Subject Object Cognition
Subject Object Cognition
Subject Object Cognition
,
I
R. 7. 0 0
Y.A. Lek,.torsk,y
VI8C!III.v L.ktouky, D. Se.
ts ht8C! 01 the EpilttmologiClI
... r. of PhilOlOphy 01 the USSf
$(:1'1lCft, Hi, llehol.rly int.r..cov.ring di.lecticel logic, Ihe
of lel.nee, history of philolOp
!IV of koowllKlOl, ltC, He 1
1COf" 01 Plperl .nd books on
ttI.t w.re highly IPPrecl.ted 1
number of hi. Pipers hIVe
tOflogn sclenllflc public.tlonl
SUBJECT
OBJECT
COGNITION
PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW
CONTENTS
Vltd,.11'I lektouk
" head of 1he Epilter
1Utt of PhilotOphy of
Sciences. His .chal.,1
cower ing di.lectic.1 It
of .:;ience, history of
gy of knowledge,
B. A. fleKTOpCKHM
Cy6~eKT. o6~eKT,
Jla
n03HaHHe
INTRODUCTION, . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . ..
IIJjZ/lUUCKOM 1I''>IKe
Part One
of paper, .nd I
that were highly IPP
ICOfIl
CONCEPTIO NS
OF COGN ITI V E
RELAT ION IN TH E NONMA RX IST
EPISTEMOLOGICAL T HEOR I ES
number of hi l PIP
forllgn scientific publ
... _ . _ . . . . . . . _ . . . . .
21
21
2. The Theory of Cognitive "i":qu ilibriu m " Between S ubjec=t and Object
. _
... __ . .. 'J:1
3. The View of Cognition .. an En8emble of the Subject',
Phylical Operations,
. .
. . _. _. _ . , . _ 38
0I1IP1Ir 2_ THE INTERPRETATION OF COGNITION AS DETER.
MINED BY THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS ... _ . . . . _ .,
48
48
62
79
87
95
Part Two
03020201QO
21~
014(01) _ 84
- 11
011,""1.
REFLECTION
OBJECT-RELATED
ACTIVITY AND COMMUNICATION
84
PRACTICAL
118
118
144
-i
LektCM
of the Epil
PhilOIOphy
His lChol
di.lectiCil
history
kno'Jdedge,
of Plpers.r
highly.
of his t=
scientific p:
...
, 155
155
.. 166
1.
~bjectiveness
d'" . -- -...
g';:~~T40~e;oL~~i~~N
nowledge. , .. , . , .
2.
3,
: . 214
.......
Name Index
.
:.
218
227
232
248
1982
INTRODUCTION
Vladislav Lekt(
head of the Epi
of PhilOSOph"
. His $Ch(
dialectiCl
genuine knowled e
an un erstandmg of what is
mere claim to kfl(~Wledg~.Pposed to false wisdom, that is,
The ~erms "to know" and "knowled "
.
veral distinct senses in everyda I
ge are u~d m seone may speak of "kno I d .. y an,~age, For mstance,
("I know how to use thO e ,ge as ability to do something
build a house"),
15 mstrument", "I know how to
We also speak of "kno I d .. ' n
recognise an object or pe~soen ~~'I
the ~nse of ability to
h'vF~ known this person for twenty ;e:':s")oscow well", "I
mally "knowledge'"
k
'
human ac'tivity which ch 15 ta ~n to mean a product of
rectly) a certain state of arffc~n~s (an,d characterises corcertain properties in defini e rurs, In reahty: ~he presence of
relations, the realisation ; O~J~cts, the eXIStence of some
("I know that such and s~chc~ham events,~r processes, etc.
It should be
lIlgS occur ).
knowledge has b~eo;e~ that analys~s of the last type of
men started
'
glven preferential treatment ever since
pened a1mos~~~lOtt~n what .knowledge is - and that hap-
~~~e;h~t~~~~:~~u~e~:~~d~hl:, f~r~~\I~~~~h{y;fi~~~~:
theoretical knowledge)WI~~,e (though certainly not only
sophers' activity and th~
b. was both t~e res,:!lt of philoIC
SU
Vladislav Le
.. head of the'
'lUte of PhiloSOf
Sciences. His $j
covering dialec
at science, hist
tzi of knowle.
lCOfes of paper
that were high
number of hi
foreign scientif
Vladillav
Is head of tI
. , . of Philc
Sciencel. H i
covering die
of science, I
'It of kl'\O\
ICCr" of pa
1hat were h
.number of
oreign sciel
thad.ology .of
q~an.tum
10
Vladislav
is head of th
... te of Philo'
Sciencfl. Hi!
covering die
at science, I'
IV of knov
ltC)fel of pa
. .t were h
~mber of
peweion sciel
...
