Memorial For Applicant

TEAM CODE: I
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
AT THE PEACE PALACE,

THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS
GENERAL LIST NO
YEAR 2016
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STATES CONCERNING DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION, SAFE
PASSAGE AND EXTRADITION OF BOBERT TIRES
17TH D.M. HARISH MEMORIAL
INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
2016
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF RATANKA

&
REPUBLIC OF ANGHORE
/
CONFEDERATION OF UNITED PROVINCES

(THE APPLICANT STATES)
(THE RESPONDENT STATE)
SUBMITTED IN THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT

MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
VI
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
XII
STATEMENT OF FACTS
XIII
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
XVII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
XVIII
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
THE ACT OF GRANTING ASYLUM BY ANGHORE IS IN VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
1.1
THE GRANT OF DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM TO BOBERT TIRES BY ANGHORE
IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1.1.1
THE GRANT
OF
ASYLUM
IS A
DEROGATION
FROM THE
TERRITORIAL
VIENNA
SOVEREIGNTY OF CUP
1.1.2
BY GRANTING ASYLUM, ANGHORE
HAS
VIOLATED
THE
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

A. Anghore has subverted the judicial process within CUP
B. Grant of Asylum is incompatible with diplomatic functions as
laid down in VCDR

1.1.3
BOBERT TIRES
IS NOT A
REFUGEE
UNDER THE
REFUGEE CONVENTION
AND UDHR AND HENCE HAS NO RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM
A. Bobert Tires has committed a non-political crime
B. Acts of Bobert Tires are against the purposes and principles of

the United Nations
D.M HARISH MEMORIAL INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016
II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
C. In any event, there is no fear of persecution.

1.2
5
STATIONING
THERE IS NO OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CUP TO
CUP
VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
DID NOT
BY
OFFICERS OUTSIDE THE ANGHORIAN EMBASSY
1.3
GRANT SAFE PASSAGE TO BOBERT TIRES
BOBERT TIRES
SHOULD BE
SURRENDERED TO CUP OR EXTRADITED
TO RATANKA
2.1
IS
IS
BOBERT TIRES
ALTERNATIVELY, OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE EXISTS IN CUSTOMARY
MONETARY GOLD PRINCIPLE
OF
INDISPENSIBLE THIRD PARTY
NOT APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
2.2
BY
REFUSING TO SURRENDER
BOBERT TIRES
TO
CUP, ANGHORE
BREACHING ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
2.3
ANGHORE
IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO SURRENDER
TO CUP
2.4
INTERNATIONAL LAW
2.4.1
OBLIGATION
TO
PROSECUTE/EXTRADITE
EXISTS WHEN THE OFFENDER
COMMITS AN ACT OF TERRORISM
2.4.2
CRIME COMMITTED BY BOBERT TIRES AMOUNTS TO TERRORISM
11
2.4.3
ANGHORE
IN THE INSTANT
11
POLITICAL
12
IS OBLIGED TO
EXTRADITE BOBERT TIRES
CASE
2.5
ALTERNATIVELY,
THERE
EXISTS
NO
FEAR
OF
PERSECUTION, TORTURE, CRUEL OR INHUMAN TREATMENT
3.
RATANKA
HAS NOT BREACHED
INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE
13
MANNER AND NATURE OF INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE FIA
3.1
ANGHORES
NON EXHAUSTION
13
ALTERNATIVELY, ANGHORE HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THIS CLAIM
13
CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE OWING TO
OF LOCAL REMEDIES
3.2
BEFORE THE COURT
3.3
ALTERNATIVELY, ACTS OF GATHERING INFORMATION BY RATANKA DO
14
III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.3.1
GATHERING
DOES NOT VIOLATE
14
SELF DEFENCE
IS A
15
THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP AGAINST ANGHORE
17
INFORMATION DURING
PEACETIME
CUSTOMARY LAW
3.3.2
ALTERNATIVELY, ANTICIPATORY
OR PEREMPTORY
VALID JUSTIFICATION OF PEACETIME ESPIONAGE
4.
ARE NOT IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
4.1
17
DO NOT AMOUNT TO 'USE OF FORCE' UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
4.2
18
DO NOT AMOUNT TO UNLAWFUL ECONOMIC COERCION
4.2.1
THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED DO NOT AMOUNT TO ECONOMIC COERCION
18
4.2.2
ALTERNATIVELY,
18
THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED, EVEN IF CONSTRUED AS
ECONOMIC COERCION, CONTINUE TO BE LAWFUL UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
4.3
ALTERNATIVELY, THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP ARE
19
EFFECTIVELY COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ANGHORE
PRAYER
XX
IV
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Paragraph
BET
Bilateral Extradition Treaty
CUP
Confederation Of United Provinces
Doc
Document
ECHR
European Convention of Human Rights
FIA
Foreign Intelligence Agency
ICCPR
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICJ
International Court of Justice
ILC
International Law Commission
Intl
International
ILR
International Law Review
MET
Multilateral Extradition Treaty
OAU
Organization of African Unity
OWA
One World Alliance
PCIJ
Permanent Court Of International Justice
Res.
Resolution
SAARC
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
UDHR
Universal Declaration Of Human Rights
UN
United Nations
UNGA
United Nations General Assembly
U.N.R.I.A.A
United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards
UNCAT
United Nations Committee Against Torture
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC
United Nations Human Rights Committee
U.N.T.S.
United Nations Treaty System
US
United States of America
Vol.
Volume
ARTICLES
1.
Marteen Den Heijer, Diplomatic Asylum and the Assange Case, 34 1

Phil. L.J. 343 (1959)
2.
A. E. Evans, The ColombianPeruvian Asylum Case: Termination 6

of the Judicial Phase, 45 AJIL 755, 761 (1951)
3.
Sibylle Kapferer, The Interface between Extradition and Asylum, 9

Legal And Protection Policy Research Series, UNHCHR (November
2003)
4.
David
Kretzmer,
Torture,
Prohibition
of,
The
Maxplanck 12
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (15th December 2010)

5.
Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 14

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321, 325-26 (1996)
6.
John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and
14
International Law, 28 MICH.J.INTL L.595 (2007)
7.
Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and 14

International Law, 46 A.F.L.REV.217, 217 (1999)
8.
Michael Kapp, Spying for Peace: Explaining the Absence of the 14

Formal Regulation of Peacetime Espionage, Chi. J. Intl L. p.1 (June
2007)
9.
Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in 14

Internal
Affairs,
ESSAYS
ON
ESPIONAGE
AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, p.12 (Ohio State University Press, 1962
10. Julius Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern 14

Conflict, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, p.29, 36 (Ohio State University Press, 1962
11. Jeffrey H. Smith, Symposium, State Intelligence Gathering and 14
VI
International Law, 28 MICH. J. INTL L. 543, 545 (2007)
12. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. 15

J. INTL L. & POLY 321 (1996);
13. Michael J. Barrett, Honorable Espionage, J DEF & DIPL, 13-21 15
(Feb. 1984)
14. Michael Glennon, The Road Ahead: Gaps, Leaks and Drips, 89 15
INTL. L.STUD.362, 374 (2013)
15. Daniel
B.
Silver,
Intelligence
and
Counterintelligence,
2 15
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 935, 965 (2005)
BOOKS
1.
JOHN BASSET MOORE. A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 1

LAW, (vol. I, 1906)
2.
M. N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (6th edition, 2008)
3.
A. RAESTAD, LA PORTE DU CANON COMME LIMITE DE 2
LA MER TERRITORIALE, (1912)

4.
FREIDRICH BERBER, LEHRBUCH DES VLKERRECHTS, 2

(vol. I 1948)
5.
S. MURTY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DIPLOMACY: 3

THE DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER,(1989)
6.
LORD GORE-BOOTH, SATOWS GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC 5

