I.

Introduction to Civil Law

I.
Tolentino, Civil Code
II.
Balane, Spanish Antecedents

II.

Effect and Application of Laws

NCC Art. 1-18
Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil
Code of the Philippines." (n)
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication. (1a)
Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. (2)
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided. (3)
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity. (4a)
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law. (4a)
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines. (n)

Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render

judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws. (6)
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. (n)
Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public
order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. (n)
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence.(n)
Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months,
days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of
thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights
from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall
be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded, and the last day included. (7a)
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (8a)
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person

whose succession is under consideration, whatever

may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be
found. (10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have, for their object,
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code
of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency
shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.
A. When do laws take effect?
NCC Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication.
RAC Secs.18-24
Chapter 5
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall
take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
unless it is otherwise provided.chanrobles
virtual law library

Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have

prospective effect unless the contrary is
expressly provided.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and
Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation
of a law or administrative issuance promulgated
in all the official languages, the English text
shall control, unless otherwise specifically
provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or
mistake, the other texts may be consulted.
Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.When a law which expressly repeals a prior law
itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not
be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law
is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be
revived, unless the repealing law provides
otherwise.
Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Chapter 6
OFFICIAL GAZETTE
Sec. 24. Contents. - There shall be published
in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature; all executive and
administrative issuances of general application;
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or
other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed
by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and such documents or
classes of documents as the President shall
determine from time to time to have general
application or which he may authorize so to be
published.

The publication of any law, resolution or other

official documents in the Official Gazette shall
be prima facie evidence of its authority.
Executive Order 200(PROVIDING FOR THE
PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL
CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY)
Sec. 1&2
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it
is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with
this Executive Order are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Cases:
Pesigan v. Angeles
G.R. No. L-64279, April 30, 1984
Aquino, J.
Facts:
Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan,
carabao dealers transported on April 2. 1982,
twenty-six (26) carabaos & a calf from
Camarines Norte with Batangas as its
destination. They were provided with health
certificates from the provincial veterinarian and
three (3) other permits attesting that the cattle
was not part of lose, stolen or questionable
animals.
Despite this, the said cattle was
confiscated by respondents Zenarosa and
Miranda, who were respectively the police
station commander and provincial veterianarian

of Basud, Camarines Norte. The confiscation

was on the basis of said EO 626-A which was
dated October 25, 1980 but was published in
theOfficial Gazette on June 14, 1982.
Executive Order 626-A provides, "that
henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex,
physical
condition
or
purpose
and
no
carabeef shall be transported from one province
to
another. The
carabaos
or
carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order
as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government to be distributed ...
to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos".
The Pesigans filed an action for replevin
against herein respondents for the recovery of
the subject cattle but this could not be executed
by the sheriff. Subsequently, the judge
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
Hence, the petitioners filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A
dated October 25, 1980, providing for the
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of
cattle transported from one province to another,
can be enforced even before its actual
publication in the Official Gazette of June 14,
1982
Held: NO
The Supreme Court held that EO 626-A is
a penal regulation published more than two
months after the confiscation of the cattle or in
June 14, 1982. Hence, it became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of

the Civil Code. It should therefore not be

enforced against the petitioners.
Publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of the regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. (People v Que Po). Justice and
fairness dictate that the public must be
informed of that provision by means of
publication in the Gazette before violators of the
executive order can be bound thereby.
Note: The word "laws" in Article 2 of the
NCC also includes circulars and regulations
which prescribe penalties
People vs. Veridiano
G.R. L-62243, October 12, 1984
Relova, J.
At issue in this case is the applicability of BP 22
which was circulated a month after private
respondent issued the dishonored check.
Facts:
On or about the 2nd week of May 1979,
private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a
check amounting to P200, 000 to one Filipinas
Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored
and despite repeated demands, the respondent
failed to make the necessary payment. Hence,
the filing of charges against him for violation of
B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Check law.
Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging
that the information did not charge an offence
on ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect
when the offense was committed on May 1979.
Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The
prosecution opposed the motion and contended
that the date of the dishonor of the check -September 26, 1979, is the date of the

commission of the offense, hence BP 22 is

applicable.
The respondent judge granted Go Bio's
motion and dismissed the criminal action hence,
this petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was
published in the Official Gazette on April 4,
1979, and hence became effective 15 days
thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends
however that said publication was only released
on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check
was issued about the second week of May 1979,
then he could not have violated BP 22 because
it was not yet released for circulation at the
time.
Issue:
W/N BP 22 was already in effect
when the offense was committed
Held:
NO.
The penal statute in question was
circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its
printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the
law is necessary so that the public can be
apprised of the contents of a penal statute
before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not
been published before its violation, then in the
eyes of the law there was no such law to be
violated. Hence, the accused could not have
committed the alleged crime. In effect, when
the alleged offense was committed there was
still no law penalizing it. If BP 22 intended to
make the printed date of issue of the Official
Gazette as the point of reference in the
determination of its the effectivity, it could have
provided a special effectivity provision. Finally,
the term "publication" in BP 22 must be given
the ordinary accepted meaning, to make known
to the people in general.

Tanada vs. Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985
Escolin, J.
Facts:
Petitioners: Taada,Sarmiento, and
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity
and Nationalism, Inc(MABINI); Respondent public
officials
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders.
Respondents, through the Solicitor
General would have this case dismissed outright
on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that the petitioner are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential
issuances in question.
Respondent further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of the
law where the law themselves provides for their
own effectivity dates.
Issue:
Whether the presidential decrees in
question which contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity?
Held:
Publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for

then the date of publication is material for

determining its date of effectivity, which is the
15th day following its publication, but not when
the law itself provides for the date when it goes
into effect.
Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential
issuances of a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose burdens on the people, such
as tax revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concern.
The Court therefore declares that
presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect.
MRCA Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 86675, December 19, 1989
Grino-Aquino, J.
Facts:
Facts: The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a
complaint against private respondents spouses
(who were defendants in said civil case). Said
case was dismissed by the trial court due to the
non-payment of proper filing fees when
petitioner failed to include include in the
complain the amount of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses sought to be recovered.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said ruling,

hence the petitioner comes to SC by petition for
review. Petitioner contends that the Manchester
ruling does not apply to the case since said
court decision was not published in the Official
Gazette. It should be noted that petitioner filed
said
complaint
ten
months
after
the
promulgation of the Manchester ruling.
Issue:
W/n court rulings need to be published in
the Official Gazette order to be effective
Held: NO.
Publication in the Official Gazette is not a
prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling
even if it lays down a new rule or procedure. It is
a well-established doctrine that the procedure of
the court may be changed at any time and
become effective at once so long as it does not
affect or change vested rights. (Aguillon v Dir. of
Lands)
As such, the court granted the petition and held
that the Manchester ruling should apply to the
case of the petitioner though it was modified by
the Sun Insurance case where the court allowed
the payment of docket fees within a reasonable
period but not beyond the reglamentary period.
Petitioner was allowed to amend the complaint
and specify therein the amount of damages it
seeks from defendant and pay the proper filing
fees
Yaokasin vs. Commissioner
G.R. No. 84111, December 22, 1989
Grino-Aquino, J.
Facts:
The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000
sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner
Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from
the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the
custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7,

1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered

the release of the cargo to the petitioner but
this order was subsequently reversed on June
15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms
Memorandum
Order
(CMO)
20-87 in
implementation of the Integrated Reorganization
Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest
and seizure cases where the decision is adverse
to the government, the Commissioner of
Customs has the power of automatic review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec.
12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that
these were not published in the Official Gazette.
The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however
published in the Official Gazette.
Issue:
W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to
be published in the OG to take effect
Held:
NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply
to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an
administrative order of the Commissioner of
Customs addressed to his subordinates, the
custom collectors. Said issuance requiring
collectors of customs to comply strictly with
Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to
particular persons or a class of persons (the
customs
collectors),
hence
no
general
applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, It
need not be published, on the assumption that it
has been circularized to all concerned.
Moreover,
Commonwealth
Act.
638
provides an enumeration of what shall be
published in the Official Gazette. It provides that
besides legislative acts, resolutions of public
nature of Congress, executive, administrative
orders and proclamations shall be published
except when these have no general applicability.

B. Ignorance of the Law

NCC Art.3 Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.
Kasilag vs. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 46623, December 7, 1939
Imperial, J.
Facts:
PROCEDURAL FACTS: This is an appeal
taken by the defendant-petitioner (Kasilag) from
the decision of the Court of Appeals which
modified that rendered by the court of First
Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that the
contract is entirely null and void and without
effect;
that
the
plaintiffs-respondents
(Rodriguez, et.al.), then appellants, are the
owners of the disputed land, with its
improvements, in common ownership with their
brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are
entitled to the possession thereof; that the
defendant-petitioner should yield possession of
the land in their favor, with all the
improvements thereon and free from any lien.
SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: The parties entered
into a contract of loan to which has an
accompanying accessory contract of mortgage.
The executed accessory contract involved the
improvements on a piece land, the land having
been acquired by means of homestead.
Petitioner for his part accepted the contract of
mortgage.
Believing that there are no violations to the
prohibitions in the alienation of lands Petitioner,
acting in good faith took possession of the land.
To wit, the Petitioner has no knowledge that the
enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element
of the credit transaction of Antichresis.
Issue:

1.
Whether or not the principal contract
entered into is null and void.
2.
Whether or not the subsequent contract is
null and void.
3.
Whether or not the Kasilag is a possessor
in good faith of the land.
Held:
1.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of
contracts is to the effect that the intention of
the contracting parties should always prevail
because their will has the force of law between
them. Article 1281 (now Art. 1370) of the Civil
Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if
the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall
be followed; and if the words appear to be
contrary to the evident intention of the
contracting parties, the intention shall prevail.
The contract should be interpreted in
accordance with these rules. As the terms
thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it
should be interpreted according to the literal
meaning of its clauses.
The words used by the contracting parties in the
contract clearly show that they intended to
enter into the principal contract of loan in the
amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent
per annum, and into the accessory contract of
mortgage of the improvements on the land
acquired as homestead, the parties having
moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions
stated in the deed. In other words, the parties
entered into a contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as
homestead, to secure the payment of the
indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated
interest thereon.

Another fundamental rule in the interpretation

of contracts, not less important than those
indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses
and conditions contrary to law, morals and
public order should be separated from the valid
and legal contract and when such separation
can be made because they are independent of
the valid contract which expresses the will of
the contracting parties.
Principal contract is that of loan and the
accessory
that
of
mortgage
of
the
improvements upon the land acquired as a
homestead. There is no question that the first of
these contract is valid as it is not against the
law.
2.
Parties entered into another verbal
contract whereby the petitioner was authorized
to take possession of the land, to receive the
fruits thereof and to introduce improvements
thereon, provided that he would renounce the
payment of stipulated interest and he would
assume payment of the land tax. The
possession by the petitioner and his receipt of
the fruits of the land, considered as integral
elements of the contract of antichresis, are
illegal and void agreements because the
contract of antichresis is a lien and such is
expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No.
2874.
3.
Despite the foregoing, SC found the
defendant-petitioner Kasilag as a possessor of
the land in good faith. Sec 433 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines provides Every person who is
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner
of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall
be deemed a possessor of good faith. And in
this case, the petitioner acted in good faith.
Good faith maybe a basis of excusable

ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in

good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the
land to which was done through his apparent
acquisition thereof.
C. Retroactivity
NCC Art. 4&5
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.

NCC Art.2252-2269
TRANSITIONALPROVISIONS
Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions
and rules laid down by this Code which may
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the old legislation shall have no
retroactive effect.
For the determination of the applicable law in
cases which are not specified elsewhere in this
Code, the following articles shall be observed:
(Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions).
Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other
previous laws shall govern rights originating,
under said laws, from acts done or events which
took place under their regime, even though this
Code may regulate them in a different manner,
or may not recognize them. But if a right should
be declared for the first time in this Code, it
shall be effective at once, even though the act
or event which gives rise thereto may have
been done or may have occurred under prior
legislation, provided said new right does not

prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right,

of the same origin. (Rule 1)
Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise
from acts or omissions which are against the law
or which infringe upon the rights of others. (n)
Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts
and contracts with a condition or period, which
were executed or entered into before the
effectivity of this Code, even though the
condition or period may still be pending at the
time this body of laws goes into effect. (n)
Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime
of the old laws, if they are valid in accordance
therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as
provided in the same, with the limitations
established in these rules. But the revocation or
modification of these acts and contracts after
the beginning of the effectivity of this Code,
shall be subject to the provisions of this new
body of laws. (Rule 2a)
Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a
civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of
rights to acts or omissions which were not
penalized by the former laws, are not applicable
to those who, when said laws were in force, may
have executed the act or incurred in the
omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.
If the fault is also punished by the previous
legislation, the less severe sanction shall be
applied.
If a continuous or repeated act or omission was
commenced before the beginning of the
effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or
is maintained or repeated after this body of laws
has become operative, the sanction or penalty
prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even
though the previous laws may not have
provided any sanction or penalty therefor. (Rule
3a)

Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into

being but were not exercised before the
effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force
in conformity with the old legislation; but their
exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce
them shall be regulated by this Code and by the
Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of
the action was commenced under the old laws,
but is pending on the date this Code takes
effect, and the procedure was different from
that established in this new body of laws, the
parties concerned may choose which method or
course to pursue. (Rule 4)
Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to
execute acts and contracts is governed by this
Code, even if her marriage was celebrated
under the former laws. (n)
Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural
child shall take place according to this Code,
even if the child was born before the effectivity
of this body of laws. (n)
Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article
302 shall also be applicable to any support,
pension or gratuity already existing or granted
before this Code becomes effective. (n)
Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors,
appointed by the courts before this Code goes
into effect, shall continue to act as such,
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 320. (n)
Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person
who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and
by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those
who, with or without a will, die after the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be
adjudicated and distributed in accordance with
this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court;
but the testamentary provisions shall be carried

out insofar as they may be permitted by this

Code.
Therefore,
legitimes,
betterments,
legacies and bequests shall be respected;
however, their amount shall be reduced if in no
other manner can every compulsory heir be
given his full share according to this Code. (Rule
12a)
Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural
children by legal fiction referred to in article 89
and illegitimate children mentioned in Article
287, shall also be acquired by children born
before the effectivity of this Code. (n)
Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or
personal property arising after this Code
becomes effective, includes those things which
came into the creditor's possession before said
date. (n)
Art. 2266. The following shall have not only
prospective but also retroactive effect:
(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be
compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against
his parents and ascendants;
(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against
collusion in cases of legal separation and
annulment of marriage;
(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the
proof of illegitimate filiation;
(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will
on petition of the testator himself;
(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the
reformation of instruments;
(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to
quiet title;
(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to
promote compromise. (n)
Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply
not only to future cases but also to those
pending on the date this Code becomes
effective:

(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions

wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt;
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries. (n)
Art. 2268. Suits between members of the same
family which are pending at the time this Code
goes into effect shall be suspended, under such
terms as the court may determine, in order that
compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in
case of legal separation proceedings, for the
purpose of effecting, if possible, a reconciliation.
(n)
Art. 2269. The principles upon which the
preceding transitional provisions are based
shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not
specifically regulated by them. (Rule13a)
RPC Art. 22
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.
Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.
Puzon vs. Abellera
G.R. No. 75082, January 31, 1989
Paras, J.
Facts:
The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera
(substituted upon her death by Domondon) was
the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of land
situated in Baguio City, a land which was
previously part of the public domain but was
titled pursuant to RA 931. In another

case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court

declared that all titles issued under RA 931 are
null and void since the said Act was applicable
only to places covered by cadastral proceedings,
and not to the City of Baguio which was covered
by a townsite reservation.
This same ruling was subsequently
incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271 with the title
"An act nullifying decrees of registration and
certificates of title covering lands within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant to RA 931
which took effect on December 22, 1977. PD
1271 considered as valid certain titles of lands
that are alienable and disposable under certain
conditions and for other purposes. Hence, the
lot in question was reverted to the public
domain.
The subject lots were sold in an auction
sale due to the non-payment of taxes. Petitioner
took interest and subsequently won the bid. A
year after, a certificate of sale was issued. In
this connection, the petitioner filed a case to
consolidate his ownership of
the lots.
Meanwhile, Domondon found out about the
auction sale and filed an opposition to the
petition for consolidation filed by petitioner. The
trial court ruled that said auction sale is null and
void and that the assessments were illegally
made. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence this petition with petitioner
contending that the tax assessments were valid
and that PD 1271 has a curative effect.
Issue:
Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied
retroactively
Held:
YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code
prohibits the retroactive application of laws
unless expressly provided therein, such rule

allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under

one of the exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is
necessarily to make such titles valid from the
time they were issued. This implies that the
intent of the law is to recognize the effects of
certain acts of ownership done in good faith by
persons with Torrens titles issued in their favor
before the cut-off date stated, honestly
believing that they had validly acquired the
lands. And such would be possible only by
validating all the said titles issued before 31 July
1973, effective on their respective dates of
issue. However, the validity of these titles would
not become operative unless and after the
conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.
Acosta vs. Plan
G.R. No. L-44466, January 30, 1989
Grino-Aquino, J.
Facts:
Petitioners
filed
an accion
publiciana against private respondent Magday
at the CFI of Isabela. Believing that as pauper
litigants they did not have to submit a record on
appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate
the entire records of the case to CA (as provided
in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).
On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge
dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record
on appeal, hence this petition. Under the Rules
of Court then in force, a record on appeal was
indeed required to be filed by a pauper
appellant although it did not have to be printed.
Issue:
Whether or not a timely submission of a
record on appeal is required for the perfection
of an appeal by a pauper litigant
Held:
NO.

Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken

this case before it could be decided, a record on
appeal is no longer required for the perfection of
an appeal. This law was given retroactive
effect.
As held in People v Sumilang, being
procedural in nature, those provisions may be
applied retroactively for the benefit of
petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'
MRCA Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 86675, December 19, 1989
Grino-Aquino, J.
Facts:
Facts: The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a
complaint against private respondents spouses
(who were defendants in said civil case). Said
case was dismissed by the trial court due to the
non-payment of proper filing fees when
petitioner failed to include include in the
complain the amount of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses sought to be recovered.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said ruling,
hence the petitioner comes to SC by petition for
review. Petitioner contends that the Manchester
ruling does not apply to the case since said
court decision was not published in the Official
Gazette. It should be noted that petitioner filed
said
complaint
ten
months
after
the
promulgation of the Manchester ruling.
Issue:
W/n court rulings need to be published in
the Official Gazette order to be effective
Held: NO.

Publication in the Official Gazette is not a

prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling
even if it lays down a new rule or procedure. It is
a well-established doctrine that the procedure of
the court may be changed at any time and
become effective at once so long as it does not
affect or change vested rights. (Aguillon v Dir. of
Lands)
As such, the court granted the petition and held
that the Manchester ruling should apply to the
case of the petitioner though it was modified by
the Sun Insurance case where the court allowed
the payment of docket fees within a reasonable
period but not beyond the reglamentary period.
Petitioner was allowed to amend the complaint
and specify therein the amount of damages it
seeks from defendant and pay the proper filing
fees
BPI vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-66826, August 19, 1988
Cortes,J.
Facts:
Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife
maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings
account and a peso current account. An
application for a dollar drat was accomplished
by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST
payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the
PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was
to be charged to the dolar savings account of
the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the
name of the purchaser of the dollar draft.
Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of
Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal
from his account, he demanded an explainaiton
from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed
that the peso value of the withdrawal was given
to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy.

When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers

check for P8450 issued by the manila banking
corporation payable to Ernesto.
Issue:
Whether the contract between petitioner
and respondent bank is a deposit?
Held:
The document which embodies the
contract states that the US$3,000.00 was
received by the bank for safekeeping. The
subsequent acts of the parties also show that
the intent of the parties was really for the bank
to safely keep the dollars and to return it to
Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack
demanded the return of the money on May 10,
1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract
defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another, with the obligation of safely keeping it
and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of
the thing delivered is not the principal purpose
of the contract, there is no deposit but some
other contract.
D. Waiver of Rights
NCC Art. 6 Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.
NCC Art. 301 The right to receive support
cannot be renounced; nor can it be transmitted
to a third person. Neither can it be compensated
with what the recipient owes the obligor.
However,
support
in
arrears
may
be
compensated and renounced, and the right to

demand the same may be transmitted by

onerous or gratuitous title.
E. Repeal of Laws
NCC Art. 7 Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
1987CONSTIArt.XVIIIsec.3 All existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.
Guingona vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion
in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated
under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,
while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt
service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD
No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process
in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the
Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed
Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioners were questioning the

constitutionality of the automatic appropriation
for debt service, it being higher than the budget
for education, therefore it is against Section
5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to assign the highest budgetary
priority
to
education.
Issue:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for
debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than
the
budget
for
education.
Held:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education, it does not thereby follow
that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as
to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country.
More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to
education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional.
F. Duty to render judgment
NCC Art.9 No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

RPC Art.5 Acts executed against the provisions

of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
G. Applicability of Custom
NCC Art.11-12
Art. 11 Customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. (n)
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence.
1987CONSTIArt.XIIsec.5 The State, subject to
the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall
protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure
their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability
of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domain.
ROC Rule129 Sec.2-3
Sec. 2 Judicial notice, when discretionary. A
court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable to
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial
functions. (1a)
Sec. 3 Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon.

Martinez vs. Van Buskirk

G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910
Moreland, J.
Facts:
1. On the 11th day of September, 1908,
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
acarromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery
wagon owned by the defendant (used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two horses
are attached), came from the opposite direction,
while their carromata went close to the
sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass
by. However, instead of merely passing by, the
horses ran into the carromata occupied by the
plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing
a serious cut upon the plaintiffs head.
3. The defendant contends that the cochero,
who was driving his delivery wagon at the time
of the accident, was actually a good servant and
was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He
also claims that the cochero was tasked to
deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that
purpose the defendants employee tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the
delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the
forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle
passed by the driver and made noises that
frightened the horses causing them to run. The
employee failed to stop the horses since he was
thrown upon the ground.
4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that
the defendant was guilty of negligence. The
court specifically cited a paragraph of Article
1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to
reverse such decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the employer, who has
furnished a gentle and tractable team (of

horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable

for the negligence of such driver.
Held:
NO. The cochero of the defendant was not
negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case. It is
believed that acts or performances which, in a
long time, have not been destructive and which
are approved by the society are considered as
custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been
permitted by the society is that they are
beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not
easily hold someone negligent because of some
act that led to an injury or accident. It would be
unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent
because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a
universal practice of merchants during that time
to deliver products through horse-drawn
vehicles; and it is also considered universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left during the accident. It has
been practiced for a long time and generally has
not been the cause of accidents or injuries the
judgment is therefore reversed.
H. Legal Periods
NCC Art.13 When the laws speak of years,
months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days
each; months, of thirty days; days, of twentyfour hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they
shall be computed by the number of days which
they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be

excluded, and the last day included.
ROC Rule22
RULE 22
COMPUTATION OF TIME
Section 1. How to compute time.
In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court,
or by any applicable statute, the day of the act
or event from which the designated period of
time begins to run is to be excluded and the
date of performance included. If the last day of
the period, as thus computed, falls on a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run
until the next working day.
Sec. 2. Effect of interruption.
Should an act be done which effectively
interrupts the running of the period, the
allowable period after such interruption shall
start to run on the day after notice of the
cessation of the cause thereof.
The day of the act that caused the interruption
shall be excluded in the computation of the
period.
RAC Sec.31 Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be
understood to be twelve calendar months;
"month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a
specific calendar month in which case it shall be
computed according to the number of days the
specific month contains; "day," to a day of
twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to
sunrise.
Armigos vs. CA
G.R. No. L-50654, November 6, 1989
Padilla, J.
Facts:

1. The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a

complaint against the herein petitioner with the
Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, for the
collection of damages and attorney's fees. After
trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the
private respondent.
2. A copy of the decision was received by the
petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day,
9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the
said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he
completed the other requirements for the
perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an
appeal bond and the payment of the appellate
court docket fee. However, when the case was
elevated to the CFI for the consideration of the
appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that
the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary
period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
3. Petitioners contention: that from 8 June
1977, when he received a copy of the decision
of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he
perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had
elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal
for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The
petitioner contended that the computation of
the period to appeal should commence on the
hour he received copy of the decision, so that
the first of the 15-day period comprising 24
hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to
4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last
day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to
4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner's contention is correct
Held:
NO.