"- ........
"
. . . . . ..
. -~-
Vladislav Lek'
is head of the EI
1Utl of Philosopl-.
Sciencrs. His sd
covering dillectil
of science, hillo'
gy of knowled~
ICOrH of papers
#tIt were highly
number of his
foreign scientific
co~ ~ ~mp~rt~t
"
a' con
and
of
to the an;.
the place of
of reflection j
many works have
on he links be
tween cognition a nd
activit y ; great attent ion has
been given t o t he fo rms of the activity o f t he subject in
reflecting reality; some works analysed the problem of the
interrelatio nship of t he individual a nd the social in cogni
tion; t he relation o f the object and t he subject-matter of
knowledge has been investigated ; many works have inquired
into the interrelation of the subjective and the objective
in the development of knowledge. I I A considerable num
ber of works deal with t he dialectics of the subject and t he
object in cognition in connection with the analysis of the
philosophical proble ms arising in the development of the
modern natural sciences. These works focus on the
relationship between the object and the instruments of reo
search the nature of physical reality, and the objectivity
of natural sc ientific knowledge, 12 Finally, a number of
significant aspect s of the cognitive relation have been con
sidered in connection with the discussion of the philoso
phical p roblems of psychology, such as the interrelations
of activity and consciousness, the role of object-related
practical activity in the genesis of percept ion, the nature of
the socalled cognitive actions, and t he problem of the
ego,I3
The present work attempts, first. to sum up the studies
in this fie ld of both the aut hor himself14 and of other So
viet specialists in epistemology, and, second , to analyse a
15
Vladillav lek
is head of the E
1Ute of Philo$OpI
number of aspects of the given problem that nrc of n general and fundamental nature and at the sum' time have not
been sufficiently studied in Soviet literatur'.
We shall try to specify and consid'r h're the main types
of conceptions of the cognitive relation, of the subject-ob_
ject relationship, i.e., the. vari~us mode~ of formulation
and discussion of the baSIC epistemological themes. Our
objective is a clear formulation of those ~onditions of study_
ing this problem which ensure the frUitfulness and scien_
tific quality of the theoretical quest on the basis of the dialectical-materialist epistemology and at the same time ac.
cord with the specificity of the cognitive situation created
by the development of modern science.
We begin our analysis of the cognitive relat ion with a
critique of the modes of formulation of the problem c haracteristic of pre-Marxian and present-day non-Marxist, bourgeois philosophy. Our investigation in this Part of the work
has a double significance. First, it fixes those modes of
epistemolOgical analysis which necessarily lead the research
into a cul-de-sac, generating contradictions between the
philosoph~cal conception and the real facts of cognition
and consclOusness as well as internal contradictions in t he
epistemological conception itself. The identification and
~scardi~g of the methods of studying the cognitive relati?n ~~Ich ~o not ensure the construction of a genuinely
scle~t~fIC epistemology help to outline more precisely the
speclf!c ~pproach ~ the analysis of cognition which is charactenstlc of MarxISt-Leninist epistemology.
In
of the pre-Marxian and non-Marxist t hewe have endeavoured to carefully sepa\1
-:
.
with which these
",t.
used' these
in order to
mo_ves 6[ph:l1oso tfie un enability
"
lS
Vledillav Lek
is heed of the EI
1Ule of Philosopl"
Sciences. His sct
covering dialectil
of science, histol
flY of knowled!
ICOres of papers
that were highly
number of his
foreign scientific
'd ed' the interrelation of consciousness and knowlcon!1 ~~o~ledge of the world and k!'owlffige. of seH, the
edg 't
f the act of reflexion the Interrelation between
strucureo
. .'In t.he process o.f cogllltIon.
the e 0 and the other subjects
AU t~ese questions, however , are Interpreted tn. ~ fundamentally erroneouS way : th.e ~al f~cts ~f cognttl~n and
consciousness which subjectlVe-ldeahst eplste.molo~ts e~te are mystified. The present book consl~ers In detail
~~u~;se defects of subjectivist epistemolog1cal. ~oncep
ti
which make a scientific study of the cogmtlVe relati~~s impossible. Besides, it is shown that all these defe~ts
are rooted in the fundamentally erroneo~s unders~andmg
of the cognitive relation itself as one that IS dete!mmed by /
the structure of a self-contained individual conscIOusness.
It should be noted that in the first and second parts of
the book we do not pursue the goal of a n:taximally c.omprehensive analysis of all those non-MarXist. conceptl?ns
that could be included under the general eplstemologlcal
viewpoints under analysis. Our choice of the objects of criticism is guided by a desire ~o specif~ and a~a!yse tho~
modes of expression of the epIStemological positions conSIdered which, on the one hand, represent their classical
form, and on the other, are widespread in modern Western
philosophy, affecting also specialists in the various sciences.
