity ratio of highly leveraged firms and force
them to reduce their debt level to avoid defaults. The deleveraging may increase financial
market volatility and have significant negative wealth effects on households and corporations, reducing investment and aggregate demand and possibly pushing the world economy
towards an even weaker growth trajectory than currently anticipated.
Figure I.15
The stock of financial assets, 20022013

300,000
250,000
Total debt securities outstanding

Total market capitalization (equity)
Total stock of bank credit
200,000
150,000
100,000
estimates, using the BIS data on
debt securities, World Federation
of Exchanges data on market
capitalization and the Bankscope
data on the stock of bank credit.
50,000
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Economic growth, poverty and carbon emission

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development underscores the imperative of achieving
inclusive and sustainable economic growth. On the one hand, this will require a recoupling
of growth and poverty reduction, and on the other, a decoupling of growth and emission
25
Figure I.16
Financial sector deleveraging, 2008 Q22008 Q4

6%
Percentage of total outstanding debt securities of the financial sector

Canada
Germany
France
Italy
4%
2%
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
4.4%
0%
-0.7%
-1.2%
-2%
-0.8%
-4%
-5.4%
-6%
-5.3%
-8%
-10%
-10.6%
-12%
Figure I.17
Financial sector deleveraging of securities and net contraction in GDP growth,

2008 Q22008 Q4
Percentage point change in annualized GDP growth
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
0.00 0.0
-0.1
0.1
0.2
GRC
-2
ESP
EA4
SGP
CAN
GBR
DEU
ITA
-6
DNK
AUT
FIN
IRL
y = 0.1006x - 0.0663
R = 0.2424
-4
-8
CHN
JPN
-10
USA
-12
SWE
0.3
-14
-16
Financial sector deleveraging (as a percentage of total debt securities)

Notes: EA4 refers to Belgium,
France, the Netherlands
and Portugal. See table J in the
of country codes.
26
levels to ensure that economic growth is sufficiently inclusive and sustainable. Given the
imperative of sustainable development, the following section presents an analysis of the
recent trends in growth, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability.
Growth and poverty reduction
Reduction in inequality
can have lasting, positive
effects on poverty
reduction
According to the Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 (United Nations, 2015c), the
proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries declined by 50 per
cent between 1999 and 2011. Nonetheless, one in five people in developing regions still live
below the international poverty line of $1.90 a day and the improvements have been unevenly spread across regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, extreme poverty declined
by just 21 per cent, while in East Asia it declined by 82 per cent. In order to progress further
with the goal of poverty reduction, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide a
number of targets to support economic growth including economic diversification, technological upgrades and innovation, development of high value added and labour-intensive
sectors; while targets to reduce economic inequality include implementing social protection
systems and achieving gender equality and equal pay for work of equal value. Both stronger
growth and redistribution may be addressed by such targets as broadening access to finance
and economic resources, achieving universal health care, ensuring inclusive and equitable
education and building resilient infrastructures.8
The relationships between growth, poverty and inequality are complex, as highlighted
by Kanbur (2004). One generally finds a negative correlation between growth in per capita income and poverty. A decline in inequality is also generally associated with declining
rates of poverty. These relationships follow from the interlinkages between poverty, average
income and income distribution, as shown by Bourguignon (2003). This relationship also
shows that the pace of poverty reduction is related to prevailing levels of economic development and relative income inequality. The percentage decline in the poverty headcount
ratio associated with a rise in income will accelerate as average income in the economy rises,
while reduction in inequality can also permanently accelerate the speed of poverty reduction (ibid.), allowing a virtuous circle to develop, provided both targets can be achieved
simultaneously. However, the relationship between income growth and inequality is much
less straightforward. Growth in GDP per capita can only necessarily reduce poverty if it
does not at the same time increase inequality; the data on this relationship show considerable variation and the academic literature is inconclusive.
Figure I.18 illustrates the relationship between income growth and the poverty headcount ratio for a sample of 90 developing economies and economies in transition. On average, a 1.0 per cent rise in GDP per capita is associated with a 1.5 per cent decline in the
poverty headcount ratio in this sample. This relationship is often referred to as the income
elasticity of poverty and is broadly in line with elasticity estimates from other studies.
While different rates of GDP growth per capita can clearly explain some of the observed
heterogeneity in poverty reduction across countries, the observed correlation is relatively
loose, reflecting differences in the levels of development, the level of income inequality,
and the change in income inequality over the sample period. The relationship between the
income elasticity of poverty and the level of development, measured as the distance between
the poverty line and average income, is intuitively straightforward. Where the poverty gap
8
See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics.
27
is high, for a given path of economic growth the decline in poverty in percentage terms will
be smaller than in countries with a lower incidence of extreme poverty. In the figure, it is
clear that the majority of low-income countries have seen relatively slower rates of poverty
reduction, while upper-middle-income countries have generally seen faster rates. Fragile
and conflict-affected countries are particularly vulnerable to high poverty rates, with little
prospect for either economic growth or income redistribution. For example, Burundi falls
within the quadrant of low growth and slow poverty reduction in figure I.18 reflecting the
fact that the sample period falls within the period of the Burundian Civil War.
The income elasticity of poverty has been strong in many Latin American economies.
While these countries had relatively lower levels of extreme poverty at the onset compared
to the low-income countries in the sample, the implementation of more redistributive policies has also been a crucial factor that allowed poverty to recede rapidly. Redistributive policies or other fiscal or employment policies that prevent inequalities from rising can, thus,
significantly accelerate poverty reduction for a given rate of economic growth.
The sectoral composition of production also has implications for income distribution
and the evolution of relative income inequality, and, consequently, poverty. When economic growth is led by sectors that are labour intensive, such as agriculture, construction
and manufacturing, the impact of GDP growth on poverty reduction tends to be stronger
(Loayza and Raddatz, 2006). This reflects the impact on income distribution: a closer relationship between production and employment growth in these sectors allows more inclusive growth, with greater potential to create jobs and support wages of the lowest-income
groups. Labour-intensive growth has been an important factor behind declining inequality
Redistribution can
positively affect both
growth and poverty
reduction
Figure I.18
Poverty headcount ratio (average annual percentage change)
Relationship between poverty headcount ratio and income growth

