A Review Bus Run-Off-Road Crashes
A Review Bus Run-Off-Road Crashes
A Review Bus Run-Off-Road Crashes
Malcolm H. Ray
RoadSafe, LLC
Box 312
12 Main Street
Canton, Maine 04221
Phone: 207 514 5474, e-mail: [email protected]
Christine E. Carrigan
RoadSafe, LLC
Box 312
12 Main Street
Canton, Maine 04221
Phone: 207 513 6057, e-mail: [email protected]
Submitted
July 23, 2014
Word count
Text = 3,850
Figures&Tables: 5 @ 250 words each =1,250
Total number of words= 5,100
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INTRODUCTION
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Run-off-road (ROR) crashes which penetrate bridge rails or strike bridge piers are
infrequent events, however, they capture news headlines due to their dramatic and often
catastrophic outcomes. This section summarizes crashes with bridge railing and piers
investigated by the NTSB over the last forty years.
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Figure 1. Final rest position of a school bus that penetrated a concrete bridge railing near
Huntsville, AL in 2006. (8)
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With respect to highway design issues, the NTSB noted that the bridge railing was a 32-inch
high Report 350 test level four (TL4) concrete safety shape installed adjacent to a four-foot left
shoulder. The bus was travelling no more than 55 mi/hr, it struck the railing at 9-10 degrees and
its gross empty weight was 17,700 lbs so the impact conditions were not extraordinary in
comparison to the standard Report 350 TL4 test conditions (i.e., 18,000-lbs single unit truck
striking the barrier at 15 degrees and 50 mi/hr). The NTSB concluded that the Toyota restricted
the bus from moving back into its lane and essentially held the front of the bus to the railing until
it eventually climbed the railing and rolled over it.
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US-75 in the area of the crash had a traffic volume of about 47,000 vehicles/day in 2006
and commercial vehicles accounted for 16 percent of the total traffic volume. The bridge railing
at the crash site, shown in Figure 2, was a 27-inch tall steel beam and post system side-mounted
on an 18-inch wide, seven-inch tall curb adjacent to a 22-inch wide shoulder. The bridge railing
was 279-ft long. The bridge railing was a Texas Type II railing which was originally designed in
1954 in accordance with the AASHTO Bridge Design Specifications in effect at the time.
Apparently, this bridge railing had been struck previously in 2001 by a tractor-trailer truck. It
had penetrated the bridge railing causing some damage to the railing anchorages in the deck.
Based on its height alone this bridge railing would be classified today as no more than a test level
three (TL3) railing but it is likely that it was never crash tested so its impact performance is
doubtful.
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As a result of the Sherman, Texas motor coach crash, NTSB issued three safety
recommendations dealing with the design and warranting of bridge railings.
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H-09-17: Establish, in conjunction with the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, performance and selection guidelines for bridge owners to use
to develop objective warrants for high-performance Test Level Four, Five, and Six bridge
railings applicable to new construction and rehabilitation projects where railing
replacement is determined to be appropriate.
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H-09-25: Work with the Federal Highway Administration to establish performance and
selection guidelines for bridge owners to use to develop objective warrants for highperformance Test Level Four, Five, and Six bridge railings applicable to new
construction and rehabilitation projects where railing replacement is determined to be
appropriate, and include the guidelines in the Load and Resistance Factor Design
(LRFD) Bridge Design Specifications.
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H-09-26: Revise Section 13 of the Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) Bridge
Design Specifications to state that bridge owners shall develop objective warrants for the
selection and use of high-performance Test Level Four, Five, and Six bridge railings
applicable to new construction and rehabilitation projects where railing replacement is
determined to be appropriate.
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Summary
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The recommendations from the NTSB from this selection of forty years of investigations
of bus crashes into bridge rails include five general recommendations about developing selection
guidelines for all vehicles types including buses and motorcoaches. The more recent
recommendations use the specific test levels adopted in Report 350 in recommending that
criteria be established to decide when each type of test level should be used for different classes
of vehicles. There are currently no crash test procedures for buses and motorcoaches, therefore,
it is not known how buses perform in the current mix of Report 350 and the AASHTO Manual
for Assessing Safety Hardware (MASH) crash tests. This paper examines the crash data to
determine if crash statistics agree with these recommendations; if crash test criteria should be
established for buses, and if barriers should be designed for buses. These issues have been
examined to ensure that the charge of the NTSB to examine significant crashes does not
inadvertently direct safety related research from more frequent crash types to more catastrophic
but much less common bus crash types.
The current MASH and Report 350 crash testing procedures do not include buses as a test
vehicle. The test and evaluation guidelines in Report 230, used by roadside safety researchers
between 1981 and 1993, did include three types of buses in the crash test matrix: a 20,000-lbs
school bus, a 32,000-lbs small intercity bus and a 40,000-lbs large intercity bus. There were no
test levels in Report 230 so these bus tests were all supplemental tests that were used to test
hardware specifically designed for situations where heavier vehicles were considered an
important design vehicle. Supplemental tests S15 through S19 involved buses and supplemental
tests S20 and S21 involved an 80,000-lbs tractor trailer truck and an 80,000-lbs tanker-trailer
truck. Interestingly, Report 230 did not include any single-unit trucks in either the standard
minimum test matrix or the supplemental matrix.