Thus, the first two chapters are by no means a "h istorical introduction" to the rest of the work. H)
These traits of the critical analysis determine the fact
that the order in which the conceptions are criticised does
not always coincide with the sequence of their emergence
in the history of philosophy.
To a considerable extent the materials critically analysed ~ere (e.g., some aspects of Husserl's epistemology,
the epIstemology of Sartre) are considered from Marxist
positions for the first time. Besides, we endeavoured to
specify those aspects of the epistemological conceptions of
Descartes, Kant, and Fichte which have not yet attracted
the attention of Marxist philosophers.
The secon~ part of ~he monograph studies the specific
traits of the ~nte~pretat.lOn. of the cognitive relation in the
system of sc.lentlflc. that IS, Marxist-Leninist, epistemology, and outlmes the prospects which open up in this approach for t.he analY~ls of a number of fundamental problems no.w discusse~ 10 ter~s of the dialectical-materialist
conceptIOn of subject, object, and cognition in work
the methodology of science, scientology and psycholos on
The work shows that the dialectico-~aterialist inte gy.
tation of the cognitive relati.on does not onlY.R.erm't rpreswer to questions that confound nonanist eprit.e~o~~:
18
Vl!ldislav Lekl
is head of the Ef
tute of Philosoph
Pa rt One
CONCEPTIONS OF TH E COGNITIVE
RELATI ON IN NONMARXIST
EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORIES
Chapter 1
x:
INTERPRETATION OF COGNITION AS
INTERACTION OF TWO NATURAL SYSTEMS
Vladislav lekt
is head of the E~
tute of PhilOSOph
Sciences. His sch
covering dillecti(
of science, histor
gy of koowledg
scores of papers ;
.
th ubject True that action is interpreted in an
Je<;t . o~ e / an '~mage'" of the object is separated or
~~:::na~~, irom it and n.oa~ in the spac~ betwee~ the object and the subject; gettIng mto the subject, the unage assumes the quality of knowledge .
.
.
The philosophy of the New TlJ~es lends a dlffer~nt
shape to a basically similar conception o~ the mechan~sm
of origin of knowledge. In terms of the Ide~s of classIcal
mechanics which had taken shape by that time, only m aterial phy~ical bodies can af~ect one a~othe~, the on~y qualities immediately inherent 10..!he.boches be~ng den,~lty, ex
tension, and form. There can be no questlon ?f emanation" of "images". Bodies can leave only ma~en~ traces of
impact in each other. The result of the phYSlcal.unpact on
the sense organs (whether it be d.irect impact, !is 10 the case
of tactile impressions, ?r a medlate.d one, as 10 t~e c!ise of
vision) is sense perception -the pnmary and baSIC kind o f
knowledge. All other kinds or types of knowledge are, in
one way or another, derivative from perception. Therefore
to discover its mechanism would in fact mean to discover
the essence of knowledge, of the cognitive relation in
general.
Here is how one of the classical adherents of such conceptions, the English philosopher John Locke, reasoned :
" ... Simple ideas [that was the term Locke used for wh at
is now called sense perception - V. L. 1 are not fictions of
our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of
th.ings without us, really operating upon us; and so carry
WIth them all the conformity which is intended or which
our state requires; for they represent to us things under
those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us;
whereby ~e are en~bled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to dIscern the states they are in and so to
take th~m for our ~ecessities, and apply them to our uses.
~d thIS conf?rmlty between our simple ideas and the
eXlste~ce of thmgs is .s,;!fficient fo r real knowledge. "1
. It IS by the speclftc formatio ns arising in t he subject
~unself, by the "ideas" or sense perceptions that m
Judges of t~e really existing objects. The relation of t~
syst~m of mterconnected perceptions to the real b'
remmds 0!le of the relation of a map to the act all
lects
The map IS not the terrain itself. At the s u t. an scape.
who can read the map will clearly underst arne lIl."le a man
tions of the real objects in the area descri~\th~~nterrelaThe argument seems clear and 10 'cal The Y e map.
of modem neurophysiology indeed~e~ 'be development
dependences characterising causal chain~ th~a eat :many
external objects, then pass through man'
orm 10 the
s senses and fur-
22
Vladislav Lt
is head of the
tute of PhiioSOI
Sciench. His s
covering di.lec
of science, hin
gy of knowle
ICOres of paper
thet were high
number of hi
foreign $Cientif
"pro-
25
\l1~isllrW
l.
is head of the
1Ute of Philosc
Sciences. His ~
covering diale!
of scie~ , his
'IV of knowll
lCOI"es of pape
that were higl
number of
foreign scienti'
. >1
t h e spin
Vladislav I
Is head of ttM
..~ of Philos
$ci.ncft. His
cov.ri"'iJ di.l,
of lCi.nee, hi
gy of know
ICOr.. of PI~
thlt
hig
number of
w.r.
for_ign scient
(nalu-'
philosophy , as a purely
natural
li:U
.
b>
h cteristic of a specific body - the cognlzmg su ]ect.
