Treitler - Facile Metaphors, Hidden Gaps, Short Circuits
Treitler - Facile Metaphors, Hidden Gaps, Short Circuits
Treitler - Facile Metaphors, Hidden Gaps, Short Circuits
JAIRO MOREN O
NAOMI ANDRE
ALEXANDRA PIERCE
uHl5
ON
MUSICAL MEANING
AND ITS
REPRESENTATIONS
ANDREW DAVIS
LEO TREITLER
MARIANNE WHEELDON
DAVID LI DOV
Z39.48-1992.
Siegmund Levarie.
ML3845.T78 2011
781.1'7-dc22
2011011588
12345161514131211
252
Interpretative Frames
Two points on which the boundary between the two dogmas can beco
me
permeable are Carruthers's observations that "the role of scholarship [under
fundamentalism] is solely to identify the accumulations of interpretive debris
12
and to polish up the original and simple meaning" (as one interpreter's "accumulated debris" may be another's "shared experience and language"), and
that under textualism-and hermeneutic practice-the meaning of litera ry
works may be, among other properties, "hidden" (but perhaps by "accu mulated interpretative debris").
Sontag, in the essay cited earlier in this chapter, illustrates thi s equivocal
status of meanings with interpretations ranging from Homer to Marx and
Freud.
The Stoics, to accord with their view that the gods had to be moral, allegorized away the rude features of Zeus and his boisterous clan in Homer's
epics. What Homer really designated by the adultery of Zeus with Leto,
they explained, was the union between power and wisdom [my emphasis]
... The most celebrated and influential modern doctrines, those of Marx
and Freud, actually amount to elaborate systems of hermeneutics ... All
observable phenomena are bracketed, in Freud's phrase, as manifest content. This manifest content must be probed and pushed aside to find the
true meaning-the latent content-beneath. 28
Manifest content or interpretative debris? Latent content or tru e meaning?
"Hermeneutics": textualist or fundamentalist? These deliberations continue into the next chapter.
254
Interpretative Frames
Ir
I interpret that as a way of saying that "we" cannot step outside ourselves to
[It] is necessary that the affects of the subjects that are sung correspond
to the effect of the song, so that melodies are peaceful in tranquil subjects,
joyful in happy matters, somber in sad [ones], and harsh things are said or
made to be expressed by harsh melodies [my emphases]. '
1 11
Guido of Arezzo writes that for the cognoscenti, recognizing the "char-
human being." To the people of the Middle Ages, "the world was more like a
acters and individual features" of the modal patterns is like distingu ishing
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garment they wore about them than a stage on which they moved." (Associated with this observation is Barfield's interesting interpretation of the lack
people of Greek, Spanish, Latin, German, and French origin from one another. Thus the "broken leaps" of the authentic deuterus (mod e), the "volup-
"felt themselves and the objects around them and the words [we can add
and the "suavity" of the plagal tetrardus are distinctly recognizable. And he
the music] that expressed these objects immersed together in a clear lake
of meaning." They viewed man as "a microcosm within a macrocosm." In his
writes that this diversity of characters matches the diverse mental d ispositions among different people, so that one prefers this mode whereas another
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relation to the world around him, "the man of the Middle Ages was less like
prefers that one. Further, Guido compares this diversity of musical qualities
and tastes with the diversity of phenomena that enter "the recess of the heart"
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255
the inherited doctrine that is expressed by Boethius in the passage I've just
quoted] - we cannot express easily in words.4
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This is to say that properties and associations of music that we today would
through the other senses, the "windows of the body" -colors, odors, tastes.
Finally, Guido reaches beyond this matter of affects and tastes to the effects
folded into a continuous unified music concept. How different, then, is the
madness by music and another man brought to the point of rape by one kind
of music and then made to back off at the last moment by another kind. 2
modern- or modernist-conception that Charles Rosen accurately characterizes in the opening of his review "Should We Adore Adorno?": "No art
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music concept, but in its core aspect it is an elaboration of the ancient concept
according to which the cosmos, the human soul, and music are bou nd to -
appears as remote as music from the life and the society that produce it ... The
sou nds of music ... are artificial and set apart." By contrast, he writes, "Paint-
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gether through their regulation by the same proportions. This was fami liarly
ing and sculpture reflect some aspects of the figures and objects or at least the
forms and colors that we encounter; novels and poems convey experiences
''j ur
and aspirations that recall, however distantly, the world that we know." 6
When we hear what is properly and harmoniously united in sound in conjunction with what is harmoniously coupled and joined together within us
and are attracted to it then we recognize that we ourselves are put together
in its likeness. 3
11
;i;
The certainty of this notion was beyond question or need for argument for
the author of the Musica enchiriadis even though he could not fully articulate
of sensual things entering the recess of the heart through the windows of the
it. He wrote,
[I]n what way music has so great an affinity and union with our souls-for
we know we are bound to it by a certain likeness ["we know" this through
Imagination).