1. The Court considered the day as

synonymous with the date. Consequently, the
5th day shall be the 15 days after the appeal
regardless of the time when it was submitted.
2. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code
to the effect that "In computing a period, the
first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included" is similar, but not identical to Section
4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided
that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the
time within which an act is required by law to be
done shall be computed by excluding the first
day and including the last; and if the last be
Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded",
as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
which stated that prescribed or allowed by the
Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any
other applicable statute, the day of the act,
event or default after which the designated
period of time begins to run is not to be
included. The last day of the period so
computed is to be included, unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the
time shall run until the end of the next day
which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday."
3. Human memory is frail - Human memory on
dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary one for a person, there is no
reasonable certainty of its correctness. What
more for the exact hour when a pleading, order
or decision is received by a party? The period
laid down by the law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional.
Namarco vs. Tecson
G.R. No. L-29131, August 27, 1969
Concepcion, J.
Facts:

Petitioner NAMARCO as successor, as successor

to all the properties, assets, rights, and chooses
inaction of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as
plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor
therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint
against the same defendants, for the revival of
the judgment rendered. Respondent and then
Defendant Tecson moved to dismiss said
complaint, upon the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof
and prescription of action. Tecson contends that
the Decision became final and executory in Dec.
21, 1955, and that since 1960 and1964 were
both leap years. Thus the present case, where it
was field on Dec. 21, 1965, was filed two days
late. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, which the latter certified the case to
this court.
Issue:
Should the petition be granted?
Held:
The Court ruled in favor of the respondent. The
court held that the term "years" and explicitly
ordains that "it shall be understood that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days." Although
some members of the Court are inclined to think
that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to
conform to ordinary experience or practice, the
theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be
upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13
of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the
Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging
in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an
act of Congress.
If public interest demands a reversion to the
policy embodied in the Revised Administrative
Code, this may be done through legislative
process, not by judicial decree.

I. Binding effect
NCC Art. 15 Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Barretto-Gonzalez vs. Gonzalez
G.R. No. L-37048, March 7, 1993
Hull, J.
Facts:
The plaintiff & defendant were both
citizens of the Philippines, married & lived
together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926.
After which they voluntary separated & have not
lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor
children together.
After negotiations, both parties mutually
agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for
her & her childrens support of P500 (five
hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased
in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title
of certain properties be put in her name.
Shortly after the agreement, Augusto
Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada &
secured inthat jurisdiction an absolute divorce
on the ground of desertion dated November 28,
1927. Onthat same date he went through the
forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as
well & had 3children with her.
When Gonzales left the Philippines, he
reduced the amount he had agreed to pay
monthly for thesupport of Manuela Barreto &
her children & has not made the payments fixed
in the Renodivorce as alimony.
Gonzales came back to the Philippines in
August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought
anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm
& ratify the decree of divorce issued by the
courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710.

Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to

the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what
would have been due to their children as their
legal portion from respective estates had their
parents died intestate on November 28, 1927,
they also prayed that the marriage existing
between Barreto & Gonzales be declared
dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto
P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the
expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor
sons. The guardians of the children also filed
as intervenors in the case.
After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted
the judgement in favor of the plaintiff &
intervenors, but reduced the attorneys fees to
P3000 instead & also granted the costs of
the action against the defendant, Hence, this
appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court
erred in their decision.
Issue:
WON any foreign divorce, relating
to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a
cause, and under conditions for which the courts
of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.
Held:
NO.
The lower court erred in granting the
relief as prayed for on granting the divorce,
because:
The court said that securing the
jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve
the divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot be
done according to the public policy in this
jurisdiction on the question of divorce.
Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court
decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos
Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties
from the time of their separation until the case
was submitted praying the ratification of the

Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the

law regarding divorce & will be done under
conditions not authorized by our laws.
The matrimonial domicile of the couple
had always been the Philippines & the
residence acquired by the husband in Reno,
Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not
confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to
dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had
entered in 1919.
Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The
Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow
such to be done,
the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines
says that litigants cannot compel the courts to
approve of their own actions or permit the
personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce
of foreign courts in manner which
out government believes is contrary to public
order & good morals.
SC RULING:
The decision of CFI-Manila was
REVERSED
& Defendant is absolved from the demands
made against him in this action.
CONNECTION TO PERSONS, FAMILY RELATION /
CIVIL CODE:
Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15
says that Laws relating to family rights &
dutiesor to status, condition, and legal capacity
of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even
though they reside in a foreign country
The last part of Art 11 of the Old Civil
Code, now in Art 17 also states
...the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts & their property, and those intended to
promote public order & good morals, shall not
be rendered without effect by any foreign laws
or judgments or by anything done or

any agreements entered into in a foreign

country.
Divorce Laws of the Philippines
The hardships of existing divorce laws of
the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the
courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written
by the Legislature if they constitutional. Courts
have no right to say such laws are too strict or
too liberal.
At the time this decision was rendered
there was still absolute divorce in the Philippines
on the ground of Adultery on the part of the
wife, and Concubinage on the part of the
husband; the divorce, however, could be
granted only upon showing that the defendant
had been convicted by final judgment for the
adultery or concubinage as the case maybe. The
new Civil Code has abolished absolute divorce,
leaving only legal separation, which is
equivalent to relative divorce.
Tenchavez vs. Escano
G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
Reyes, J.B.L,J.
Facts:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong
to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and
ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt.
Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and
was duly registered in the local civil registry. A
certain Pacita Noel came to be their matchmaker and go-between who had an amorous
relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta
are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed

to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as

suggested by Vicentas parents. However after
translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta
continued leaving with her parents in Cebu
while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating
that she was single and when it was approved
she left for the United States and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was
later on approved and issued by the Second
Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then
sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell
Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on
August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint
against Vicenta and her parents whom he
alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining
her husband.
Issue:
Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano
is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
Held:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not
admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens because it
would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such
grant would arise to discrimination in favor of
rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano
with her American husband is enough grounds
for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In
the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and
Escano are still married. A foreign divorce
between Filipinos sought and decreed is not
entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of

the divorcee entitled to validity in the

Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled
the other for damages.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Facts:
Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton,
an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They
established residence in the Philippines and had
two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce
in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of
incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van
Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before
RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she
be ordered to render an accounting of her
business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal
property. He also prayed that he be declared
with a right to manage the conjugal property.
The defendant wife moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the cause of
action was barred by a previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings wherein he had
acknowledged that the couple had no
community property.
Issue:
Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted
by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and
American husband held binding upon the latter.
Held:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
Divorce of the parties. There can be no question
as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
states of the U.S. The decree is binding on
Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot
sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of
the United States. It is true that owing to the

nationality principle under article 15 of the civil

code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorce abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released Upton from the marriage from the
standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his
national law, he is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case as petitioner husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also
estopped by his own representation before the
Nevada court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. He should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989
Regalado, J.
Facts:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married
with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German national before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who
was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella
Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated
in private respondent and he initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before
the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983.
The petitioner then filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on
January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2

complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda,
latter had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.
Issue:
Whether private respondent can prosecute
petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as
decree of divorce was already issued.
Held:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution
for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. Though in
this case, it appeared that private respondent is
the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as
he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
J. Human Relations
NCC Art. 19-21
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to

morals, good customs or public policy shall

compensate the latter for the damage.
People vs. Ritter
G.R. No. 88582, March 5, 1991
Gutierrez, Jr. J.
Facts:
Ritter, an Australian was charged of
Robbery with Homicide for the death of Rosario
Baluyot, a street child. According to the doctors,
she died because of blood infection due to the
insertion of a part of a vibrator or a foreign
object inside her private part.
Witnesses pointed out that Ritter brought
her and another kid to the hotel and touched
them. When the kids went out of the hotel,
Rosario complained of pains. After seven
months, a person found him unconscious and
was brought to the hospital.
The attendant testified that during the
examination and when asked on why there was
a foreign object inside her, Baluyot replied that
Ginalaw siya ng Negro 3 months ago. After
several investigations, Ritter was caught and
was found guilty of Rape with Homicide.

Issue:
Should Ritter be held liable for the death
of Rosario?
Held:
No. His guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. It is not clear whether he was
the one who caused the death of the child.
However, the testimonies proved that he
was a pedophile. Although the court acquitted
him for rape with homicide, he was prosecuted
for committing acts contrary to morals, good
customs, public order and public policy. The

sexual exploitation committed by Ritter should

not and cannot be condoned. Damages were
thus awarded to the heirs of Rosario amounting
to P30,000.
III.

Civil Personality
A. Persons and Personality
NCC Art. 37-39
General Provisions
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction
are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others,
modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of
these circumstances are governed in this Code,
other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws.
Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious
belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over,
is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases
specified by law. (n)
B. Commencement and termination of
personality
1. Natural Persons

NCC Art. 40-41

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided
it be born later with the conditions specified
in the following article. (29a)
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is
considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's
womb. However, if the fetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is
not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four
hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb.
1987CONSTI Art.II Sec.12
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
PD603 Child and Youth Welfare Code Art.5
Commencement of Civil Personality. - The
civil personality of the child shall commence
from the time of his conception, for all
purposes favorable to him, subject to the
requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.
FC Art.164 Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial
insemination of the wife with the sperm of
the husband or that of a donor or both are

likewise legitimate children of the husband

and his wife, provided, that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a
written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The
instrument shall be recorded in the civil
registry together with the birth certificate of
the child.
RPC Art. 256-259
Art. 256. Intentional abortion. Any person
who shall intentionally cause an abortion
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he
shall use any violence upon the person of the
pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without
using violence, he shall act without the
consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the woman
shall have consented.
Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. The
penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period shall be
imposed upon any person who shall cause an
abortion by violence, but unintentionally.
Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman
herself of by her parents. The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon a
woman who shall practice abortion upon
herself or shall consent that any other
person should do so.
Any woman who shall commit this offense to
conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.

If this crime be committed by the parents of

the pregnant woman or either of them, and
they act with the consent of said woman for
the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the
offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or
midwife and dispensing of abortives. The
penalties provided in Article 256 shall be
imposed in its maximum period, respectively,
upon any physician or midwife who, taking
advantage of their scientific knowledge or
skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in
causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper
prescription from a physician, shall dispense
any abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a
fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Roe vs. Wade
(US), January 22, 1973
Facts:
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a
pregnant mother who wished to obtain an
abortion, sued on behalf of all woman
similarly situated in an effort to prevent the
enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing
all abortions except those performed to save
the life of the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that
make criminal all abortions except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother are an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy.
Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to
procure or attempt an abortion except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe

sought a declaratory judgment that the

statutes were unconstitutional on their face
and an injunction to prevent defendant
Dallas County District Attorney from
enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that
she was unmarried and pregnant, and that
she was unable to receive a legal abortion by
a licensed physician because her life was not
threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy and that she was unable to afford
to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a
legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly
situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her
right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly
invade a right possessed by the appellant to
terminate her pregnancy embodied in the
concept of personal liberty contained in the
Fourteenth Amendments Due Process
Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and
sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights
or its penumbras, or among the rights
reserved to the people by the Ninth
Amendment?
Held.
The right to personal privacy includes the
abortion decision, but the right is not
unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of
the States are of relatively recent vintage,
deriving from statutory changes generally
enacted in the latter half of the 19th century.
At common law abortion performed before
quickening (the first recognizable movement

of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable

offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was
ever a firmly established common law crime
even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the
historical enactment of criminal abortion
laws. The first is that the laws are the
product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this
argument has been taken seriously by
neither courts nor commentators. The
second reason is that the abortion procedure
is hazardous, therefore the States concern is
to protect pregnant women. However,
modern medical techniques have altered the
situation, with abortions being relatively safe
particularly in the first trimester. The third
reason is the States interest is in protecting
the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat
negated by the fact that the pregnant
woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of
abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of
the first trimester, the abortion decision
must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant womans attending physician, and
may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate
end of the first trimester, the State may
regulate abortion in ways reasonably related
to maternal health based upon the States
interest in promoting the health of the
mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the
State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion, except where necessary for the
preservation of the mothers life, based upon
the States interest in the potential of the
potential life of the unborn child.

Gelluz vs. CA
G.R. No.L-16439, July 20, 1961
Reyes, J.B.L.,J.
Facts:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo,
respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz,
the petitioner and physician, through her
aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant
some time in 1950 before she and Oscar
were legally married. As advised by her aunt
and to conceal it from her parents, she
decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She
had her pregnancy aborted again on October
1953 since she found it inconvenient as she
was employed at COMELEC. After two years,
on February 21, 1955, she again became
pregnant and was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida
at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez
Street. Oscar at this time was in the
province of Cagayan campaigning for his
election to the provincial board. He doesnt
have any idea nor given his consent on the
abortion.
Issue:
Whether husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from the physician who
caused the same.
Held:
The Supreme Court believed that the
minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death
of a person does not cover cases of an
unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality which trial court and Court of
Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find
any basis for an award of moral damages

evidently because Oscars indifference to the

previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates
he was unconcerned with the frustration of
his parental affections. Instead of filing an
administrative or criminal case against
Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to
personal profit and filed a civil action for
damages of which not only he but, including
his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows
that hes after obtaining a large money
payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that
serves as indemnity claim, which under the
circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
Quimiging vs. Icao
G.R. No.26795, July 31, 1970
Reyes, J.B.L.,J.
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix
Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential
relations. Despite the fact that Icao was
married, he succeeded to have carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times under
force and intimidation and without her
consent. As a result, Carmen became
pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen
stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for
support at P120 per month, damages and
attorneys fees. The complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga
del Norte on the ground lack of cause of
action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse,
she gave birth to a baby girl but the court
ruled that no amendment was allowable

since the original complaint averred no cause

of action.
Issue:
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim
damages.
Held:
Supreme Court held that a conceive child,
although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The conceive child may also
receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if
they were already born as prescribed in
Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the
civil code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children
does not contemplate support to children as
yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is
that Icao being a married man forced a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust and
this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens
rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim
compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are
reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
De Jesus vs. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933
Street,J.
Facts:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20

years of age was a cashier in a barber shop
owned by the defendants brother in law
Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the
defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried
scion of a prominent family in Manila was
accustomed to have his haircut in the said
barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio
and had an amorous relationship. As a
consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias
pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor.
On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to
a rev father confirming that the child is his
and he wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the country, he
continuously wrote letters to Antonia
reminding her to eat on time for her and
juniors sake. The defendant ask his
friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and
hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital
in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia
and his child at a House in Camarines Street
Manila where they lived together for about a
year. When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed
and he was married with another woman at
this time.
It should be noted that during the
christening of the child, the defendant who
was in charge of the arrangement of the
ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to
be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was
first planned.
Issues:
1. Whether the note to the padre in
connection with the other letters written by

defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy

proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that
Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child,
justified by the conduct of the father himself,
and that as a consequence, the defendant in
this case should be compelled to
acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
Held:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father
serves as admission of paternity and the
other letters are sufficient to connect the
admission with the child carried by Antonia.
The mere requirement is that the writing
shall be indubitable.
The law fixes no period during which a
child must be in the continuous possession of
the status of a natural child; and the period
in this case was long enough to reveal the
father's resolution to admit the status.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the
trial court in refusing to provide damages to
Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of
promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no
proof upon which a judgment could be based
requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC
found no necessity to modify the judgment
as to the amount of maintenance allowed to
Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos
per month. They likewise pointed out that it
is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to
modify the order as to the amount of
pension.

NCC Art. 42 Civil personality is extinguished

by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by
law, by contract and by will.
Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragante
G.R. No.L-770, April 27, 1948
Hilado, J.
Facts:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service
Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the
said intestate estate through its Special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate an ice plant with a
daily productive capacity of two and one-half
(2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan
and to sell the ice produced from the said
plant in the Municipalities of San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that
Fragantes intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petitioner argues that allowing the
substitution of the legal representative of the
estate of Fragante for the latter as party
applicant and afterwards granting the
certificate applied for is a contravention of
the law.
Issue:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended
an artificial judicial personality.
Held:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended
an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante
had lived, in view of the evidence of record,
would have obtained from the commission

the certificate for which he was applying. The

situation has not changed except for his
death, and the economic ability of his estate
to appropriately and adequately operate and
maintain the service of an ice plant was the
same that it received from the decedent
himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the
estate or the mass of property, rights and
assets left by the decedent, directly becomes
vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise.
The reason for this legal fiction, that the
estate of the deceased person is considered
a "person", as deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice
or prejudice resulting from the impossibility
of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling
such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for
the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, include the
exercise during the judicial administration of
those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his estate which survived after
his death.
The decedent's rights which by their
nature are not extinguished by death go to
make up a part and parcel of the assets of
his estate for the benefit of the creditors,
devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of
the decedent. It includes those rights and
fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which
survived after his death like his pending
application at the commission.

Dumlao vs. Quality Plastics

Products,Inc.
G.R. No. L27956, April 30 1976
Aquino, J.P.
Facts:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was
rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering
defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio,
Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity
Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus
legal rate of interest from November 1958
before its decision became final or else
Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to
foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay
the amount before the limit given. Oria's
land, which was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area
of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction
on September 24, 1962 which he has given
as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or
long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics
was not aware on Orias death. The
summons and copies of complaint was
personally served on June 24, 1960 by a
deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter
acknowledged and signed in his own behalf
and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all
surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs
in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality
Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and
the execution against his land (T-873).
Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate estate.
Issue:

Whether judgment against Oria and

execution against his land be annulled on the
ground of lack in juridical capacity.
Held:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the
summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was
already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The
Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that
indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias
death and that they acted in good faith in
joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired
over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is
a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment
against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was
concerned. He had no more civil personality
and his juridical capacity which is the fitness
to be the subject of legal relations was lost
through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality
Plastics in order to annul the judgment
against Oria does not follow that they are
entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the
corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is
reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil
Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared
void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution
sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732
is also void.
Eugenio, Sr. vs. Velez
G.R.No. 85140, May 17, 1990
Padilla, J.
Facts:
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters
unaware of the formers death on August 28,

1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on

September 27, 1988 before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental alleging that she was
forcible taken from her residence sometime
in 1987 and was confined by the herein
petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The
court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but
petitioner refused to surrender the
Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground
that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas
corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old
single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court
ordered that the body should be delivered to
a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio
assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can claim
custody of the deceased.
Held:
The court held that the custody of the
dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded
to the surviving brothers and sisters
pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- if
the deceased was an unmarried man or
woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of
the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin
of the deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse
as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil
Code, Philippine law does not recognize
common law marriages where a man and a
woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be

husband and wife in the community where

they live may be considered legally mauled
in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it
requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage.
Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, legal
impediment that disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana.
NCC Art. 43 If there is a doubt, as between
two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior
to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they
died at the same time and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to the other.
ROC Rule 131 Sec.3 Disputable
presumptions. The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
(a)That a person is innocent of crime or
wrong;
(b)That an unlawful act was done with an
unlawful intent;
(c)That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act;
(d)That a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns;
(e)That evidence willfully suppressed would
be adverse if produced;
(f)That money paid by one to another was
due to the latter;
(g)That a thing delivered by one to another
belonged to the latter;

(h)That an obligation delivered up to the

debtor has been paid;
(i)That prior rents or installments had been
paid when a receipt for the later one is
produced;
(j)That a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful
act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act; otherwise, that things which a person
possess, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him;
(k)That a person in possession of an order on
himself for the payment of the money, or the
delivery of anything, has paid the money or
delivered the thing accordingly;
(l)That a person acting in a public office was
regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m)That official duty has been regularly
performed;
(n)That a court, or judge acting as such,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o)That all the matters within an issue raised
in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it; and in like manner that all
matters within an issue raised in a dispute
submitted for arbitration were laid before the
arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p)That private transactions have been fair
and regular;
(q)That the ordinary course of business has
been followed;
(r)That there was a sufficient consideration
for a contract;
(s)That a negotiable instrument was given or
indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t)That an endorsement of negotiable
instrument was made before the instrument
was overdue and at the place where the
instrument is dated;

(u)That a writing is truly dated;

(v)That a letter duly directed and mailed was
received in the regular course of the mail;
(w)That after an absence of seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he is considered dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead
for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all
purposes including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1)A person on board a vessel lost during a
sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2)A member of the armed forces who has
taken part in armed hostilities, and has been
missing for four years;
(3)A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and whose
existence has not been known for four years;
(4)If a married person has been absent for
four consecutive years, the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage if he or
she has well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already death. In case of
disappearance, where there is a danger of
death the circumstances hereinabove
provided, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage. However, in any case,
before marrying again, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceedings as

provided in the Family Code and in the rules

for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x)That acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was
conformable to the law or fact;
(y)That things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and ordinary
nature habits of life;
(z)That persons acting as copartners have
entered into a contract of copartneship;
(aa)That a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb)That property acquired by a man and a
woman who are capacitated to marry each
other and who live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under void marriage,
has been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry.
(cc)That in cases of cohabitation by a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to
marry each other and who have acquire
properly through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry,
such contributions and their corresponding
shares including joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit are equal.
(dd)That if the marriage is terminated and
the mother contracted another marriage
within three hundred days after such
termination of the former marriage, these
rules shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:
(1)A child born before one hundred eighty
days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have

been conceived during such marriage, even

though it be born within the three hundred
days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(2)A child born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been
conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred
days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(ee)That a thing once proved to exist
continues as long as is usual with things of
the nature;
(ff)That the law has been obeyed;
(gg)That a printed or published book,
purporting to be printed or published by
public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh)That a printed or published book,
purporting contain reports of cases adjudged
in tribunals of the country where the book is
published, contains correct reports of such
cases;
(ii)That a trustee or other person whose duty
it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when
such presumption is necessary to perfect the
title of such person or his successor in
interest;
(jj)That except for purposes of succession,
when two persons perish in the same
calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died
first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred,
the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and
the age of the sexes, according to the
following rules:

1.If both were under the age of fifteen years,

the older is deemed to have survived;
2.If both were above the age sixty, the
younger is deemed to have survived;
3.If one is under fifteen and the other above
sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4.If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and
the sex be different, the male is deemed to
have survived, if the sex be the same, the
older;
5.If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and
the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
(kk)That if there is a doubt, as between two
or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, as to which of them died first,
whoever alleges the death of one prior to the
other, shall prove the same; in the absence
of proof, they shall be considered to have
died at the same time. (5a)
Joaquin vs. Navarro
G.R. No. L-5426
Tuason, J.
Facts:
This was a summary proceeding to
resolve the order of the deaths of Joaquin
Navarro Jr and his Angela. While the battle
for the liberation of Manila was raging, the
whole family sought refuge at the German
Club. While staying there, it was set on fire
and the Japs were shooting at the fleeing
refugees. 3 daughters were shot dead,
Angela refused to leave the place while JN Jr,
wife, FL & JN Sr fled. JN jr was shot while
coming out. Moments later, the German Club
collapsed. CA said that the mother died
before the son on the basis that she could
have died immediately after for a variety of
causes.

Issue:
Whether the mother died before JN Jr.
Held:
In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair
inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died
before his mother. The presumption that AJ
died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the
doctrine of preponderance of evidence by
which civil cases are decided, this inference
should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may
be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or
(4) inferential.
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2
or more persons are called to succeed each
other as to which of them died first. In the
Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that they died at the same time,
and there shall be no transmission of rights
from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in
cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of
survivorship.
2. Juridical Persons
NCC Art. 44-47
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and
entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as
soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and
associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (35a)

Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1

and 2 of the preceding article are governed
by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of
general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning
partnerships. (36 and 37a)
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and
possess property of all kinds, as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions,
in conformity with the laws and regulations
of their organization. (38a)
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations,
institutions and other entities for public
interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of
Article 44, their property and other assets
shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or
the charter creating them. If nothing has
been specified on this point, the property
and other assets shall be applied to similar
purposes for the benefit of the region,
province, city or municipality which during
the existence of the institution derived the
principal benefits from the same.
Smith Bell & Company vs. Natividad
G.R. No. 15574, September 17, 1919
Malcolm, J.
Facts:
-Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippine
Islands; majority of the stockholders are
British; owner of a motor vessel known as
the Batobrought to Cebu for the purpose of
transporting Smith, Bell & Co.s merchandise
between ports in the islands.-application for
registration was made at Cebu at the

Collector of Customs---denied. Because they

were not citizens of the US/Phils.-Act 2671,
Sec. 1172. Certificate of Philippine Register.
upon registration of a vessel of domestic
ownership, and of more than 15 tons gross,
a certificate of Philippine register shall be
issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the
taking of the certificate of Philippine register
shall be optional with the owner.-domestic
ownership, as used in this section, means
ownership vested in the (a) citizens or native
inhabitants of the Phil Islands; (b) citizens of
the US residing in the Phil. Islands; (c) any
corporation or company composed wholly of
citizen of Phils./US or both-plaintiffs
contention: Act No. 2671 deprives the corp.
of its property without due process of law
because by the passage of the law, the
company was automatically deprived of
every beneficial attribute of ownership of the
Bato and that they are left with a naked title
they could not use.
Issue:
WON Smith, Bell & Co. were denied of the
due process of law by the Phil. Legislature in
itsenactment of Act 2761.
Held:
No. (judgment affirmedplaintiff cant
be granted registry.)
RD: Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations
such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to
register vessels in the Phils. Coastwide trade,
falls within the authorized exceptions.
Specifically within the purview of the police
power. Literally and absolutely, steamship
lines are the arteries of the commerce in the
Phils. If one be severed, the lifeblood of the
nation is lost. If these are protected, security

of the country and general welfare is

sustained.