Low growth, slow
poverty reduction
10
5
High growth, slow

poverty reduction
Upper-middleincome
countries
VEN
Lower-middleincome
countries
AGO
BDI
-5
TZA
Low-income
countries
SLV
MEX
-10
Fuel exporting
countries
ECU
PRY
-15
-20
Full sample
trend
BTN
VNM
Low growth,
rapid poverty
reduction
-25
-30
-2
High growth,
rapid poverty
reduction
2
10
GDP per capita (average annual percentage change)
12
Source: UN/DESA based on

National Accounts, United
Nations population statistics,
World Bank Poverty and Equity
Database.
Note: The sample includes 90
developing economies and economies in transition. High-income
countries are excluded. Time
periods differ across countries
owing to data available, but
extend 5-15 years to the most
recent available observation.
Axes cross at the mean growth
rates for each series, so that the
quadrants include observations
above or below these means.
See table J in the
of country codes.
28
Growth slowdown will

impede global poverty
reduction efforts
in several economies located in East and South Asia. In Viet Nam, for example, agriculture,
construction and manufacturing sectors together accounted for nearly 50 per cent of production in 2000. This, together with important progress in providing universal education,
may help to explain the impressive decline in extreme poverty in Vietnam over the last 15
years. Conversely, resource-rich economies that have a dominant energy or mining sector,
which are highly capital intensive, tend to have a weaker relationship between GDP growth
and poverty reduction (Christiaensen, Chuhan-Pole and Sanoh, 2013). While per capita
GDP growth in resource-rich countries in Africa was measurably higher than in resourcepoor countries in the past decade, poverty reduction registered a faster pace largely because
of higher employment intensity of growth in the resource-poor economies.
Looking forward, the broad slowdown in economic growth in many developing economies can be expected to restrain progress in poverty reduction in the near term. Poverty
rates remain high in many parts of the world, most notably in sub-Saharan Africa, where
in many countries more than 50 per cent of the population still lives below the poverty
line of $1.90 per day. While GDP growth per capita is expected to hold up moderately well
in this region, achieving the SDG target of achieving at least 7 per cent GDP growth per
annum in the LDCs is most likely unattainable in the near term. Recent experiences with
poverty reduction show that strong economic growth in itself is not sufficient to maintain
and accelerate the momentum of poverty alleviation, but must be accompanied by some
form of redistribution. Policies aimed at reducing inequality, such as investment in education, health and infrastructure, and building stronger social safety nets, can play a crucial
role. The promotion of labour-intensive industries can also be an effective policy for poverty
reduction, so long as this is not achieved at the expense of productivity growth, which is
essential for real wage growth and decent work as envisaged in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Growth and environmental sustainability

Global energy-related carbon emissions experienced no growth in 2014 for the first time
since 1990 (except for 2009, when the global economy contracted, and 1992, the year after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union (figure I.19a)).9 The latest evidence shows signs that the
world might start to see some delinking between economic growth and carbon emissions.
While still accounting for only about 13 per cent of the worlds total energy consumption,
low-carbon energy sources accounted for over 50 per cent of the new energy consumption
in 2014the first time in 20 years.10
As an example, China saw a net decline of 1.5 per cent in its carbon emissions in 2014.
It follows a decade of continuous improvement in carbon intensity (i.e., carbon emissions per
unit of GDP) and reflects the gradual shift in energy structure from a heavy reliance on fossil
fuel, particularly coal, to renewable energy sources. The expected continuing expansion of
the service sector and the declining growth of investment (particularly in heavy industries)
in the context of structural transformation should further weaken the link between economic growth and carbon emissions. Despite the stall of global carbon emission growth in 2014,
it is not certain that the stabilization trend continued into 2015 and the rest of the forecast
9
Unless otherwise specified, carbon emissions in this section refer to energy-related carbon emissions.
See International Energy Agency (2015).
10
Low-carbon energy sources include hydro, wind, geothermal, solar, non-traditional biomass and nuclear. See BP Global (2015).
29
period. Some of the weather factors that contributed to the 2014 emissions decline in certain
regions might weaken. China, for example, experienced significant growth in hydropower
generation in 2014 largely due to above-trend rainfall; also, its carbon emissions level is not
expected to peak until between 2020s and early 2030s.11 Additionally, low oil prices will
hamper emissions mitigation efforts should the oil prices remain subdued.
In 2014, renewable energy investment reversed its two-year downward trend and
reached $270.2 billion, up 17 per cent from 2013 levels (United Nations Environment
Programme, 2015). It reflects strong policy support and a growing realization among institutional investors that renewable energy is a stable and relatively low-risk investment. The
rise in renewable energy investment in 2014 contrasts the sharp slowdown of overall fixed
investment growth since 2012. Considering the significant decline in capital cost in renewable energy sources over the past several yearswind and solar in particularthe investment increase is even more impressive, as each dollar of investment is translated into more
renewable power capacity than previous years. At the global level, it is estimated that about
103 gigawatts (GW) of renewable power capacity (excluding large hydro) was installed in
2014. Wind and solar photovoltaics alone accounted for 95 GW of newly installed capacity in 2014, surpassing the total renewable power capacity of 86 GW installed in 2013.
It is estimated that renewable energy accounted for 48 per cent of the net power capacity
installed in 2014 and its share of total global electricity generation reached 9.1 per cent, up
from 8.5 per cent in 2013. Developing countries witnessed $131 billion of renewable energy
investment in 2014 and have been quickly catching up with the developed countries, which
saw a total investment of $139 billion in the same year (figure I.19b). Among all economies,
China led renewable energy investment with $83.3 billion in 2014.
Despite the low oil prices, renewable energy investments remained strong in the first
three quarters of 2015, at roughly an equal level as the same period in 2014. A possible
explanation is that oil and renewable energy are largely used for different purposes: the
former is mainly used in the transportation sector, whereas the latter for electricity generation. At the global level, only about 4 per cent of electricity is generated from oil. However,
since gas and oil prices are linked in many markets and gas is more commonly used for
generating electricity, the impact of low oil prices on renewable energy investment could
start to pass through, should oil prices remain low. Even in that case, oil prices would need
to plunge considerably further to have a strong impact. It is estimated that the outlook of
mature renewable energy sources such as wind and solar would be only significantly affected if the oil prices drop to about $20-30 per barrel (Goossens, 2015).12
The latest available cross-country data in 2012 show an inverted U-shaped relationship
between per capita GDP and per capita carbon emission (figure I.19c). Rather than implying countries will automatically witness a fall in per capita emissions after reaching certain
income levels,13 it reflects the combined effects of the various factors in determining emissions
trajectory. These factors include the changes in energy prices and energy structure, economic
11
As part of its intended nationally determined contribution communicated to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, China has committed to reach carbon emission peak by about 2030.
12
For example, Deutsche Bank estimates that electricity generated from oil would cost about $0.08/kWh
at the oil price level of $40 per barrel. Given that unsubsidized rooftop solar electricity typically costs
between $0.08-$0.13/kWh, oil prices would have to drop below $40 to make electricity generated from
solar power uncompetitive when compared to that generated from oil. See Deutsche Bank (2015).
13
In the literature, there is no clear consensus on the existence of the inverted U-shaped relationship
between emissions and growththe so-called Environmental Kuznets Curvewhen other control
variables are being taken into account.
Investment in renewable
energy is on the rise
Investments in renewable
energy remain strong
despite subdued oil price
30
structural transformation, and emission mitigation policies adopted by the Government,