....
256
Interpretati ve Fram es
257
258
Interpretative Frames
259
Social Foundation s of Music (written in 1911 and published ten years later). 15
1his is an analysis of the historical development of music in terms of the increasing rationality of its technical basis (the tonal system, the system of meters, the regulation of multivoice composition) and of its social organization
as an institution . This analysis Weber conducts in parallel with an analysis
of the development of capitalism in terms of its rationalization. What Adorno
An assertion like the one that the musical dialectic between the ration ality
of compositional technique and the irrationality of expression represents
a reflection and consequence of the social conflict between the rationality of the technical means and the irrationality of the "indigenous" ends,
which are at cross purposes, 12 is simply impossible to understand . For even
the most daring of psycho-analytical theories would find it hard to establish a link between the irrationality of the emotions and that of economic
liberalism.
A lthough he is one of many critics who have blown the whistle on this
prac tice of Adorno's, Rosen chooses generously to side-step the issue. After
It is a comfort to be offered an alternative to the silly Pollyanna-like ratio nalization that is frequently offered, according to which Adorno 's "difficult
one can adopt the practice under the illusion that one has somehow "historicalized" the music, or one can throw up one's hands and say, "I don't get
did not observe, however, is Weber's caveat that the empirical history of music m ust analyze these factors without involving itself in the aesthetic evaluation of musical works of art.
all, the available responses to it are limited. Confronted with such exegesis
From "impatient objection" to outrage. Milan Kundera, in an essay "Improvisation in Homage to Stravinsky," cites Adorno's interpretation of the
dissonances in Stravinsky's adaptations of works of Gesualdo, Pergolesi, and
Tchaikovsky:
These notes ... become the marks of the violence the composer wreaks
against the idiom, and it is that violence we relish about them, that battering1 that violation1so to speak of musical life. Though dissonance may originally have been the expression of subjective suffering1its harshness shifts
in value and becomes the sign of a social constraint . .. It may be that the
widespread effect of these works of Stravinsky's is due in large part to the
fact that inadvertently, and under color of aestheticism1 they in their own
way trained men to something that was soon methodically inflicted on them at
the political level [Kundera's emphases]. 14
Kundera comments, "Let us recapitulate: a dissonance is justified if it expresses 'subjective suffering,' but in Stravinsky ... that very dissonance is the
sign of brutality: a parallel is drawn (by a brilliant short circuit of Adorno's
thought) with political brutality: ... the coming political oppression (which
in this particular historical context can mean only one thing: fascism). "
Adorno's practice in the sociological interpretation of music might be
thought to pursue the lead taken by Max Weber in his book The Ration al and
a charge that would not have upset Adorno (as Rosen observes, Adorno
sh ared with Oswald Spengler not only the thesis of the" decline of the West"
but also a "preference of intuition to empirical research and theory"). It is
even questionable whether the claims under such a practice have heuristic
value.
Instead Rosen writes, "Perhaps the fundamental insight of Adorno was a
recognition that works do not passively reflect the society in which they arise,
but act within it, influencing it and criticizing it." 16 His language makes clear
that he endorses this axiom, as well he might, for it would constitute a basis for
a historiography in which things happen because of what people do (and fail
to do).Adorno espouses such a historiography. But he seems not to have been
able to desist from issuing such seemingly playful and essentially meaningless
characterizations as this, which Rosen cites: "The functional interconnections present throughout Haydn's music give an impression of competence,
active life and suchlike categories, which ominously call to mind the rising
b ourgeoisie." 17 But Adorno was dead serious, as he made clear in this propaedeutic that he published in 1932 in the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung and
reaffirmed in his Introduction to the Sociology of Music:
Here and now, music can do nothing but represent, in its own structure,
the social antimonies which also bear the guilt of its isolation. It will be
the better the more deeply it can make its forms lend shape to the power
26 0
l1
2 61
The emphases are mine, and they are intended to mark the fallaciou sness
of the respective terms. To say that every twelve -tone composition is derived
from a row is as if we would say that every tonal piece is derived from a key,
witho ut implying that th e row is the exac t counterpart of a key. But like a key,
a row sets certain sonic constraints, in one sense, and potentials, in another.