Barlin vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. L-2832, November 24, 1906
Willard, J.
A very old case that happened in 1906, in
the pueblo of Lagonoy, province of Ambos
Camarines. The Roman Catholic Church
which had been razed to the ground in
1869 was reconstructed, from government
funds and from voluntary labor of the
townspeople, upon orders of the town
officials, also based on general laws and
guidelines of the Spanish government.
Reconstruction was completed in 1873, and
until 1902 a Roman Catholic priest
administered this church, until it came under
the care of P Vicente Ramirez .In November
1902, a successor to Ramirez was appointed
but he refused to turn over the church,
convent and other properties. This was the
point in history when Spain ceded authority
to the United States and all its property
together with it. Many Filipino clergy rebelled
against the Roman Catholic Church whom
they said refused to recognize and grant the
rights of the Filipino priests. This Filipino
priests joined together and formed the
United Filipino Church, who, though not
recognizing the Roman Catholic Church,
nonetheless continued to hold office and
ceremonies in the Roman Catholic tradition,
on the condition that unless the Roman
Catholic Church recognized them, they will
hold on to their church properties and refuse

to turn them over. For reason, REV. JORGE

BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic
administrator of this vacant bishopric and
legal representative of the general interests
of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in
the diocese of Nueva Caceres came to file a
case against P. VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-rector
of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Parochial
Church of Lagonoy and the Municipality of
Lagonoy. Rev Barlin held that the church and
its adjuncts were a property of the Roman
Catholic Church, while Padre Ramirez
held that the town of Lagonoy was the owner
of the property. The court held that the
church was a property of the Roman Catholic
Church. There was a law that states that all
church buildings were made by the Spanish
government and representatives in the
Philippines usin ggovernment and private
local funds, but the Spanish government
implemented this to the effect that the
churches and its income were dedicated for
the propagation of the faith. Hence, its
properties were beyond the commerce of
man. Priests held them in the concept
of guardians or stewards. The truth is that,
from the earliest times down to the cession
of the Philippines to the United States,
churches and other consecrated objects were
considered outside of the commerce of man.
They were not public property, nor could
they be subjects of private property in the
sense that any private person could the
owner thereof. They constituted a kind of
property distinctive characteristic of which
was that it was devoted to the worship of
God Furthermore, the municipality cannot
show evidence of title, right of ownership
or possession

Facts:
Ramirez, having been appointed parish priest
by the plaintiff Barlin, took possession of the
Church in 1901 until a successor had been
appointed in 1902.Defendant Ramirez
refused to surrender the Church
and Barlin filed a suit; the municipality of
Lagonoy joined Ramirez as defendants,
claiming possession
and ownership of the Church and
contesting Barlins authority and capacity to
order that Ramirez be replaced and
surrender the Church to the appointed
successor.
Issue:
WON the Catholic Church is the rightful
owner of the Church?
Held:
Yes. Ratio: The Roman Catholic Church is
a juridical entity in the Philippine Islands, and
under Article 46 of theCivil Code, Juridical
persons may acquire and possess property of
all kinds as well as incur obligations and
bring civil or criminal actions, inconformity
with the laws and regulations of their
organization. Disposition: Judgment of the
Lower Court affirmed.
IV.

Restrictions on Capacity
A. General Rule: presumption of capacity
Standard Oil vs. Arenas
G.R. No. L-5921, July 25, 1911
Arellano, C.J.
Facts:
The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment,
including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who
acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila
ordered the defendants to pay jointly and

severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While the

judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa
Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged
that her husband was declared insane on July
24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was
authorized by the court as guardian to institute
the proper legal proceedings for the annulment
of several bonds given by her husband while in
a state of insanity.
Issue:
(1)Whether or not suffering from monomania of
wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that
the person does not have capacity to act. (2)
Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of
entering into contract at the time the bond was
executed on December 15, 1908.
Held:
The court affirmed the trial court decision that
Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The
SC held that there is no evidence to warrant the
conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person
suffering from monomania of wealth is really
insane and therefore is deranged and incapable
of binding himself in a contract. From the
testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente has
the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he
had property of his own and was not deprived of
its management, as well as the fact that he had
never squandered any large sum of money.
As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof
that showed that at the date of the giving of the
bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was
incapable of acting because of insanity. The
witnesses who as physicians, testified that they
observed insane periods in Villanueva twice
prior to 1903, once on 1908, but none at the
time of the execution of the said bond on
December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the
wife never before sought to legally deprive her

husband management over his estate knowing

full well that he was insane.
B. Restrictions on Capacity to Act
NCC Art. 38-39
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state
of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to
act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person
from certain obligations, as when the latter arise
from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among
others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deafmute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship.
The consequences of these circumstances are
governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of
Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not
limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or
over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in
cases specified by law.
1. Minority
Age of Majority
R.A. 6809
Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY
FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE
ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:

Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No.

209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the
attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same
Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is
also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate
parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life, save the exceptions established by
existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental
consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to
derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards
below twenty-one years of age mentioned in
the second and third paragraphs of Article
2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act,
existing wills, bequests, donations, grants,
insurance policies and similar instruments
containing references and provisions
favorable to minors will not retroact to their
prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon
completion of its publication in at least two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989
Suffrage
1987CONSTI Art.V Sec.1 Suffrage may be
exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at

least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
Marriage
FC Art.5 Any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37
and 38, may contract marriage.
R.A. 6809 (Supra)
NCC Art. 1327 The following cannot give
consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deafmutes who do not know how to write.
NCC Art. 1390 (1) The following contracts are
voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to a contract;
NCC Art. 1403 (3)The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
3) Those where both parties are incapable of
giving consent to a contract.
NCC Art. 1397 The action for the annulment
of contracts may be instituted by all who are
thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily.

However, persons who are capable cannot

allege the incapacity of those with whom
they contracted; nor can those who exerted
intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or
employed fraud, or caused mistake base
their action upon these flaws of the contract.
NCC Art. 1399 When the defect of the
contract consists in the incapacity of one of
the parties, the incapacitated person is not
obliged to make any restitution except
insofar as he has been benefited by the thing
or price received by him.
NCC Art. 1489 All persons who are
authorized in this Code to obligate
themselves, may enter into a contract of
sale, saving the modifications contained in
the following articles.
Where necessaries are those sold and
delivered to a minor or other person without
capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable
price therefor. Necessaries are those referred
to in Article 290.
NCC Art. 1426-1427
Art. 1426. When a minor between eighteen
and twenty-one years of age who has
entered into a contract without the consent
of the parent or guardian, after the
annulment of the contract voluntarily returns
the whole thing or price received,
notwithstanding the fact the he has not been
benefited thereby, there is no right to
demand the thing or price thus returned.
Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen
and twenty-one years of age, who has
entered into a contract without the consent
of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a

sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in

fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no
right to recover the same from the obligee
who has spent or consumed it in good faith.
Mercado vs. Espiritu
G.R. No. L-11872, December 1, 1917
Torres, J.
Facts:
Petitioner/Plaintiffs:
Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado
Respondent/Defendant:
Jose Espiritu, administrator of the estate of
the deceased Luis Espiritu
April 9, 1913 counsel for Domingo and
Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of
FirstInstance of Bulacan against Luis Espiritu,
who died afterwards.
Since Luis Espiritu died, the complaint
was amended and was filed against Jose
Espiritu.
The plaintiffs alleged that they and their
sisters Concepcion and Paz Mercado were
thechildren and sole heirs of Margarita
Espiritu, who is the sister of the deceased
LuisEspiritu.
Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving a
tract of land of 48 hectares in area as
her paraphernal property, which is located in
the barrio of Panducot, municipality of Calum
pit, Bulacan.
1910, Luis Espiritu was accused to have
induced and fraudulently succeeded in
gettingthe plaintiffs to sell their land for a
sum of P400 as opposed to its assessed
value of P3,795.
The annulment of a deed of sale was
sought by the plaintiffs.
They asserted that two of the four parties
were minors (Domingo andJosefa Mercado)

who presented themselves to be of legal age

upon signing the deed of saleand before the
notary public.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is a valid
contract when the minors presented
themselvesthat they were of legal age
Ruling:
Yes. The courts have laid down the rule that
the sale of a real estate, made by minors
who presented themselves to be of legal
age, when in fact they are not, is a
valid contract. Moreover, they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfilment of the obligations contracted by
them, or to seek for annulment. Also, these
minors cannot be permitted afterwards to
excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or seek their
annulment. This is in accordance with the
provisions of the law on estoppels.
This is in accordance with the provisions of
the law on estoppel.
Young vs. Tecson
39 O.G. 953
Bambalan vs. Maramba
G.R. No. L-27710, January 30, 1928
Romualdez, J.
Facts:
FACTS:
Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her first
husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura
received a loan from Genoveva Muerong and
German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died
leaving Bambalan as the sole heir of his
estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba
forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a
minor, to sell their land as payment for the

loan. Bambalan signed, but said that he was

forced because they were threatening his
mother with imprisonment. Muerong and
Maramba bought Bambalans first cedula to
acknowledge the document.
Issue:
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and
Muerong is valid.
Held:
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because
he was a minor at the time of execution. The
Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs.
Espiritu is not applicable to this case,
because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of
age, and the defendant knew him as a
minor.
Important Statutes:
Civil Code, Article 38.
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civilinterdiction are mere restrictions on the
capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his
acts or from property relations, such as
easements.
Civil Code, Art. 1327.
The following cannot give consent to a
contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deafmutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)
Civil code, Art. 1390.
The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to a contract;

(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by

mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao vs. Alcantara
G.R. No. L1720, March 4, 1950
Paras, J.
Facts:
On August 3, 1931, appellant Sia Suan
executed a deed of sale with Rufino
Alcantara an dhis sons Damaso Alcantara
and appellee Ramon Alcantara, conveying
five parcels of land to said petitioner. Ramon
Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and
22 days old. On August27, 1931, Gaw Chiao
(husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from
Francisco Alfonso, attorney
of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao th
at Ramon Alcantara was a minor and
accordingly disavowing the contract. After
being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however,
Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit
ratifying the deed of sale. On said occasion
Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao
the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan
sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from
whom Antonio Azores inherited the same. On
August 8, 1940, an action was instituted
by respondent Ramon Alcantara in the CFI
(Court of First Instance) of Laguna for the
annulment of the deed of sale as regards his
undivided share in the two parcels of land
covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and
752 of Laguna. The CFI of Laguna rendered a
decision in favor of appellee Alcantara in
view of his minority during the execution of
the contract. Thus, this appeal by certiorari
of Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao.
Issue:

Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed on

August 31, 1931 is null and void?
Ruling: No. The SC ruled that Ramon is not
allowed to annul such deed, because he
already ratified it. The letter written by him
informing the appellants of his minority
constituted an effective disaffirmance of the
sale, and that although the choice
to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the
contract until the courts adjudge the
agreement to be invalid, said notice
shieldedRamon from laches and consequent
estoppel. Ramon may have executed his acts
in bad faith for he earned money from Gaw
Chiao as a result of the sale and its
ratification, yet he summons the courts to
annul the sale because he executed it while
still a minor.
The appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby reversed and the
appellants absolved from the complaint, with
costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara
De Braganza,et al. vs. Abrille
G.R. No. L12471, April 13, 1959
Bengzon, J.
Facts:
Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from
De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war
notes and in consideration thereof, promised
in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per
annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2
years after the cessation of the war.
Because they have no paid, Abrille is sued
them in March 1949. The Manila court of
first instance and CA held the family
solidarily liable to pay according to the
contract they signed. The family petitioned
to review the decision of the CA whereby

they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa

Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for
consideration of the minority of the Braganza
sons when they signed the contract.
Issue:
Whether or not the boys, who were 16
and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the
contract of loan they have signed.
Held:
The SC found that Rosario will still be
liable to pay her share in the contract
because they minority of her sons does not
release her from liability. She is ordered to
pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the
decision of the CA which found them
similarly liable due to their failure to disclose
their minority. The SC sustained previous
sources in Jurisprudence in order to hold
the infant liable, the fraud must be actual
and not constructive. It has been held that
his mere silence when making a contract as
to his age does not constitute a fraud which
can be made the basis of an action of
deceit.
The boys, though not bound by the
provisions of the contract, are still liable to
pay the actual amount they have profited
from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if
the written contract is unenforceable
because of their non-age, they shall make
restitution to the extent that they may have
profited by the money received. In this case,
2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which
when converted to Philippine money is
equivalent to P1,166.67
Criminal Liability

RPC Art.12 (2)(3)

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from
criminal liability. the following are exempt
from criminal liability:
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under
fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall
be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be
criminally irresponsible, the court, in
conformably with the provisions of this and
the preceding paragraph, shall commit him
to the care and custody of his family who
shall be charged with his surveillance and
education otherwise, he shall be committed
to the care of some institution or person
mentioned in said Art. 80.
RPC Art. 13 (2)
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The
following are mitigating circumstances:
(2)That the offender is under eighteen year
of age or over seventy years. In the case of
the minor, he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
PD603 Child and Youth Welfare Code Secs
189-204
Article 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A
youthful offender is one who is over nine
years but under twenty-one years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense.
A child nine years of age or under at the time
of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability and shall be committed to the care of
his or her father or mother, or nearest
relative or family friend in the discretion of
the court and subject to its supervision. The

same shall be done for a child over nine

years and under fifteen years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense, unless
he acted with discernment, in which case he
shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Article 192.
The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Article 190. Physical and Mental
Examination. - It shall be the duty of the lawenforcement agency concerned to take the
youthful offender, immediately after his
apprehension, to the proper medical or
health officer for a thorough physical and
mental examination. Whenever treatment for
any physical or mental defect is indicated,
steps shall be immediately undertaken to
provide the same.
The examination and treatment papers shall
form part of the record of the case of the
youthful offender.
Article 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held
for Examination or Trial. - A youthful offender
held for physical and mental examination or
trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish
bail, shall from the time of his arrest be
committed to the care of the Department of
Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation
center or a detention home in the province
or city which shall be responsible for his
appearance in court whenever required:
Provided, That in the absence of any such
center or agency within a reasonable
distance from the venue of the trial, the
provincial, city and municipal jail shall
provide quarters for youthful offenders
separate from other detainees. The court
may, in its discretion, upon recommendation

of the Department of Social Welfare or other

agency or agencies authorized by the Court,
release a youthful offender on recognizance,
to the custody of his parents or other
suitable person who shall be responsible for
his appearance whenever required.
Article 192. Suspension of Sentence and
Commitment of Youthful Offender. - If after
hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings, the court should find that the
youthful offender has committed the acts
charged against him the court shall
determine the imposable penalty, including
any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment
of conviction, the court shall suspend all
further proceedings and shall commit such
minor to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare, or to any
training institution operated by the
government, or duly licensed agencies or
any other responsible person, until he shall
have reached twenty-one years of age or, for
a shorter period as the court may deem
proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of
Social Welfare or the agency or responsible
individual under whose care he has been
committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to
visitation and supervision by a
representative of the Department of Social
Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such
other officer as the Court may designate
subject to such conditions as it may
prescribe.
Article 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender
whose sentence is suspended can appeal

from the order of the court in the same

manner as appeals in criminal cases.
Article 194. Care and Maintenance of
Youthful Offender. - The expenses for the
care and maintenance of the youthful
offender whose sentence has been
suspended shall be borne by his parents or
those persons liable to support him:
Provided, That in case his parents or those
persons liable to support him can not pay all
or part of said expenses, the municipality in
which the offense was committed shall pay
one-third of said expenses or part thereof;
the province to which the municipality
belongs shall pay one-third; and the
remaining one-third shall be borne by the
National Government. Chartered cities shall
pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case
a chartered city cannot pay said expenses,
part of the internal revenue allotments
applicable to the unpaid portion shall be
withheld and applied to the settlement of
said indebtedness.
All city and provincial governments must
exert efforts for the immediate establishment
of local detention homes for youthful
offenders.
Article 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The
Department of Social Welfare or its
representative or duly licensed agency or
individual under whose care the youthful
offender has been committed shall submit to
the court every four months or oftener as
may be required in special cases, a written
report on the conduct of said youthful
offender as well as the intellectual, physical,
moral, social and emotional progress made
by him.

Article 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is

shown to the satisfaction of the court that
the youthful offender whose sentence has
been suspended, has behaved properly and
has shown his capability to be a useful
member of the community, even before
reaching the age of majority, upon
recommendation of the Department of Social
Welfare, it shall dismiss the case and order
his final discharge.
Article 197. Return of the Youth Offender to
Court. - Whenever the youthful offender has
been found incorrigible or has wilfully failed
to comply with the conditions of his
rehabilitation programs, or should his
continued stay in the training institution be
inadvisable, he shall be returned to the
committing court for the pronouncement of
judgment.
When the youthful offender has reached the
age of twenty-one while in commitment, the
court shall determine whether to dismiss the
case in accordance with the next preceding
article or to pronounce the judgment of
conviction.
In any case covered by this article, the
youthful offender shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with the full time
spent in actual commitment and detention
effected under the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 198. Effect of Release of Child Based
on Good Conduct. - The final release of a
child pursuant to the provisions of this
Chapter shall not obliterate his civil liability
for damages. Such release shall be without
prejudice to the right for a writ of execution
for the recovery of civil damages.
Article 199. Living Quarters for Youthful
Offenders Sentence. - When a judgment of

conviction is pronounced in accordance with

the provisions of Article 197, and at the time
of said pronouncement the youthful offender
is still under twenty-one, he shall be
committed to the proper penal institution to
serve the remaining period of his sentence:
Provided, That penal institutions shall
provide youthful offenders with separate
quarters and, as far as practicable, group
them according to appropriate age levels or
other criteria as will insure their speedy
rehabilitation: Provided, further, That the
Bureau of Prisons shall maintain agricultural
and forestry camps where youthful offenders
may serve their sentence in lieu of
confinement in regular penitentiaries.
Article 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where
a youthful offender has been charged before
any city or provincial fiscal or before any
municipal judge and the charges have been
ordered dropped, all the records of the case
shall be destroyed immediately thereafter.
Where a youthful offender has been charged
and the court acquits him, or dismisses the
case or commits him to an institution and
subsequently releases him pursuant to this
Chapter, all the records of his case shall be
destroyed immediately after such acquittal,
dismissal or release, unless civil liability has
also been imposed in the criminal action, in
which case such records shall be destroyed
after satisfaction of such civil liability. The
youthful offender concerned shall not be held
under any provision of law, to be guilty of
perjury or of concealment or
misrepresentation by reason of his failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact
related thereto in response to any inquiry
made of him for any purpose.

"Records" within the meaning of this article

shall include those which may be in the files
of the National Bureau of Investigation and
with any police department, or any other
government agency which may have been
involved in the case.
Article 201. Civil Liability of Youthful
Offenders. - The civil liability for acts
committed by a youthful offender shall
devolve upon the offender's father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother, or in case of her death or incapacity,
upon the guardian. Civil liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family
friend of the youthful offender.
Article 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The
Department of Social Welfare shall establish
regional rehabilitation centers for youthful
offenders. The local government and other
non-governmental entities shall collaborate
and contribute their support for the
establishment and maintenance of these
facilities.
Article 203. Detention Homes. - The
Department of Local Government and
Community Development shall establish
detention homes in cities and provinces
distinct and separate from jails pending the
disposition of cases of juvenile offenders.
Article 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian
or Any Person in the Commission of
Delinquent Acts by Their Children or Wards. A person whether the parent or guardian of
the child or not, who knowingly or wilfully,
1. Aids, causes, abets or connives with the
commission by a child of a delinquency, or
2. Does any act producing, promoting, or
contributing to a child's being or becoming a
juvenile delinquent, shall be punished by a

fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or to

imprisonment for a period not exceeding two
years, or both such fine and imprisonment,
at the discretion of the court.
2. Insanity
Effect on Marriage
FC Art.45(2)
A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(2) That either party was of unsound mind,
unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife
Effect on Contracts
NCC Art. 1327-1328
Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent
to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deafmutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)
Art. 1328. Contracts entered into during a
lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to
in a state of drunkenness or during a
hypnotic spell are voidable.
Criminal Liability
RPC 12(1)
Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability. the following are exempt from
criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless
the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

ROC Rule 101

Sec. 1. Venue; Petition for commitment. - A
petition for the commitment of a person to a
hospital or other place for the insane may be
filed with the Court of First Instance of the
province where the person alleged to be
insane is found. The petition shall be filed by
the Director of Health in the all cases where,
in his opinion, such commitment is for the
public welfare, or for the welfare of said
person who, in his judgment, is insane, and
such person or the one having charged of
him is opposed to his being taken to a
hospital or other place for the insane.
Sec. 2. Order for hearing. - If the petition
filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date for the hearing
thereof, and copy of such order shall be
served on the person alleged to be insane,
and to the one having charge of him, or on
such of his relatives residing in the province
or city as the judge may deem proper. The
court shall furthermore order the sheriff to
produce the alleged insane person, if
possible, on the date of the hearing.
Sec. 3. Hearing and judgment. - Upon
satisfactory proof, in open court on the date
fixed in the order, that the commitment
applied for is for the public welfare or for the
welfare of the insane person, and that his
relatives are unable for any reason to take
proper custody and care of him, the court
shall order his commitment to such hospital
or other place for the insane as may be
recommended by the Director of Health. The
court shall make proper provisions for the
custody of property or money belonging to

the insane until a guardian be properly

appointed.
Sec. 4. Discharge of insane. - When, in the
opinion of the Director of Health, the person
ordered to be committed to a hospital or
other place for the insane is temporarily or
permanently cured, or may be released
without danger he may file the proper
petition with the Court of First Instance which
ordered the commitment.
Sec. 5. Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding.
- It shall be the duty of the provincial fiscal or
in the City of Manila the fiscal of the city, to
prepare the petition for the Director of Health
and represent him in court in all proceedings
arising under the provisions of this rule.
U.S. vs. Vaquilar
G.R. Nos. L9471 and L-9472, March 13,
1914
Trent,J.
Facts:
Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing
his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring
other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses
testified that the defendant appeared to be
insane prior to the commission of the
crimes. They also testified that the appellant
was complaining of pains in his head and
stomach prior to the killing. The witnesses
evidence for insanity include:
- appellants eyes were very big and red
with his sight penetrating at the time he
was killing his wife.
he looked at me he was crazy because if
he was not, he wouldnt have killed his
family
- at the moment of cutting those people,
he looked like a madman; crazy because
he would cut anybody at random

sister said, then he pursued me.he

must have been crazy because he cut
me
Issue:
Whether or not these pieces of evidence are
sufficient to declare the accused as insane,
therefore exempt from criminal liability.
Held:
The evidence is insufficient to declare him
insane. The appellants conduct was
consistent with the acts of an enraged
criminal, not of a person with an unsound
mind at the time he committed the crimes.
The fact that a person acts crazy is not
conclusive that he is insane. The popular
meaning of crazy is not synonymous with
the legal terms insane. The conduct of the
appellant after he was confined in jail is not
inconsistent with the actions of a sane
person (not saying a word in the cell, crying
out loud at night) who has reflected and felt
remorse after the commission of the crime.
The court further held that mere mental
depravity, or moral insanity which results not
from any disease of the mind, but from a
perverted condition of the moral system
where the person is mentally sane, does not
exempt one from criminal responsibility. In
the absence of proof that the defendant had
lost his reason or became demented after a
few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that
he was in a normal state of mind.
Standard Oil vs. Arenas
G.R. No. L-5921, July 25, 1911
Arellano, C.J.
Facts:
The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment,
including the appellant Vicente Villanueva

who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of

Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While
the judgment was in the course of execution,
Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared
and alleged that her husband was declared
insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11,
she was authorized by the court as guardian
to institute the proper legal proceedings for
the annulment of several bonds given by her
husband while in a state of insanity.
Issue:
(1)Whether or not suffering from
monomania of wealth necessarily warrants
the conclusion that the person does not have
capacity to act. (2) Whether or not the
appellant, was incapable of entering into
contract at the time the bond was executed
on December 15, 1908.
Held:
The court affirmed the trial court decision
that Villanueva possessed the capacity to
act. The SC held that there is no evidence to
warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision,
that a person suffering from monomania of
wealth is really insane and therefore is
deranged and incapable of binding himself in
a contract. From the testimony of his wife, it
seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go
wherever he wished, that he had property of
his own and was not deprived of its
management, as well as the fact that he had
never squandered any large sum of money.
As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct
proof that showed that at the date of the
giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the
appellant was incapable of acting because of
insanity. The witnesses who as physicians,
testified that they observed insane periods in

Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908,

but none at the time of the execution of the
said bond on December 15, 1908. It was also
shown that the wife never before sought to
legally deprive her husband management
over his estate knowing full well that he was
insane.
People vs. Rafanan
G.R. No. L-54135, November 21, 1991
Feliciano, J.
Facts:
The 14 year old victim was hired by the
mother of the appellant as a house helper.
One evening, she was forced by the
appellant to have sexual intercourse using a
bolo on her neck as a threatif she does not
cooperate. After the abuse, he also
threatened to kill her if she reports what
happened to anyone. After a few days, the
victim finally told her mother about what
happened leading to the arrest and
conviction of the appellant of the crime of
rape. The commission of the crime was not
seriously disputed by appellant. But the
principal submission of appellant was that he
was suffering from a metal aberration
characterized as schizophrenia when he
inflicted his violent intentions upon the
victim. The trial court suspended the trial
and ordered that the appellant be confined
at the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong for observation and treatment.
In the meantime, the case was archived.
Appellant was admitted into the hospital on
29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26
June 1978. The appellant was diagnosed to
be indeed suffering from schizophrenia by his
attending physicians but was deemed fit to

stand trial upon almost 1 years of

treatment.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant should be
exempted from liability for the crime on
thegrounds of insanity
Held:
The court rejected the insanity defense of
appellant and affirmed the lower courts
decision convicting the appellant of the
crime of rape. For the defense of insanity to
be sustained it is critical that there is
complete loss of intelligence at the time of
the commission of the crime. The fact that
appellant threatened the victim with death
should she reveal she had been sexually
assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of
the Court, that the apellant was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of his assault.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A
person accused of a crime has the burden
of proving his affirmative allegation of
insanity. In this case the appellant failed to
present clear and convincing evidence
regarding his state of mind immediately
before and during the sexual assault on the
victim. Schizophrenia formerly called
dementia praecox, is a chronic mental
disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and
often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions In People vs. Formigones, the Court
elaborated on the required standards of legal
insanity and established two distinguishable
tests(a) THE TEST OF COGNITION
"complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the[criminal] act,"(b) THE TEST
OF VOLITION

"or that there be a total deprivation

freedom of the will."
3. Deaf-Mutism
NCC Art. 1327 (2)
The following cannot give consent to a
contract:
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deafmutes who do not know how to write.
NCC Art. 807
If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he
must personally read the will, if able to do
so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons
to read it and communicate to him, in some
practicable manner, the contents thereof.
NCC Art. 820
Any person of sound mind and of the age of
eighteen years or more, and not bind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a
witness to the execution of a will mentioned
in Article 805 of this Code.
4. Prodigality
ROC Rule 92 Sec.2
Sec. 2. Meaning of word "incompetent."
- Under this rule, the
word "incompetent"includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf
and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals, and persons not
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take
care of themselves and manage their

property, becoming thereby an easy prey for

deceit and exploitation.
5. Civil Interdiction
RPC Art. 34
Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall
deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority,
or guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act
or any conveyance inter vivos.
RPC Art. 41
Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal;
Their accessory penalties. The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction
for life or during the period of the sentence
as the case may be, and that of perpetual
absolute disqualification which the offender
shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.
6. Family Relations
FC Art.150
Property donated or left by will to the
spouses, jointly and with designation of
determinate shares, shall pertain to the wife
as paraphernal property, and to the husband
as capital, in the proportion specified by the
donor or testator, and in the absence of
designation, share and share alike, without
prejudice to what is provided in Article 753
FC Art.87

Every donation or grant of gratuitous

advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage.
7. Alienage
8. Absence
NCC Art. 381-396
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CASE OF
ABSENCE
Art. 381. When a person disappears from his
domicile, his whereabouts being unknown,
and without leaving an agent to administer
his property, the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
appoint a person to represent him in all that
may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under
similar circumstances the power conferred
by the absentee has expired. (181a)
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the
preceding article having been made, the
judge shall take the necessary measures to
safeguard the rights and interests of the
absentee and shall specify the powers,
obligations and remuneration of his
representative, regulating them, according to
the circumstances, by the rules concerning
guardians. (182)
Art. 383. In the appointment of a
representative, the spouse present shall be
preferred when there is no legal separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the
spouse present is a minor, any competent

person may be appointed by the

court. (183a)
CHAPTER 2
DECLARATION OF ABSENCE
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without
any news about the absentee or since the
receipt of the last news, and five years in
case the absentee has left a person in charge
of the administration of his property, his
absence may be declared. (184)
Art. 385. The following may ask for the
declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may
present an authentic copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the
law of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of
the absentee some right subordinated to the
condition of his death. (185)
Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence
shall not take effect until six months after its
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. (186a)
CHAPTER 3
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE
ABSENTEE
Art. 387. An administrator of the absentee's
property shall be appointed in accordance
with Article 383. (187a)
Art. 388. The wife who is appointed as an
administratrix of the husband's property
cannot alienate or encumber the husband's
property, or that of the conjugal partnership,
without judicial authority. (188a)
Art. 389. The administration shall cease in
any of the following cases:
(1) When the absentee appears personally or
by means of an agent;

(2) When the death of the absentee is proved

and his testate or intestate heirs appear;
(3) When a third person appears, showing by
a proper document that he has acquired the
absentee's property by purchase or other
title.
In these cases the administrator shall cease
in the performance of his office, and the
property shall be at the disposal of those
who may have a right thereto.(190)
CHAPTER 4
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for
the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened. (n)
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, including the division
of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a
sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has
taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of
death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four
years. (n)

Art. 392. If the absentee appears, or without

appearing his existence is proved, he shall
recover his property in the condition in which
it may be found, and the price of any
property that may have been alienated or
the property acquired therewith; but he
cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194)
CHAPTER 5
EFFECT OF ABSENCE UPON THE
CONTINGENT RIGHTS OF THE ABSENTEE
Art. 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining
to a person whose existence is not
recognized must prove that he was living at
the time his existence was necessary in
order to acquire said right. (195)
Art. 394. Without prejudice to the provision
of the preceding article, upon the opening of
a succession to which an absentee is called,
his share shall accrue to his co-heirs, unless
he has heirs, assigns, or a representative.
They shall all, as the case may be, make an
inventory of the property. (196a)
Art. 395. The provisions of the preceding
article are understood to be without
prejudice to the action of petition for
inheritance or other rights which are vested
in the absentee, his representatives or
successors in interest. These rights shall not
be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed
for prescription. In the record that is made in
the Registry of the real estate which accrues
to the coheirs, the circumstance of its being
subject to the provisions of this article shall
be stated. (197)
Art. 396. Those who may have entered upon
the inheritance shall appropriate the fruits
received in good faith so long as the
absentee does not appear, or while his

representatives or successors in interest do

not bring the proper actions.

of any litigation in which they may take part

by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.

9. Insolvency Trusteeship
NCC Art. 1491
The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of
another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person
or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose
administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them, unless the consent of the
principal has been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the
property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the
property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been intrusted to
them; this provision shall apply to judges and
government experts who, in any manner
whatsoever, take part in the sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys,
clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with
the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object

NCC Art. 1381

The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by
guardians whenever the wards whom they
represent suffer lesion by more than onefourth of the value of the things which are
the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of
absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion
stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors
when the latter cannot in any other manner
collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under
litigation if they have been entered into by
the defendant without the knowledge and
approval of the litigants or of competent
judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by
law to be subject to rescission.
V.

Domicile and Residence

Juridical Person

NCC Art. 51
When the law creating or recognizing them, or any
other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical
persons, the same shall be understood to be the
place where their legal representation is
established or where they exercise their principal
functions.
Natural Persons

Whether or not the candidate who got the second

highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when
the candidate for such position was disqualified.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that while it is true that
SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny
due course to the certificate of candidacy of
Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed, the fact remains that the local
elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a
bona fide candidate. The voters of the province
voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a
qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her
votes were counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that the
petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by
the electorate.

NCC Art. 50
For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is
the place of their habitual residence.
FC Art. 68-69
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. (109a)
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with
the other if the latter should live abroad or there
are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family.
Abella vs. COMELEC
G.R. No.100710, September 3, 1991
Gutierrez, Jr.,J.
Facts:
Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was
allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the
COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from
running as governor of Leyte on the ground that
she misrepresented her residence in her certificate
of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that
she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her
husband who was earlier disqualified from running
for the same office. The COMELEC granted the
petition. However, when the Commission granted
the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the
Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella,
who gathered the second highest votes in the said
area, sought to take his oath as governor of
Kananga, Leyte.
Issue:

VI.

The Family Code

A. Effect and Retroactivity
E.O. 209 as amended by E.O. 227
AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES"
I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the
Philippines, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Article 26 of the Executive Order No. 209
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 26. All marriage solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the

Filipino spouses shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law."
Sec. 2. Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Sec. 3. Article 39 of the Executive Order No. 209
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 39. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage shall
not prescribe. However, in the case of marriages
celebrated before the effectivity of this Code
and falling under Article 36, such action or
defense shall have taken effect."
Sec. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect
upon the effectivity of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of July,
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.
R.A. 6809
Republic Act No. 6809
December 13,
1989
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM
TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER
NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No.
209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the

attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same
Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the
child who shall then be qualified and responsible
for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental
consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to
derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards
below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the
second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act,
existing wills, bequests, donations, grants,
insurance policies and similar instruments
containing references and provisions favorable
to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon
completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989
R.A. 7160 Local Government Code
B. Repeal and Amendment
FC253
The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof
shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed
under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127,
insofar as they are applicable.

VII.

Marriage
A. Concept and nature
1. Definition
FC Art. 1
Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code.
NCC Art. 52
Marriage is not a mere contract but an
inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except
that the marriage settlements may to a
certain extent fix the property relations
during the marriage.
1987CONSTI Art.XV Sec.2
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
1987CONSTI Art.II Sec.12
The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of

the mother and the life of the unborn from

conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
1987CONSTI Art.II Sec.14
The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.
1987CONSTI Art.XV
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living
wage and income; and
(4) The right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for
its elderly members but the State may also
do so through just programs of social
security.

2. Nature

FC Art. 1
Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code.
P.D.1083 Muslim Code (MC) Art.14
Nature. Marriage is not only a civil
contract but a social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by
this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage
settlements may to a certain extent fix the
property relations of the spouses.
ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3.
Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other
evidence:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)That a person is innocent of crime or
wrong;
(b)That an unlawful act was done with an
unlawful intent;
(c)That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act;

(d)That a person takes ordinary care of his

concerns;
(e)That evidence willfully suppressed would
be adverse if produced;
(f)That money paid by one to another was
due to the latter;
(g)That a thing delivered by one to another
belonged to the latter;
(h)That an obligation delivered up to the
debtor has been paid;
(i)That prior rents or installments had been
paid when a receipt for the later one is
produced;
(j)That a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful
act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act; otherwise, that things which a person
possess, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him;
(k)That a person in possession of an order on
himself for the payment of the money, or the
delivery of anything, has paid the money or
delivered the thing accordingly;
(l)That a person acting in a public office was
regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m)That official duty has been regularly
performed;
(n)That a court, or judge acting as such,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o)That all the matters within an issue raised
in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it; and in like manner that all
matters within an issue raised in a dispute
submitted for arbitration were laid before the
arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p)That private transactions have been fair
and regular;
(q)That the ordinary course of business has
been followed;

(r)That there was a sufficient consideration

for a contract;
(s)That a negotiable instrument was given or
indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t)That an endorsement of negotiable
instrument was made before the instrument
was overdue and at the place where the
instrument is dated;
(u)That a writing is truly dated;
(v)That a letter duly directed and mailed was
received in the regular course of the mail;
(w)That after an absence of seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he is considered dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead
for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all
purposes including the division of the estate
among the heirs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)A person on board a vessel lost during a
sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2)A member of the armed forces who has
taken part in armed hostilities, and has been
missing for four years;
(3)A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and whose
existence has not been known for four years;
(4)If a married person has been absent for
four consecutive years, the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage if he or
she has well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already death. In case of

disappearance, where there is a danger of

death the circumstances hereinabove
provided, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage. However, in any case,
before marrying again, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceedings as
provided in the Family Code and in the rules
for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent
spouse. chanrobles virtua law library
(x)That acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was
conformable to the law or fact;
(y)That things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and ordinary
nature habits of life;
(z)That persons acting as copartners have
entered into a contract of copartneship;
(aa)That a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb)That property acquired by a man and a
woman who are capacitated to marry each
other and who live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under void marriage,
has been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry.
(cc)That in cases of cohabitation by a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to
marry each other and who have acquire
properly through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry,
such contributions and their corresponding
shares including joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit are equal.

(dd)That if the marriage is terminated and

the mother contracted another marriage
within three hundred days after such
termination of the former marriage, these
rules shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:
(1)A child born before one hundred eighty
days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have
been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred
days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(2)A child born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been
conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred
days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(ee)That a thing once proved to exist
continues as long as is usual with things of
the nature;
(ff)That the law has been obeyed;
(gg)That a printed or published book,
purporting to be printed or published by
public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh)That a printed or published book,
purporting contain reports of cases adjudged
in tribunals of the country where the book is
published, contains correct reports of such
cases;
(ii)That a trustee or other person whose duty
it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when
such presumption is necessary to perfect the
title of such person or his successor in
interest;

(jj)That except for purposes of succession,

when two persons perish in the same
calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died
first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred,
the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and
the age of the sexes, according to the
following rules:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.If both were under the age of fifteen years,
the older is deemed to have survived;
2.If both were above the age sixty, the
younger is deemed to have survived;
3.If one is under fifteen and the other above
sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4.If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and
the sex be different, the male is deemed to
have survived, if the sex be the same, the
older;
5.If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and
the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
(kk)That if there is a doubt, as between two
or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, as to which of them died first,
whoever alleges the death of one prior to the
other, shall prove the same; in the absence
of proof, they shall be considered to have
died at the same time.
NCC Art. 220
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children,
the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children,

and the validity of defense for any member

of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
3. Breach of Promise to marry
NCC Art. 19-21
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
NCC Art. 2176
Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
MC Art. 22
Breach of contract. Any person who has
entered into a contract to marry but
subsequently refuses without reasonable
ground to marry the other party who is
willing to perform the same shall pay the
latter the expenses incurred for the
preparation of the marriage and such
damages as may be granted by the court.
Cabague vs. Auxilio
G.R. No. L5028, November 26, 1952

Bengzon, J.
Facts:
Felipe Cabague & his son Geromino sued
Matias Auxilio & his daughter Socorro to
recover damages resulting from defendants
resulal to carry out the agreed marriage
between Soccorro & Geromino.
It was said that Socorro promised to
marry Geronimo provided that the latter
would improve their house and spend for the
wedding feast and needs of the bride.
The plaintiffs complied and spent 700php,
but then the defendants later on refused to
honor their pledged word.
The defendants moved to dismiss and
said that such is just an oral agreement and
theres no written agreement that was
executed.
Under the new rules of court, the
defendant may now present a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the contract was
not in writing and such may be proved.
Issue:
Can Felipe Cabague & his son Geronimo
recover damages and sue Soccorro and his
father for Breech of a mutal promise to
marry?
Held:
SC DECISION:
YES & NO. There are 2 kinds of
agreements involved in this case. One is the
agreement between Felipe Cabague & the
defendant in consideration of the marriage of
soccorro & Geronimo, the second one is
between the two lovers, as a mutual
promise to marry. The court said:
- YES. For the breach of the mutual promise
to marry, Geronimo may sue Soccorro for
damages.

NO. However for the case of Felipe

Cabagues action, such may not prosper
because it is to enforce an agreement in
consideration of marriage, such cannot be
maintain under the theory of mutual
promise to marry. Neither can Felipe
cause an action against Soccoro for
failure to marry his son.
However, yet again the court declares
that Geromino may continue his suit
against Socorro for damages as may have
resulted from her failure to carry out their
mutual matrimonial promises.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / CIVIL CODE
CONNECTION:
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
A breach of promise to marry does not
automatically entitle the offended party to an
award of damages.
Article 21 of family Code provides that any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Domalagan vs. Bolifer
G.R. No. L-8166, February 8, 1916
Johnson, J.
Facts:
Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered
into a verbal contract wherein the former
was to pay defendant the of P500 upon the
marriage of the former's son Cipriano
Domalagan with the defendant's daughter,
Bonifacia.
Jorge Domalagan paid the sum of P500 plus
P16 as hansel or token of future marraige.
However, Bonifacia married Laureano Sisi.
Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan
demanded return of the P516 plus interest

and damages arising from the fact that he

exerted effort to sell property in Bohol to
come up with the sum.
Defendant denied complaint and alleged that
it did not constitute a cause of action.
RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff
suffered any additional damages. But the
ruling was still in favor of the plaintiff,
making the defendant pay P516 plus interest
from Dec 17, 1910 plus costs.
Issue:
WON Domalagan can demand his P516 since
no marriage took place.
Held:
YES. The amount constitutes DPN (Donation
Propter Nuptias) since it fulfills all the
requirements, thus it may be revoked. Verbal
contracts are valid even if it is not clothed in
the necessary form.
Hermosisima vs. CA
G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960
Concepcion, J.
Facts:
An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954,
Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as
complainant, filed with the said CFI a
complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child
of said petitioner, as well as for support of
said child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise to marry. Petitioner
admitted the paternity of the child and
expressed willingness to support the latter,
but denied having ever promised to marry
complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas,
was born in July 1917, since
1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner
who was almost ten years younger than her
used to go around together and were

regarded as engaged, although he made no

promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she
gave up teaching and became a life
insurance underwriter where intimacy
developed between her and petitioner, since
one evening in 1953 when after coming from
the movies, they had sexual intercourse in
his cabin on board MV Escano to which he
was then attached as apprentice pilot. In
February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner
that she was pregnant, whereupon he
promised to marry her. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are
recoverable under our laws for breach of
promise to marry.
Held:
It appearing that because of the defendantappellants seductive prowess, plaintiffappellee overwhelmed by her love for him
yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her
age and self-control. In the present case, the
court is unable to say that petitioner is
morally guilty of seduction, not only because
he is approximately ten years younger but
also because the Court of First Instance
found that complainant surrendered herself
to the petitioner because overwhelmed by
her love for him she wanted to bind him by
having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy.
Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
Bengzon, J.P.,J.
Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer are to

be wed. 2 days prior the ceremony,
Francisco left, leaving a telegram he will
come back but never did. Beatriz filed for
damages, and judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and
exemplary damages. Defendant now asserts
that the judgment against him is contrary to
law, given that there is no provision in the
Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of
promise to marry.
Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is
actionable.
Held:
No it is not, but this case is not a mere
breach of promise to marry. He must be held
answerable for the damages in accordance
with Art. 21.
The SC maintained that though breach of
promise to marry is not actionable, the
defendants act is still punishable under
Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that
any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In this case, plaintiff already arranged
everything for the wedding, like the wedding
gowns, invitations, matrimonial bed, etc.
The SC held that this is not a case of mere
breach of promise to marry A wedding has
been formally set and all the preparations
have been made, only for the groom to walk
out 2 days before. This is contrary to good
customs, since defendant acted in a reckless
and oppressive manner.
Estremos vs. Ephan (CA)

83 O.G. 4022 No. 35

Facts:
Tanjanco vs. CA
G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966
Reyes, J.B.L.,J.
Facts:
Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos.
Since he promised her marriage, she
consented to his pleas for carnal knowledge.
As a result, she conceived a child, and due to
her condition, she had to resign from her
work. Because she was unable to support
herself and
the baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry
her, she instituted an action for damages,
compelling the defendant to recognize the
unborn child, pay her monthly support, plus
P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner
constitute seduction as contemplated in Art.
21.
Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere
sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to
marry. It connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement superior power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded. In this case,
for 1 whole year, the woman maintained
intimate sexual relations with the defendant,
and such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly here there is
voluntariness and mutual passion, for had
the plaintiff been deceived, she would not
have again yielded to his embraces for a
year.
Ga Shem Shookat Baksh vs. CA

G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993

Davide, Jr.,J.
Facts:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a
complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner for the
alleged breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan
where the latter was an Iranian medical
exchange student who later courted her and
proposed marriage. The petitioner even
went to Marilous house to secure approval of
her parents. The petitioner then forced the
respondent to leave with him in his
apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she
lived with him. After a week, she filed a
complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even
tied the respondent in the apartment while
he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at
one time became pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage
agreement and told Marilou to not live with
him since he is already married to someone
in Bacolod. He claimed that he never
proposed marriage or agreed to be married
neither sought consent and approval of
Marlious parents. He claimed that he asked
Marilou to stay out of his apartment since
the latter deceived him by stealing money
and his passport. The private respondent
prayed for damages and reimbursements of
actual expenses.
Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give
rise to cause for damages.
Held:

The existing rule is that breach of promise to

marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The
court held that when a man uses his promise
of marriage to deceive a woman to consent
to his malicious desires, he commits fraud
and willfully injures the woman. In that
instance, the court found that petitioners
deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to
surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such
promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to
have carnal knowledge with the woman and
actual damages should be paid for the
wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner
even committed deplorable acts in disregard
of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA
awarding damages to the respondent.
4. Not subject to stipulation
NCC Art. 221
The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband
and wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal
separation, or of annulment of marriage;
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with
intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of
their legitime.
Panganiban vs. Borromeo
September 9, 1933

Malcolm, J.
Facts:
Alejandro and Juana Mapala subscribe a
contract before notary public Elias Borromeo.
Respondent cooperated the in execution
of the document although he may not fully
understand the content of the document.
The substance of the document permits
the husband and the wife to live in a
adulterous relationship without any
opposition.
Issue:
WON the contract sanctioned an illicit and
immoral practice
WON the lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct.
Held:
Yes, the contract contained provisions
which is contrary to law, morals and public
order and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable.
In his instance, if the spouse should retain
their present frame of mind, no prosecution
of either one by the other could be expected.
Nevertheless, it is far from the purpose of the
Legislature to bar to legalize adultery and
concubinage.
Yes, the court has the right to discipline
an attorney who has been guilty of
misconduct
A member of the bar who performs an act as
a notary and public of a disgraceful or
immoral act character may be held to
account by the court even to the extent of
disbarment.
Persons relation: The agreement between
Alejandro and Juana prior to marriage were

contrary to law, morals and public order, as

consequence not judicially recognizable
In re: Atty. Santiago
June 21, 1940
Facts:
Ernesto Baniquit who was living
separately from his wife for some nine
consecutive years sought legal advice from
Atty. Roque Santiago (a practicing lawyer and
notary public).
Atty. Santiago, upon hearing the side of
Banquit assured him that he could secure
separation from his wife thus he asked him
to bring Soledad Colares, that same
afternoon.
He prepared a document stipulating
among others that the two parties authorizes
each other to marry again.
The said document was executed and
Atty. Santiago assured the parties that the
document would be void.
Thus this action (administrative) was
initiated through the complaint of the
Solicitor General against Atty. Santiago with
a charge of malpractice and a prayer for
disciplinary action against him.
Issue:
Was the action of Atty. Santiago constitute
malpractice which justifies disbarment from
practice of law?
Held:
YES.
Thus, this also means that the preparation
and execution of the contract separating the
two parties is considered void.
It should be noted even Atty. Santiago
admitted that he realized he made a mistake
and thus, after the execution, he sent for the

contracting parties to come to his office and

they signed the deed of cancellation.
SC Decision: ATTY. SANTIAGO ROQUE WAS
FOUND GUILTY. He was suspended for one
year from practicing law.
Relevance:
Marriage cannot be terminated by virtue of
any contract made by the two parties.
Family Code of the Philippines Article 1
should be read with reference to New Civil
Code Article 221 which states that:
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of
no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband
and wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal
separation, or of annulment of marriage;
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with
intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of
their legitime.
Selanova vs. Mendoza
A.M. No. 804-CJ, May 19, 1975
Aquino, J.
Facts:
Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross
ignorance of the law for preparing and
ratifying a document extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
complainant and his wife. One condition of
the liquidation was that either spouse would
withdraw the complaint for adultery or
concubinage which each had filed against
the other and that they waived their right to
prosecute each other for whatever acts of

infidelity either one would commit against

the other. Respondent relied on Art 191 of
the old Civil Code that states the husband
and wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. The
judge ratified the document without judicial
approval from CFI Negros where the couple
was residing, making it void assuming
arguendo that Art. 191 is still in effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement separating
the conjugal property and the spouses is
void.
Held:
It is. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the
following shall be void:
1. Any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife;
2. Every extrajudicial agreement during
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute
community property between husband and
wife.
While adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, they are crimes punishable by the
RPC, and a contract legalizing their
commission is contrary to law, morals and
public order, and as a consequence not
judicially recognizable.
Lichauco-De Leon vs. CA
G.R. No. 80965, June 6 1990
Medialdea, J.
Facts:
On October 18, 1969, private respondent
Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia
Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock
before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan,
Rizal.