PRACTICE,(5th edition, Longman Publishers, 1979)
7.
A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN 6

INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Vol. 2, 1972)
8.
ZIMMERMAN, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 7

COURT OF JUSTICE-A COMMENTARY, (2005)
VII
9.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, (7th edition, 2008)
10. P.MALANCZUK, AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 9

INTERNATIONAL LAW, (7th revised edition, Routledge, 1997)
11. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GUIDELINES ON HUMAN 9
RIGHTS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, (Council of
Europe Publishing, March 2003)
12. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, EDWARD WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT 10
JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995)
13. CLAIRE MITCHELL, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE- THE 10
PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE CLAUSE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
14. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
11
(Third Edition, Volume 1, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1937)

15. PHOEBE OKOWA, ISSUES OF ADMISSIBILITY AND THE
13
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Cambridge

University Press, 2010)
16. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (2nd edition,
15
1912)
17. H.M. KINDRED ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, (5th edition,
15
Cambridge University Press, 1993)

18. BRUNO SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
17
A COMMENTARY, (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002)

19. MARGARET P. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, (2
ND
17
EDITION,
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 1996)

20. BOWETT, SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (The
18
Lawbook Exchange, 1958)
VIII
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

1.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18th April, 1961, 500
2,3,5,8,
UNTS 95
2.
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,(1977)
4,10
3.
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 4,10

Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, (1987)
4.
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 4

(1999)
5.
Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, (1999)
4,10
6.
Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, (2002)
7.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
4,10
Bombings, (1997)
8.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 4,10

Terrorism, (1999)
9.
Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 4,10

Combating International Terrorism, (1999)
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17th July 1998,
2187 UNTS 90
11. UN, Charter of the United Nations, Article (51), Oct. 24, 1945,
16
1945 ATS 1
12. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 28th July
1951, 189 UNTS 137
UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS
1.
UNHCR, Thirtieth session, Question of Diplomatic Asylum, Report 1,2,8
IX
of the Secretary General (Sep 22, 1975)

2.
SC Res. 1377, 4413th meeting, UN SCOR 56th year, 4, UN doc.
S/Res/1377/2001
3.
SC Res. 1373, 4385th meeting, UN SCOR 56th year, 5, UN doc.
S/Res/1373/2001
4.
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 3rd 8,9,19,20

August 2001, U.N.Doc A/56/83
5.
UNGA, Human Rights and Terrorism U.N.Doc A/RES/54/164, (24 9

February 2000)
6.
SCR, International Cooperation In The Fight Against Terrorism 9

S/RES/1269 (19 October 1999
7.
SCR,
International
Cooperation
To
Combat
Threats
To 9
International Peace And Security Caused By Terrorist Acts

S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001)
8.
SCR, Combatting Terrorism, S/RES/1456 (20 January 2003)
9.
ILC, The Obligation To Extradite Or Prosecute (Aut Dedere Aut
10
Judicare), Final Report of the International Law Commission

(2014) ILC Yearbook, Volume II, Part II (2)
10. UNGA, Question of the punishment of War Criminals and of
10
persons who have committed Crimes Against Humanity,

A/Res/2840 (XXVI) (18 December 1971)
11. UNGA, Principles of International Co-operation in the detection, 10
Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons guilty of War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, A/RES/3074 (XXVIII) (3
December 1973)
12. SCR, Terrorism, S/RES/1333, (19 December, 2000)
10
13. SCR, Terrorism, S/RES/1566/ (8 October, 2004)
10
14. UNGA, Economic Measures as a means of Political and Economic
19
Coercion against Developing Countries: Note by the Secretary

General, UN Doc A/38/535 (25th October 1993)
ICJ
1.
ColombianPeruvian Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 ICJ, 1,2,6,8

(Nov 20)
2.
Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) 1995 ICJ, June 7

30
3.
The Case Concerning Land, Island, Maritime and Frontier Dispute 7

(El Salvador v. Honduras), 1992 ICJ, September 11
4.
Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua 8

(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 ICJ (June 27)
5.
Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. 13

Australia), 1992 ICJ, (June 26)
6.
Application Of The Convention On The Prevention And 13

Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide (Bosnia And Herzegovina
v. Serbia And Montenegro), 1996 ICJ Reports 595,626 (Feb. 26)
PCIJ & OTHER CASES

1.
The case of the S. S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. 927, 15

(September 7)
2.
Cox v. Canada 1994 UNHRC, UN doc. CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993, 9

(Oct. 31)
3.
M.A. v. Italy UNHRC 1984, (April 10)
4.
Chipana
v.
Venezuela,
1998
9
CAT
6.2
UN
doc. 12
CAT/C/21/D/110/1998 (Nov.10)
5.
ACLU v. Clapper, 2013 2nd District Circuit New York 959 (May 7)
16
XI
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Federal Republic of Ratanka and the Confederation of United Provinces on one side and
the Republic of Anghore on the other side have agreed to submit this dispute Concerning
Diplomatic Protection, Safe Passage and Extradition of Bobert Tires, to the International
Court of Justice pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1 of the Statute of this Court and by virtue
of a Special Agreement (Compromis) signed in The Hague, The Netherlands, on the twelfth
day of October in the year two thousand and fifteen and jointly notified to the Court on the
same date. In accordance with Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute, the Court has
jurisdiction to decide all matters referred to it for decision. Both parties shall accept the
Courts decision as final and binding and execute it in good faith.
XII
SUMMARY OF FACTS
DESCRIPTION OF STATE PARTIES
RATANKA: The Federal Republic of Ratanka is a developed country. It has a written
constitution, which is premised on the theory of Separation of Powers. The Government of
Ratanka holds FIA to be a part of its executive. However, the legal basis of FIA is to be
decided by a class action petition pending before the 9th District Circuit Court in Ratanka.
Ratanka shares a BET with CUP.
CONFEDERATION OF UNITED PROVINCES: CUP is a developed country. The laws
of CUP recognize the right to free speech as a basic right with reasonable restrictions. CUP
shares a BET with Ratanka. Also, CUP is a part of the MET of 1995
ANGHORE: Anghore is a developing country. It has its embassy in CUP.
SCANDINATIA: Scandinatia is the country of which Bobert Tires is a national. It is a party
to the MET of 2005.
BOBERT TIRES AND THE FIA

Bobert Tires is a national of Scandinatia and pursued his higher education in Ratanka. After
he graduated, the Ministry of External Affairs appointed him as an advisor on foreign legal
issues. When he was appointed, Tires signed a contract of engagement with Ratanka. This
contract conferred the Courts of Ratanka with the jurisdiction to adjudicate, if Ratanka were
to believe that Bobert Tires has acted against its interest, in the performance of his duties,
either in Ratanka or whilst abroad. Over time, Bobert Tires was asked to work on a White
Paper to discuss the compliance of investigative modes and methods of the FIA with foreign
legal requirements and standards. While working on this, Bobert Tires accessed files and
documents of the FIA. These documents disclosed that Ratanka had gathered information
including: recording of conversations between Foreign Heads of States, details of military
and defence acquisitions and the development of space programs of various countries. By
reading these files, Bobert Tires learnt the codes to access these digital files. After two years
of working on the White Paper and seven days before he was to be interviewed for grant of
Ratankas citizenship, Bobert Tires left Ratanka for CUP.
XIII
STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE ONE WORLD ALLIANCE

