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THIRD DIVISION

PURISIMO
M.
CABAOBAS,
EXUPERIO
C.
MOLINA,
GILBERTO V. OPINION, VICENTE
R. LAURON, RAMON M. DE PAZ,
JR., ZACARIAS E. CARBO, JULITO
G. ABARRACOSO, DOMINGO B.
GLORIA, and FRANCISCO P.
CUMPIO,
Petitioners,

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o. 176908

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Present:
VELASCO, JR., J, Chairperson,
PERALTA,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
REYES, and
JARDELEZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
- versus -

PEPSI-COLA

PRODUCTS,

November 11, 2015

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PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents.

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x. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:
For resolution is petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Decision dated March 25, 2015 with Motion to Refer Case to the
[Court] En Banc, stating that:
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS MATTER IS PROPER FOR
RESOLUTION BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, EN BANC. 1
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS CASE HAS TO BE DECIDED ON
THE BASIS OF ITS OWN PECULIAR FACTUAL SETTING AND

Rollo, p. 418.

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G.R. No. 176908

NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS PROVED AND EXISTING IN

THE CASE OF MOLON. 2

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RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH ALL OF

THE REQUISITES OF A VALID RETRENCHMENT PROGRAM AND
THE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
NLRC ARE BEREFT OF ANY DISCUSSION OR CONCLUSION
THAT RESPONDENT COMPLIED WITH THE THIRD, FOURTH
AND FIFTH REQUISITES. 3

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Petitioners contend that the principle of stare decisis is not applicable

becaifse the factual circumstances of this case and those in the case of PepsiCo/a Products, Inc. v. Molon, 4 are divergent. According to petitioners,
records in Molon show that both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) had already determined that Pepsi
complied with the requirements of substantial loss and due notice to both the
DOLE and the workers to be retrenched, and that the requisite separation
pay had already been paid as evidenced by the September 1999 quitclaims.
In contrast, petitioners point out that a few days after service of their notices
of termination, four (4) employees 5 were regularized, and replacements to
the forty-seven (4 7) dismissed employees were also hired, and that they have
not yet received their separation pay. Petitioners conclude that respondent
Pepsi-Cola Products, Inc. (PCPI) failed to prove the fourth and the fifth
requisites of a valid retrenchment program, 6 as the CA and the NLRC were
silent on the matter.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration with motion to refer the case to
the Court en bane is denied for lack of merit.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the factual circumstances of this
case and those in Molon are not divergent, hence, the principle of stare
decisis is applicable. As held in the Court's Decision dated March 25, 2015:
x x x the issues, subject matters and causes of action between the
parties in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon and the present
case are identical, namely, the validity of PCPPI's retrenchment program,
and the legality of its employees' termination. There is also substantial
identity of parties because there is a community of interest between the
parties in the first case and the parties in the second case, even if the latter
was not impleaded in the first case. The respondents in Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Molon are petitioners' former co-employees
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
G.R. No. 175002, February 18, 2013, 691SCRA113.
Casino, A., Mendigo, R., Poblete, E. and Rosario, R., rollo, p. 420.
4. That the employer exercises its prerogative in good faith for the advancement of its interest and
not to defeat or circumvent the employees' right to security of tenure; and
5. That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and
who would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age and
financial hardship for certain workers.

or

Resolution

G.R. No. 176908

and co-union members of LEPCEU-ALU who were also terminated

pursuant to the PCPPI's retrenchment program. The only difference
between the two cases is the date of the employees' termination, i.e.,
Molon, et al., belong to the first batch of employees retrenched on July 31,
1999, while petitioners belong to the second batch retrenched on February
15, 2000. That the validity of the same PCPPI retrenchment program had
already been passed upon and, thereafter, sustained in the related case of
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon, albeit involving different
parties, impels the Court to accord a similar disposition and uphold the
legality of same program.xx x7

On petitioners' claim that after they were served notices of

termination, 4 employees were regularized, and replacements to the 4 7
dismissed employees were also hired, the Court has resolved the same in the
Decision dated March 25, 2015, thus:
On PCPPI's alleged failure to explain its acts of regularizing four
(4) employees and hiring of sixty (63) replacements and additional
workers, the Court upholds the NLRC's correct ruling thereon, viz.:
Let Us squarely tackle this issue of replacements in
the cases of the complainant in this case. We bear in mind
that replacements refer to the regular workers subjected to
retrenchment, occupying regular positions in the company
structure. Artemio Kempis, a filer mechanic with a salary
of P9,366.00 was replaced by Rogelio Castil. Rogelio
Castil was hired through an agency named Helpmate
Janitorial Services. Castil's employer is Helpmate Janitorial
Services. How can a janitorial service employee perform
the function of a filer mechanic? How much does Pepsi
Cola pay Helpmate Janitorial Services for the contract of
service? These questions immediately come to mind. Being ,
not a regular employee of Pepsi Cola, he is not a
replacement of Kempis. The idea of rightsizing is to
reduce the number of workers and related functions
and trim clown, streamline, or simplify the structure of
the organization to the level of utmost efficiency and
productivity in order to realize profit and survive. After
the CRP shall have been implemented, the desired size
of the corporation is attained. Engaging the services of
service contractors does not expand the size of the
corporate structure. In this sense, the retrenched
workers were not replaced.
The same is true in the case of Exuperio C. Molina
who was allegedly replaced by Eddie Piamonte, an
employee of, again, Helpmate Janitorial Services; of
Gilberto V. Opinion who was allegedly replaced by Norlito
Ulahay, an employee of Nestor Ortiga General Services; of
Purisimo M. Caba[o]bas who was allegedly replaced by
Christopher Albadrigo, an employee of Helpmate Janitorial
Services; of Vicente R. Lauran who was allegedly replaced
"' om;ued.)