among others. On the other hand, global warming resulting from high atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gas emissions also has economic consequences. Immediate impacts can
be transmitted through extreme weather events that affect agriculture, displace populations,
bring damages to infrastructures, etc. Climate change is also posing increasing risks to global financial stability: for example, insurance companies are facing a rising number of claims
Figure I.19
Emission levels and renewable energy investments

a. World gross product and carbon emissions
growth, 19902014
Percentage
300
CO2 emissions growth

Real WGP growth
Developed
Developedeconomies
economies
Developing
Developingeconomies
economies
250
200
3
2
150
1
0
100
-1
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2014
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
2005
50
-2
-3
2004
b. New renewable energy investment,

20042014
c. Per-capita GDP and per-capita carbon emissions, 2012
30
Fitted values
KWT
TTO
Source: a. World Bank (2015b);

International Energy Agency
(2014a; 2015); b. United Nations
Environment Programme (2015);
c. World Bank (2015b); International Energy Agency (2014a).
of country codes.
Carbon emissions per capita (ton)
25
BHR
OMN
20
BRN
ARE
KAZ
TKM
RUS
10
EST
10000
USA
KOR
CZE
POL
ZAF
GRC
IRNBLR
MYS
SRB
CHN
BGR
VEN
SVKCYP
BIH
MNG
PRT
MKD CHL
AUS
CAN
SAU
15
20000
JPNDEU NLD
IRL
AUT
NZL
GBR
DNK
ESP ITA HKGFRA
SWE
ISR
30000
40000
50000
GDP per capita (constant 2005$)
ISL
CHE
60000
NOR
70000
31
associated with large-scale, costly natural disasters caused by extreme weather.14 Structural
transformations that shift the economy towards a low-carbon path and impose stringent
restrictions on carbon emissions could also lead to a repricing of assetsparticularly those
related to natural resources and extraction sectorsand change the incentive structures to
minimize carbon footprints and promote sustainable development.
Policy stances, challenges and the way forward

Monetary policy
Global monetary policy has remained generally accommodative in the face of weakening
growth and subdued inflationary pressures in many parts of the world. In 2015, developed
economies continued to rely on accommodative monetary policysuch as asset purchases
in the euro area and Japan and near-zero (or negative) policy ratesto deliver growth.
There is, however, a growing understanding among policymakers that monetary easing
is not sufficient for stimulating real economic activity. While accommodative monetary
policy stances helped avert a financial sector meltdown and prevent a prolonged recession,
they have not been as effective as expected in stimulating investment and growth. The key
monetary policy assumptions underlying the central forecast, and forecast sensitivities to
these assumptions, are reported in the appendix to this chapter.
Monetary policy stances during the post-crisis period clearly kept the cost of borrowing at historically low levels. From a historical perspective, both short- and long-term
interest rates in developed economies are still very low. Figure I.20 shows ten-year govern-
Monetary easing prevented

further worsening of the
economic slowdown
Figure I.20
Ten-year government bond yields in selected developed economies,

October 2005October 2015
6
Percentage
5
4
France
Germany
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
3
2
1
data from JPMorgan.
0
Oct-2005 Oct-2006 Oct-2007 Oct-2008 Oct-2009 Oct-2010 Oct-2011 Oct-2012 Oct-2013 Oct-2014 Oct-2015
14
For example, it is estimated that, while holding other factors constant, the 20cm of sea level rise at the
southern tip of Manhattan since the 1950s has increased insured losses from 2012 Hurricane Sandy
by 30 per cent in New York. See Lloyds (2014).
32
Monetary policy stances of

developed economies are
expected to diverge
ment bond yields since October 2005 for France, Germany, Japan, the United States and
the United Kingdom.
While monetary conditions in most developed economies remain loose, the policy
stances of the Fed and other major central banks have diverged over the past year. The Fed
has moved closer to its first interest-rate hike since 2006 as the labour market in the United
States has continued to improve gradually. However, amid concerns over the impact of global economic weakness on domestic activity and inflation, the Fed rate rise is now expected
to occur in December 2015, but could be pushed into 2016 in the case of a weaker-thanexpected global economic outlook. After the initial lift-off, the pace of interest-rate
normalization by the hike is likely to be slow and highly sensitive to inflation and job
market developments.
Unlike the Fed, other developed-country central banks, including the ECB and
the Bank of Japan, are still easing monetary policy. The ECB continues to implement its
expanded asset purchase programme, which was launched in March 2015 in an attempt to
steer inflation closer to the 2 per cent target. The monthly asset purchases of public and private sector securities amount to an average of 60 billion and are expected to be carried out
through the end of March 2017. While the programme has supported the recovery of the
euro area, a downgrading of the inflation forecast has opened the door for further stimulus.
A first interest-rate increase by the ECB is not expected until late 2017 or 2018. The Bank
of Japan has maintained the pace of asset purchases under its quantitative and qualitative
monetary easing programme (QQME), targeting an increase in the monetary base at an
annual pace of about 80 trillion yen. The authorities have not specified an end date for the
programme, indicating that it will continue until inflation is stable at 2 per cent. The likelihood of a further expansion of the programme has increased in recent months as headline
and core inflation once again declined and economic activity weakened.
Against the backdrop of weakening growth, rising financial market volatility, sharp
exchange-rate depreciations and increasing portfolio capital outflows, monetary policies
in developing and transition economies have shown some divergence in 2015 (figure I.21).
Figure I.21
Central bank policy rates in the BRICS, October 2011October 2015