Expatriates having permanent residence in CUP formed the OWA there. Its object was to
expose the imperial hegemony of Developed States in various International Organizations in
general. Bobert Tires came into contact with OWA within a month of being in CUP and
began to informally advise them, particularly to exploit social media as a medium to advance
its campaign. On his advice, OWA set up accounts on various social media platforms and
increased its followers by exposing transcripts of conversation between the Heads of State of
Granje and Alleja, two lesser-developed countries, at a UN Summit in 2008. This was
followed by many such frequent leaks, where OWA published diplomatic cables, containing
sensitive information, which OWA claimed were received from an unknown source. This
came to be known in contemporary media as the Communigate scandal and OWA claimed
that it was the largest leak of diplomatic cables in history. Such leaks caused immense
dissatisfaction against Ratanka on the International level. A few days later, CUP blocked
OWAs website on which such information was displayed. However, when a petition was
filed challenging the Governments decision, the High Court Queens Bench division held
that the act of the Government to block the website as a whole, would be an act of excessive
pre-censorship and action could be taken against specifically inflammatory posts on an
international scale through a fresh petition.
RATANKA, CUP AND BOBERT TIRES

Ratankas Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Henis Kampberg, met with his counterpart of
CUP and claimed the leaks by OWA to be State Secrets and State Property and in the light
of the same, CUP was expected to prevent OWA from publishing such information, else it
would result in irretrievable breakdown of diplomatic relations. Considering the gravity of
the leaks, the FIA began its own investigation. It probed into the status of its employees and
ex employees of the Ministry of Ratankas External Affairs who may have had access to such
information. The FIA narrowed down to Bobert Tires as the likeliest source. Ratanka then
declared Bobert Tires as an Enemy of the State and OWA as a terrorist organization.
Ratankas lawmakers called for Tires to be charged with espionage. In the meanwhile, Bobert
Tires was arrested by CUPs Criminal Investigation Division, and produced before a
Magistrates Court. The Magistrates Court granted bail to Bobert Tires under the provisions
XIV
STATEMENT OF FACTS
of the Bail Act, 1932. Simultaneously, authorities in Ratanka began criminal investigations
against Bobert Tires under the Ratanka Espionage Act, 1917.
INTERVENTION OF ANGHORE
When Bobert Tires was on bail in CUP, he came into contact with Ms. Tolo Koure, an
executive assistant to the Ambassador of Anghore in CUP. A week later, Anghore announced
that Bobert Tires had been granted political asylum in the Anghorian embassy at CUP. This is
because Anghore believed that Bobert Tires might become a victim of political persecution.
CONSEQUENCES OF ANGHORES INTERVENTION

Ratanka issued an extradition request to CUP under its BET. The Government of CUP
approached the Anghorian embassy but it refused to release Tires maintaining that the action
against him was politically motivated. CUP stationed Metropolitan Police Service outside the
Anghorian embassy to arrest Bobert Tires should he try to leave. Hereafter, Ratanka and CUP
declared indefinite trade, economic and financial sanctions against Anghore until Anghore
refused to place value on the maintenance of international peace and take substantial
measures against the harboring of terrorists and fugitives. Additionally, Scandinatia issued an
arrest warrant for Bobert Tires under the MET to which Scandinatia and CUP are signatories
for allegedly assaulting two women in 2008, prior to leaving for Ratanka. Once an arrest
warrant is issued under the MET, it requires a signatory State to arrest and transfer a criminal
suspect or sentenced person to the issuing state so that the person can be put on trial or
complete a detention period. Thus, the Scandinatian officers sought Tires extradition to
Ratanka. The Anghorian embassy sought an assurance from Scandinatia that Bobert Tires
will not be re-extradited to Ratanka if extradited to Scandinatia. However, there was no
further response from Scandinatia. Soon after, Bobert Tires had developed a potentially life
threatening heart defect and a lung condition. However, Tires was out of danger and his
condition had been stabilized. Requisite medical care could not be provided in the Anghorian
embassy and hence, it wrote to CUP, requesting safe passage on humanitarian grounds. CUP
rejected this request, on the grounds that the purported illness had not been verified by CUP.
XV
STATEMENT OF FACTS
EPILOGUE
Ratanka, CUP, and Anghore agreed to have the dispute referred to the ICJ under Article
40(1) of its Statute. Ratanka and CUP contended that the asylum is unlawful, safe passage
cannot be granted and the inviolability of the premises of Anghores embassy has been
upheld. It also claims the extradition of Bobert Tires. The nature of the information gathered
by the FIA, its methods and the sanctions imposed against Anghore do not violate
International Law. Anghore contends that the asylum is legal, safe passage to Bobert Tires
should be granted and the inviolability of Anghores embassy has been violated. Anghore
argues that Bobert Tires must not be extradited. It also claims that the nature of the
information gathered by the FIA, its methods and the sanctions imposed against it violate
International Law.
XVI
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The parties have placed before this Honble Court, the following Questions for its
consideration:
1. Whether the Asylum granted to Bobert Tires by the Anghorian Embassy in CUP is
unlawful?
2. Whether CUP is obligated to provide safe passage to Bobert Tires?
3. Whether stationing Metropolitan Police Service outside the Anghorian embassy in CUP
and subsequent acts of CUP amount to violation of the VCDR?
4. Whether Anghore must extradite or surrender Bobert Tires to Ratanka or CUP?

5. Whether the manner and method used by Ratankas FIA to gather information and the
nature of information collected by it, are in violation of International Law?
6. Whether the economic, financial and trade sanctions imposed by Ratanka and CUP
against Anghore amount to Use of Force?
The Applicants have duly addressed all the aforementioned in the form of four
substantive arguments advanced, summarized under.
XVII
1. THE ACT
OF
GRANTING ASYLUM
BY
ANGHORE
IS IN
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The grant of asylum by Anghore is a derogation from the territorial sovereignty of CUP,
which is regarded as a fundamental axiom of International Law. Further, the act of
granting asylum is in violation of VCDR. Besides, Bobert Tires does not qualify as a
refugee under the refugee convention or the UDHR, hence extending no obligation upon
Anghore to grant him asylum. Additionally, there is no obligation under International
Law on CUP to grant Bobert Tires safe passage to Anghore. In the instant case, CUP did
not violate International Law by stationing officers outside the embassy.
2. BOBERT TIRES SHOULD BE SURRENDERED TO CUP OR EXTRADITED TO RATANKA