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When Report 350 was developed, six test levels were incorporated; TL4 through TL6
were specifically added to include heavier vehicles. The bus tests from the supplemental matrix
of Report 230 were dropped and the single-unit truck test for TL4 was added. The single-unit
truck was thought to be a much more common vehicle on the roadway and presented many of the
same mass and stability challenges as the three buses used in Report 230. The current MASH
10000S single-unit truck has the same mass as the school bus in Report 230 test S15 and the
intercity buses fall in a range between the MASH single-unit truck and tractor trailer truck so the
assumption has been that buses can be accommodated by TL4 and TL5 barriers. Unfortunately,
this assumption has never been tested so it is not conclusively known if the Report 350 and
MASH tests for TL4 and TL5 barriers are effective for bus impacts.
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Large
Trucks
2,987
51,000
232,000
Buses
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9,000
47,000
All
Vehicles
30,797
1,517,000
3,957,000
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Total
286,000
56,000
5,505,000
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Large
Truck
3,380
74,000
Buses
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20,000
All Vehicle
33,808
2,217,000
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Data
Source
(10)
(11)
Vehicle Type
All vehicles
All vehicles
Bus and truck
Bus
Truck
Bus and truck
Bus
Truck
Avg.
Avg.
Annual
Annual
Crashes HMVMT
5,968,444
29,602
1,094,788
29,602
145,288
2,644
11,657
102
133,633
2,542
30,696
2,644
1,006
102
29,690
2,542
Avg.
Annual
Crashes
per
HMVMT
201.76
36.98
54.95
114.28
52.57
11.61
9.86
11.68
Relative
Risk of
Heavy
Vehicle
Crash to All
vehicle
Crashes
1.00
0.18
0.27
0.57
0.26
0.31
0.27
0.32
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When considering all crash types (i.e., head-on, side swipe, angle, ROR, etc.), buses are
approximately 57 percent as likely as all vehicle types to become involved in a crash. When
limiting the analysis to ROR crashes, buses are 27 percent as likely as all vehicle types of
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becoming involved in an ROR crash. The bus ROR crash rate to all bus crash rate is
approximately 9 percent (i.e., 9.88/114.28=0.086=8.6%). This is in fact less than the all vehicle
type ROR crashes to all crash type rate (i.e., 18%). Using Table 2 and Table 3, it can also be
shown that fatal plus injury crash rate for buses is 1.6 F+I crashes/HMVMT versus 10.4 F+I
crashes/HMVMT for all vehicle types. Even with their much higher vehicle occupancy, buses
are involved in fatal plus injury crashes six times less than all vehicle types.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Buses are 27 percent less likely than other vehicles to become involved in an ROR crash
and are six times less likely to result in a fatal plus injury crash as the general population of
vehicles per HMVMT. Passengers of buses are 0.87 times less likely to become injured in a bus
crash than all other vehicle crashes. Bus crashes do not appear to present a significant roadside
challenge in terms or exposure or injury rates when compared to all vehicle types.
Not surprisingly, the NTSBs charge to investigate and determine the probable cause of
significant crashes slants their investigations toward more catastrophic crashes, with buses
representing 50 percent of the bridge rail investigations conducted in the last forty years. A
review of the national data on bus crashes relative to all vehicle crashes and bus ROR crashes
relative to all vehicle ROR crashes indicates that buses are involved in fewer ROR crashes than
all vehicles, even when exposure is considered.
The assumption in Report 350 and MASH has been that barriers designed for higher test
levels using single unit and tractor trailer trucks would also perform well in impact with buses
but this assumption has never been demonstrated. It would be worthwhile to perform bus crash
tests on some common TL4 and TL5 bridge railings and/or median barriers to establish definitely
whether the TL4 and TL5 barriers are effective in bus impacts. If TL4 and TL5 barriers are
shown to be effective for buses it is probably not worthwhile to incorporate buses into the
standard test matrices on a routine basis since the standard matrices using trucks would address
bus performance. Of course, if the exploratory crash tests on common TL4 and TL5 barriers
result in poor bus performance the roadside safety community might have to rethink how bus
crash safety should be incorporated into the crash testing guidelines.
The consideration of trucks is explicit in roadside design, however, buses are not directly
considered in the current crash testing design standards. Even with this explicit consideration of
trucks, trucks continue to present a larger challenge in terms of ROR crash rates. While it would
be useful to determine how typical buses perform in MASH TL4 and TL5 crash tests, when
funding is allocated for future development of roadside hardware, it appears these funds would
better serve the intended purpose of reducing ROR crash rates by focusing on all vehicle types
and truck crash types before considering buses.
This work was sponsored in part by NCHRP 22-27 and NCHRP 22-12(03). The authors
wish is thank the project panels from both projects and the program officer, Mr. Mark Bush for
their thoughtful comments and feedback throughout the research efforts.
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REFERENCES
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NTSB, Student Transportation Lines, Inc. Charter Bus Climbing of Bridge Rail
and overturn Near Martinez, California, May 21, 1976, Highway Accident
Report No. NTSB/HAR-77/02, National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, D.C., 1977.
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NTSB, Student Transportation Lines, Inc. Charter Bus Climbing of Bridge Rail
and overturn Near Martinez, California, May 21, 1976, Highway Accident
Report No. NTSB/HAR-77/02, National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, D.C., 1977.
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NTSB, Highway Accident Brief: HWY-07-MH-007, Accident No. HWY-07MH-007, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C., 19 November
2009.
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