Th.at the ordering of tones in a row is arbitrary is to imply that it might equally
well be determined by a throw of the dice or a sequence ofletters rando mly
chosen from a t elephone catalogue. The implication is confirmed in a foot-
note: "The twelve-tone composer resembles the gambler; he waits and sees
erally done from the standpoint of the present-day exegete, w ithout much
what number app ears and is happy if it is one offering musical meaning." In
concern whether the proposed meanings would h ave been picked up by the
21
It is hardly a coincidence that the mathematical techniques of music originated in Vien na, the home of logical positivism [despised by Adorno]. The
inclination towards numerical games is as unique to the Viennese intellect
as is the game of chess in the coffee ho use [one wonders whether Adorno
played chess].
M arxism :
I n terpretative Fra m es
Wiesengrund, and I can't say it often eno ugh: my works are twelve note com-
that are as arbitrary and distorted as are the flawed interpretations of the
music of the late Beethoven under the influence of h is h istorical read ings,
w rote to Joseph Rufer, "The first conception of a series always takes place in
the form of a thematic character." How he meant these remarks can be read
out of Rosen's bookArnold Scho enberg. "The series was, for Schoenberg, both
his disciples.
We read in the section "The Concept of Twelve-Tone Technique" of Phi-
tion on the motif that one may say that his motifs are not really derived from
the series, they generate it ." 23 This understanding of the place of the series in
the ontology of the work has been borne out by numerous analyses, including
my own of Berg's Lulu (see chpter 8). Whether it is that a series is abstracted
from a concrete musical idea (or a complex of such ideas), or constructed
to produce properties that a composer means at the outset to impose on a
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Interpretative Frame s
263
of the decline of the West, which is writ large across Adorno's work, was in
the air. 27 But more specifically, reading Dialectic of Enlightenment and Minima
moralia one can get an impression of how the Nazi years had turned Adorno's
criticism of capitalism into a vision of the decline of Western Civilization
over a much longer span of time. And given his lifelong consuming engage-
all, shockingly, like the sort of banal journalistic polemic against twelve-tone
ment with music and hi.s totalizing view of society and culture, one can well
composition that one could read regularly not so many years ago in various
organs of the popular press.
ask how could he not see that vision reflected in music history, regardless
of whether that outcome is defensible on the evidence of hearing or on the
Rosen writes, "For his view of the history of music and society, [AdornoJ
logic of reason.
A t the conclusion of his review, Rosen reflects on Adorno's historical view
against the background of his biography: "His view of modern culture arises
from the natural despair of one who lived through the terrible inflation in
form or the method over the material, of the object over the subject, of the
system over the creator, of the triumph of order.
Germany of the 192o's, which ruined so many upper middle-class fami lies.
His attack on commercial interests betrayed him into an idealization of the
past." Rosen asks, "What was this world whose disappearance could inspire in
The new ordering of twelve-tone technique virtually extinguishes the subject ... [M]usic becomes capable of restraining itself coldly and inexorably,
and this is the only fitting position for music following its decline."2 4
Adorno such profound and ironic nostalgia?" By way of answer he closes with
a paragraph from Minima moralia, which he introduces with these words:
"at one point his prose rises to a truly poetic evocation of the Golden Age, a
Thus is completed a process that was immanent in music history "since the be -
ginning of the bourgeois era," a "longing ... to 'grasp' and to place all sounds
into an order, and to reduce the magic essence of music to human logic." In a
rare swerve outside the confines of the Beethoven-to-Schoenberg framework
for his history, he continues, "Luther calls Josquin des Pres, who died in 1521,
'the master of notes who compelled the notes to his will, in contrast to other
composers, who bent the will to the notes."' 25 And here is where the Stravinsky and Schoenberg lines converge in his story of the decline of mu sic into
an authoritarian society.
A personal note: whatever I may think of Adorno's thesis of a tendency in
Western society toward a state of authoritarianism, I do not hear it in t he late
music of Beethoven, in Stravinsky's transformations of music by G esualdo,
Pergolesi, and Tchaikovsky, or in Schoenberg's twelve-tone music. A nd I
resist as a piece of authoritarianism in itself the dogma that this tend ency is
in that music.