In the instant case, Monetary Gold Principle of indispensible third party is inapplicable
because Scandinatias rights and and legal interests do not form the very subject matter
of the dispute. Further, by refusing to surrender Bobert Tires to CUP, Anghore is in
breach of its international obligation conferred to it through principles of International
Law and VCDR. Alternatively, obligation to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut
judicare) has attained customary law status concerning acts of terrorism and hence
Bobert Tires, being involved in acts of terrorism, should be prosecuted by Anghore or
extradited to Ratanka. Anghore cannot prosecute Tires because there exists a contract of
engagement between Tires and Ratanka, leaving extradition to Ratanka the only
alternative. Additionally, there exists no fear of being exposed to political persecution,
torture, cruel or inhuman treatment if Bobert Tires is extradited to Ratanka.
3. RATANKA
HAS
BREACHED INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE MANNER AND NATURE OF
INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE FIA
Primarily, Anghores claim is inadmissible due to the rule of prior exhaustion of local
remedies. Secondly, Anghore has no standing to bring the claim before ICJ since it has
not been injured in any way by the acts of Ratankas FIA. Alternatively, acts of gathering
XVIII
information by Ratanka does not violate International Law. Lotus Principle provides that
in the absence of a positive rule, states are free to act. Since gathering information is
neither prohibited nor regulated in International Law, Ratanka is justified to act as it
wishes. Additionally, acts of Ratanka can be justified on grounds of anticipatory selfdefence which is positively codified in UN charter.
4. THE SANCTIONS
IMPOSED BY
RATANKA
AND
CUP
AGAINST
ANGHORE
ARE NOT IN
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The sanctions imposed by Ratanka and CUP against Anghore do not amount to Use of
Force. Alternatively, such sanctions do not amount to Economic Coercion under
International Law. Even if these sanctions are construed to be Economic Coercion,
customary practice demonstrates the usage of such Coercion in accordance with
International Law. Additionally, these sanctions can also be effectively interpreted as
Countermeasures adopted in accordance with the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
XIX
CONTENTION I
THE ACT OF GRANTING ASYLUM BY ANGHORE IS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1.1
THE GRANT OF DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM TO BOBERT TIRES BY
ANGHORE IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The ICJ has opined that diplomatic asylum is not protected by International Law.1 Authorities
are to the effect that the practice of diplomatic asylum has no basis in International Law but
merely in the consent of the state concerned.2 Since the practice of asylum is not sanctioned by
International Law, it can be defended only on the ground of the consent of the state within
whose jurisdiction it is sought to be maintained.3 Instead of providing consent, CUP had
approached the Anghorian Embassy for the immediate release of Bobert Tires for his
deportation to Ratanka for trial.4 Therefore, the grant of asylum is contrary to the principles of
International Law.
1.1.1 The Grant of Asylum is a derogation from the Territorial Sovereignty of CUP.
The principle of territorial sovereignty of a state is regarded as a fundamental axiom of
International Law.5 Diplomatic asylum takes place in derogation of the territorial sovereignty
of the State when it is granted.6 It limits the latter's jurisdiction over all individuals on its
territory, jurisdiction which is an essential attribute of State sovereignty under in International
Law.7
Since the refugee is within the territory of the State where the offence was committed, grant
of asylum withdraws the offender from the jurisdiction of the territorial State and constitutes
an intervention in matters, which are exclusively within the competence of that State. Such
ColombianPeruvian Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 ICJ 266 274275 (Nov 20)
Marteen Den Heijer, Diplomatic Asylum and the Assange Case, 34 Phil. L.J. 343 (1959)
JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 779 (vol. I, 1906)
Compromis 21
M. N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, [hereinafter Shaw] p. 487 (6th edition, 2008); L. Delbez, Du
Territoire dans ses Rapports avec lE tat, 39 Revue Generale de Droit International Public 46 (1932);
NORMAN LLEWELLYN HILL, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY, p. 3 (Oxford University Press, 1945)
6
UNHCR, Thirtieth session, Question of Diplomatic Asylum, Report of the Secretary General (Sep 22, 1975)
Id.
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS
derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognized unless its legal basis is
established in each particular case.8 Therefore, there is no general rule of International Law
permitting a grant of Asylum and such a legal basis in a particular case needs to be proved by
a particular treaty or custom.9 Firstly, there exists no treaty between the parties to establish a
legal basis for the grant of such an asylum. Secondly, the rule of customary law, which a
given State can no longer abolish, has not really been formed: the matter remains at the level
of a temporary custom, which can disappear just as it emerged. 10 Therefore, the grant of
asylum is a derogation from the territorial sovereignty of CUP.
1.1.2 By granting Asylum, Anghore has violated the Vienna Convention On Diplomatic
Relations.
A) Anghore has subverted the judicial process within CUP.
The VCDR states that without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of
all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the
receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.11
Furthermore, the ICJ held that even in Latin America, the treaty basis for Diplomatic Asylum
was narrowly construed so as to prevent abuse and that Asylum could not be used as a means
to avoid the regular application of laws of the receiving state.12
Bobert Tires was facing trial before a Magistrates court in CUP, and was out on bail at the
time he was granted Asylum by the embassy of Anghore.13 It is important for the security of
the State that crimes should not go unpunished.14 A diplomatic agent can have no legitimate
motive for removing from the operation of local justice a person over whom he himself has
no jurisdiction.15 Therefore, Anghore has subverted the judicial process within CUP in
8
Supra note 1
Prakash Shah, Asylum, Diplomatic, MPEPIL, Oxford Public International Law (April 2007)
10
A. RAESTAD, LA PORTE DU CANON COMME LIMITE DE LA MER TERRITORIALE, pp. 125,126

(1912) FREIDRICH BERBER, LEHRBUCH DES VLKERRECHTS, pp. 466-467 (vol. I 1948)
11
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 41(1), 18th April, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
12
Supra note 6
13
Compromis 17, 21
14
Supra note 6
15
Id.
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
violation of the VCDR.

B) Grant of Asylum is incompatible with diplomatic functions as laid down in VCDR.
The VCDR states that the functions of the diplomatic mission include promoting friendly
relations between the sending State and the receiving State.16 The premises of the mission
must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down
in the VCDR or by other rules of general International Law.17 The element of
incompatibility not only refers to activity that violates local laws, but also covers conduct
that falls outside the scope of ordinary diplomatic functions.18
The grant of Asylum resulted in deteriorating ties between CUP and Anghore to the extent
that the former imposed trade, economic and financial sanctions against the latter. The grants
of refuge which meet disapproval of the territorial state are an affront to friendly relations and
therefore, incompatible with diplomatic functions as laid down in VCDR.19
1.1.3 Bobert Tires is not a refugee under the Refugee Convention and UDHR and hence,
has no right to seek Asylum.
The Convention on the Status of Refugees contains exceptions to the definition of a refugee,
firstly, if he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to
his admission to that country as a refugee,20 and secondly, if he has been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 21 Additionally, International
Law provides that the right of Asylum may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.
16
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 3(1)(e), 18 th April, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
17
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 41(3), 18th April, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
18
B. S. MURTY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT

AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, p. 417 (1989)
19
A.J.Jeffrey, Diplomatic Asylum; Its Problems and Potential as a means of Protecting Human Rights, 1 S.A. J.
H.R. 22, (1985)
20
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1(F) (b) & (c), 28 th July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
21
Id.
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
A) Bobert Tires has committed a non-political crime.

An increasing number of offences have been declared non-political for the purposes of
extradition in Regional and International Conventions dealing with terrorism-related crimes,
thus precluding the application of the political offence exemption by the requested State.22
There are multiple exceptions to the political offender exception, including the exclusion of
certain non-political crimes including acts of terrorism.23
Bobert Tires is responsible for leaks to OWA, which is a terrorist organization posing a threat
to global security,24 therefore he is responsible for terrorism, a non-political crime.
B) Acts of Bobert Tires are against the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations and that knowingly financing; planning and inciting terrorist acts are also
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.25 Hence, since Bobert Tires has
committed acts of terrorism,26 contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
the application of the Refugee Convention or the UDHR to his case is incompatible with the
principles of International Law.
C) In any event, there is no fear of persecution.
Persecution refers to the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights, contrary to
International Law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity. 27 Separation of
powers is the political doctrine of constitutional law under which the three branches of
22
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Article 2(1) (1977); South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Article II (1987); OAU
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Article 3(2) (1999); Convention of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, Article 2(b) (1999); Arab Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, Article 2(b) (1999); Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, Article 11
(2002).: International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Article 11 (1997); International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Article 14 (1999).
23
H. Istafi, Counterterrorism and Policy Change, 24 Harv. L. Rev.35 (1993)
24
Compromis 15
25
SC Res. 1373, 4385th meeting, UN SCOR 56th year, 5, UN doc. S/Res/1373/2001; SC Res. 1377, 4413th
meeting, UN SCOR 56th year, 4, UN doc. S/Res/1377/2001
26
Supra note 24
27
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(1)(j), 17 th July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
government (executive, legislative, and judicial) are kept separate to prevent abuse of
power.28 Bobert Tires was out on bail at the time he was granted Asylum,29 indicating
conclusively towards an ongoing fair trial, without any deprivation of fundamental rights
contrary to International Law. Furthermore, since Ratankas constitution is based on the
doctrine of Separation of Powers,30 the presence of an independent judiciary to try Tires for
his alleged crime of leaking state secrets and state property31 eliminates any fear of political
persecution.
1.2
CUP DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW BY STATIONING
OFFICERS OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY

There are two important aspects of the rule of inviolability of the premises, firstly, the agents
of the receiving state may not enter the premises of the mission, except with the consent of
the head of the mission,32 and secondly, the receiving state has a special duty to take all
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.33
CUP was well within its rights to station officers outside the Anghorian Embassy to arrest
Tires in case he left the embassy,34 since he was already undergoing a trial within CUP,35 and
Ratanka had made a formal extradition request to CUP to deport Bobert Tires.36 This act does
not violate either of the aforementioned aspects. Firstly, the police did not enter the premises,
but was stationed outside.37 Secondly, the positive duty to protect is not an absolute duty, as
all appropriate steps denotes that all measures taken must be proportional to the risk and
28
Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School, Separation of Powers, available at:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/separation_of_powers (Last visited, 10th January, 8:42 a.m.)
29
Compromis 19
30
Compromis 2
32
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 22(1), 18 th April, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
33
34
Compromis 23
35
Compromis 17
36
Compromis 21
37
Supra note 4
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
dangers threatening the premises of the mission.38 There was no such risk or danger to the
embassy and hence, no omission on the part of CUP to discharge its positive duty to protect.
Therefore, CUP did not breach International Law by stationing police officers outside the
embassy.
1.3 THERE IS NO OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CUP TO
GRANT SAFE PASSAGE TO BOBERT TIRES
The ICJ has held that under International Law, the absence of a treaty obligation on the part
of the receiving state to allow a safe conduct implies that it was not legally bound to accede
to a request for a safe conduct.39 The generally accepted view is that, since it constitutes a
further incursion into their territorial sovereignty, receiving states are under no duty to allow
safe conducts to fugitives.40 Anghore has requested that CUP grant Bobert Tires a safe
passage to Anghore for the treatment of his purported illness.41 An official statement issued
by the Anghorian Embassy stated that Bobert Tires was out of danger and had been
stabilized,42 and in any event CUP is under no duty or obligation under International Law to
grant safe passage to Bobert Tires.
38
LORD GORE-BOOTH, SATOWS GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, p. 111 (5th edition, Longman
Publishers, 1979)
39
ColombianPeruvian Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950, ICJ Rep 266, 279, (Nov 20)
40
A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, p.46, (Vol. 2, 1972);

A. E. Evans, The ColombianPeruvian Asylum Case: Termination of the Judicial Phase, 45 AJIL 755, 761
(1951)
41
Compromis 29
42
Compromis 28
CONTENTION II
BOBERT TIRES SHOULD BE SURRENDERED TO CUP OR EXTRADITED TO RATANKA
2.1 MONETARY GOLD PRINCIPLE OF INDISPENSIBLE THIRD PARTY IS NOT
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
According to the Monetary Gold Principle, the Court will not adjudicate on a case where the
Court would be required, as a necessary prerequisite, to adjudicate on the rights or
responsibilities of a non-consenting and absent third State.43 However, it is limited to those
cases where the third state's rights form the very subject matter of the dispute.44 The Court
has also explained that while applying this principle, the test is whether a determination of the
absent third state's rights and obligations would 'constitute the very subject-matter of'45 and is
'needed as a basis for'46 its judgment, as opposed to the situation where its findings 'might
have implications'47 for the third state's rights and obligations or might affect the legal
interests of another state.48 In the instant case, Scandinatia was merely a stopover in Bobert
Tires legal journey to Ratanka since it neglected to respond to the assurance that Anghore
sought, in order to protect Bobert Tires from re-extradition.49 Hence, Scandinatias rights and
legal interests do not form the subject matter of the dispute.
Alternatively, the courts judgment might have mere implications on the rights of
Scandinatia, which does not violate the aforementioned principle. In any case, if Scandinatia
does consider itself to be affected by any decision of the court, it is free to institute separate
proceedings or to employ the procedure of intervention in accordance with Article 62 of the
Statute of ICJ.50 Therefore, the monetary gold principle is not applicable in the instant case
43
Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) 1995 ICJ 90, June 30; ZIMMERMAN, THE STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE-A COMMENTARY, p.1161 (2005)
44
The Case Concerning Land, Island, Maritime and Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), 1992 ICJ 92,
September 11
45
Olivia Lopes Pegna, Necessary Third Party before the ICJ, 9 EJIL 306-315 (1998)
46
Id.
47
Supra note 44
48
Supra note 43
49
Compromis 27
50
Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
1986 ICJ 14 (June 27)
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
2.2 BY REFUSING TO SURRENDER BOBERT TIRES TO CUP, ANGHORE IS

BREACHING ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
International Obligations are those, which are conferred to a state through principles of
International Law, treaties or conventions.51 The grant of Diplomatic Asylum, being not
recognized in International Law,52 undermines the territorial sovereignty of the state where
the crime is committed as it limits the jurisdiction over the individuals on its territory, a
jurisdiction that is by International Law an essential attribute of State sovereignty.53
Therefore, a decision to grant Diplomatic Asylum involves derogation from the sovereignty
of that State. Anghore is thus breaching its International obligations, as such an act is
contrary to International Law.
Secondly, grant of diplomatic asylum is contrary to VCDR, which provides that it is the duty
of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of
the receiving State and not interfere in the internal affairs of that State.54 With regards to
diplomatic asylum, the ICJ has opined that conferring Diplomatic Asylum involves
derogation from the sovereignty of that State as it withdraws the offender from the
jurisdiction of the territorial State and constitutes an intervention in matters which are
exclusively within the competence of that State.55 Therefore, in such cases the state granting
Asylum commits a wrongful act, as it constitutes a breach of International obligation 56 by
violating obligations imposed upon it by VCDR.
2.3 ANGHORE IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO SURRENDER BOBERT TIRES
TO CUP
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease
51
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 384, (7th edition, 2008)
52
Supra note 1
53
UNHCR, Thirtieth session, Question of Diplomatic Asylum, Report of the Secretary General (Sep 22, 1975)
54
55
ColombianPeruvian Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 ICJ 266 274275, (Nov 20)
56
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 2, 3 rd August 2001, U.N.Doc A/56/83
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
that act, if it is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition, if circumstances so require.57 Anghore, therefore is under an obligation to cease its
continuing internationally wrongful act and surrender Bobert Tires to CUP.
2.4 ALTERNATIVELY, OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE EXISTS IN CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International Criminal, Humanitarian and Human Rights Law provides a basis for extradition
in the absence of inter-State agreements with respect to certain crimes, and in some cases
even imposes an obligation on States to extradite or prosecute the alleged perpetrators of such
crimes.58 Additionally, Customary International Law may also serve as the basis for
extradition in the absence of previous treaty arrangements.59 There is no rule of International
Law, which prevents States from extraditing in the absence of a treaty. 60
Extradition is an important instrument of cooperation in the administration of justice, which
requires that safe havens should not be provided for those who seek to evade fair trial for
criminal offences, or who escape after such fair trial has occurred.61 In the context of human
rights and the fight against terrorism, this has been affirmed, for example, by the UNGA and
Security Council,62 as well as the Council of Europe.63
2.4.1 Obligation to Prosecute/Extradite (aut dedere aut judicare) exists when the offender
commits an act of terrorism.
An increasing number of offences have been declared non-political for the purpose of
57
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 30, 3 rd August 2001, U.N.Doc A/56/83
58
Sibylle Kapferer, The Interface between Extradition and Asylum, Legal And Protection Policy Research
Series, UNHCHR (November 2003)
59
Id.
60
P. MALANCZUK, AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 117 (7th