18
Percentage
Brazil
China
India
Russian Federation
South Africa
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
from various National
central banks.
2
0
Oct-2011
Apr-2012
Oct-2012
Apr-2013
Oct-2013
Apr-2014
Oct-2014
Apr-2015
Oct-2015
Many Asian central banks cut their policy rates in 2015, responding to declining inflation
and seeking to support growth.
The Peoples Bank of China has reduced its one-year benchmark lending rate six times
since November 2014, lowering the rate from 6 per cent to 4.35 per cent. The authorities
have also used other measures, such as reserve requirement cuts and targeted lending facilities, to inject liquidity into the economy. The Reserve Bank of India cut its main policy
rate four times in 2015, by a total of 125 basis points. For many developing economies,
especially those with open capital accounts, the monetary policy stance over the next two
years will not only depend on growth and inflation trends, but also on potential spillover
effects of policy changes in the United States.
In several South American and African countries, including Brazil, Colombia, Kenya and South Africa, monetary policy has recently been tightened in a bid to halt rising
inflation, significant capital outflows and large currency depreciations. For most of these
countries, the monetary tightening is expected to further lower growth prospects, which
have already been hit by the drop in commodity prices and a range of domestic factors.
Fiscal policy
Most of the developed economieswhose fiscal deficits and public debt levels are averaging
about 3 per cent and 100 per cent of GDP, respectivelyhave gradually transitioned since
2013 from post-crisis consolidation of public finances to a more neutral fiscal stance. With
few exceptions, no significant fiscal drag is expected in 2015-2016 in developed countries.
The key fiscal policy assumptions underlying the central forecast, and forecast sensitivities
to these assumptions, are reported in the appendix to this chapter.
In the United States, the federal budget deficit has improved by 7 percentage points of
GDP since 2009, supported by stronger economic growth in 2014-2015. Following several
years of austerity, the fiscal policy stance has become more neutral, and this is expected to
continue in the near term. Real federal government consumption expenditure is expected
to remain at 2015 levels in both 2016 and 2017, but given the moderate improvement in the
state and local government fiscal positions, real government expenditure at this level will
grow by about 1 per cent in both 2016 and 2017.
Among the countries of the EU, fiscal policy stances diverge. Several EU members, including France, are running budget deficits exceeding 3 per cent of GDP and
have to consolidate their public finances, complying with the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the EU. In Japan, the Government conducts a flexible fiscal policy, but is pursuing medium-term fiscal consolidation, aiming to achieve a primary budget surplus
by 2020. However, the Government decided to postpone the planned consumption tax
increase from October 2015 to April 2017 and to implement additional stimulus measures. The Government also intends to reduce the corporate tax rate in April 2016. The
countrys public debt-to-GDP ratio stands at over 220 per cent and may become unsustainable in the long run, but as most of this debt is held domestically, default risks are
relatively small compared to countries that face large external and foreign-currencydenominated debt burdens.
Among the major developing countries, fiscal policy in China is expected to be moderately expansionary in the medium-term and the consolidated government deficit may
reach historically high levels, mostly because of large and growing indebtedness of the
regional governments. The central Governments support to the regions may increase in
order to prevent the excessive reliance of local governments on commercial borrowing. The
33
Developing countries
and economies in
transition face new
constraints in maintaining
accommodative monetary
policy stances
34
Global imbalances continue

to pose a potential risk to
global financial stability
ongoing debt-restructuring programme is expected to reduce financial risks at the local

level. In Brazil, by contrast, the Government is tightening its fiscal stance, in part by curbing subsidized public lending, in order to reduce public debt and to restore the countrys
investment grade.
Among the economies in transition, the Government of the Russian Federation had
to revise its 2015 budget against the backdrop of the fall in oil prices and weaker economy,
and foresee a wider than initially anticipated budget deficit. However, fiscal tightening in
the near-term will be somewhat mitigated by drawing from the Reserve Fund and expanding the tax base. Other commodity-exporting economies are also bracing for fiscal tightening during the forecast period.
While the dispersion of global current-account deficits and surpluses has narrowed
somewhat from the peaks leading up to the global financial crisis, a significant degree of
imbalance still persists, posing a potential risk to global financial stability. Global imbalances in net external debt holdings have continued to widen since 2011, as illustrated in
figure I.22. High levels of gross external debt leave a country exposed to a sudden withdrawal of foreign capital, and pose additional risks linked to exchange-rate fluctuations if
the external debt is denominated in foreign currency. Without any additional narrowing of
the global current-account imbalance, global imbalances in net external debt can be expected to continue to widen beyond the end of this decade, and global vulnerabilities related to
external debt are unlikely to recede.
Two key factors interacting with the recent evolution and outlook for global imbalances are the sharp exchange-rate realignments and the deterioration of commodity prices,
especially the oil price. The pace of global net debt accumulation has moderated signif-
Fiscal tightening is likely

in commodity-exporting
economies
A strong dollar may

reverse the trend in
global imbalances, which
have improved since the
financial crisis
Figure I.22
Net external asset positions as a percentage of world gross product, 20032017a

25
Percentage
20
15
10
5
National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, International
Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics and updated
and extended version of dataset
constructed by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
a Data for 2015-2017
are projections.
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Creditor developed
Debtor developed
Creditor fuel exporters
Debtor fuel exporters

China, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore
Other non-fuel exporters
35
icantly in recent years, largely associated with the United States current-account deficit
narrowing from 5.8 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 2.2 per cent in 2014, matched by a decline
in Chinas current-account surplus from 8.5 per cent of GDP to 2.1 per cent over the same
period. The real appreciation of the dollar highlighted above can be expected to unwind
some of this improvement, although at the global level this deterioration may be partially
offset by narrowing surpluses in creditor countries with currencies that are closely tied to
the dollar, as well as the impact of commodity price declines on imbalances.
IMF (2006, chap. II) highlighted the role that rising oil prices played in exacerbating
global imbalances in the lead-up to the financial crisis. By contrast, the recent drop in oil
prices should help to improve imbalances at the global level. The vast majority of net debtor
countries are fuel importers, while the majority of fuel exporters have historically run persistent current-account surpluses. The sharp deterioration of current-account balances in
fuel-exporting economies will be partially financed by drawing down reserves in countries
that have normally run large current-account surpluses.
As Chinas current-account surplus has narrowed, Germany is now the largest surplus
country in the world. Germanys intra-euro area trade surplus has narrowed sharply since
2007, but its extra-euro area surplus has continued to widen, as illustrated in figure I.23.
The growing external surplus of Germany partly explains the widening current-account
surplus of the euro area as a whole, which also reflects the rapid adjustment of the external
positions of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (figure I.23). Please see Chapter III
for more details on global imbalances and reserves accumulation.
Figure I.23
Euro area current-account balance (CAB)

