CANUTO vs MARIANO

GR L-11346
March 21, 1918
FACTS

Espiridiona Canuto (petitioner - seller) executed a deed of sale with right to repurchase (within 1 year from
the date of sale Dec. 4, 1913) over a parcel of land with Juan Mariano (respondent - buyer)

The redemption period elapsed and Canuto failed to exercise her right to repurchase the land so defendant
set up a claim of absolute ownership of the land

Canuto insisted that she be permitted to exercise her right to repurchase in accordance with an ALLEGED
ORAL AGREEMENT for the extension of the redemption period until the end of the month of December
1914 (as you can see, dapat ni-expire na ang redemption period ni Canuto on Dec. 4, 1914 but

according niya gi-extend daw nila ang period until the end of December 1914)

As TESTIFIED by Canuto:
o On the morning of Dec. 2, 1914 (2 days before ni-expire ang redemption period), while she was
washing her clothes near a well, Mariano passed by so she seized the opportunity to beg an
extension of the time to repurchase the land
o She promised Mariano that she would borrow money and make payment if he would extend the
redemption period under the end of the month
o After some demur, Mariano agreed to allow her the whole month of December in which to redeem
the land
o So the following Sunday, she went to the house of Mariano who promised her nga magkita sila the
next day 4pm (Monday) at the house of Atty. Mercado to receive the purchase money and execute
the necessary documents evidencing the transaction
o When she went to the lawyers house on Monday bringing with her the purchase money, defendant
failed to meet his engagement (wala siya gitunga ni Mariano). She tried to go to his house but was
told he was not at home.

Since then, Mariano has refused to carry out his oral agreement, claiming that the redemption

period set out in the original deed of sale expired on Dec. 4, 1914 and Canuto no longer had the
right to repurchase the land

Severino Pascual, who was present when the oral agreement to extend the time for the repurchase of the
land was made, CORROBORATED the testimony of Canuto in this regard

Trial judge accepted the testimony of Canuto as substantially true account of all that occurred and declined
to believe the conflicting testimony of Mariano (wala gi-state sa decision unsa ang version ni defendant in
this case)

RULING
Mao ni relevant topic on Evidence.

WON petitioner should be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the terms

of the written instrument (deed of sale with right to repurchase) by the
introduction of oral evidence (alleged agreement to extend the redemption
period)? YES
The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to
alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to
prohibit the establishment by parole of an agreement between
the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time
1.

when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such

agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or
even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by
the writing; for the parole evidence does not in any way deny that the
original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to
express, but merely goes to show that the parties have

exercised their right to change or abrogate the same ,

or to make a new and independent contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written

contract the parole one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is
otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced .
=====================================
2. WON petitioner should be allowed

to repurchase the land even though the

redemption period stipulated in the original deed of sale already expired?
YES
defendant having extended the time within which the plaintiff could
repurchase the land on condition that she would find the money and make repurchase
within the extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to
repudiate his promise, it appearing that the plaintiff stood ready to
make the payment within the extended period, and was only prevented from
The

doing so by the conduct of the defendant himself.

Did petitioner lose her right to redeem because she failed to make a
judicial deposit of the purchase price when defendant declined to receive it?
NO
3.

the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a bona fide offer or tender of the
price agreed upon for the repurchase is sufficient to preserve the rights of
the party making it, without the necessity of making judicial deposit , if the
offer or tender is refused; and in the case of Fructo vs. Fuentes (15 Phil. Rep., 362) we
said that in such cases when diligent effort is made by the vendor of the land to
exercise the right to repurchase reserved by him in his deed of sale "and
fails by reason of circumstances over which he has no control, we are of
the opinion and so hold that he does not lose his right to repurchase on
the day of maturity."
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Warning full text ahead

G.R. No. L-11346

March 21, 1918

ESPIRIDIONA CANUTO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN MARIANO, defendant-appellant.