revised edition, Routledge, 1997)
61
Cox v. Canada 1994 UNHRC 10.3 UN doc. CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993, (Oct. 31); M.A. v. Italy UNHRC 1984
13.4 (April 10)
62
UNGA, Human Rights and Terrorism U.N.Doc A/RES/54/164, (24 February 2000); SCR, International
Cooperation In The Fight Against Terrorism S/RES/1269 (19 October 1999); SCR, International Cooperation
To Combat Threats To International Peace And Security Caused By Terrorist Acts U.N.Doc S/RES/1373 (28
September 2001); SCR, Combatting Terrorism, U.N.Doc S/RES/1456 (20 January 2003)
63
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GUIDELINES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM, p.57 (Council of Europe Publishing, March 2003)
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
extradition in Regional and International Conventions dealing with terrorism-related crimes,
thus precluding the application of the political offence exemption by the requested State. 64
The principle of aut dedere aut judicare (prosecute or extradite) constitutes customary
International Law.65 The obligation applies in respect of a wide range of crimes of serious
concern to the International Community and has been included in all sectorial conventions
against International Terrorism,66 as well as in various UNGA resolutions.67
In cases of terrorism, this principle may also be attributed Customary Law status.68 It can be
found in nearly every universal or regional convention and treaty relating to the fight against
International Terrorism. Mention may be made of Council of Europe Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism69; SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism70;
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 71; Arab Convention on
Combating Terrorism72 ; and International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism73. The principle is further intrinsic to several UNGA resolutions74, as well as
Security Council resolutions75. All these documents ascertain the opinio iuris necessary for an
emerging norm of Customary International Law. Thus, obligation to Prosecute/Extradite
64
Supra note 20
65
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, EDWARD WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, p.3 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995)
66
ILC, The Obligation To Extradite Or Prosecute (Aut Dedere Aut Judicare), Final Report of the International
Law Commission (2014) ILC Yearbook, Volume II, Part II (2)
67
UNGA, Question of the punishment of War Criminals and of persons who have committed Crimes Against
Humanity, U.N.Doc A/Res/2840 (XXVI) (18 December 1971); UNGA, Principles of International Cooperation in the detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons guilty of War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity, U.N.Doc A/RES/3074 (XXVIII) (3 December 1973)
68
Supra note 65
69
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Article 7 (1977)
70
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism, Article IV (1987)
71
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Article 8 and 9 (1997)
72
Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Article 3 (1999)
73
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Article 10 (1999)
74
CLAIRE MITCHELL, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE- THE PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE CLAUSE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, p.37
75
SCR, Terrorism, U.N.Doc S/RES/1333, (19 December, 2000); SCR, Terrorism, U.N.Doc S/RES/1566/ (8
October, 2004);
10
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
exists when the offender commits an act of terrorism.
2.4.2 Crime committed by Bobert Tires amounts to Terrorism.
The concept of terrorism has evolved in the 21st century. Today it can be defined as serious
damage to public or private property, including a State or government property. 76 Its ambit
has widened and it is no more confined to acts of bombing or hijacking. 77 Terrorism also
includes destruction of government property and damaging computer information used by
government institutions.78 Alternatively, it can also be defined as an act intended to influence
government policy through intimidation79 or to compel a Government to do or abstain from
doing an act80.
By leaking State secrets and state property,81 Bobert Tires damaged the intelligence gathered
by the FIA, which is exclusively the property of Ratanka.82 Furthermore, this act was done
with the intention of intimidating the government by making available such intelligence on a
website, accessible to enemies as well. Therefore, the acts of Bobert Tires fall under the
ambit of Terrorism.
2.4.3 Anghore is obliged to extradite Bobert Tires in the instant case.
Acts of Bobert Tires amount to terrorism and therefore Anghore is obliged to prosecute or
extradite him according to the principle of aut deder aut judicare. Importantly, in the instant
case, Anghore cannot prosecute Bobert Tires as there exists a contract of engagement
between Bobert Tires and Ratanka which confers exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of
Ratanka to try Bobert Tires for his acts against the interest of Ratanka.83 Alternatively,
Ratanka has the right to prosecute Bobert Tires in accordance to the principle of territorial
76
Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, Article 2, A/59/894
77
National Counterterrorism Center of United States of America, Watch listing Guidance, p.12 (March 2013)
78
Id.
79
Supra note 77
80
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, p.889 (Third Edition, Volume 1, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1937)
81
Compromis 15
82
Compromis 10
83
Compromis 3
11
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
jurisdiction according to which states have the right to exercise jurisdiction over persons who
perpetrated crimes against the State territory.84 Therefore, Anghore is obliged to extradite
Bobert Tires to Ratanka in the instant case.
2.5 ALTERNATIVELY, THERE EXISTS NO FEAR OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION;
TORTURE, CRUEL OR INHUMAN TREATMENT
For extradition to be in breach of the requested States obligations under UNCAT, there must
be specific reasons for believing that the person concerned is personally in danger of being
subjected to torture.85 Even, the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights in the requesting State is not in itself a sufficient reason to believe
that a person is in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific case. 86 This
implies that specific instances of human rights violations in a given State does not in itself
mean that a specific individual faces a substantial risk of torture if he or she is returned to that
State.87 Furthermore, additional grounds must be produced to show that the specific
individual would be personally at risk.88 In the absence of any such additional grounds in the
case concerned, it can be said that Bobert Tires will not be exposed to torture, if extradited to
Ratanka.
Secondly, the written constitution and the theory of Separation of Powers in Ratanka,89
further substantiate that there is no fear of political persecution. Bobert Tires has committed a
crime by leaking classified information and state secrets, and therefore extradition is
requested so that he can have a fair trial before the judiciary of Ratanka.
Keeping in mind that it is important for the security of the State that crimes should not go
unpunished, Bobert Tires should be extradited to Ratanka or surrendered to CUP.
84
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 2002 ICJ 4 (Separate
opinion of Judge Guillame) (Feb.14)
85
Chipana v. Venezuela, 1998 CAT 6.2 UN doc. CAT/C/21/D/110/1998 (Nov.10)
86
Id. 6.3
87
Supra note 85
88
David Kretzmer, Prohibition of Torture, MPEPIL, Oxford Public International Law (15th December 2010)
89
Compromis 2
12
CONTENTION III
RATANKA
HAS NOT
BREACHED INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE MANNER AND NATURE OF
INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE FIA
3.1 ANGHORES CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE OWING TO NON EXHAUSTION OF

LOCAL REMEDIES
Anghore has alleged that Ratanka has breached International Law by the manner and nature
of information gathered by its FIA.90 The legal basis of the functioning of the FIA is already
subject to judicial consideration through the class action petition, which is pending before the
9th District Circuit Court in Ratanka.91 Thus, it is evident that the local or domestic remedy is
still pending. Without their exhaustion, no remedies for legal injury can be envisaged at the
International level.92 Therefore, the claims of Anghore, with regard to Ratankas FIA, are not
admissible before this Court until domestic remedies for the same have been exhausted.93
3.2 ALTERNATIVELY, ANGHORE HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THIS CLAIM
BEFORE THE COURT
International Law allows only those Claimants, which have a demonstrable legal interest, 94 to
bring an action in respect of a wrong.95 States that are not directly injured are precluded from
bringing claims before the ICJ with a definite exception in cases of violations of peremptory
norms and the erga omnes obligations created by specific provisions of treaties such as the
Genocide Convention.96
90
Compromis 33
91
Compromis 2
92
UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.19 (2003)
93
Id.
94
Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 1992 ICJ Reports 240, (June 26)
95
PHOEBE OKOWA, ISSUES OF ADMISSIBILITY AND THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY (Cambridge University Press, 2010)
96
Application Of The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide (Bosnia And
Herzegovina v. Serbia And Montenegro), 1996 ICJ Reports 595,626 (Feb. 26)
13
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
Ratanka has not directly violated the rights of Anghore. 97 Alternatively, Ratankas FIA,
through its practices, has neither engaged in the violation of peremptory norms nor its erga
omnes obligations towards any State. Thus, Anghore, on account of it being a third party in
the present dispute, is precluded from bringing any claim before the ICJ.
3.3 ALTERNATIVELY, ACTS OF GATHERING INFORMATION BY RATANKA DO
NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Espionage is defined as a consciously deceitful collection of information, ordered by a
government, accomplished by humans unauthorized by the target to do the collection. 98 The
act of Peacetime Espionage is neither prohibited nor regulated.99 There is no law, treaty,
norm, or custom that dictates what can be and what cannot be spied upon.100 Today,
espionage is used by nearly all states in order to determine political and military intentions as
well as the location and inner workings of military hardware.101 Acts of gathering information
by Ratanka can be justified on grounds of: a) Customary practice and b) Anticipatory selfdefense.
3.3.1 Gathering information during peacetime does not violate Customary International Law.
States do not consider espionage as a violation of International Law.102 Considering the
increasing state practice in international affairs, it is fair to say that the practice of states
recognizes espionage as a legitimate function of the state, and therefore it is legal as a matter
97
Compromis 9
98
Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321, 325-26
(1996)
99
A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH.J.INTL L.595
(2007); Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46
A.F.L.REV.217, 217 (1999); Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and
International Law, 28 MICH. J. INTL L. 625, 625 (2007)
100
Michael Kapp, Spying for Peace: Explaining the Absence of the Formal Regulation of Peacetime Espionage,
Chi. J. Intl L. p.1 (June 2007)
101
Id.
102
Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs, ESSAYS ON
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, p.12 (Ohio State University Press, 1962); Julius Stone, Legal
Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict, ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, p.29, 36 (Ohio State University Press, 1962)
14
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
of Customary International Law.103 Additionally, some of the most authoritative opinions