Resolution

G.R. No. I 76908

by Wendylen Bron, an employee of Double "N" General

Services; of Ramos M. de Paz, who was disabled, and
replaced by Alex Dieta, an employee of Nestor Ortiga
General Services; and of Zacarias E. Carbo who was
allegedly replaced by an employee of Double "N" General
Services. x x x 8

There is also no merit in petitioners' claim that PCPI failed to comply

with the third requisite of a valid retrenchment program, since they have not
yet been paid their separation pay.
In their Consolidated Posi_tion Paper, petitioners only sought for
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, payment
of backwages, damages and attorney's fees on account of their unlawful
retrenchment. PCPI, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper that it
had offered to pay petitioners separation package equivalent to 150% or 1.5
months for every year of service, and that they were served individual
notices advising them to claim their separation pay. In its Decision dated
December 15, 2000, the Labor Arbiter ruled that it was duly established that
the last two (2) requisites for a valid retrenchment under Article 283 of the
Labor Code, were complied with by PCPPI, 9 namely, written notices to
employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment, and the
payment of separation pay. On appeal, the NLRC ruled in its September 11,
2002 Decision that having been validly retrenched, petitioners were not
entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. However, in ordering PCPI to
pay petitioners' separation benefits of 1Y2 month salary for every year of
service, plus commutation of all vacation and sick leave credits, the NLRC
noted that the corresponding length of petitioners' services with PCPI are
different from what they had erroneously alleged. 10 Meanwhile, the CA held
in its Decision dated July 31, 2006 that the requisite for the payment of
separation pay was evidenced by the notices sent by PCPI to petitioners. 11
Clearly, PCPI cannot be faulted for petitioners' failure to receive their
separation pay.
Likewise without merit is petitioners' contention that PCPI failed to
establish the fourth and fifth requisites of a valid retrenchment program, i.e.,
that the employer exercised its prerogative in good faith for the advancement
of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees' right to
security of tenure, and it used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who
would be dismissed and who would be retained.
It bears emphasis that petitioners are raising such issue only for the

first time in this motion for reconsideration, and that explains why the

JO
II

Id. at 411-412. (Emphasis added)

Id. at 53.
Id.at214.
Id. at 38.

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Resolution

G.R. No. 176908

NLRC and the CA did not discuss such issue in the first place. Notably,
petitioners' main contention in their petition for review on certiorari is that
PCPI' s retrenchment program and their consequent dismissal from
employment were both unlawful because it failed to prove financial losses
and to explain its act of hiring replacement and additional workers, and its
true motive was to prevent their union, LEPCEU-ALU, from becoming the
certified bargaining agent. Suffice it to state that, as a rule, no question will
be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.
"Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of
the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be
considered by a reviewing comi, as they cannot be raised for the first time at
that late stage. Basic considerations of fairn,ess and due process impel this
rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel. " 12
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that this case
cannot be considered as one of those cases under the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court 13 (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC) that shall be acted upon by the
Court En Banc.

WHEREFORE, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the

Court's March 25, 2015 Decision with Motion to Refer Case to the [Court]
En Banc is DENIED.

12

Engr. Besana, et al. v. Mayor, 639 Phil. 216, 229 (20 I 0).
Section 3. Court en bane matters and cases. - The Court en bane shall act on the following
matters and cases:
(a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question;
(b) cases raising novel questions of law;
(c) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
(d) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;
(e) cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of
a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine exceeding
forty thousand pesos;
(t) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a
dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judge's
suspension or a lawyer's suspension from the practice of law;
(g) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any
Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court;
(h) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en bane or by a Division may be
modified or reversed;
(i) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;
U) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
(k) division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects the
welfare of a community;
(!) subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at least three
Members of the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en
bane;
(m) cases that the Court en bane deems of sufficient imp011ance to merit its attention; and
(n) all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their
personnel.
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G.R. No. 176908

Resolution

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO~- PERALTA
Associat1 Justice

WE CONCUR:

J. VELASCO, JR.
Chairperson

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Associate Justice

Associate J

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.

PRESBITE~OJ. VELASCO, JR.

Ass iate Justice

Chairpe on, Third Division

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Re~olution

G.R. No. 176908

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

CERTlFIEC TRUE COPY

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Division lerk
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Third Division

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