Alfredo Chicote, Jose Arnaiz and Pascual B. Azanza for appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, providing for the
execution of a deed evidencing the repurchase by the plaintiff of a parcel of land from the
defendant, upon the payment by the former of the sum of P360.
On December 4, 1913, the plaintiff executed a deed of sale of the parcel of land
described in the complaint, to the defendant, for the sum of P360, reserving the
right to repurchase the land for that amount within one year from the date of the
deed of sale. The redemption period having elapsed, and the plaintiff having failed to

exercise her right to repurchase within that period, the defendant set up a claim of
absolute ownership to the land, notwithstanding the insistent demand of the
plaintiff that she be permitted to exercise her reserved right of repurchase in
accordance with an alleged oral agreement for the extension of the
redemption period down to the end of the month of December, 1914. She claims that
on the second day of December, 1914, two days before the expiration of the original
redemption period, she asked the defendant for an extension of time for the
repurchase of the land and that upon her promise to make the repurchase during
the month of December, 1914, the defendant agreed to extend the redemption set
out in the written contract, to the end of that month; that after the expiration of the original
redemption period, she thought to make the repurchase in accordance with the agreement
as to the extension of the time therefor; but the defendant failed to appear at the time and
place agreed upon for the payment of the purchase price and has refused since that time to
execute a deed of resale, or to reserve the purchase price agreed upon, despite the
plaintiff's repeated demands and tender of the purchase price.
The

plaintiff testified that on the morning of December the second, 1914, while she

was washing clothes near a well, the defendant passed by; that she seized the
opportunity to beg an extension of time in which to repurchase the land , promising

the defendant that she would borrow the money and make payment if he would extend the
redemption period until the end of the month; that after some demur the defendant

agreed to allow her the whole of the month of December in which to redeem the
land; that the following Sunday she went to the house of the defendant and that he

promised to meet her at the house of Mercado, an attorney, at 4 o'clock of the next day,
there to receive the purchase price and execute the necessary documents evidencing the
transaction; that she took the money to the lawyer's office at the time appointed, and
waited there until dark, but that the defendant failed to meet his engagement; that she then
went to his house, but was told that he was not at home; and that since that time defendant
has refused to carry out his oral agreement, claiming that the redemption period set out in
the original deed of sale expired on the fourth day of December, 1914, and that she had no
right to repurchase the land after that date. Severino Pascual, who was present

when the oral agreement to extend the time for the repurchase of the land
was made, corroborated her testimony in this regard , and we find nothing in
the record which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge who
accepted her testimony as a substantially true account of all that occurred, and
declined to believe the conflicting testimony of the defendant which he characterized
as vague and incredible.

defendant having extended the time within which the plaintiff could
repurchase the land on condition that she would find the money and make repurchase
within the extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to
repudiate his promise, it appearing that the plaintiff stood ready to
make the payment within the extended period, and was only prevented from
The

doing so by the conduct of the defendant himself. (Villegas vs. Capistrano, 9 Phil. Rep., 416;
Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. Rep., 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. Rep., 394; Rosales vs. Reyes
and Ordoveza, 25 Phil. Rep., 495.)
The contention that the plaintiff should not be permitted to alter, vary, or

contradict the terms of the written instrument by the introduction of oral

evidence is manifestly untenable under the circumstances of the case , as
will readily appear from the following citation from 17 Cyc., p. 734, and numerous cases
cited in support of the doctrine:
The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter,

vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to

prohibit the establishment by parole of an agreement between

the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time
when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such
agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or
even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by
the writing; for the parole evidence does not in any way deny that the
original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to
express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right
to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written

contract the parole one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is
otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced .
The contention that the plaintiff lost her right to redeem because she failed to make
judicial deposit of the purchase price when the defendant declined to receive it , is
not entitled to serious consideration in view of the repeated decisions of this
court to the contrary collated and discussed in the case of Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza
(25 Phil. Rep., 495). In that case and in the cases cited therein we declared that the

settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a bona fide offer or tender of the
price agreed upon for the repurchase is sufficient to preserve the rights of
the party making it, without the necessity of making judicial deposit , if the
offer or tender is refused; and in the case of Fructo vs. Fuentes (15 Phil. Rep., 362) we
said that in such cases when diligent effort is made by the vendor of the land to
exercise the right to repurchase reserved by him in his deed of sale "and
fails by reason of circumstances over which he has no control, we are of
the opinion and so hold that he does not lose his right to repurchase on
the day of maturity."
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed with costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur in the result.
Johnson, J., did not sign.