hold that it is not considered wrong, morally, politically or legally to send spies abroad. 104
This is because such clandestine information gathering does not violate International Law.105
Intrinsic to the concept of surveillance and spying is the Lotus Principle. The Lotus case
famously stands for the proposition that in the absence of a positive rule, States are free to
act.106 The underlying idea remains that if no limits are established by International Law, a
state remains free to act as it wishes.107 Therefore, the Lotus approach provides in the absence
of any restriction, spying does not breach International Law.
In the case concerned, the information gathered by Ratanka through the use of its unique
technology or through agents is not illegal owing to the aforementioned two grounds which
are: a) The acts of Ratanka are not prohibited, explicitly or implicitly, by International Law or
Customary Practice as nothing in International Law forbids states from spying on each
other;108 and b) In the absence of such prohibition, Ratanka is free to act as per will.
Therefore, information gathering during peacetime does not violate Customary Law.
3.3.2 Alternatively, Anticipatory or Peremptory Self Defence is a valid justification for
Peacetime Espionage.
If this Court were to take the view that intervention by spies is prohibited in International
Law, it is submitted that such intervention can be justified on grounds of self-defense.109
Espionage for self-defense constitutes a justified intervention for the simple reason that it's
103
Jeffrey H. Smith, Symposium, State Intelligence Gathering and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INTL L.
543, 545 (2007)
104
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 510-11 (2nd edition, 1912) (hereafter OPPENHEIM);
Michael J. Barrett, Honorable Espionage, J DEF & DIPL, 13-21 (Feb. 1984)
105
Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INTL L. & POLY 321 (1996); Daniel
B. Silver (updated and revised by Frederick P. Hitz & J.E. Shreve Ariail), Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 935, 965 (2005)
106
The case of the S. S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. 927, (September 7)
107
Michael Glennon, The Road Ahead: Gaps, Leaks and Drips, 89 INTL. L.STUD.362, 374 (2013)
108
Daniel B. Silver, Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 935, 965 (2005);
Thomas C. Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive Information Operations in Space, 9 U.S.AIRFORCE
ACAD.J.LEGALSTUD. 121, 140 (1999)
109
H.M. KINDRED ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, p.835 (5th edition, Cambridge University Press, 1993)
15
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
not illegal for a state to intervene for self-defense.110 It has been widely suggested that spying
is a precursor to (and an integral part of) a states right to act in self-defense.111 That is, for a
state to be able to accurately anticipate and prepare for an armed attack before it occurs, it
must be lawful for that state to gather intelligence on foreign military and governmental
decision-making.112 Furthermore, to deem spying unlawful in International Law would be to
vitiate a states critical and well established right of self-defense, which no state would
tolerate.113 In the 21st century, States are committed to the idea that they require access to as
much data as possible to accurately locate terrorist plots and connections among suspected
terrorists, among other threats.114 Most fundamentally, states are of the view that effective
intelligence collection can alert them that another state is planning to attack it, or is engaged
in activities that evidence hostile intent.115 Therefore, for states to enjoy the positively
codified right to self-defense, they should retain the right to acquire information that would
indicate whether they face imminent armed attack.116 Thus, acts of spying of Ratanka through
FIA can be justified on the grounds of anticipatory/peremptory self-defence.
110
Faculty of Law of Western Ontario University, Espionage in International Law: A Necessary Evil, Public
International Law, Issue 427A, p. 6 (1999)
111
Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 AM.U.INTL

L.REV.1091, 1092 (2004)
112
Id.
113
UN, Charter of the United Nations, Article (51), Oct. 24, 1945, 1945 ATS 1
114
ACLU v. Clapper, 2013 2nd District Circuit New York 959 (May 7)
115
Id.
116
Julius Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict, ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 42 (Ohio State University Press, 1962)
16
CONTENTION IV
THE SANCTIONS
IMPOSED BY
RATANKA
AND
CUP
AGAINST
ANGHORE
ARE NOT IN
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
4.1 THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP AGAINST ANGHORE

DO NOT AMOUNT TO USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
International sanctions are penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the
targets failure to observe International Standards or International Obligations.117 Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter refrains all UN members in their International Relations, from resorting to
the threat or use of force against the Territorial Integrity or Political Independence of any
State.118 The travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter demonstrates that the prohibition on the
threat or the use of force is only directed to military force.119 States have rejected the proposal
to include economic force under the ambit of Use of Force. Furthermore, Article 51, the
provision for self-defence against the Use of Force explicitly refers to armed force only. 120 If
the word force were to include economic measures, it would render Article 2(4) inconsistent
with Article 51 of the UN Charter.121 Additionally, the UN Charter mandates the prohibition
of armed force only.122
Ratanka and CUP declared that they were imposing a trade, economic, and financial sanction
against Anghore so long as Anghore refused to place value on the maintenance of
international peace and take substantial measures against the harboring of terrorists and
fugitives.123 However, these sanctions do not amount to Use of Force against Anghore. The
word force intrinsically refers to the prohibition of the use or threat of force;
117
MARGARET P. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, p.9

(2ND EDITION, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 1996)
118
UN, Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4), Oct. 24, 1945, 1945 ATS 1
119
BRUNO SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, p. 118