In October, 1972, a de facto separation

between the spouses occured due to
irreconcilable marital differences
On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with
the Superior Court of California, County of
San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of
marriage and filed for distribution of
marriage but Jose Vicente was a Filipino
Resident.
On March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in
entering into a Letter-Agreement with her
mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria
De Leon. Said agreement contained the
payment sum of P100, 000 and transfer of
lots conveyed to her who Macaria did.
On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose
Vicente filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial
approval of dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.
Macaria intervened that the properties in
distribution which she paid was her
properties and assailed that the purpose of
validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement
is the termination of marital relationship
between Sylvia and Jose Vicente which
states:
In consideration for a peaceful and
amicable termination of relations between
the undersigned and her lawfully wedded
husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the
following are agreed upon:
The trial court declared the nullity of
Letter agreement and the conjugal
partnership dissolved.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
Issue:

Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is

valid? No
Held:
The use of the word "relations" in the
letter agreement is ambiguous and subject
to interpretation since Macaria believed it to
be dissolution of marriage but for Sylvia it is
only dissolution of property relations and
that Sylvia and Jose both filed in the court for
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
Also, under Article 221 of the New Civil
Code:
The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband
and wife;
The letter agreement is an extra-judicial
agreement prepared during marriage by
Sylvia so it is void and agreement must be
entered by the spouse and not to a third
party.
The threat of Sylvia to Macaria for the
latter to agree to the letter agreement is not
a threat for in order that intimidation may
vitiate consent and render the contract
invalid, the following requisites must concur:
that the intimidation must be the
determining
cause of the contract
that the threatened act be unjust or
unlawful;
that the threat be real and serious, and
that it produces a reasonable and wellgrounded
fear from the fact that the
person from whom it comes has the
necessary means or ability to inflict
the threatened injury.

PERSONS RELATIONS:
But marriage is not a mere contract but a
sacred social institution.
Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but
an inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulations...
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms,
and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.
B. Requisites
Pugeda vs. Trias
G.R. No. L-16925, July 24, 1962
Labrador, J.
Facts:
1. Kinds of Requisites
FC Art.2
No marriage shall be valid, unless these
essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer.
FC Art.3
The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal

declaration that they take each other as

husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.
FC Art.5
Any male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract
marriage.
NCC Art.53
No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character
2. Kinds of non-compliance
3. Effect of non-compliance
4. Essential requisites
a. Legal capacity
1. Gender
FC Art.2 (1)
No marriage shall be valid, unless
these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a
female.
2. Age
FC Art.5
Any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38, may contract
marriage.

FC Art.35 (1)
The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party
below eighteen years of age even with
the consent of parents or guardians
R.A. 6809 LOWERING THE AGE OF
MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO
EIGHTEEN YEARS (Supra)
NCC Art. 54
Any male of the age of sixteen years
or upwards, and any female of the age
of fourteen years or upwards, not
under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 80 to 84, may
contract marriage.
NCC Art. 80 (1)
The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted under the ages
of sixteen and fourteen years by the
male and female respectively, even
with the consent of the parents
3. Parental Consent
FC Art. 14
In case either or both of the
contracting parties, not having been
emancipated by a previous marriage,
are between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one, they shall, in addition to
the requirements of the preceding
articles, exhibit to the local civil
registrar, the consent to their
marriage of their father, mother,

surviving parent or guardian, or

persons having legal charge of them,
in the order mentioned. Such consent
shall be manifested in writing by the
interested party, who personally
appears before the proper local civil
registrar, or in the form of an affidavit
made in the presence of two witnesses
and attested before any official
authorized by law to administer oaths.
The personal manifestation shall be
recorded in both applications for
marriage license, and the affidavit, if
one is executed instead, shall be
attached to said applications.
FC Art.45
A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is
sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen years of age or over but
below twenty-one, and the marriage
was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the
party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such
party freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as husband
and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound
mind, unless such party after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards, with full knowledge

of the facts constituting the fraud,

freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party
was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such
party thereafter freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically
incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to
be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with
a sexually-transmissible disease found
to be serious and appears to be
incurable.
NCC Art. 65
If the spouses should reconcile, a
corresponding joint manifestation
under oath duly signed by them shall
be filed with the court in the same
proceeding for legal separation.
NCC Art. 85 (1)
A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is
sought to have the marriage annulled
was between the ages of sixteen and
twenty years, if male, or between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if
female, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the
parent, guardian or person having
authority over the party, unless after

attaining the ages of twenty or

eighteen years, as the case may be,
such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
Sison vs. Te Lay Li
NO 7037- May 7, 1952
Reyes, J.B.L.,J.
Facts:
Plaintiff and Appellee: Juanita Sison
Defendant and Appellant: Te Lay Li
Appeal from a decision of CFI
Davao declaring the two marriages
celebrated one after another on April
28, 1949 null and void on the ground
of plaintiffs consent was obtained
through force and intimidation
employed upon her by her father
Morning of April 28, 1949civil
wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena
of MC of Davao, afternoonremarried
in accordance with rites of Republic of
China before Chinese Consul S.T. Mih
in office in Davao City
Plaintiffs testimony:
Defendant never wooed her
Wedding arranged by father
Father whipped her often as
she
opposed marriage
Resorted to beating her
She ran away from home but
found
by father and
promised she will not
force her
again
But renewed subject of
marriage
handed her a
knife telling her to
choose
between her life of his
because of fear that her father

might kill her she agreed to the

marriage
Testimony corroborated by
mother
and Epifania del Rio
relative of her
mother
She lived with her husband
in his
parents home but
considered him
a stranger since
she doesnt love
him
She was kept a prisoner in
the
house; she
never occupied the
same bed with husband
Never had sexual intercourse except on June 1,
1949 forced by husband using a knifeshe
mustered courage to escape from her husbands
home
DEFENDANTS CLAIMS:
Marriages were regular and legal
Entered into marriage freely and
voluntarily
Plaintiff not kept a prisoner
Plaintiff would everyday ask her father in
law to
give her and her husband their own
house and
business
She slapped heronly when she ran away
with
P1200 and when asked
where she came from she
retorted it was
none of his business
CFI: finding the plaintiffs marriage
consummated only by intimidation and force
and that plaintiff never for a moment
acquiesced to the status of a wife to the
defendant and declared two marriages between
them null and void; defendant ordered to return
the P1200 and whatever personal belongings
the plaintiff had left in their house
Witnesses; Judge Delfin Hofilena for
defendant but testified in cross examination that

plaintiff came to him and confided that she was

being compelled to marry a man she did not like
Te Seng: plaintiff ran away, her father
asked help from him to take daughter
home; confessed that daughter did not
want to marry the defendant
Held:
DECISION OF SC: The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the sole modification that the
amount ordered return to plaintiff should be
P1248 according to evidence and not P1200.
REASONS:
While it is true that it is the policy of the law to
maintain the marriage ties, when it is amply
proved that the marriage is effected through
duress and intimidation and w/o the consent
and against the will of one of the parties, there
are no ties to be preserved and the marriage
should consequently be annulled here was no
voluntary cohabitation on the wifes part
b. Consent Freely Given
1. Mistake as to identity
FC Art. 35 (5)
The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
(5) Those contracted through mistake
of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other;
NCC Art. 86 (1)
Any of the following circumstances
shall constitute fraud referred to in
Number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity
of one of the contracting parties
2. Insanity

FC Art. 45 (2)
A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(2) That either party was of unsound
mind, unless such party after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
3. Fraud
FC Art. 45 (3)
A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(3) That the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards, with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
NCC Art. 1338-1344
Art. 1338. There is fraud when,
through insidious words or
machinations of one of the contracting
parties, the other is induced to enter
into a contract which, without them,
he would not have agreed to. (1269)
Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts,
when there is a duty to reveal them,
as when the parties are bound by
confidential relations, constitutes
fraud. (n)
Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in
trade, when the other party had an
opportunity to know the facts, are not
in themselves fraudulent. (n)

Art. 1341. A mere expression of an

opinion does not signify fraud, unless
made by an expert and the other party
has relied on the former's special
knowledge. (n)
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third
person does not vitiate consent,
unless such misrepresentation has
created substantial mistake and the
same is mutual. (n)
Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in
good faith is not fraudulent but may
constitute error. (n)
Art. 1344. In order that fraud may
make a contract voidable, it should be
serious and should not have been
employed by both contracting parties.
Incidental fraud only obliges the
person employing it to pay damages.
4. Force, intimidation and undue
influence
FC Art. 45 (4)
A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(4) That the consent of either party
was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such
party thereafter freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
NCC Art. 1335-1337
Art. 1335. There is violence when in
order to wrest consent, serious or
irresistible force is employed.
There is intimidation when one of the
contracting parties is compelled by a

reasonable and well-grounded fear of

an imminent and grave evil upon his
person or property, or upon the person
or property of his spouse, descendants
or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of
intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be borne
in mind.
A threat to enforce one's claim
through competent authority, if the
claim is just or legal, does not vitiate
consent. (1267a)
Art. 1336. Violence or intimidation
shall annul the obligation, although it
may have been employed by a third
person who did not take part in the
contract. (1268)
Art. 1337. There is undue influence
when a person takes improper
advantage of his power over the will of
another, depriving the latter of a
reasonable freedom of choice. The
following circumstances shall be
considered: the confidential, family,
spiritual and other relations between
the parties, or the fact that the person
alleged to have been unduly
influenced was suffering from mental
weakness, or was ignorant or in
financial distress.
5. Physical incapacity
FC Art. 45 (5)
A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:

(5) That either party was physically

incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to
be incurable;
6. Affliction with STD
FC Art. 45 (6)
A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
That either party was afflicted with a
sexually-transmissible disease found
to be serious and appears to be
incurable.
5. Formal Requisites
a. Authority of the Solemnizing
Officer
1. Who are authorized
FC Art.7
Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of
any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect
and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the
written authority granted by his church or
religious sect and provided that at least
one of the contracting parties belongs to
the solemnizing officer's church or
religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only
in the case mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to

which a chaplain is assigned, in the
absence of the latter, during a military
operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or viceconsul in the case provided in Article 10.
FC Art.1
Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
FC Art.31
A marriage in articulo mortis between
passengers or crew members may also be
solemnized by a ship captain or by an
airplane pilot not only while the ship is at
sea or the plane is in flight, but also
during stopovers at ports of call.

FC Art.32
A military commander of a unit, who is a
commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in
articulo mortis between persons within
the zone of military operation, whether
members of the armed forces or civilians.

NCC Art. 56
The petition for legal separation shall be
denied on any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has
condoned the offense or act complained
of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has
consented to the commission of the
offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between
the parties in the commission of the
offense or act constituting the ground for
legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground
for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the
parties to obtain decree of legal
separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by
prescription.
NCC Art. 74
A marriage in articulo mortis may also be
solemnized by the captain of a ship or
chief of an airplane during a voyage, or
by the commanding officer of a military
unit, in the absence of a chaplain, during
war. The duties mentioned in the two
preceding articles shall be complied with
by the ship captain, airplane chief or
commanding officer.
NCC Art. 76
No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting

parties shall state the foregoing facts in an

affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
1991 LGC Sec 444(b)(1)(xviii)
The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties,
Functions and Compensation.
(xviii) Solemnize marriages, any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding;
1991 LGC Sec 455(b)(1)(xviii)
Chief Executive (Mayor) Powers, Duties
and Compensation.
(xviii) Solemnize marriage, any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding
2. How authorized
FC Art. 7(2)
Marriage may be solemnized by
Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of
any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect
and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the
written authority granted by his church or
religious sect and provided that at least
one of the contracting parties belongs to
the solemnizing officer's church or
religious sect;
Villar vs. Paraiso
G.R. No. L-8014, March 14, 1955

Bautista-Angelo,J.
Facts:
In the 1951 elections, Paraiso defeated Villar
and was elected and proclaimed Mayor of
Rizal, Nueva Ecija.Villar filed a quo warranto
proceeding against Paraiso contending that
the latter was ineligible to hold office because
he was then a minister of the United Church
of Christ and as such, was disqualified under
Sec. 2175 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Villar instituted a quo warranto
proceeding praying that Paraisos
proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null
and void, and that he be declared duly
elected mayor of Rizal.Paraiso denied
ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as
minister and that his resignation was
accepted by thecabinet of his
church.Procedural History: RTC found Paraiso
ineligible for being an ecclesiastic and
declared his proclamation as mayornull and
void. However, it did not declare Villar as
mayor-elect for lack of legal ground to do so.
Both partiesappealed. CA certified the case to
the SC, finding that Villar raised only
questions of law even though Paraiso
raisedboth questions of law and fact.
Issue:
WON Paraiso, being an ecclesiastic, is
ineligible to hold office as Mayor of Rizal,
Nueva Ecija
Held:
YESRule: SEC. 2175.
Persons ineligible to municipal office
In no case shall there be elected or appointed
to amunicipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in
active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincialor Insular funds,
or contractors for public works of the

municipality.Application: SC did not find any

reason to deviate from the finding of the trial
court that respondent never ceasedas
minister of the order to which he belonged
and that the resignation he claimed to have
filed months prior to the elections was a mere
scheme to circumvent the prohibition of law
regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for
a municipal office .Indeed, if respondent
really and sincerely intended to resign as
minister of the religious organization to which
he belonged for the purpose of launching his
candidacy why did he not resign in due form
and have the acceptance of his resignation
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.
The purpose of registration is two-fold:
to inform the public not only of the authority
of the minister to discharge religious
functions, but equally to keep it informed
of any change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection of
the public. This is specially so with regard to
the authority to solemnized marriages, the
registration of which is made by the law
mandatory(Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It
is no argument to say that the duty to secure
the cancellation of the requisite resignation
devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the
head of his organization or upon the official in
charge of such registration, upon proper
showing of the reason for such cancellation,
because the law likewise imposes upon the
interested party the duty of effecting such
cancellation, who in the instant case is the
respondent himself. This he failed to do. And
what is more, he failed to attach to his
certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged
resignation as minister knowing full well that
a minister is disqualified by law to run for a

municipal office. The documents Paraiso

presented purporting to show his alleged
resignation were held to be self-serving and
appeared to have been prepared
haphazardly, leading the court to believe that
these were made only to cure his ineligibility
to hold office. Disposotive Portion: Wherefore,
the decision appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs. Petitioner
was not declared elected, having obtained
second place in the elections, in the absence
of an express provision authorizing such
declaration.
Aranes vs. Occiano
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002
Puno, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged
respondent Judge Occiano with gross
ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding
judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, he solemnized the marriage of
Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February
17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction and without the requisite of
marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and
Orobia filed their application of marriage
license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped
that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but
neither of them claimed it. In addition, no
record also appeared with the Office of the
Civil Registrar General for the alleged
marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony,
he carefully examined the documents and
first refused to conduct the marriage and

advised them to reset the date considering

the absence of the marriage license.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the
postponement of the wedding might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia
who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized
the marriage on the assurance of the couple
that they will provide the license that same
afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the
couple that their marriage is valid.
Issue:
Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of
solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and conducting it outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
Held:
The court held that the territorial jurisdiction
of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His
act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore
is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M.
Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined
P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
3. effect of absence of authority

FC Art. 4
The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
FC Art. 35(2)
The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
(2) Those solemnized by any person not
legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith
that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so
b. Marriage ceremony
1. Form
FC Art. 3 (3)
The formal requisites of marriage are:
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place
with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.

FC Art. 6
No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the
contracting parties to appear personally

before the solemnizing officer and declare in

the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be
contained in the marriage certificate which
shall be signed by the contracting parties and
their witnesses and attested by the
solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when
the party at the point of death is unable to
sign the marriage certificate, it shall be
sufficient for one of the witnesses to the
marriage to write the name of said party,
which fact shall be attested by the
solemnizing officer.
Martinez vs. Angel Tan
G.R. No. L-4904, February 5, 1909
Willard, J.
Facts:
Rosalia Martinez was visiting her brother in
Palompon, Leyte. She met Angel Tan there
and they were married by a Justice of Peace.
Tan and Martinez first submitted a petition
requesting the Justice to solemnize their
marriage. Upon arriving at the office of the
justice, they signed another document to
ratify their petition under oath. Then the
marriage was solemnized and a marriage
certificate was signed by Tan, Martinez,
Ballori and witnesses Esmero and Pacita
Ballori. The couple did not live together and
when Martinez went home to Ormoc, her
relatives convinced her to file charges
claiming that the marriage was not valid
since she signed the document in her own
home thinking that it was a paper authorizing
Tan to ask the consent of her parents to the
marriage.
Issue:

WON the marriage is valid.

Held/Ratio:
Yes. They were married since there was an
expression of mutual consent and both of
them appeared before the justice of the
peace. Court ruled that General Orders No. 68
Sec. 6 states: No particular form for the
ceremony of marriage is required, but the
parties must declare in the presence
solemnizing the marriage that they take each
other as husband and wife.
Letters of Martinez to Tan regarding the
marriage and asking for her parents consent
are proof that marriage took place and is
valid. Parties ratified their petition under
oath. They both understood Spanish thus
they knew the contents of the document they
were signing.
2. Place of Ceremony
FC Art.8
The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers of the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
in cases of marriages contracted on the point
of death or in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of
the parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that
effect. (57a)
FC Art. 28-29
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so
located that there is no means of

transportation to enable such party to appear

personally before the local civil registrar, the
marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license.(72a)
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two
preceding articles, the solemnizing officer
shall state in an affidavit executed before the
local civil registrar or any other person legally
authorized to administer oaths that the
marriage was performed in articulo mortis or
that the residence of either party, specifying
the barrio or barangay, is so located that
there is no means of transportation to enable
such party to appear personally before the
local civil registrar and that the officer took
the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and
relationship of the contracting parties and the
absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
FC Art.32-33
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who
is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo
mortis between persons within the zone of
military operation, whether members of the
armed forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among
members of the ethnic cultural communities
may be performed validly without the
necessity of marriage license, provided they
are solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices.(78a)
3. Marriage Certificate
FC Art. 6
No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It

shall be necessary, however, for the

contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be
contained in the marriage certificate which
shall be signed by the contracting parties and
their witnesses and attested by the
solemnizing officer.
FC Art. 22
The marriage certificate, in which the parties
shall declare that they take each other as
husband and wife, shall also state:
(1) The full name, sex and age of each
contracting party;
(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual
residence;
(3) The date and precise time of the
celebration of the marriage;
(4) That the proper marriage license has been
issued according to law, except in marriage
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
(5) That either or both of the contracting
parties have secured the parental consent in
appropriate cases;
(6) That either or both of the contracting
parties have complied with the legal
requirement regarding parental advice in
appropriate cases; and
(7) That the parties have entered into
marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy
thereof. (67a)
Maldridejo vs. De Leon
G.R. No. L-32473, October 6, 1930
Villa-Real, J.
Facts:

FACTS:
1. Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez had a
child, Domingo de Leon.
2. Eulogio died in 1915 and was survived by
his wife and son.
3. During her widowhood, Flaviana lived with
Pedro Madridejo.
4. In 1917, a child named Melecio was born to
Flaviana and Pedro.
5. In 1920, Flaviana married Pedro in articulo
mortis.
6. Flaviana died the following day.
7. Domingo de Leon died in 1928.
8. The priest who solemnized the marriage
failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary.
9. The court held that Melecio is Domingos
next of kin and ordered defendants to restore
and deliver the ownership and possession of
the property to Melecio.
10. Hence this appeal contending that the
court erred in holding the marriage of
Flaviana and Pedro valid.
Issue:
Is the marriage of Flaviana and Pedro valid?
Held:
The mere fact that the parish priest of
Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro and
Flaviana, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary does not invalidate the marriage in
articulo mortis, it not appearing that the
essential requisites required by law for its
validity were lacking in the ceremony, and
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate is not one of said essential
requisites. It is only an irregularity of a formal
requisite.

(2) WON the marriage legitimized Melecio

Madridejo.
No. To be legitimized by a subsequent
marriage of ones parents, a natural child
must be acknowledged before or after the
celebration of the said marriage. Plaintiff in
this case did not meet these requirements
and is thus void of legitimacy.