200
Billions of euros
150
100
50
0
-50
-100
-150
Other Euro areacontribution to Euro area CAB

Germany net intra-Euro area trade
Germany remaining CAB

Euro area (CAB)
2015S1
2014S2
2014S1
2013S2
2013S1
2012S2
2012S1
2011S2
2011S1
2010S2
2010S1
2009S2
2009S1
2008S2
2008S1
2007S2

from Eurostat and ECB databases.
2007S1
-200
36
Vulnerabilities in developing economies increase

A number of economies
are likely to be hard hit by
a sharper-than-expected
slowdown of the Chinese
economy
A larger-than-expected slowdown in China, the second largest economy in the world, is

likely to have substantial ripple effects on the rest of the global economy. The hardest hit
would be Chinas immediate neighbours (Mongolia, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, the
Republic of Korea) who have strong trade ties with China. Figure I.24 highlights 29 countries that are particularly exposed, as China is the number one export destination for these
economies.15 These include both commodity-exporting economiessuch as Angola, Brazil, Chile, Mongoliaas well as a few high-income economies, including Australia, New
Zealand and the Republic of Korea. Exports to China account for more than 25 per cent of
total exports in the case of 11 of these economies, making them particularly vulnerable to
the slowdown of the Chinese economy.
Lower commodity prices have already significantly worsened the fiscal position of
many commodity-dependent developing economies and exacerbated their external debt
burden. The risk of debt default, although still relatively low for small commodity-exporting economies, can intensify if commodity prices decline further. The increased risk of
debt unsustainability may compel investors to move both their equity and debt capital to a
relatively safer investment environment, exacerbating capital outflows and further undermining the economic health of commodity-exporting economies. The vicious cycle of low
growth, depressed revenue prospects, increased risk perceptions, capital outflows, reduced
liquidity and increased borrowing costs may become mutually reinforcing, restraining
growth further. This may have a cascading, contagious effect on a range of developing
Figure I.24
Share of exports to China

240%
120%

National Accounts
Main Aggregates Database
and IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics.
of country codes.
Exports as a share of GDP
100%
80%
SGP (rhs)
220%
KOR
GNQ
60%
MNG
AGO
OMN COG
CHL MOZ
MRT
KAZ
NZL
URY
BFA
UZB LAO
ZAF
BEN AUS
PER
20%
RWA CAF GMB COD
BRA
ETH
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
40%
200%
HKG (rhs)
THA
SAU
180%
160%
140%
70%
80%
90%
120%
100%
Share of merchandise exports to China
15
Angola, Australia, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China, Kazakhstan, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Oman, Peru, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand,
Uruguay and Uzbekistan.
37
economies, both commodity exporters and others, leading to a broader debt crisis reminiscent of the debt crisis in the late 1980s.
Developing economies in general would need to find new sources of growth domestically or regionally to escape the potential downward spiral emanating from commodity-price- and exchange-rate-related shocks. This would require Governments to pursue
comprehensive structural transformation and industrial policies that would mobilize
domestic savings and investment, improve institutions and corporate governance and reduce
transaction costs and increase competitiveness. Sustained and sustainable improvement
in labour productivity would allow many developing countries to create more decent
jobs, increase the labour share of income and reduce income inequality both within and
between countries.
Geopolitical risks cloud regional economic prospects

The near-term global economic forecast remains susceptible to a number of geopolitical tensions and risks. These include the situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic,
Ukraine and Yemen and the refugee crisis that has engulfed various neighbouring countries
of some of these crisis spots, as well as Europe.
The intermittent geopolitical crisis around Ukraine presents a risk to the economic outlook, at least at the regional level. Despite the ceasefire agreement reached in
February 2015, the conflict in the East of Ukraine is not yet resolved. The mutual economic sanctions between the Russian Federation and many OECD economies, including the United States and the EU, were extended in July 2015. As a result, many leading Russian companies and banks remain cut off from the major international capital
markets, and cooperation with a number of Russian enterprises is under embargo. The
Government of the Russian Federation, on its side, implemented a one-year extension of
the ban on imports of food products from those countries that are participating in the
sanctions. Together with the fall in oil prices, the sanctions have taken a toll on the Russian economy, leading to outflows of capital and a contraction in investment. As many of
the smaller CIS economies significantly depend on remittance inflows from the Russian
Federation, the downturn in the Russian economy has had a negative spillover effect on
the region, which is set to continue in 2016. The weaker Russian import demand also had
a knock-on effect on some countries in the EU-15, while the food import ban has had a
sectoral impact on some of the new EU member States, in particular on the Baltic States,
Hungary and Poland, and also has affected transit trade revenues for these economies. The
sanctions were only one of the factors leading to the drastic depreciation of the Russian
currency in 2014. A further escalation of the conflict may lead to interruption of the Russian natural gas flow through Ukraine, which would be especially damaging for Eastern
Europe, while the increased defence expenditure in the EU-15 may weigh on the public
finances.
Violent conflicts continue in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and
Yemen, with significant spill over effects on the regional economies. The prolonged conflicts, particularly in the Syrian Arab Republic, aggravated the problem of refugees who
already numbered in the millions in neighbouring countries. An increasing number of citizens have been fleeing from these countries, and also from North Africa, towards Europe.
The presence of a large number of refugees is likely to increase political and financial strains
in the host economies, with the potential for contagion of conflict spreading beyond the
Further spread of conflict