(2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002)
120
UN, Charter of the United Nations, Article (51), Oct. 24, 1945, 1945 ATS 1
121
C. Joyner, The transnational boycott as economic coercion in International Law: Policy, Place and Practice,
Journal of Transnational law, pp.22-23 (1984)
122
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24th October 1945, Preamble at 7, 1945 ATS 1
123
Compromis 24
17
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
they will not apply to political or economic pressure, but only to physical armed force. 124
Hence, the sanctions imposed by Ratanka and CUP against Anghore do not amount to Use of
Force.
4.2. THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP AGAINST ANGHORE
DO NOT AMOUNT TO UNLAWFUL ECONOMIC COERCION
4.2.1. The sanctions imposed do not amount to Economic Coercion.
Economic sanctions can be defined broadly to include measures of an economic character, as
distinguished from military character taken to express disapproval of the acts of the target or
to induce that target (state) to change some policy or practice or even governmental
structure.125 Economic sanctions are differentiated from Economic Coercion in that fact that
the former are not usually measures taken for economic gain, and often at commercial
sacrifice.126 The sanctions imposed by Ratanka and CUP have been imposed only as long as
Anghore refuses to comply with International Law127 and are thus clearly not motivated by
economic or commercial gain. Furthermore, such sanctions expressly reflect Ratanka and
CUPs disapproval of the acts of Anghore with a view to maintain international peace.128
Hence, the sanctions imposed by Ratanka and CUP do not amount to Economic Coercion.
4.2.2. Alternatively, the sanctions imposed, even if construed as economic coercion, continue
to be lawful under International Law.
Economic Coercion can be defined broadly to include the use, or the threat to use, measures
of an economic character, as distinguished from military character to force that Target (state)
to change some non-economic policy or practice or even governmental structure of the Target
State.129 There is no clear consensus in International Law as to when coercive measures are
improper, despite relevant treaties, declarations and resolutions adopted in international
124
BOWETT, SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 148 (The Lawbook Exchange, 1958)
125
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, p.698 (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002)
126
Id.
127
Compromis 24
128
Id.
129
Supra note 9
18
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
organizations, which try to develop norms limiting the use of such measures. 130 Customary
practice holds that economic coercion through economic sanctions is not always unlawful.
Economic Sanctions have been imposed unilaterally by the US against Libya, India, Japan,
and others; Japan has imposed sanctions against Burma (now Myanmar); the European
community has imposed sanctions against Turkey.131 The aforementioned sanctions were
invariably intended to bring about changes in the respective non economic policies of each of
the Target States and these have not been held unlawful under International Law.132
Similarly, the sanctions imposed by Ratanka and CUP against Anghore, in accordance to
customary practice, aimed at a change in Anghores non economic policy and exhorted
compliance with International Law by precluding the harboring of terrorists and fugitives,
precisely Bobert Tires, in its embassy at CUP.133
Thus, the sanctions imposed by the States of Ratanka and CUP against Anghore does not
amount to coercion. However, if the Honorable Court were to take a view that the sanctions
are coercive, it is also pleaded that such coercive sanctions would not be unlawful under
International Law.
4.3 ALTERNATIVELY, THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP ARE
EFFECTIVELY COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ANGHORE
Anchored in Chapter II of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts is the concept of Countermeasures.134 Countermeasures are resorted to when
the targeted State has committed an internationally wrongful act.135 Article 58(1) of the
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts lays down the
conditions to be complied with before a counter measure is taken and they are: a) to call upon
130
UNGA, Economic Measures as a means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries:
Note by the Secretary General, UN Doc A/38/535 (25th October 1993)
131
Omer Y Elagab, Coercive Economic Measures against Developing Countries, 41 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 682694, No. (July 3 1992)
132
Id.
133
Compromis 24
134
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Chapter (II), 3 rd August 2001, U.N.Doc A/56/83
135
CHIARA FRANCO, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, p.4

(Instituto Affari Internazionali, 5th March 2015)
19
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
the responsible State to fulfill its obligations and b) to notify the responsible State of any
decision to take countermeasures and offer to negotiate with the State.136 However, intrinsic
in Article 58(2) is the exception to Article 58(1)(b); accordingly the injured State may take
urgent counter measures as are necessary to preserve its rights 137. In the given circumstances,
CUP approached the Anghorian embassy for the immediate release of Bobert Tires for his
deportation to Ratanka for trial in spite of believing that the grant of Asylum is an illegal and
void act.138 Thus, Ratanka and CUP fulfilled their responsibility to call upon Anghore to
fulfill its obligations under Article 58(1). However, it is contended by Ratanka and CUP that
the countermeasures were necessary to be taken by them under Article 58(2) considering that
the Anghorian embassy wouldnt change its stance and that, the diplomatic cables that were
leaked by Bobert Tires were the largest leaks of diplomatic cables in history139. The leak of
such records by Bobert Tires could reasonably sabotage Ratankas foreign policy and
endanger the lives of Ratankians.140 Anghores harboring of such terrorists and fugitives
compelled Ratanka and CUP to impose urgent sanctions against the Anghore to preserve their
rights, which are to try Bobert Tires for espionage and other crimes in Ratanka and to
maintain adherence to the territorial States judicial process respectively. Conclusively, the
sanctions imposed by Ratanka and CUP can be effectively construed as countermeasures.
Thus, it is pleaded that the sanctions imposed by the Ratanka and CUP are not in violation of
International Law.
136
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article (58), 3 rd August 2001, U.N.Doc A/56/83
137
Id.
138
Compromis 21
139
Compromis 9
140
Compromis 16
20
PRAYER
In light of the questions presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the agent
for the Applicant States most humbly and respectfully pray before this Honble Court,
that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare that
1. The grant of diplomatic asylum to Bobert Tires by Anghore is contrary to the
principles of International Law.
2. There is no obligation under International Law on CUP to grant safe passage to
Bobert Tires.
3. CUP did not violate International Law by stationing its officers outside the embassy.
4. Bobert Tires should be surrendered to CUP or extradited to Ratanka.
5. Ratanka has not breached International Law by the manner and nature of information
gathered by the FIA.
6. The sanctions imposed by Ratanka and CUP against Anghore are not in violation of
International Law.
The Applicant States additionally pray that the Court may make any such order as
it may deem fit in terms of equity, justice and due conscience. And for this act of
kindness the Applicant States shall as duty bound ever humbly pray.
(Respectfully Submitted)
- Agents on behalf of the Applicant States.
XX

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TEAM CODE: I

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE,

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF RATANKA

CONFEDERATION OF UNITED PROVINCES

(THE RESPONDENT STATE)

SUBMITTED IN THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT

THE ACT OF GRANTING ASYLUM BY ANGHORE IS IN VIOLATION OF

THE GRANT OF DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM TO BOBERT TIRES BY ANGHORE

IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

BY GRANTING ASYLUM, ANGHORE

CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

B. Grant of Asylum is incompatible with diplomatic functions as

laid down in VCDR

AND UDHR AND HENCE HAS NO RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM

A. Bobert Tires has committed a non-political crime

B. Acts of Bobert Tires are against the purposes and principles of

D.M HARISH MEMORIAL INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

C. In any event, there is no fear of persecution.

THERE IS NO OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CUP TO

VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

OFFICERS OUTSIDE THE ANGHORIAN EMBASSY

GRANT SAFE PASSAGE TO BOBERT TIRES

SURRENDERED TO CUP OR EXTRADITED

ALTERNATIVELY, OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE EXISTS IN CUSTOMARY

MONETARY GOLD PRINCIPLE

INDISPENSIBLE THIRD PARTY

NOT APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE

BREACHING ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION

IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO SURRENDER

EXISTS WHEN THE OFFENDER

COMMITS AN ACT OF TERRORISM

CRIME COMMITTED BY BOBERT TIRES AMOUNTS TO TERRORISM

EXTRADITE BOBERT TIRES

PERSECUTION, TORTURE, CRUEL OR INHUMAN TREATMENT

HAS NOT BREACHED

MANNER AND NATURE OF INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE FIA

ALTERNATIVELY, ANGHORE HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THIS CLAIM

CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE OWING TO

BEFORE THE COURT

ALTERNATIVELY, ACTS OF GATHERING INFORMATION BY RATANKA DO

D.M HARISH MEMORIAL INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

DOES NOT VIOLATE

THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP AGAINST ANGHORE

VALID JUSTIFICATION OF PEACETIME ESPIONAGE

ARE NOT IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP AGAINST ANGHORE

DO NOT AMOUNT TO 'USE OF FORCE' UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP AGAINST ANGHORE

DO NOT AMOUNT TO UNLAWFUL ECONOMIC COERCION

THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED DO NOT AMOUNT TO ECONOMIC COERCION

THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED, EVEN IF CONSTRUED AS

ECONOMIC COERCION, CONTINUE TO BE LAWFUL UNDER INTERNATIONAL

ALTERNATIVELY, THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RATANKA AND CUP ARE

EFFECTIVELY COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ANGHORE