4. Duties of Solemnizing Officer

FC Art. 23-24
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of
the contracting parties the original of the
marriage certificate referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by
the local civil registrar to the solemnizing
officer transmitting copies of the marriage
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain
in his file the quadruplicate copy of the
marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage
license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of
the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage in place other
than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil

registrar to prepare the documents required
by this Title, and to administer oaths to all
interested parties without any charge in both

cases. The documents and affidavits filed in

connection with applications for marriage
licenses shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax.(n)
5. Effect of Irregularity
FC Art. 4
The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
c. Marriage License
(1) Where to apply
FC Art. 9-10
Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by
the local civil registrar of the city or
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, except in marriages where
no license is required in accordance with
Chapter 2 of this Title. (58a)
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens
abroad may be solemnized by a consulgeneral, consul or vice-consul of the Republic
of the Philippines. The issuance of the
marriage license and the duties of the local
civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer

with regard to the celebration of marriage

shall be performed by said consular
official. (75a)

certificates in any formality in connection

with the securing of the marriage
license. (59a)
b. Proof of capacity

(2) Requirements for issuance

a. Application
FC Art. 11
Where a marriage license is required, each of
the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the
proper local civil registrar which shall specify
the following:
(1) Full name of the contracting party;
(2) Place of birth;
(3) Age and date of birth;
(4) Civil status;
(5) If previously married, how, when and
where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
(6) Present residence and citizenship;
(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting
parties;
(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the
father;
(9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the
mother; and
(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of
the guardian or person having charge, in case
the contracting party has neither father nor
mother and is under the age of twenty-one
years.
The applicants, their parents or guardians
shall not be required to exhibit their residence

FC Art. 12-14
Art. 12. The local civil registrar, upon
receiving such application, shall require the
presentation of the original birth certificates
or, in default thereof, the baptismal
certificates of the contracting parties or
copies of such documents duly attested by
the persons having custody of the originals.
These certificates or certified copies of the
documents by this Article need not be sworn
to and shall be exempt from the documentary
stamp tax. The signature and official title of
the person issuing the certificate shall be
sufficient proof of its authenticity.
If either of the contracting parties is unable to
produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a
certified copy of either because of the
destruction or loss of the original or if it is
shown by an affidavit of such party or of any
other person that such birth or baptismal
certificate has not yet been received though
the same has been required of the person
having custody thereof at least fifteen days
prior to the date of the application, such party
may furnish in lieu thereof his current
residence certificate or an instrument drawn
up and sworn to before the local civil registrar
concerned or any public official authorized to
administer oaths. Such instrument shall
contain the sworn declaration of two
witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full
name, residence and citizenship of such
contracting party and of his or her parents, if

known, and the place and date of birth of

such party. The nearest of kin of the
contracting parties shall be preferred as
witnesses, or, in their default, persons of
good reputation in the province or the locality.
The presentation of birth or baptismal
certificate shall not be required if the parents
of the contracting parties appear personally
before the local civil registrar concerned and
swear to the correctness of the lawful age of
said parties, as stated in the application, or
when the local civil registrar shall, by merely
looking at the applicants upon their
personally appearing before him, be
convinced that either or both of them have
the required age. (60a)
Art. 13. In case either of the contracting
parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead
of the birth or baptismal certificate required
in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of his or her previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be
secured, the party shall make an affidavit
setting forth this circumstance and his or her
actual civil status and the name and date of
death of the deceased spouse. (61a)
Art. 14. In case either or both of the
contracting parties, not having been
emancipated by a previous marriage, are
between the ages of eighteen and twentyone, they shall, in addition to the
requirements of the preceding articles,
exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent
to their marriage of their father, mother,
surviving parent or guardian, or persons

having legal charge of them, in the order

mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested
in writing by the interested party, who
personally appears before the proper local
civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit
made in the presence of two witnesses and
attested before any official authorized by law
to administer oaths. The personal
manifestation shall be recorded in both
applications for marriage license, and the
affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be
attached to said applications. (61a)
FC Art. 21
When either or both of the contracting parties
are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary for them before a marriage license
can be obtained, to submit a certificate of
legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by
their respective diplomatic or consular
officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other
countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of
legal capacity herein required, submit an
affidavit stating the circumstances showing
such capacity to contract marriage. (66a)
c. Parental Advice
FC Art. 15
Any contracting party between the age of
twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged
to ask their parents or guardian for advice
upon the intended marriage. If they do not
obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the
marriage license shall not be issued till after
three months following the completion of the
publication of the application therefor. A
sworn statement by the contracting parties to
the effect that such advice has been sought,

together with the written advice given, if any,

shall be attached to the application for
marriage license. Should the parents or
guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact
shall be stated in the sworn statement. (62a)
d. Marriage Counseling
FC Art. 16
In the cases where parental consent or
parental advice is needed, the party or
parties concerned shall, in addition to the
requirements of the preceding articles, attach
a certificate issued by a priest, imam or
minister authorized to solemnize marriage
under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage
counselor duly accredited by the proper
government agency to the effect that the
contracting parties have undergone marriage
counseling. Failure to attach said certificates
of marriage counseling shall suspend the
issuance of the marriage license for a period
of three months from the completion of the
publication of the application. Issuance of the
marriage license within the prohibited period
shall subject the issuing officer to
administrative sanctions but shall not affect
the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties
need parental consent or parental advice, the
other party must be present at the counseling
referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
e. Publication
FC Art. 17
The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice
which shall contain the full names and
residences of the applicants for a marriage

license and other data given in the

applications. The notice shall be posted for
ten consecutive days on a bulletin board
outside the office of the local civil registrar
located in a conspicuous place within the
building and accessible to the general public.
This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. The marriage license shall be issued
after the completion of the period of
publication. (63a)
f. Investigation of Impediments
FC Art. 18
In case of any impediment known to the local
civil registrar or brought to his attention, he
shall note down the particulars thereof and
his findings thereon in the application for
marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue
said license after the completion of the period
of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a
competent court at his own instance or that
of any interest party. No filing fee shall be
charged for the petition nor a corresponding
bond required for the issuances of the
order. (64a)
g. Payment of Fees
FC Art. 19
The local civil registrar shall require the
payment of the fees prescribed by law or
regulations before the issuance of the
marriage license. No other sum shall be
collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any
kind for the issuance of said license. It shall,
however, be issued free of charge to indigent

parties, that is those who have no visible

means of income or whose income is
insufficient for their subsistence a fact
established by their affidavit, or by their oath
before the local civil registrar. (65a)
h. Family planning certificate
P.D. 965
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 965 July 20, 1976
A DECREE REQUIRING APPLICANT FOR
MARRIAGE LICENSE TO RECEIVE
INSTRUCTIONS ON FAMILY PLANNING AND
RESPONSIBLE PARENTHOOD
WHEREAS, the Government has adopted a
national population program to achieve and
maintain levels of population most conducive
to the national welfare;
WHEREAS, an essential element of the
population program is to inform and instruct
the people on family planning and responsible
parenthood; and
WHEREAS, an effective mode of
implementing the program would be to
require all applicants for marriage license to
receive instructions and information on family
planning and responsible parenthood before
they are issued the marriage license, and to
create the administrative machinery for
giving such instructions and information;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby order and decree:
Section 1. Office of Family Planning. There is
hereby created in every city and municipality
an Office of Family Planning to be headed by
the city or municipal health officer. He shall
be assisted by the city or rural health nurse,

members of the city or rural health unit, and

such other personnel from the different
agencies of the government involved in the
family planning program, who shall perform
family planning duties in addition to their
regular duties. Private entities or individuals
duly accredited by the Commission on
Population engaged in family planning
activities may also be impressed into the
service.
Section 2. Duties of Family Planning
Office. The Office of Family planning shall
give instructions and information on family
and responsible parenthood to applicants for
marriage license and other interested persons
in the form of personal instruction and/or
handbook, pamphlets or brochures.
Furthermore, such instructions and
information shall be consistent with the
policies of the Commission on Population.
Section 3. Certificate of
Compliance. Applicants for marriage license
shall, upon filing an application therefore, be
obliged to receive instructions and
information on family planning and
responsible parenthood from the Family
Planning Office. Such instructions and
information may be in the form of personal
instruction or in the form of brochures,
pamphlets, or handbooks. In places where
there are no health officers, any person duly
accredited by the Commission on Population
may give the instructions herein provided.
No marriage license shall be issued by the
Local Civil Registrar unless the applicants
present a certificate, issued at no cost to the
applicants, by an Office of Family Planning
that they had received instructions and

information on family planning and

responsible parenthood.
If, for any reason, the information or
instructions shall not have been given within
the period required by law for the issuance of
a marriage license, a certification to that
effect shall be given to the Civil Registrar by
the Office of Family Planning and the former
shall withhold the issuance of the marriage
license for a period of two weeks to enable
the Family Planning Office to give instructions
and information and the applicants to receive
the same. At the end of such period, when no
instructions shall have been given, the Civil
Registrar may issue the marriage license.
Section 4. Assistance of National
Office. Agencies of the National Government
charged with the implementation of the
Family Planning program shall render
assistance to family planning offices herein
created.
Section 5. Penalties. Any member of the
Office of Family planning who fails or refuses
without just cause to give the instructions
and the certificate herein provided: any local
Civil Registrar who issues the marriage
license without the requisite certification from
the Office of Family Planning, or any person
who obtains the certificate fraudulently, shall
be subject to appropriate administrative or
criminal charges.
Section 6. Rules and Regulation. The
Commission on Population shall issue rules
and regulations to implement the provisions
of this Decree.
Section 7. Repeal of Prior Law. All laws and
ordinances inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take

effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 20th day of
July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-six.
(3) Place where valid
FC Art. 20
The license shall be valid in any part of the
Philippines for a period of one hundred
twenty days from the date of issue, and shall
be deemed automatically canceled at the
expiration of the said period if the contracting
parties have not made use of it. The expiry
date shall be stamped in bold characters on
the face of every license issued. (65a)
(4) Period of Validity
FC Art. 20
The license shall be valid in any part of the
Philippines for a period of one hundred
twenty days from the date of issue, and shall
be deemed automatically canceled at the
expiration of the said period if the contracting
parties have not made use of it. The expiry
date shall be stamped in bold characters on
the face of every license issued. (65a)
(5) Duties of the Civil Registrar
FC Art. 24-25
Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil
registrar to prepare the documents required
by this Title, and to administer oaths to all
interested parties without any charge in both
cases. The documents and affidavits filed in
connection with applications for marriage

licenses shall be exempt from documentary

stamp tax.(n)
Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned
shall enter all applications for marriage
licenses filed with him in a registry book
strictly in the order in which the same are
received. He shall record in said book the
names of the applicants, the date on which
the marriage license was issued, and such
other data as may be necessary.(n)
(6) Marriage exempt from license
requirement
FC Art. 27-34
Art. 27. In case either or both of the
contracting parties are at the point of death,
the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license and shall
remain valid even if the ailing party
subsequently survives. (72a)

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so

located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar, the
marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license.(72a)
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two
preceding articles, the solemnizing officer
shall state in an affidavit executed before the
local civil registrar or any other person legally
authorized to administer oaths that the
marriage was performed in articulo mortis or
that the residence of either party, specifying
the barrio or barangay, is so located that
there is no means of transportation to enable
such party to appear personally before the

local civil registrar and that the officer took

the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and
relationship of the contracting parties and the
absence of legal impediment to the
marriage. (72a)
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required
in the last preceding article, together with the
legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be
sent by the person solemnizing the marriage
to the local civil registrar of the municipality
where it was performed within the period of
thirty days after the performance of the
marriage.(75a)
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between
passengers or crew members may also be
solemnized by a ship captain or by an
airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea
or the plane is in flight, but also during
stopovers at ports of call. (74a)
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who
is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo
mortis between persons within the zone of
military operation, whether members of the
armed forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among
members of the ethnic cultural communities
may be performed validly without the
necessity of marriage license, provided they
are solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices.(78a)
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The

solemnizing officer shall also state under oath

that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties are found no legal
impediment to the marriage. (76a)
Borja-Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March 8, 2001
Davide, Jr. C.J.
Facts:
Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of
the law against Sanchez. Herminia BorjaManzano was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano having been married on May 21,
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in
Caloocan. They had four children. On March
22, 1993, her husband contracted another
marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez. During
that time, Payao was also married to
Domingo Relos. The marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were
separated but both married thus,
respondent Judge ought to know that the
marriage was void and bigamous. He claims
that when he officiated the marriage of David
and Payao, he knew that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven
years as manifested in their joint affidavit
that they both left their families and had
never cohabit or communicated with their
spouses due to constant quarrels.
Issue:
Whether the solemnization of a marriage
between two contracting parties who both
have an existing marriage can contract
marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5
years under Article 34 of Family Code.
NOOOO
Held:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that

parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other. Considering that both
parties has a subsisting marriage, as
indicated in their marriage contract that they
are both separated is an impediment that
would make their subsequent marriage null
and void. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of
a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly,
respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated
gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Ninal vs. Bayadong
G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. On
April 24, 1985 he shot and killed her. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December
24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Bayadog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license.
After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997,
his heirs filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license.
Norma Badayog contends that the
ground have no legal basis for hermarriage to

Pepito according to Article 34 of the Family

Code no marriage license isnecessary for
person who have cohabited for atleast five
years. The respondent alsocontends that
petitioners are not among those allowed by
the law to file a suit fordeclaration of nullity of
her marriage to Pepito.
The trial court ruled in favor of the
respondent on the ground that indeed
theFamily Code is silent as to situation. The
Petition should have been filed before the
deathofPepito and not after his death. Thus,
the petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article
34 of the Family Code) to warrant the
counting of the 5-year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license.
Held:
The 5-year common law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivitymeaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity is
unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, subject only to the exception
in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and

respondents marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least 5 years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito
had already been separated in fact from his
lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even
where there is was actual severance of the
filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as
husband and wife.
Having determined that the second marriage
involve in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
C. Law Concerning Validity
1 Tolentino 260-263
1. General Rule on Contracts
a. As to form
NCC Art. 17
The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed

before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. (11a)
b. As to substantive requirements
NCC Art. 15
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
NCC Art. 17
The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed
before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments

promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. (11a)
2. Special Rule in marriage
a. Lex Loci Celebrationis
FC Art. 26
All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)
b. Exceptions
FC Art. 26
All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have

capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As

amended by Executive Order 227)

In relation to:
FC Art. 35 (1)
The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below
eighteen years of age even with the consent
of parents or guardians;
FC Art. 35 (4)
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages
not failing under Article 41
FC Art. 35 (5)
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the
other; and
FC Art. 36
A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
FC Art. 38
The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-inlaw;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the
adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the
adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a
legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same
adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the
intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her own
spouse. (82)
NCC Art. 71
All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law. (19a)
Republic vs. Orbecido III
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in
Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a
son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left
for the U. S. bringing along their son and after
a few years she was naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent
Orbecido learned from his son who was

living with his wife in the States that his

wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce
decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for
authority to remarry with the trial court
invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002,
the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur
granted the petition of the respondent and
allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor Generals motion for
reconsideration was denied. In view of that,
petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of
the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant
case.
Issue:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under
Article 26(2).
Held:
Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreignlaw allowing it. Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.
Furthermore, respondent must also show that
the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only
applies to case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant
case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino

citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized

as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the U. S.
A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not
apply to the instant case.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have
it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to
prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is
still barred from remarrying.
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of
proof, failed to submit competent evidence
showing his allegations that his naturalized
American wife had obtained a divorce decree
and had remarried.
D. Presumption of Marriage
NCC Art. 220
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the

marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children,

the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children,
and the validity of defense for any member of
the family in case of unlawful aggression.
ROC Rule 131 Sec.3
Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
(a)That a person is innocent of crime or
wrong;
(b)That an unlawful act was done with an
unlawful intent;
(c)That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act;
(d)That a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns;
(e)That evidence willfully suppressed would
be adverse if produced;
(f)That money paid by one to another was
due to the latter;
(g)That a thing delivered by one to another
belonged to the latter;
(h)That an obligation delivered up to the
debtor has been paid;
(i)That prior rents or installments had been
paid when a receipt for the later one is
produced;
(j)That a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful
act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things which a person
possess, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him;
(k)That a person in possession of an order on
himself for the payment of the money, or the

delivery of anything, has paid the money or

delivered the thing accordingly;
(l)That a person acting in a public office was
regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m)That official duty has been regularly
performed;
(n)That a court, or judge acting as such,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o)That all the matters within an issue raised
in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it; and in like manner that all
matters within an issue raised in a dispute
submitted for arbitration were laid before the
arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p)That private transactions have been fair
and regular;
(q)That the ordinary course of business has
been followed;
(r)That there was a sufficient consideration
for a contract;
(s)That a negotiable instrument was given or
indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t)That an endorsement of negotiable
instrument was made before the instrument
was overdue and at the place where the
instrument is dated;
(u)That a writing is truly dated;
(v)That a letter duly directed and mailed was
received in the regular course of the mail;
(w)That after an absence of seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he is considered dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead
for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be

sufficient in order that his succession may be

opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all
purposes including the division of the estate
among the heirs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)A person on board a vessel lost during a
sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2)A member of the armed forces who has
taken part in armed hostilities, and has been
missing for four years;
(3)A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and whose
existence has not been known for four years;
(4)If a married person has been absent for
four consecutive years, the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage if he or
she has well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already death. In case of
disappearance, where there is a danger of
death the circumstances hereinabove
provided, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage. However, in any case,
before marrying again, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceedings as
provided in the Family Code and in the rules
for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent
spouse. chanrobles virtua law library
(x)That acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable
to the law or fact;
(y)That things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and ordinary
nature habits of life;

(z)That persons acting as copartners have

entered into a contract of copartneship;
(aa)That a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb)That property acquired by a man and a
woman who are capacitated to marry each
other and who live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under void marriage, has been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry.
(cc)That in cases of cohabitation by a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to
marry each other and who have acquire
properly through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry,
such contributions and their corresponding
shares including joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit are equal. chanrobles
virtua law library
(dd)That if the marriage is terminated and the
mother contracted another marriage within
three hundred days after such termination of
the former marriage, these rules shall govern
in the absence of proof to the
contrary:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)A child born before one hundred eighty
days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have
been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred
days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(2)A child born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been
conceived during such marriage, even though

it be born within the three hundred days after

the termination of the former marriage.
(ee)That a thing once proved to exist
continues as long as is usual with things of
the nature;
(ff)That the law has been obeyed;
(gg)That a printed or published book,
purporting to be printed or published by
public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh)That a printed or published book,
purporting contain reports of cases adjudged
in tribunals of the country where the book is
published, contains correct reports of such
cases;
(ii)That a trustee or other person whose duty
it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when
such presumption is necessary to perfect the
title of such person or his successor in
interest;
(jj)That except for purposes of succession,
when two persons perish in the same
calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died
first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred,
the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and
the age of the sexes, according to the
following rules
1.If both were under the age of fifteen years,
the older is deemed to have survived;
2.If both were above the age sixty, the
younger is deemed to have survived;
3.If one is under fifteen and the other above
sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4.If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and
the sex be different, the male is deemed to

have survived, if the sex be the same, the

older;
5.If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the
other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
(kk)That if there is a doubt, as between two
or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, as to which of them died first,
whoever alleges the death of one prior to the
other, shall prove the same; in the absence of
proof, they shall be considered to have died
at the same time. (5a)
Perido vs. Perido
G.R. No. L-28248, March 12, 1975
Makalintal, C.J.
Facts:
Lucio Perido married twice during his
lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong,
with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix,
Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio
married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he
had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria,
Sofronia and Gonzalo.
On August 15, 1960 the children and
grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a
document denominated as "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," where
they partitioned among themselves lots
inherited by them from Lucio Perido.
The children belonging to the first
marriage of Lucio Perido filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance against the
children of the second marriage, to annul the
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial
Partition".

Petitioners alleged that the children

belonging to the second marriage were
illegitimate.
The trial court held that the 5 children of
Perido were all legitimate and it annulled the
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial
Partition".
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred (1)
in declaring that the 5 children were and (2)
in declaring that Lucio Perido was the
exclusive owner of Lots because the said lots
were the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong.
The court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court. Now, the instant
petition.
Issues:
1. Are the 5 children of Lucio Perido to Marcelina
Baliguat
legitimate? YES because:
there was sufficient evidence that Lucios first wife
died before he married Marcelina and the presumption
that persons living together husband and wife are
married to each other specially where legitimacy of the
issue is involved, and may overcome only by
convincing proof on the part alleging that it is
illegitimate.
PERSONS RELATION: Presumption of Marriage
especially in legitimacy of children because:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage.
Marriage is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony.
Because if they are not married, they would he living
in the constant violation of decency and of law.

A presumption established by our Code of Civil

Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage."
a. The petitioners witnesss failed to prove the
illegitimacy of second marriage.
2. WON the lots in litigation are the exclusive
properties of Lucio Perido and not conjugal
properties?
a. The lands were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido
which he inherited from his grandmother except Lot
no. 459 which he bought during his second marriage.
b. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided
accordingly among his legal heirs.
-

Fiel v. Banawa
(Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common
law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered
legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in
the Philippines. )
E. Void Marriages
1 Tolentino 270-310
1. General Rule
FC Art. 4
The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. (n)

2. Absence of requisites
FC Art. 35
The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen
years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had
the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those
covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void
under Article 53.
FC Art. 234
(Repealed by R.A. 6809)
Emancipation takes place by the attainment of
majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of twenty-one years.
Emancipation also takes place:
(1) By the marriage of the minor; or
(2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an
agreement in a public instrument executed by the
parent exercising parental authority and the minor at
least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall
be irrevocable

3. Bigamous and polygamous marriages

FC Art. 35(4)

The following marriages shall be void from the

beginning:
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
failing under Article 41
FC Art. 39
The action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended
by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533;
The phrase"However, in case of marriage celebrated
before the effectivity of this Code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten
years after this Code shall taken effect"has been
deleted by Republic Act No. 8533[Approved February
23, 1998]).
FC Art. 40
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
FC Art. 41
A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

FC Art. 44
If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in
bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law.
RPC Art. 349
Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
PEOPLE v MENDOZA (1954)
95 Phil 845
1936 Arturo Mendoza married Jovita De Asis
1941 Mendoza married Olga Lema, with subsisting
marriage
1943 Jovita died in 1943
1949 Mendoza married Carmencita Panlilio, it was for
this last marriage that he was prosecuted for
bigamy.
HELD: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for the third
marriage because marriage with Lema was void for
bigamy, being contracted when De Asis was still alive.
When he wed Panlilio, his marriage with De Asis was
no longer subsisting by reason of the latter's death.
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law
or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annullable marriages.

There is here no pretense that appellant's second

marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief
that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent
for seven consecutive years or generally considered as
dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared
null and void by a subsequent court.
FACTS
: Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on
Aug. 5,1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still
subsisting, Mendoza gotmarried to Olga Lema in
Manila on May 14, 1941. de Asis died on Feb.2, 1943.
Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with
CarmencitaPanlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19,
1949. He was sued andconvicted of bigamy for
the second marriage.
ISSUE
: Whether or not Mendoza is liable for bigamy.
RULING
:
No. Acquitted. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613
provides: Any
marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void unless first marriage has beenannulled,
dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7
consecutiveyears without news if he/she is still alive.
Judicial declaration of nullity is
only necessary for third case. Thus, his marriage with
Lema is null and
void without need for judicial declaration. Third
marriage was contractedafter the death of the first
spouse, thus not bigamous.

People vs. Aragon

G.R. No.L-5930, February 17, 1954
Labrador, J.
Facts:
Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea.
While his marriage with the latter subsist, he

contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is

staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a
traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo
and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to
Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She
later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by
physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo
to undergo treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima
contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu
found him guilty of bigamy.
Issue:
Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.
Held:
The action was instituted upon the complaint of the
second wife whose marriage with Rosima was not
renewed after the death of the first wife and before the
third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last
marriage was a valid one and prosecution against
Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.
Tolentino vs. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905, May 30, 1983
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Facts:
Amado Tolentino had contracted a second
marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1,
1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage with
petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31,
1943, was still subsisting
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal
Case No. 2768 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch II, which Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty,
sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty.
After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed
on him, he continued to live with private respondent
until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate

carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria

Clemente."
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction
of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the
surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria
Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The
lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the
proper requisites under the law" and indicated the
need for a more detailed proceeding,
Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case
below against private respondent and the Local Civil
Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as
the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the
death certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated October
21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's
instance, dismissed the case, stating:
The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in
this case, thru counsel Atty. Hernan E. Arceo, for the
reasons therein mentioned, is hereby GRANTED.
Further: (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy
because the issue involved is marital relationship; (2)
the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because
as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art.
412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a case
like this, and up to now, there has been no such
publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of
this case has been aptly discussed in Special
Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already
dismissed, for lack of the proper requisites under the
law.
In view of the above dismissal, all other motions
in this case are hereby considered MOOT and
ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly
challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent
Court in ordering dismissal.
HELD: We rule for petitioner.
First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's
ultimate objective is the correction of entry

contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule

108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial
declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of
the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the
correction of the entry in the death certificate of said
deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an
adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary
proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one
who has an interest in contesting it. Private
respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party
defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition
and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is
also a party defendant. The publication required by the
Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are
involved. After all, publication is required to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a
proceeding under Rule 108, it was the Court that was
caned upon to order the publication, 3 but it did not. in
the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so
much with the form of actions as with their
substance. 4
Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado,
upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that
sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital
status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no
better proof of marriage than the admission by the
accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The
second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null
and void from the beginning and of no force and
effect. 6 No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely
concluded, then, without need of further proof nor is
remand to the Court below, that private respondent
not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but
petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be
validly made.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the

other issues raised need no longer be discussed.
In fine, since there is no question regarding the
invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private
respondent and that the entry made in the
corresponding local register is thereby rendered false,
it may be corrected. 8While document such as death
and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are
presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely
disputable and will have to yield to more positive
evidence establishing their inaccuracy. 9
WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21,
1975, of respondent Court is hereby set aside and
petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the
surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let
the corresponding correction be made in the latter's
death certificate in the records of the Local Civil
Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.
No costs.

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy

G.R. No. L-53703, August 19, 1986
Paras, J.
Facts:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978.
Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in
1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters
former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter
into a marital union, she contents that the first
marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that
Karl was married to another woman before their
marriage.
Issue:
Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
Held:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be

void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until

annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly
married to her first husband. Consequently, her
marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of
introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for
then such marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl
and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.
Facts:
Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lilia Oliva on the ground of Lilias
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion.
Lilia admitted to the previous marriage but claimed
that it was null and void since she was forced to enter
the said union. In the pre-trial that ensued, both
parties agreed that the issue was whether the previous
marriage was void or merely voidable. Lilia asked the
court for an opportunity to present more evidence but
the respondent judge denied the petition. Lilia appeals
to the SC in hopes of modifying the agreed facts
and to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
Issue:
WON the prior marriage was void or voidable.
Held/Ratio:
The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to
prove that her marriage was vitiated by force.
Assuming, however that this is so, it would still be
irrelevant since the previous marriage wasnt void but
merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since
no annulment was made, her current marriage is
therefore void.