It is a matter of some dispute whether Adorno was influenced by O swald
Spengler (Rosen claims Spengler's influence as an instance of Adorno's "derivative intelligence"). 26 But I don't know that we have to attribute Adorno's
extreme pessimism directly to Spengler's influence. For one thing, the idea
of the very enigmatic, and contradictory, character of his work. Also because
Adorno deserves to be represented here by a specimen of his finest writing,
beside the writing that I have cited with less enthusiasm.
Rampant technology eliminates luxury, but not by declaring privilege a
human right; rather, it does so by both raising the general standard of living and cutting off the possibility of fulfillment. The express train that in
three nights and two days hurtles across the continent is a miracle, but
traveling in it has nothing of the faded splendor of the train bleu. What
made up the voluptuousness of travel, beginning with the goodbye-waving
through the open window, the solicitude of amiable accepters of tips, the
ceremonial of mealtimes, the constant feeling of receiving favors that
take nothing from anyone else, has passed away, together with the elegant
people who were wont to promenade along the platforms before the departure, and who will by now be sought in vain even in the foyers of the most
prestigious hotels. That the steps of railway carriages have to be retracted
intimates to the passenger of even the most expensive express that he must
obey the company's terse regulations like a prisoner. Certainly, the company gives him the exactly calculated value of his fare, but this includes
264
Interpretative Frames
nothing that research has not proved an average demand. Who, aware
of such conditi ons, could depart on impulse on a voyage with his mistress
as once from Paris to Nice? 28
With a wider understanding of Adamo's pessimism about the course
of music's history within the context of his personal history and its engage ment with world history, and of the way that doleful overview forced h is
interpretations of individual musical works or oeuvres into congruence with
it, there might have been less enthusiasm for extracting from his work and on
h is authority an autonomous practice of deciphering music on the strength
of sheer intuition, a practice with the bravado of tightrope walking without
a net.
I began by asking whether Adorno's holistic view of culture and society
constitutes the basis for a healin g of the parturition that accomp anied the
age of enlightenment. Considering the unconvincing way in which, in his
p ractice, phenomena of one domain (art) are transposed as phenomena
of another (commerce), I would have to say, hardly. It is a kind of artificial,
counterfeit holism, required for the story that Adorno had to tell. It falls too
far short of port raying our experience of music in the world as the alternative
we seek to the tradition of approach ing music as an autonomous phenomenon-a tradition that was in fact explicitly embraced by Adorno himself as
a grounding principle of his complex views .29
I
',\
Rosen never comes back around to answer the question of his title. I
believe most readers would conclude that, on balance, his review implies a
negative answer. It is all too true that "unfortunately Adorno's adm irers often
treasure [I would add "and imitate"] the worst aspects of his work," as Rosen
writes. But it is unfortunate, too, that, with the exception of that striking
passage from Min ima moralia, Rosen makes no mention of work of Adorno
that can inspire the admiration of even those of us who sh are his dista ste for
the worst aspects.
In his essay "Homage to Adorno's 'Homage to Zerlina,'" 30 Berthold H oeckner writes that "Adorno's 'Homage' may be no more than a sketch, b ut it
claims for itself no less than the quality of a master painting." He reproduces
this "bagatelle," as he calls it, so that we can see for ourselves, and stresses its
character as a late work. But he mentions in the same breath the breathtaking
essay "Schubert,"31 written by Adorno in i928, his twenty-fifth year, which
Adorno judged thirty-six years later to be his "first somewhat comprehensive
265
. . . work touching on the meaning of music." I read with the same pleasure the
omnibus essay he published two years later in the Viennese journal A nbruch
under the title "Hermeneutik," comprising a brief theoretical statement and a
nu mber of exemplary critical sketches. 32 Probably the best-known extended
critical work in this "high-flying style" (Hoeckner) is Adorno's Mahler: A
M usical Physiognomy.33
We might consider it another casualty of the Nazi era that Adorno on
the whole had higher priorities when it came to writing about music-or
p erh aps better said, that work of this uniquely inspired character and eloquence of style had to compete for Adorno's attention with his high-flying
(in a different sense) oracular ambitions in work that he could well have
left to others-and lament the critical writing that he might otherwise have
produced and inspired in his followers . In an indirect sense Adorno's work
was a casualty of the very conditions that he diagnosed . At the same time we
can b e consoled by the fact that not all escapees from the Nazi horrors who
took refuge amidst the commercialism of America allowed their work to be so
embittered by the experience of both. Not all have shared Adorno's declaration that "To write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric." 34