would depress growth in
some regions
38
Syrian Arab Republic and reaching the door-step of Europe. There is also mounting pressure from refugees trying to enter Western Europe in search of a better livelihood. This has
added new challenges for a number of transit and destination countries, both in logistical
and financial terms. In addition, in a number of destination countries, issues regarding the
integration of refugees into society and the labour market are likely to create additional
policy challenges.
Policy challenges are expected to intensify
Monetary policy
normalization will need to
strike a balance between
sustaining growth and
managing financial stability
risks
More than seven years after the global financial crisis, policymakers around the world still
face enormous difficulties in restoring robust and balanced global growth. In developed
countries, most of the burden of promoting growth has fallen on central banks, which
have used a wide range of conventional and unconventional policy tools, including various
large-scale QE programmes, forward guidance and negative nominal interest rates. These
measures have led to an unprecedented degree of monetary accommodation in recent years,
with monetary bases soaring and short- and long-term interest rates falling to historically
low levels.
Accommodative monetary conditions and abundant supply of global liquidity have
also given rise to wide swings in capital flows to emerging markets. Financial stability risks
have increased amid concerns over the excessive build-up of financial assets, commensurate
asset price bubbles and balance-sheet vulnerabilities, especially in emerging markets. Volatility in commodity, currency, bond and stock markets has moved up since mid-2014, partly as a result of monetary policy adjustments and uncertainties over future policy moves.
Against this backdrop, the monetary authorities in developed countries face the task
of balancing the need for continued monetary accommodation with the goal of limiting real
and nominal volatilities and minimize the risks to global financial stability. In this context,
macroprudential policies have become increasingly important since the global financial crisis. The ultimate goal of macroprudential toolssuch as capital requirements for banks and
other financial institutions, limits on loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, and limits on
banks foreign-exchange exposureis to temper the financial cycle and contain systemic
risks (see Constncio, 2015). Macroprudential policies, when designed and applied effectively, can help mitigate financial sector volatility and redirect financial resources to more
productive sectors of the economy.
For developed-country central banks, the main challenge over the coming years is
how to normalize monetary policy without crushing asset prices, causing major financial
volatility and potentially threatening the expected recovery. At present, the international
focus is on the Fed, which is the first major central bank to start the monetary tightening
cycle. While the Feds decision-making is guided by its dual mandatepromoting maximum stable employment and price stabilityit is taking into account the potential spillover effects of its policies on the world economy. By keeping the Fed fund rate at the zero
lower bound, the Fed has also temporarily prevented a widening of the monetary policy
gap with other central banks and a further strengthening of the dollar. Going forward, the
challenge for the Fed is not only to get the timing of interest-rate hikes right, but also to
adequately prepare financial markets for the moves via effective communication of its plans.
While the normalization of United States interest rates is expected in late 2015, some
uncertainties remain regarding both the anticipated path of interest rates and the reaction of global financial markets and the real economy to the shift in policy rates. A rise
39
in debt-servicing costs will necessarily be associated with the United States interest-rate
normalization, both domestically and in the many developing economies and economies
in transition that hold debt denominated in United States dollars. In addition, as the rates
of return on United States assets normalize, a sudden change in risk appetite could trigger
a collapse of capital flows to developing economies and economies in transition, or sharp
exchange-rate realignments as experienced following the Feds announcement in 2013 that
it would soon begin tapering its QE programme. Significant levels of net capital outflows
have already occurred in many developing economies in anticipation of the normalization
of United States policy rates (for more discussion, see the section on rising volatility in
exchange rates and capital flows), and there is a risk that these withdrawals could increase
further, drying up liquidity in many developing economies. This may lead to a depreciation
of many developing-country exchange rates, or pressure them to raise interest rates to prevent capital outflows. Countries that hold a large stock of net external debt are particularly
exposed to the associated rising costs of debt servicing. As a downside risk to the outlook,
financial markets could overreact and overshoot the adjustment, or exhibit a sudden change
in risk appetite, leading to heightened financial market volatility, an even sharper withdrawal of capital from developing markets, and a more significant slowdown in global growth.
In developing countries and economies in transition, the current global economic
and financial environment poses major challenges for monetary and exchange-rate policies. Economic growth in most countries has slowed significantly over the past few years
amid declining commodity prices and domestic weaknesses.16 Although potential growth
is likely to be lower than before the global financial crisis, sizeable negative output gaps have
opened up in many countries. These gaps would call for considerable monetary loosening.
However, the room for monetary easing is constrained for a number of developing-country and economies in transition central banks in the CIS and South America that have
encountered high inflationary pressures. Furthermore, in several cases, policy rates have
not returned to pre-financial crisis levels, which limit the scope for interest rate cuts. These
constraints are accompanied by concerns that rising United States interest rates and a further strengthening of the dollar could trigger a wave of emerging-market corporate defaults
over the coming years.
Given that monetary policies have done most of the heavy lifting for supporting
growth during the post-crisis period, both developed and developing countries will need to
rely more on fiscal policy instruments to stimulate growth in the near term. Fiscal policies
will need to primarily focus on boosting investment and productivity growth. Most of the
EU countries enjoy low sovereign borrowing costs, supported by the ongoing sovereign
bond purchases by the ECB. While this mitigates the costs of financing deficits, policymakers will continue to struggle to find a balance between supporting growth and employment
and adhering to their commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact. This may become
more challenging if deflation in the euro area persists, which may inflate fiscal deficits and
public debt-to-GDP ratios.
Compared with the developed economies, developing countries and economies in
transition generally have smaller budget deficits and public debt levels. This should encourage developing countries to pursue expansionary fiscal policies, including well-timed and
16
Average growth in developing countries for 2015 is estimated at 3.8 per cent. In the past 25 years,
average annual growth has been lower only during acute crisis episodes: the Asian crisis in 1998, the
financial crises in Argentina and Turkey in 2001 and the global financial crisis in 2009. Economies in
transition are estimated to contract by an average rate of 2.8 per cent in 2015.
Going forward, fiscal

policy will need to do the
heavy lifting to stimulate
investment and growth
40
Increasing labours share