Donato v. Luna
G.R. No. L-53642, April 15, 1988
Gancayco, J.

Facts:
An information for bigamy against petitioner
Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the
lower court in Manila. This was based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before
the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979,
Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26,
1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that
Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was
Donatos second since she had no previous knowledge
that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to
the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second
marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5
years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on
September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live
with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their
home upon learning that Donato already previously
married.
Issue:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy
pending before the lower court be suspended in view
of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending
before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the
ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
Held:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on
prejudicial question since a case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused if it

was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage

and was obtained by means of duress violence and
intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis
of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown
to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent
judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We
make no pronouncement as to costs.
Terre vs. Terre
A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992
Per Curiam:
Facts:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito
Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre
successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was
void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that
they are free to contract marriage. They got married
in 1977 where he wrote single under Dorothys status.
After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned
them and subsequently contracted another marriage
to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged
with abandonment of minor and bigamy.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is
null and void.
Held:
Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio
considering that Merlito is her first cousin thereby
against public policy. However, she did not file any
declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she
contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her
second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the
absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked
for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

4. Subsequent marriage upon reappearance of

absent spouse

FC Art. 41
A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (83a)
In relation to
FC Art. 42-44
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage at the instance of any interested person, with
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage
and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance

being judicially determined in case such fact is

disputed. (n)
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage
referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived
prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share
of the net profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or
in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid,
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in
bad faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary
in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage
acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n)
NCC Art. 390-391
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the

purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened. (n)
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the estate among
the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea
voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in
war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years. (n)

FC Art. 55 (9)
A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of
the following grounds:
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the
petitioner;
FC Art. 101
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute
community, subject to such precautionary conditions
as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the
preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or
property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other
when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without

intention of returning. The spouse who has left the

conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.
Jones vs. Hortiguela
G.R. No. L-43701, March 6, 1937
Concepcion, J.
Facts:
Felix, 2nd husband of the deceased Marciana, was
appointed administrator of the estate of Marciana.
Felix and Angelita Jones, daughter of Marciana from
her first husband were declared only heirs. Felix fixed
the partition of the intestate estate wherein he
adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment
of his share of the conjugal properties and his
usufructuary right and the remaining part to angelita
represented by her guardian Paz.
Angelita now prays for the reopening of the
proceedings questioning the validity of the marriage of
her mother and Felix and if there was in fact a valid
marriage he is not entitled to share in usufruct of onethird of the inheritance and that during the
proceedings she was a minor and didnt have counsel.
She wants new partition of the properties.
CFI: denied the reappointment of heirs to be her only
and ordering of new partition and final account of
estate

Although, it was proven that the 2nd marriage of

Marciana with Felix is valid since the marriage took
place 9 years after the disappearance of the first
husband of marciana
Facts:
- Dec 1914 Marciana Escano married Arthur Jomes.
On 1918 he left and never came back
- Oct 1919 Escano filed to declare him an absentee,
granted under art 186 of CC, order was published in
OG and El Ideal
- May 6, 1927 Escano married Hortiguela
- May 9, 1932 Escano died leaving Hortiguela as
judicial administrator of her entire estate. Only he and
Angelita Jones, daughter from first marriage were her
heirs, Represented by Paz Corominas since she was a
minor
- May 3, 1934 declared that she was the only heir
and her husband should be made administrator of
estate, Marriage between Escano and Hortiguela was
null and void, was a minor then and had been assisted
by Hortiguelas same lawyers thus her rights were
impaired.
ISSUE: WON Escano and Hortiguelas marriage was
valid.
HELD: YES
- Rules on judicially declaring a person as absentee are
different from estate and marriage
-Estate need to declare someone as absent for
precautions for administration of estate of absentee
-Not necessary in marriage
-Only need to be absent for 7 years which he was for 9
years before 2nd marriage was made.
-Recognized Hortiguela as her step-father

Held:
Reverse, court lost its jurisdiction in handling the
appeal with regards to the above mentioned prayers of
Angelita because there was no appeal ever taken
therefrom therefore the court could not resume it

RESULT: hortiguela has right to be administrator and

heir to part of estate.

In re Szatrow
HELD
: The disputable presumption established by the rule of
evidence that a person not heard from in seven years
is dead may arise and be invoked either in an action or
in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and
submitted for decision to, a competent court.
Independently of such an action or proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked nor can it be
made the subject of an action or special proceeding.

5. Bad faith of both spouses under FC Art. 44

If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in
bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law. (n).
6. Psychological Incapacity
FC Art. 36
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)
FC Art. 68-73
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. (109a)
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the
other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is
not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the
support of the family. The expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the
community property and, in the absence thereof, from
the income or fruits of their separate properties. In
case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the
separate properties. (111a)
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the
right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for
such management shall be paid in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70. (115a)
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her
duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which
tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or
to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the
court for relief. (116a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without the
consent of the other. The latter may object only on
valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide
whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper; and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the spouse who has
not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights
of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a)
Sempio-Dy, Major Changes Introduced by the
Family Code

Appendix A
Cases under Canon Laws
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997
Panganiban, J.
Facts:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo
Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a
son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of
the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend
time with his friends and squandering his money with
them, from his dependency from his parents, and his
dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo
was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the
sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week
later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than
three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her
own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social
worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present
any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the
RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities
should be construed as psychological incapacity
Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the
Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize

the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and

family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with
the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives
of marriage; where said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court
of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity,
existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and
that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity
must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present case,
there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be
more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of
it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be

proven existing at the time of the celebration of

marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness
must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital
obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and
Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards
parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the
State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and
reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
Choa vs. Choa
G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002
Panganiban, J.
Facts:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in
1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and
Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his
marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case
went to trial and the trial court further held that
Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs
to controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with
perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows
latters psychological incapacity because according to
him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him
behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
Issue:
Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented
quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his

marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological

incapacity.

Held:
The court held that documents presented by
Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way
show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife.
The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse
of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified
and complained about three aspects of Lenis
personality namely lack of attention to children,
immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative
sexuality and none of these three, singly or
collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It
must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from
other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause
of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just
established that the spouses had an incompatibility or
a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated
through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence
presented was completely insufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity more so without
any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
Barcelona vs. CA and Bengzon
G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003
Carpio, J.
Facts:
respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally
married union begot five children

 On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R.

Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M.
Barcelona (petitioner Diana).
Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity
subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged
the non-complied marital obligations:
o During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels
due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming
from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper
and was frequently out of the house. She would go to
her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day
o When the family had crisis due to several
miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness
of a
child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually
refused to speak to her husband
o On November 1977, the respondent, who was five
months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the
pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner,
requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal
dwelling.
o In his desire to keep peace in the family and to
safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner
was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling
o The respondent at the time of the celebration of their
marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligation of marriage and such
incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time.
Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the
relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent
- Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the
guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause
for action

- ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action

against Diana
- HELD: YES , since petition stated legal right of Tadeo,
correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or omission
as seen in facts (cause of action 46)
- FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE
OF ILLNESS
- Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage petition does not need to show (NOT) root
cause since only experts can determine it b the
physical manifestations of physical incapacity
RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF
ACTION
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
Corona, J.
Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in
1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back
to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then
gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor,
Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas
to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent
money for two months and after that he stopped
giving financial support. She wrote him several times
but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her
friend that Toshio visited the country but did not
bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus

summons issued to him remained unserved.
Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion
for leave to effect service of summons by publication.
The motion was granted and the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published
in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15
days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after
the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed
a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation.
Issue:
Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligation.
Held:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as
rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it
would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios
illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. It is essential that a person show incapability
of doing marital obligation due to some psychological,
not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered
as psychologically incapacitated.
Tenebro vs. CA
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The
two lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro

informed Ancajas that he had been previously married

to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas
thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with
Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no
record of such. He further argued that his second
marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab
initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot
be charged for bigamy.
Issue:
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
Held:
The prosecution was able to establish the
validity of the first marriage. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void
ab initio completely regardless of petitioners
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance
of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes
the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
7. Incestuous Marriage

FC Art. 37
Marriages between the following are incestuous and
void from the beginning, whether relationship between
the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any
degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half blood. (81a)
NCC Art. 963-967
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the
number of generations. Each generation forms a
degree. (915)
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may
be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
(916a)
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those
who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he
descends. (917)
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as
there are generations or persons, excluding the
progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from
the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from
the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor and then descent is made to the person with
whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person
is two degrees removed from his brother, three from

his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his
first cousin, and so forth. (918a)
Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing
between persons who have the same father and the
same mother.
Half blood relationship is that existing between
persons who have the same father, but not the same
mother, or the same mother, but not the same father.
(920a)
8. Marriages against Public Policy
FC Art. 38
The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted
child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting
parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child
and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of
the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter;
and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to
marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or
his or her own spouse. (82)
Compare FC Art. 38 (2) with NCC Art. 80 (6)
Art. 38 (2)
The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning for reasons of public policy:
(2) Between step-parents and step-children

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the

beginning:
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have
been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either
of them;
NCC Art. 80 (7)
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and
other marriages specified in Article 82.
NCC Art. 82
The following marriages shall also be void from the
beginning:
(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and
stepmothers and stepsons;
(2) Between the adopting father or mother and the
adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse
of the former, and between the former and the
surviving spouse of the latter;
(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and
the adopted.
NCC Art. 963-967
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the
number of generations. Each generation forms a
degree. (915)
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may
be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
(916a)
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those

who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he
descends. (917)
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as
there are generations or persons, excluding the
progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from
the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from
the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor and then descent is made to the person with
whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person
is two degrees removed from his brother, three from
his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his
first cousin, and so forth. (918a)
Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing
between persons who have the same father and the
same mother.
Half blood relationship is that existing between
persons who have the same father, but not the same
mother, or the same mother, but not the same father.
(920a)
9. Non-compliance under FC Art. 53
Either of the former spouses may marry again after
compliance with the requirements of the immediately
preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage
shall be null and void.
10. Effect of nullity
FC Art. 50-54
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also
apply in the proper cases to marriages which are
declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the

liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of third
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their
property may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either of both of the parents; but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again
after compliance with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.chan robles
virtual law library

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the

judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become final and
executory shall be considered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
FC Art. 40 Compare with NCC rule
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
FC Art. 237
The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage
of a minor or of the recorded agreement mentioned in
the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall revive the
parental authority over the minor but shall not affect
acts and transactions that took place prior to the
recording of the final judgment in the Civil Register.
R.A. 6809
(See Above)

FC Art. 147-140
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or

industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.

For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her shall be

forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph

of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.

Yaptinchay vs. Torres

G.R. No. L-26462, June 9, 1969
Sanchez, J.
Facts:
Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the Pasay
City, Rizal, CFI to appoint
her, first, as Special Administratrix and then as regular
administratrix of the estate
of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hong Kong on July 7,
1965 alleging that:
o Isidro had lived with her continuously, openly
and publicly as husband and wife
for 19 yrs. (46-64Taft Ave., Pasay City, and
64-65Russel Ave., Pasay City)
o Isidro died without a will and left an estate in
Philippines, HK and other places
with estimated value of about P500K;
o Isidro left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and
Asuncion
o On July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties
carted away from the residences aforesaid
personal properties belonging to Isidro together
with others exclusively owned by Teresita.
CFI granted such appointment while Josefina Y.
Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y.
Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased
opposed saying that Teresita, not being an heir of the
decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for
the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to
procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and
that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased
for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified
to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. Also,

oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of

Virginia, as special administratrix and of Josefina, as
regular administratrix.
After the parties were heard, the probate court
granted counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix who subsequently
submitted a preliminary inventory of the assets of the
estate of the deceased which included a house in
North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal.
This time, Teresita filed in another branch (Pasig
Branch) of the Rizal, CFI an action for replevin
and preliminary injunction for liquidation of the
partnership supposedly formed during the period of
her cohabitation with Isidro and for damages.
Respondent judge Torres ordered issued a temporary
restraining order that Virginia et. al. and their agents
from disposing any of the properties listed in the
complaint and from interfering with Teresitas rights to,
and possession over the house now standing at North
Forbes Park.
Virginia et al opposed, on the grounds that:
O exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of the deceased was already vested in the
Pasay City, CFI Branch
O the present liquidation case was filed to oust said
probate court of jurisdiction over the properties
enumerated in this 2nd case
Teresita was not entitled to the remedy of
injunction prayed for, her alleged right sought to be
protected thereby being doubtful and still in dispute.
Virginia et. al thus prayed the Teresita and all others in
her behalf be made to cease and desist from
disturbing Virginias possession of the North Forbes
Park house and to order removal from the house of the
employees employed by Teresita, to keep Teresita et.
al. from entering the house and any other real
property registered in Isidros name and from
interfering with or from disturbing the exercise by of
Virginias rights and powers of administration over the
assets registered in the name of Isidro and/or in the
latter's possession at the time of his death.

The Court granted Virginias prayers considering

the Forbes Park property is really under the
responsibility of Virginia as the appointed Special
Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro.
This was amended adding that Virginia et. al are
enjoined from selling, disposing or otherwise
encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever
pending the termination of this case, considering that
present case treats principally with the liquidation of
an alleged partnership between the Teresita and the
deceased. Teresitas MFR was denied hence this
petition
Issues: WON preliminary injunction may be granted
(in relation to Teresitas
prayers)
Held: NO. Petition dismissed and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction dissolved
and set aside.
1. Injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of
taking property out of possession and/or control of
a party and placing it in that of another whose title
thereto has not been clearly established. In the
verified petition before this Court, Teresita avers
that construction of said North Forbes Park property
was undertaken jointly by her and deceased,
Teresita even contributing her own exclusive funds
therefor. But in her amended complaint she had
said that she acquired through her own personal
funds and efforts real properties such as North
Forbes Park house. Virginia et. al. dispute Teresitas
claim of complete or even partial ownership of the
house. Maintaining that construction of that house
was undertaken by the deceased without Teresita's
intervention and with his own personal funds. Note
that it was only after hearing and considering the
evidence adduced and the fact that after the death
of Isidro the Forbes Park house was among the
properties of the deceased placed under Virginias
administration that respondent judge issued the

injunction order. Thus, petitioner herein is not

entitled to the injunction she prayed for below.
2. Furthermore, grant or denial of an injunction rests
upon the sound discretion of the court, in the
exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere
except in a clear case of abuse. Although Teresitas
presented loans that she had contracted during the
period when said house was under construction as
proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which
would correlate such loans to the construction work
the evidence, on the contrary were indicative that
the loans she obtained from the bank were for
purposes other than the construction of the home.
Thus, the unsupported assertion that the North
Forbes Park house is petitioners exclusive property
may not be permitted to override the prima facie
presumption that house, having been constructed
on Isidros lot (or of the conjugal partnership) at his
instance, and during his marriage with Josefina, is
part of the estate that should be under the control
of the special administratrix.
RELEVANT PART: Nor can petitioner's claim of
ownership presumably based on the
provisions of Art. 144, CC be decisive. Art. 144 says
that: "When man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership." But stock
must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil
relationship envisaged in Art. 144 is circumscribed by
conditions, the existence of which must first be shown
before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to
accrue. One such condition is that there must be a
clear showing that the petitioner had, during
cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of
the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership
is duly established, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy cannot be considered the
"present right" or title that would make available the
protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For,

the existence of a clear positive right especially calling

for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is
not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a
remedy to enforce an abstract right.
11. Who can invoke nullity
FC Art 39
The action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended
by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533;
The phrase"However, in case of marriage celebrated
before the effectivity of this Code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten
years after this Code shall taken effect"has been
deleted by Republic Act No. 8533[Approved February
23, 1998]).
12. Prescription
FC Art. 39
The action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended
by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533;
The phrase"However, in case of marriage celebrated
before the effectivity of this Code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten
years after this Code shall taken effect"has been
deleted by Republic Act No. 8533[Approved February
23, 1998]).
FC Art. 36 par2
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In relation to FC Art. 255

Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all
the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain
valid.
Art. 42.
(2) A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage at the instance of any interested person, with
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage
and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance
being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.
Art. 237. The annulment or declaration of nullity of
the marriage of a minor or of the recorded agreement
mentioned in the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall
revive the parental authority over the minor but shall
not affect acts and transactions that took place prior to
the recording of the final judgment in the Civil
Register.
13. Procedure in action for declaration of Nullity
i.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY
OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under theFamily
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court.
(c) Imprecriptibility of action or defense. - An action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage shall not prescribe.
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36
of Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts
showing the either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriages at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration
of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Sec. 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. (a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriage based on
any of the grounds under Article 45 of the Family
Code and within the period herein indicated:
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or
person exercising substitute parental authority did not
give his or her consent, within five years after
attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining
the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited
with the other as husband or wife; or the parent,

guardian or person having legal charge of the

contracting party, at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the
other's insanity; or by any relative, guardian, or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before
the death of either party; or by the insane spouse
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity,
provided that the petitioner, after coming to reason,
has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by
fraud, within five years after the discovery of the
fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by
force, intimidation, or undue influence, within five
years from the time the force intimidation, or undue
influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the
force, intimidation, or undue influence having
disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is
physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other and such incapability continues and
appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage; and
(6) The injured party where the other party was
afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to
be serious and appears to be incurable, within five
years after the celebration of marriage.
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court.

Sec. 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family

Court of the province or city where the petitioner or
the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing or, in the case of nonresident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The
petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the
cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common
children of the parties and specify the regime
governing their property relations, as well as the
properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written
agreement between the parties, the petitioner may
apply for a provisional order for spousal support, the
custody and support of common children, visitation
rights, administration of community or conjugal
property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent
action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of
marriage. (b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed
in the Family Court.
Sec. 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines at the election of the
petitioner.
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The
petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the
cause of action.

(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common

children of the parties and specify the regime
governing their property relations, as well as the
properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written
agreement between the parties, the petitioner may
apply for a provisional order for spousal support,
custody and support of common children, visitation
rights, administration of community or conjugal
property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent
action.
(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a
certification against forum shopping. The verification
and certification must be signed personally by me
petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or
through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification
and certification against forum shopping shall be
authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the
Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul
or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall
serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing
and submit to the court proof of such service within
the same period.
Failure to comply with any of
requirements may be a ground
dismissal of the petition.

the preceding
for immediate

Sec. 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be

governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and by the
following rules:

(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his

given address or his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of
summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon him
by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
and in such places as the court may order In addition,
a copy of the summons shall be served on the
respondent at his last known address by registered
mail or any other means the court may deem
sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in
an order of the court with the following data: (a) title of
the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition;
(d) principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs
prayed for; and (e) a directive for the respondent to
answer within thirty days from the last issue of
publication.
Sec. 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the
petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the
parties; provided, however, that any other ground that
might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as
an affirmative defense in an answer.
Sec. 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his
answer within fifteen days from service of summons,
or within thirty days from the last issue of publication
in case of service of summons by publication. The
answer must be verified by the respondent himself and
not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court
shall not declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not
tender an issue, the court shall order the public
prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists
between the parties.

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1)

Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the
public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists,
he shall state the on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of a copy of a report The court shall
set the report for hearing and If convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion
exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall
be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.
Sec. 10. Social worker. - The court may require a
social worker to conduct a case study and submit the
corresponding report at least three days before the
pre-trial. The court may also require a case study at
any stage of the case whenever necessary.
Sec. 11. Pre-trial. (1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On
motion or motu proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial
after the last pleading has been served and filed, or
upon receipt of the report of the public prosecutor that
no collusion exists between the parties.

(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their

respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall
ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party at
least three days before the date of pre-trial.
(b) The notice shall be served separately on the
parties and their respective counsels as well as on the
public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear
personally at the pre-trial.
(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent
even if he fails to file an answer. In case of summons
by publication and the respondent failed to file his
answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent
at his last known address.
Sec. 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief
shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to
enter into agreements as may be allowed by law,
indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims
together with the applicable laws and authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts,
as well as the disputed factual and legal issues;
(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert
opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature
and purpose thereof;

(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall

contain:

(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their

respective affidavits; and

(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and

(f) Such other matters as the court may require.

Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its
required contents shall have the same effect as failure

to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding

paragraphs.
Sec. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. {a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the case
shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly
authorized representative appears in court and proves
a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the
petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to
appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial and
require the public prosecutor to investigate the nonappearance of the respondent and submit within
fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating
whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion
between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court
shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the
State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Sec. 14. Pre-trial conference.
conference, the court:

-At

the

pre-trial

(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist

the parties in reaching an agreement on matters not
prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a report within one month
from referral which, for good reasons, the court may
extend for a period not exceeding one month.
(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails,
the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference,
on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of
receiving expert testimony and such other makers as
may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Sec. 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the
pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination of the
pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which

shall recite in detail the matters taken up In the

conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments
allowed on the pleadings, and except as to the ground
of declaration of nullity or annulment, the agreements
or admissions made by the parties on any of the
matters considered, including any provisional order
that may be necessary or agreed upon by the parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall
contain a recital of the following:
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need
not be proved subject to Section 16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;
(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that
have been marked and will be presented;
(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and
their testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to
the public prosecutor to appear for the State and take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any
stage of the proceedings and fabrication or
suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.
(d) The parties shall not be allowed to raise issues or
present witnesses and evidence other than those
stated in the pre-trial order.
The order shall control the trial of the case, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the
pre-trial order to propose corrections or modifications.

Sec. 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not

allow compromise on prohibited matters, such as the
following:
(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Sec. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall
personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation
of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall
be allowed except as to matters involving property
relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment
on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed.
(3} The court may order the exclusion from the
courtroom of all persons, including members of the
press, who do not have a direct interest in the case.
Such an order may be made if the court determines on
the record that requiring a party to testify in open
court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth;
would cause to the party psychological harm or
inability
to
effectively
communicate
due
to
embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the
right of a party to privacy; or would be offensive to
decency or public morals.
(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or
perusal of the records of the case or parts thereof be

made by any person other than a party or counsel of a

party, except by order of the court.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the
parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with
the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda support of their claims within
fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It
may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its
own memorandum if the case is of significant interest
to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be
submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the
period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance with
Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the
public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear
in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall
be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of
fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is filed by any of
the parties the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.

(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall

forthwith issue the corresponding decree if the parties
have no properties.

Sec. 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute

Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The court shall
issue the Decree after:chan robles virtual law library

If the parties have properties, the court shall observe

the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of this Rule.

(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the

petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was
celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where
the Family Court is located;

The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil

Registry where the marriage was recorded and In the
Civil Registry where the Family Court granting the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage is located.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall
be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from
notice of judgment.
(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the
Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by
filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice
of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.
Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate
court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, including custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.

(2) Registration of the approved partition and

distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the
proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are
located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes
in cash, property, or sound securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive
portion of the judgment entered and attach to the
Decree the approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53
of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil
Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate
indicating the new civil status of the children affected.
Sec. 23. Registration and publication of the decree;
decree as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing party
shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil
Registry where the marriage was registered, the Civil
Registry of the place where the Family Court is
situated, and in the National Census and Statistics
Office. He shall report td the court compliance with this
requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy
of the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by
publication, the parties shall cause the publication of
the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to

prove the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons
concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent
as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes
delivered
to
their
common
children.
Sec. 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family
Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party dies at
any stage of the proceedings before the entry of
judgment, the court shall order the case closed and
terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of the
estate in proper proceedings in the regular courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of
nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding
upon the parties and their successors in interest in the
settlement of the estate in the regular courts.
Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on
March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March
7, 2003.

(a) Requisite for valid remarriage

FC Art. 40
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
G.R. No. L-53703, August 19, 1986
Paras, J.
Facts:

Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978.

Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in
1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters
former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter
into a marital union, she contents that the first
marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that
Karl was married to another woman before their
marriage.
Issue:
Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
Held:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be
void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly
married to her first husband. Consequently, her
marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of
introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for
then such marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl
and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.
Terre vs. Terre
A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992
Per Curiam:
Facts:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito
Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre
successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was
void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that
they are free to contract marriage. They got married
in 1977 where he wrote single under Dorothys status.
After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned
them and subsequently contracted another marriage
to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged
with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is
null and void.
Held:
Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio
considering that Merlito is her first cousin thereby
against public policy. However, she did not file any
declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she
contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her
second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the
absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked
for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(b) Support and custody pendent lite
FC Art. 49
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said
children and their choice of the parent with whom they
wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent.
(c) Safeguards against collusion
FC Art. 49
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said
children and their choice of the parent with whom they

wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also

provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent.
(d) No confession of judgment
FC Art. 48
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
NCC Art. 2035
No compromise upon the following questions shall be
valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
Jocson vs. Robles
G.R. No. L-23433, February 10, 1968
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Facts:
Where the second wife filed an action for annulment,
and the husband also assailed the validity of the
marriage claiming he was coerced to marry her by her
parents and brothers, and filed a motion for summary
judgment supported by affidavits of the plaintiff's
father and brothers to this effect, and the plaintiff also
submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings, the
court correctly denied the motion for summary

judgment in view of provisions of the Civil Code

expressly prohibiting the rendition of a decree of
annulment of marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. The affidavits of the wife's
father and brothers practically amounts to these
methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
Facts: Petitioner files for annulment of marriage, and
respondent supports the claim that he was only forced
into the marriage through a joint affidavit executed
by him, his father and brother. SC: annulment denied
on grounds that judgment rendering a marriage
annulled cannot be made upon stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment (confession here
being that the respondent himself admitted to being
forced into the marriage) - NCC - 88 and 101
prohibit this.
Tolentino vs. Villanueva
G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974
Makasiar, J.
Facts:
Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be
allowed even if the sermons were not served to
the respondent. SC: denied because in accordance
with NCC - 88, 101, in case of non-appearance of
defendant, court shall order a prosecuting attorney to
inquire w/n collusion exists, and if not, the attorney
shall intervene to make sure that evidence is not
fabricated and no collusion is in place.
FACTS
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino
filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen
Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained
through fraud because immediately after the marriage
celebration, he discovered that was pregnant despite
the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior

to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live

as husband and wife as immediately after the
marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house
and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until
January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing
in San Francisco, Cebu.
Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City
Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons
and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a
responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed
on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default
and to set the date for the presentation of his
evidence.
respondent Judge declared private respondent
in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88
and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred
the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to
determine whether collusion exists between the
parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report
within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the
event of a negative finding, to represent the State at
the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence;
and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the
City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other
documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information
and guidance.
Assistant City Fiscal issued a subpoena to
petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner
with him as well as copies of other documents in
connection with the annulment case on August 27,
1962 at 10:00 A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24,
1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could
not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily
expose his evidence.
In a motion, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the
respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of
his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not
submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of
sixty (60) days when he submitted to the City Fiscal a
copy of the complaint.

respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of

petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation
by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether
or not there is collusion between the parties.
respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in
view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit
himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to
the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101
of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal
separation based on a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment and direct that in case of nonappearance of defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to
prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus,
Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be
observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded
the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that
actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall
not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the

complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of

Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule
19 of the 1964 Revised Rules, with "legal separation"
being substituted for "divorce", obviously because the
present Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws
and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions
of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore
are as much the concern of the State as of the
spouses; because the State and the public have vital
interest in the maintenance and preservation of these
social institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The
prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by
non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that
marriage is more than a mere contract between the
parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails
to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order
to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital
bonds Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the
petition is without merit.

F. Voidable Marriages
1 Tolentino 270-310
1. Void vs. Voidable Marriages
FC Art. 4
The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. (n)

FC Art. 45
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have
the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or
over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by
force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexuallytransmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable
2. Grounds for annulment
a. Absence of Parental Consent
FC Art. 45 (1)
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have

the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or
over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
FC Art. 47 (1)
The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by
the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by
the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or
her consent, within five years after attaining the age of
twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before
such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
R.A. 6809
See above
b. Insanity
FC Art. 45 (2)
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
FC Art. 47 (2)
The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by
the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by
the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's

insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person

having legal charge of the insane, at any time before
the death of either party, or by the insane spouse
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
c. Fraud

FC Art. 45 (3)
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
FC Art 46
Any of the following circumstances shall constitute
fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final
judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease,
regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism
or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of
the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment
of marriage.
FC Art 47 (3)

The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by

the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years after the discovery
of the fraud;

NCC Art. 1338-1344

Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious
words or machinations of one of the contracting
parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
(1269)
Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a
duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by
confidential relations, constitutes fraud. (n)
Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the
other party had an opportunity to know the facts, are
not in themselves fraudulent. (n)
Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not
signify fraud, unless made by an expert and the other
party has relied on the former's special knowledge. (n)
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does
not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has
created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.
(n)
Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not
fraudulent but may constitute error. (n)
Art. 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract
voidable, it should be serious and should not have
been employed by both contracting parties.
Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to
pay damages.
Buccat vs. Buccat
G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941
Horrilleno, J.
Facts:

Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met

in March 1938, became engaged in September, and
got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida,
who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After
knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned
to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their
marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to
married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage
be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her
pregnancy before the marriage?

Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to
nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the
State is interested and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there
was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo,
a first-year law student, did not suspect anything
about Luidas condition considering that she was in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed
physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when
they got married.
Decision:
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to
plaintiff-appellant
Aquino vs. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960
Gutierrez David, J.
Facts:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955

on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at
the date of her marriage with the former on December
1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by
another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child.
During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent
the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only
Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence
presented was the marriage contract between the
parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any
evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for
annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus
a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.
Issue:
Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged
by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would
annul a marriage.

Held:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a
ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was
allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant
at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to
say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially
since she was naturally plump or fat. It is only on
the 6thmonth of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
womans abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more
general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded
the case for new trial and decision complained is set
aside.

Anaya vs. Palaroan

G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Facts:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in
1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the
marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force and intimidation. The
complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the
marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim. While
the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to
their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative of his. According to her, the nondivulgement to her of such pre-marital secret
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed
for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on
such ground.
Issue:
Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Held:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital
relationship with another woman was not one of those
enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for
annulment and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation
or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar
does not constitute fraud and therefore would not
warrant an annulment of marriage.
d) Force, Intimidation and Undue Influence
FC Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by
force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same

having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter

freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be
filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years from the time the
force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or
ceased;

NCC Art. 1335. There is violence when in order to

wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed.
There is intimidation when one of the contracting
parties is compelled by a reasonable and wellgrounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his
person or property, or upon the person or property of
his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his
consent.
To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex
and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
A threat to enforce one's claim through competent
authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate
consent. (1267a)
Art. 1336. Violence or intimidation shall annul the
obligation, although it may have been employed by a
third person who did not take part in the contract.
(1268)
Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a person
takes improper advantage of his power over the will of
another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom
of choice. The following circumstances shall be
considered: the confidential, family, spiritual and other

relations between the parties, or the fact that the

person alleged to have been unduly influenced was
suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in
financial distress. (n)

RPC Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,

concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness
and rape, the marriage of the offender with the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to
the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after
the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
Sison v Te Lay Li (supra)
Doctrine: Cohabitation must be something more
than merely living together in the same house or
even occupying the same bed. It is the voluntary
living together of the parties as husband and
wife, and including sexual relations

Ruiz v. Atienza (CA) 40 OG 1903 (1941)

Jose Ruiz impregnated Pelagia
Atienza. He was fetched from his residence by
Atienza's relatives who allegedly intimidated him into
marrying her.
An uncle of Atienza was even said
to have threatened to file immorality charges against
Ruiz that would prevent his admission to the Bar.
HELD: There was no ground for annulment. Neither
violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration.
Also, threat cannot come from lawful actions such as
threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar based on

immorality. He was also not kidnapped by his wife's

relatives, there being many occasions for him to
escape.
- If guilty of seduction, a man cannot avoid marriage
by duress (come to Court with clean hands) MARRIAGE
NOT ANNULLABLE.
FACTS
: Plaintiff requests the annulment of her marriage on
the ground that his consent was given under duress.
His wife, whom he had premarital relations, bore a
child. When the child was born, the father of his wife
allegedly approached him with a knife and in the
company of a lawyer. The lawyer threatened his
entrance to the bar.
HELD
: Petition cannot be granted because the petitioner
had several chances of escape before the marriage
and because his wife bore his own child. Where a man
marries under threat of or constrain from lawful
prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid
marriage on the ground of duress. Proof of bodily harm
must be sufficiently shown. Threat to obstruct
admission to the bar does not constitute duress. Only
if the threat is so grave that the person is not acting in
his own freewill that a marriage becomes void.
e) Physical Incapacity/ Impotence
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be
filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article
45, by the injured party, within five years after the
marriage. (87a)

SARAO v GUEVARRA (1940)

because the defendant complained of pains. The

defendant was operated on and her uterus and ovaries
were surgically removed. The removal rendered the
defendant incapable of procreation as such, plaintiff
wants his marriage with the respondent annulled.

40 OG 15 Supp 263
-

In the afternoon of their wedding,

Sarao tried to have carnal knowledge of Pilar Guevarra,
but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to
wait until evening.
When night came, he again
approached the wife, but through he found the orifice
of her vagina sufficiently large of his organ, she
complained of pains in her private parts and he
noticed oozing there from some matter offensive to
the smell.
Because of this, coitus had not
been successful, and after the first night every attempt
the plaintiffs part to have a carnal act with his wife
proved a failure, because she complained of pains in
her genital organs and he did not want her to suffer.
Upon the advice of a physician and
with the plaintiffs consent, an operation was
performed in which the uterus and ovaries were
removed.
The surgery rendered her incapable
of procreation, but she could copulate.
Plaintiff, however, since witnessing
the operation, lost all desire to have access with his
wife. Now, he asks for annulment.
ISSUE: WON their marriage can be annulled based on
the defendants incapacity to procreate

HELD: The incapacity for copulation was only

temporary. The defect must be lasting to be a ground
for annulment, because the test of impotence is not
the capacity to reproduce, but the capacity to
copulate. ANNULMENT DENIED.
Facts: On the day of the marriage of the plaintiff and
the defendant, the marriage was not consummated

Held: Impotency is not inability to procreate but

inability to copulate. Inability to copulate cannot be a
ground for annulment and a temporary or occasional
incapacity cannot be used as a ground to nullify a
marriage.

JIMENEZ v CANIZARES (1960)

109 Phil 273
Joel Jimenez filed for annulment on
the ground of his wife's impotency, claiming that her
vagina was too small to allow penetration.
Remedios Canizares refused to
have physical exam despite repeated orders by the
court contempt of court for noncompliance and
constitutes collusion
HELD: Since the only evidence presented was
Jimenez's testimony, there was no sufficient basis to
establish the wife's impotency. For all intents and
purposes actually, because only the testimony of the
husband, the presumption of the law is in favor of
potency. REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Facts: Petitioner filed an action to annul his marriage
to respondent on the ground that the orifice of the
vagina of his wife was too small to allow penetration.
For that reason, petitioner has left the conjugal abode.
The defendant failed to comply with the order of
medical examination and so, the lower court granted
the annulment.
Held: Presumption will always be in favor of potency. It
is understandable that a woman would refuse to
subject herself to physical examination. The testimony
of one party is not sufficient to annul the marriage

because to do so will open the court to cases of

collusion between the spouses for the annulment of
their marriage.
Facts: Aug 3, 1950 Joel Jimenez and Remedios
Canizares wed. 7 June 1955 the plaintiff Joel Jimenez
prays for a decree annulling his marriage in the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga. This was because her
vagina was too small for his member and thus they
couldnt copulate and thus she is impotent. 14 June
1955 - wife was summoned and served a copy of the
complaint. She did not file an answer. 17 December
1956 the Court entered an order requiring the
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical
capacity for copulation. 11 April 1957 the Court
entered a decree annulling the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant since plaintiff had no
response whatsoever. 26 April 1957 the city attorney
filed a motion for reconsideration since impotency was
never really established. Rather than nullifying
marriage Court should have compelled her to undergo
and examination

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexuallytransmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease,
regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or

HELD: NO
- law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that
must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to
annul a marriage.
- Not proven in this case since wife has been
unresponsive. Court says that it may not so much be
indifference as it is that she is shy and embarrassed
about the situation
RESULT: presumption is in favor of potency. Case is
thus remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

3. Who can seek annulment?

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be
filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by
the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or
her consent, within five years after attaining the age of
twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before
such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by
the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before
the death of either party, or by the insane spouse
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years after the discovery
of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years from the time the
force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or
ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article
45, by the injured party, within five years after the
marriage. (87a)

F) Affliction with STD

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

4. Prescription: When to seek annulment?

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be
filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:

ISSUE: WON marriage may be annulled on sole

testimony of husband that his wife is impotent

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by

the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or
her consent, within five years after attaining the age of
twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before
such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by
the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before
the death of either party, or by the insane spouse
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years after the discovery
of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years from the time the
force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or
ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article
45, by the injured party, within five years after the
marriage. (87a)
5. Procedure in Annulment
a. Support and custody pendent lite
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said
children and their choice of the parent with whom they
wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent. (n)
b. safeguards against collusion
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent

collusion between the parties and to take care that

evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
c. no confession of judgment
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)
Jocson vs. Robles
G.R. No. L-23433, February 10, 1968
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Facts:
Where the second wife filed an action for annulment,
and the husband also assailed the validity of the
marriage claiming he was coerced to marry her by her
parents and brothers, and filed a motion for summary
judgment supported by affidavits of the plaintiff's
father and brothers to this effect, and the plaintiff also
submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings, the

court correctly denied the motion for summary

judgment in view of provisions of the Civil Code
expressly prohibiting the rendition of a decree of
annulment of marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. The affidavits of the wife's
father and brothers practically amounts to these
methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
Facts: Petitioner files for annulment of marriage, and
respondent supports the claim that he was only forced
into the marriage through a joint affidavit executed
by him, his father and brother. SC: annulment denied
on grounds that judgment rendering a marriage
annulled cannot be made upon stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment (confession here
being that the respondent himself admitted to being
forced into the marriage) - NCC - 88 and 101
prohibit this.
Tolentino vs. Villanueva
G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974
Makasiar, J.
Facts:
Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be
allowed even if the sermons were not served to
the respondent. SC: denied because in accordance
with NCC - 88, 101, in case of non-appearance of
defendant, court shall order a prosecuting attorney to
inquire w/n collusion exists, and if not, the attorney
shall intervene to make sure that evidence is not
fabricated and no collusion is in place.
FACTS
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino
filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen
Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained
through fraud because immediately after the marriage
celebration, he discovered that was pregnant despite

the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior

to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live
as husband and wife as immediately after the
marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house
and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until
January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing
in San Francisco, Cebu.
Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City
Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons
and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a
responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed
on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default
and to set the date for the presentation of his
evidence.
respondent Judge declared private respondent
in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88
and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred
the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to
determine whether collusion exists between the
parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report
within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the
event of a negative finding, to represent the State at
the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence;
and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the
City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other
documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information
and guidance.
Assistant City Fiscal issued a subpoena to
petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner
with him as well as copies of other documents in
connection with the annulment case on August 27,
1962 at 10:00 A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24,
1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could
not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily
expose his evidence.
In a motion, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the
respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of
his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not
submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of

sixty (60) days when he submitted to the City Fiscal a

copy of the complaint.
respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of
petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation
by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether
or not there is collusion between the parties.
respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in
view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit
himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to
the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101
of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal
separation based on a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment and direct that in case of nonappearance of defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to
prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus,
Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be
observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded
the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that

actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall

not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the
complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of
Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule
19 of the 1964 Revised Rules, with "legal separation"
being substituted for "divorce", obviously because the
present Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws
and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions
of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore
are as much the concern of the State as of the
spouses; because the State and the public have vital
interest in the maintenance and preservation of these
social institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The
prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by
non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that
marriage is more than a mere contract between the
parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails
to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order
to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital
bonds Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the
petition is without merit.
6. Effects of Annulment
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said
children and their choice of the parent with whom they
wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent. (n)
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also
apply in the proper cases to marriages which are

declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under

Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of third
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their
property may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either of both of the parents; but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime.(n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again
after compliance with the requirements of the

immediately
preceding
Article;
otherwise,
the
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become final and
executory shall be considered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
FC Art. 237
The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage
of a minor or of the recorded agreement mentioned in
the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall revive the
parental authority over the minor but shall not affect
acts and transactions that took place prior to the
recording of the final judgment in the Civil Register.
R.A. 6809: An Act Lowering the Age of Majority From
Twenty-One to Eighteen Years, Amending for the
Purpose Executive Order Numbered Two Hundred Nine,
And for Other Purposes
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the
Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"ART. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment
of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of eighteen years."
Sec. 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are
hereby repealed.
Sec. 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby
amended to read as follows:
"ART. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the child
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing
laws in special cases. "Contracting in this Code shall be
construed to derogate from the duty or responbility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below

twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and

third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Sec. 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills,
bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and
similar instruments containing references and
provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their
prejudice.
Sec. 5. This Act shall take effect upon
completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation. President of the
Philippines
7. Marriage when one spouse is absent
FC Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (83a)
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of

the residence of the parties to the subsequent

marriage at the instance of any interested person, with
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage
and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance
being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (n)
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage
referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived
prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share
of the net profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or
in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid,
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in
bad faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary
in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage
acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n)
NCC Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of

such person with any person other than such first

spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent
court. (29a)
Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83,
Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to
be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such
former husband or wife was then in force;
Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the parties and within the periods as
follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the
spouse who has been absent, during his or her
lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent
marriage during the lifetime of the other
RPC Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor
shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
Jones vs. Hortiguela
G.R. No. L-43701, March 6, 1937
Concepcion, J.

Facts:
Felix, 2nd husband of the deceased Marciana, was
appointed administrator of the estate of Marciana.
Felix and Angelita Jones, daughter of Marciana from
her first husband were declared only heirs. Felix fixed
the partition of the intestate estate wherein he
adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment
of his share of the conjugal properties and his
usufructuary right and the remaining part to angelita
represented by her guardian Paz.
Angelita now prays for the reopening of the
proceedings questioning the validity of the marriage of
her mother and Felix and if there was in fact a valid
marriage he is not entitled to share in usufruct of onethird of the inheritance and that during the
proceedings she was a minor and didnt have counsel.
She wants new partition of the properties.
CFI: denied the reappointment of heirs to be her only
and ordering of new partition and final account of
estate
Held:
Reverse, court lost its jurisdiction in handling the
appeal with regards to the above mentioned prayers of
Angelita because there was no appeal ever taken
therefrom therefore the court could not resume it
Although, it was proven that the 2nd marriage of
Marciana with Felix is valid since the marriage took
place 9 years after the disappearance of the first
husband of marciana
Facts:
- Dec 1914 Marciana Escano married Arthur Jomes.
On 1918 he left and never came back
- Oct 1919 Escano filed to declare him an absentee,
granted under art 186 of CC, order was published in
OG and El Ideal

- May 6, 1927 Escano married Hortiguela

- May 9, 1932 Escano died leaving Hortiguela as
judicial administrator of her entire estate. Only he and
Angelita Jones, daughter from first marriage were her
heirs, Represented by Paz Corominas since she was a
minor
- May 3, 1934 declared that she was the only heir
and her husband should be made administrator of
estate, Marriage between Escano and Hortiguela was
null and void, was a minor then and had been assisted
by Hortiguelas same lawyers thus her rights were
impaired.

: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of

presumptive death before she can remarry.

ISSUE: WON Escano and Hortiguelas marriage was

valid.
HELD: YES
- Rules on judicially declaring a person as absentee are
different from estate and marriage
-Estate need to declare someone as absent for
precautions for administration of estate of absentee
-Not necessary in marriage
-Only need to be absent for 7 years which he was for 9
years before 2nd marriage was made.
-Recognized Hortiguela as her step-father

RULING
: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure
declaration of presumptive death of her husband
because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in
1933.
It provides that for the purposes
of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have
the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaratio
n of absence made inaccordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his
or her former spouse to be living, that each former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

RESULT: hortiguela has right to be administrator and

heir to part of estate.
Lukban vs. Republic

Facts:
- Dec 10, 1933 petitioner married Lourdes Lukban
but left after a fight. Never came back in 20 years.

FACTS
: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married
in 1933and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and
has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked
for him asking the parents and friends but no one
knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is
already dead since he was absent for more than 20
years and because she intends to marry again, she
desires to have her civil status put in order to be
relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Won Francisco can be declared presumptively

dead

ISSUE

HELD: No, since it isnt authorized by law and to be

declared a widow is dependent upon the death of her
husband
State of absence will always remain disputable
RESULT: petition is denied
Gue vs. Republic
Facts:

1) Appeal from an order of the CFI Manila dismissing

the petition of Angelina Gue
2) Oct 11, 1944: married to William Gue and had a
child Anthony Gue; another child Eulogio
3) on January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and
went to Shanghai China but since then had not been
heard of, neither had he written to her nor in any way
communicated with her and she failed to locate him
despite of her efforts and diligence
4) they had not acquired any property during the
marriage
5) she asked the court for a declaration of the
presumption of death of William gue (Art 390 of the
CC)
CFI: after publication and hearing, issued the order of
dismissal
- no right had been established by the petitioner upon
which a judicial decree may be predicated and this
action is not for
settlement of the estate of the absentee as it is clear
he did not leave any
- * A judicial presumption even if final and executor,
would still be a prima facie presumption only and it
still disputableit is for this reason that it cannot be a
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration
proof of actual death would still have to be determined
6) Appealed- invoked the provisions of Art 390 of the
New Civil Codeabsence of 7 yearsfor succession
shall not be presumed dead till after an absence of 10
years
7) According to appellant with promulgation of the NCC
in 1950, the courts are now authorized to declare
persons presumptively dead
SOLICITOR GENERAL: opposed to the petition; same
reason as above (*)
SC: the appeal order dismissing the petition is
AFFIRMED
FACTS

: This is an appeal from an order of the CFI Manila

dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue. On Oct 11,
1944 Angelina was married to William Gue and had a
child Anthony Gue, and another child named Eulogio.
On January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and went
to Shanghai China but since then had not been heard
of, neither had he written to her nor in any way
communicated with her and she failed to locate him
despite of her efforts and diligence. They had not
acquired any property during the marriage. She asked
the court for a declaration of the presumption of death
of William Gue. The Court of First Instance, after
publication and hearing, issued the order of dismissal
saying that no right had been established by the
petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be
predicated and this action is not for settlement of the
estate of the absentee as it is clear he did not leave
any
HELD
: A judicial presumption even if final and executor,
would still be a prima facie presumption only and it
still disputable, it is for this reason that it cannot be a
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration,
proof of actual death would still have to be
determined. The provisions of Art 390 of the New Civil
Code, absence of 7 years, for succession shall not be
presumed dead till after an absence of 10 years.
8. Marriage dissolved abroad
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6),
3637 and 38. (17a)
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982
which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry

NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties,

or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
9. Illegal Marriages
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. (n)
Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or
parental advice is needed, the party or parties
concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the
preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a
priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize
marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage
counsellor duly accredited by the proper government
agency to the effect that the contracting parties have
undergone marriage counselling. Failure to attach said
certificates of marriage counselling shall suspend the
issuance of the marriage license for a period of three
months from the completion of the publication of the
application. Issuance of the marriage license within the
prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to
administrative sanctions but shall not affect the
validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need
parental consent or parental advice, the other party
must be present at the counselling referred to in the
preceding paragraph. (n)
Art. 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow
till after three hundred days following the death of her
husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth
to a child. (n)
Art. 351. Premature marriages. Any widow who shall
marry within three hundred and one day from the date

of the death of her husband, or before having

delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time
of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman
whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved,
if she shall marry before her delivery or before the
expiration of the period of three hundred and one day
after the legal separation.
Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony.
Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or
sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.

People vs. Masinsin

If the widow contracts the marriage in good faith in the
belief that her husband was permanently impotent or
sterile, there is no liability.
Since the purpose of this article is to avoidcases of
doubtful paternity, the woman will notbe liable
thereunder if: (a) she has alreadydelivered; and (b) she
has conclusive proof that she was not pregnant by her
first spousesince he was permanently sterile
a. For the same reason, she should not be liable if
she has conclusive proof that she herself is
permanently sterile or incurablyimpotent or that the
second spouse also suffers from the same reproductive
incapacity.
b. Even under the foregoing circumstances,
however, if she gets married without the marriage
license when required, or withany other violation of the
law on marriage, she will at least be liable under Art.
350