of income can help boost
aggregate demand and
revive global growth
targeted fiscal stimuli, to boost domestic demand and growth. In oil-exporting economies,
persistently low oil prices should eventually encourage public finance reforms, including
discretionary spending, and support policies targeting economic diversification. Oil-importing developing countries, on the other hand, should take advantage of low oil prices to
redirect their fiscal savings to productive investments.
Well-designed fiscal policies can play a central role in fostering employment creation
and reducing both unemployment and underemployment. Furthermore, current income
disparities and low wage growth can be addressed with social transfers as well as with effective training policies to advance workers employability, and through stronger collective bargaining mechanisms that can improve income distribution. Additionally, considering that
labour force participation is low and long-term unemployment extremely high, more active
labour market policies may be considered as a complement to unemployment benefits to
make labour markets more inclusive. Efforts to enhance access to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises can also play a significant role in investment recovery and job creation.
Progressive tax structures, including income tax relief for lower-income groups, are
also effective in addressing working poverty and income inequalities, with potential benefits for growth and employment creation. Particularly in developing economies, where the
informal sector is larger, well-designed tax systems can encourage formal employment creation in general, but they can also support more disadvantaged social groups and improve
government revenue. In addition, since working poverty is also often associated with lowskilled labour, training policies targeting low-skilled workers may play a critical role in
enhancing employment, productivity and output growth. They can help address income
disparities between groups of workers, by increasing labour productivity and reducing
working poverty. According to OECD (2015a), wage inequality is lower in countries where
skills are more equally distributed. At the same time, training programmes for low-skilled
workers can also stimulate discouraged workers to re-enter the labour market and reduce
long-term unemployment.
Labours declining share of total income has been identified as a key underlying factor
limiting aggregate demand and, ultimately, output growth. This is in part the result of a
long-term trend, which has led to a widening gap between wage growth and productivity growth (see United Nations, 2015a). In addition, as has been underscored by several
international organizations (OECD, the International Labour Organization (ILO), IMF,
UNCTAD, UN/DESA), the weakening of workers bargaining power is another important
factor underpinning the declining labour share of total income. Mandatory minimum wages, where they do not exist, can directly help those at the bottom of the income distribution,
but they can also secure fair pay and increase tax revenues. As a complementary policy,
collective bargaining mechanisms can be designed to realign wage growth with productivity growth, rendering economic growth more inclusive and equitable. Evidence shows
that Governments that have introduced new measures to increase minimum wages, as well
as collective bargaining, were able to curb working poverty and income inequality, while
boosting aggregate demand.
Sustainable development will require more

sustained policy coordination
Effective policy
coordination is needed
to boost investment,
employment, productivity
and growth
Stimulating inclusive growth in the near term and fostering long-term sustainable development will require more effective policy coordinationbetween monetary, exchange-rate
and fiscal policiesto break the vicious cycle of weak aggregate demand, under-investment, low productivity and low growth performance in the global economy. Equally critical
is the coordination of monetary and macroprudential policies to align the objectives of

financial stability and growth, and to ensure that finance indeed supports the real economy
and that the world economy does not lapse into yet another financial crisis. This would
also be critical to ensuring a smooth adjustment in asset prices to minimize the negative
spillover effects of the normalization of monetary policy stances worldwide. Furthermore,
economic, social and environmental policies need to be coordinated to realize the comprehensive and universal 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. There also needs to be
stronger international coordination of various domestic-level policies, taking into account
the possible spillover effects on the rest of the economy.
Policy coordination, however, has become increasingly difficult against the backdrop of ever greater complexity in the financial market, persistent and growing disconnect between finance and the real economy, and the chronic misalignment and incentive incompatibility of various policy objectives pursued by different stakeholders at
both national and international levels. At the domestic level, policies are often designed
and implemented in compartments, with little integration and coordination of different
policy objectives.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the G20 undertook concrete measures
to improve policy coordination at the global level. However, a quick but shallow recovery of
global growth in 2011-2012 rendered the measures less of an imperative. Against the backdrop of a prolonged period of slow growth combined with the global commitment to the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the international community needs to renew
its efforts to improve policy coordination at national, regional and international levels.
International policy coordination is critically important for realizing the ambitious,
comprehensive and universal 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieving its
associated goals and targets. First and foremost, policy coordination is needed to revive
global growth and put the world economy on a new path of equitable, sustained and sustainable growth. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, agreed at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in July 2015, provides the framework for policies
and actions to align all financing flows and international and domestic policies with economic, social and environmental priorities (see chap. III, box III.1). A successful conclusion
of the multilateral trade negotiations (i.e., reducing barriers to market access, especially
for developing economies) will provide a much-needed impetus to investment, stimulate
productivity growth and output, facilitate redistribution of global income, reduce global
imbalances and address both within- and between-country income inequalities. The imperative of international policy coordination is also most evident in the area of climate change
and environment. The successful conclusion of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Paris, leading to binding commitments to reduce emission levels, is expected
to pave the way for more effective international policy coordination for sustainable development in all three dimensions: economic, social and environmental.
41
Policy coordination will

continue to face daunting
challenges
Agreements on trade and

climate change will provide
a much-needed impetus
to stimulate sustainable
growth
Appendix
Baseline forecast assumptions

This appendix summarizes the key assumptions underlying the baseline forecast, including monetary and fiscal policies for major economies, exchange rates for major currencies
and the international prices of oil. It also assesses the sensitivity of the baseline forecast to
these assumptions, using the World Economic Forecasting Model (WEFM) of UN/DESA.
WEFM is a large-scale global macroeconomic model, covering 160 countries, which ensures the global consistency of the forecasts presented in this report.
Monetary policy
The United States Federal Reserve Board (Fed) is expected to raise its key policy rate by
25 basis points by the end of 2015. The target for the federal funds rate will then increase
gradually, by 50 basis points and 100 basis points in 2016 and 2017, respectively (figure
I.A.1). The Fed terminated its asset purchase programme in October 2014, which has so
far not driven a strong rebound of long-term government bond yields in the United States
of America. Until the end of 2017, the Fed is expected to maintain its policy of reinvesting
principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities
in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at
auction, broadly maintaining the size of its balance sheet (figure I.A.2).
The European Central Bank (ECB) significantly loosened its monetary stance in
2015, introducing an expanded asset purchase programme, with monthly purchases of public and private sector securities amounting to 60 billion. This policy is expected to continue until the end of March 2017, bringing the size of the ECB balance sheet close to its level
in 2012. After cutting interest rates twice in 2014, the ECB is expected to maintain policy
interest rates at current levels for one year following the termination of the asset purchase
programme, and raise interest rates by 50 basis points by end-2017.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) increased the scale of its asset purchase programme in October 2014 from 60-70 trillion to 80 trillion yen per annum. The BoJ is expected to keep the
scale of asset purchases at this level until at least the end of 2017, and to maintain its policy
interest rate at current levels of 0-10 basis points.
The Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) is expected to continue to carry out targeted
measures, including further cuts to the reserve requirement ratio and targeted lending facilities, to inject liquidity into the economy. These measures will roughly offset the decline of
foreign-exchange depositsa major source of liquidityand the overall monetary condition will remain neutral during the forecast period.
44
Figure I.A.1
Key policy rates

7
6
5
PBC Benchmark lending rate
ECB Main refinancing operations
Fed Funds Target Rate
BoJ Policy rate
4
3
2
Dec-17
Sep-17
Jun-17
Mar-17
Sep-16
Dec-16
Jun-16
Mar-16
Dec-15
Jun-15
Sep-15
Mar-15
Dec-14
Sep-14
Jun-14
Mar-14
Dec-13
Sep-13
Jun-13
Mar-13
Dec-12
Jun-12
Sep-12
Mar-12
1
from relevant central banks.
Figure I.A.2
Total assets of major central banks, December 2006December 2017

550
500
BoJ
FED
ECB
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Dec-06
May-07
Oct-07
Mar-08
Aug-08
Jan-09
Jun-09
Nov-09
Apr-10
Sep-10
Feb-11
Jul-11
Dec-11
May-12
Oct-12
Mar-13
Aug-13
Jan-14
Jun-14
Nov-14
Apr-15
Sep-15
Feb-16
Jul-16
Dec-16
May-17
Oct-17

data from Bank of Japan, United
States Federal Reserve and
European Central Bank.
Fiscal policy
Fiscal policy in the United States is expected to become marginally expansive. Real government consumption expenditure is expected to expand by 0.9 per cent in both 2016 and
2017, and there will be no major change in the tax system. The accord reached between
the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government in October 2015
suspended the debt ceiling until March 2017, and it is assumed that an appropriate debt
ceiling beyond March 2017 will be set in a timely manner.
Chapter I. Appendix
45
In aggregate, the fiscal stance in the EU is neutral in 2015, and is expected to be

broadly neutral or marginally expansionary in 2016. A slightly tighter stance is expected
for 2017. Excessive Deficit Procedures remain ongoing in 9 EU countries, which will entail
tightening measures of at least 0.5 per cent of GDP per annum.
In Japan, the scheduled date for the second increase in the consumption tax rate was
delayed from October 2015 to April 2017, and it is assumed that the increase will come into
effect as currently scheduled. The corporation tax rate will be cut in April 2016 from 32.1
per cent to 31.3 per cent. Government outlays are expected to increase during the fiscal year
beginning in April 2016.
In China, the fiscal policy stance will remain mildly expansionary during the forecast
period. The ratio of local government debt to total fiscal capacity is expected to reach about
86 per cent by end-2015, but will remain below the 100 per cent ceiling over the forecast
period.
Exchange rates among major currencies

The dollar/euro exchange rate is assumed to average 1.117 in 2015, and to depreciate in line
with the widening differential between ECB and Fed interest rates to 1.094 in 2016 and
1.042 in 2017.
The yen/dollar exchange rate is assumed to average 120.75 in 2015, 122.98 in 2016
and 124.80 in 2017.
The renminbi/dollar exchange rate is assumed to average 6.225 CNY/dollar in 2015
and 6.53 in 2016 and 6.47 in 2017.
Figure I.A.3
Data and assumptions on major currency exchange rates

1.8
1.6
1.4
January 2012=1
/$ index
Yuan/$ index
Yen/$ index
2015 average
2016 assumption
2017 assumption
1.2
1
0.8
data from JPMorgan and WEFM
working assumption.
Jan-12
Feb-12
Apr-12
May-12
Jul-12
Sep-12
Oct-12
Dec-12
Jan-13
Mar-13
May-13
Jun-13
Aug-13
Sep-13
Nov-13
Jan-14
Feb-14
Apr-14
Jun-14
Jul-14
Sep-14
Oct-14
Dec-14
Feb-15
Mar-15
May-15
Jun-15
Aug-15
Oct-15
2016
2017
0.6
46
Oil price
The price of Brent oil is expected to average $53 per barrel in 2015, $51 per barrel in 2016
and $62 per barrel in 2017.
Forecast sensitivities to key assumptions

Below are illustrative sensitivities of forecasts for the major global regions to some of the key
underlying assumptions of the forecast, based on simulations using WEFM.
Figure I.A.4
Impact of a 1 percentage point rise in United States interest rates

0.05
Percentage point change from baseline

Developed economies
-0.05
Africa
East and South Asia
-0.1
Western Asia
-0.15
Latin America and the

Caribbean
-0.2
-0.25
Source: UN/DESA-WEFM
simulation.
2016
2017
GDP growth
2016
2017
Inflation
Figure I.A.5
Impact of a 1 per cent of GDP increase in United States government spending

0.9
0.8
Developed economies
0.7
0.6
Africa
0.5
0.4
East and South Asia
0.3
Western Asia
0.2

Caribbean
0.1
0
-0.1
simulation.
2016
2017
GDP growth
2016
2017
Inflation
47
Chapter I. Appendix
Figure I.A.6
Impact of a 5 per cent depreciation of the euro/$ rate

0.6
0.4
Developed economies
0.2
0
-0.2
Africa
-0.4
East and South Asia
-0.6
Western Asia
-0.8

Caribbean
-1
-1.2
-1.4
2016
2017
GDP growth
2016
2017
simulation.
Inflation
Figure I.A.7
Impact of a 10 per cent rise in the oil price

1.6
1.4
Developed economies
1.2
Africa
0.8
East and South Asia
0.6
Western Asia
0.4

Caribbean
0.2
0
-0.2
2016
2017
GDP growth
2016
2017
Inflation
simulation.

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and

World Economic Situation

Global economic outlook

World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016

Growth of world output, 20132017

Annual percentage change

United States of America

Commonwealth of Independent States

East and South Asia

Latin America and the Caribbean

Mexico and Central America

Least developed countries

World output growth with

Chapter I. Global economic outlook

Prospects for the least developed countries

Developed economies are

World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016

Box I.1 (continued)

Commodity exports as a share of GDP and share

Source: UN/DESA calculations

Share of the top commodity group in total commodity exports

Chapter I. Global economic outlook

Box I.1 (continued)

Contribution to global growth, 20072017

Inflation remains benign

Deflation risks linger

World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016

Global consumer price inflation, 2006-2017a

Unemployment challenges persist

Chapter I. Global economic outlook

Global employment gap, 19992019

Total employment, millions of people

Upper and lower bound

Source: International Labour

Total unemployment by regions, 20072019

201 mil (5.9%)

197 mil (6.1%)

210 mil (5.8%)

201 mil (5.9%)

Latin America and the Caribbean

South East Asia and the Pacific

Central & South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) & CIS

Developed economies and European Union

Source: International Labour

World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016

Large informal sectors

Despite slower employment growth, unemployment figures remained relatively stable

Employment growth and decent work critical for realizing

Headwinds impede global growth

Chapter I. Global economic outlook

Persistent macroeconomic uncertainties and volatility;

Persistent macroeconomic uncertainties and volatility

Uncertainty shocks persist

Persistent uncertainty can

World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016

Volatility proxies for the

Trends in key real and nominal variables

Both real and nominal