Th~aapproach to the analysis of activitr is quite a~cept!ibl~
to the adherents of this view. ,In fact, It does ~C?t 10 pnfo\clpie go beyond the interpretatIon o~ the cogmtlve relatu:m
as a natural interaction of a special type. AI,though Its
dherents analyse some cognitive problems with greater
&scrimination and precision than La,eke and. the otber
'(fleoreticfan-s who stressed t~e. one-~Id~d ~ctlon ?f the
object on the subject, it is still 10 I?nnclple lm,?osSI?le to
construct an adequate epi~temologlca1. conception tn the
framework of a modernised .naturallst mode~ o! cognition. The theoreticians who mte~pret ~he sub~ect 5 cognitive activity in a naturalistic fashton, eIther stick to the
positions of metaphysical materialism or a~cept the standpoint of subjective idealism, or even aSSimilate both of
these positions.
. .
. .
An illustration of thIs conceplton of the cogmtlve relation is the system of the so-called genetic epistemology of
Jean Piaget one of the most prominent Western psychologists. "Gen~tic epistemology", which is extremely influential abroad, has arisen as an attempt to philosophically
interpret the extensive results of experimental and theoretical psychological studies carried out by Piaget and his
collaborators during several decades. In analysing "genetic
epistemology", we shall endeavour to separate the actual
facts discovered by Piaget (we shall return to these facts,
characterising important aspects of the process of cognition, il\ our positive inquiry into the problem) from his
theoretical interpretation, which is largely untenable in its
philosophical aspects.
T\vo. features distinguish the approach of the Swiss psyc}lologlst. First, he recognises the subject's active role at all
h'vels o~ the .cognitive p~ocess, beginning with perception
and endmg with complex mtellectual structures. This activeness o~ the .subject is expressed in the transformation of
the obJ~ct, tn the fact t~at t~e.latter can only affect the
subJect!n the cC?urse of Ius activity, which varies in charac.
ter. at ~If.rerent mtell~ctual levels. Second, the cognitive relation IS tnterprete~ m the f~a~ework of the system-struc~ural approach: vanous cogmtlVe formations are viewed as
mtegral structures: and the subject-object relation itself is
reg.arded as a Special type of system in which subJect and
object are mutually "balanced".
. The main. ideas of the operational conception of intelligence (as Plaget refers to his psychological th
)
follows:
eory are as
1. Intelligence is defined in the context of behaviour,
2.
:r
29
\
\
I/lidisllV
is head of t~
tuft of Philo
Sciences. Hi!
covering dia
of science, h
gy of knOVI
scorll of PII
that were hi
number of
foreign scien
movemcnt.s and percepLions and do not involve any notions. AILhough &ensorimotor intelligcnce is not yet logi.
cal it "functionally" prepares lOA:ical reasoning proper.
h. Preoperational intelligence (between two and seven
years) is characterised by wellformed speech, notions, in
teriorisation of action in Lhought (action is replaced by
some sign: word, image, or symbol).
At the stage of preoperational intelligence, the child is
not yet capable of appl~in~ ar;a earlier acquired ~cheme of
action with constant objects eIther to remote objects or to
definite sets and quantities. The child does not yet have
re-/ersible operations and the concepts of retainina: appli
cable to actions at 8 level higher than sensorimotor
actions.
III. At t he stage of concrete operations (between eight
and eleven) different types of intellectual activity that
have appea!"~d during the previous period finally reach a
state of " mohile equilibrium", that is., they become rever
sible At the same time the basic concepts of retention are
formed, the child is capa?le of concrete logical operations.
He can fonn both relations and classes out of concrete
things. But the logical operations have not yet become ge.
neralised. At this stage children cannot construct correct
speech independently of real action.
IV. At the formal operations stage (between 1112 and
14-15) the genesis of intelligence is completed. The ability
to reason hypothetically and deductively develops at this
stage, and the system of operations of propositio,?-al logic
is formed. The subject can equally well operate With both
objects and propositi<?ns ..The ,em~rgence o~ the~ systems
of operations sho ws, m Piaget S VIew, that mtelhgence has
.
been formed.
Altho ugh t he develo pment ~f log.ical ~asomn~ forms an
important aspect of the geneSIS of mtelhgence, It does. not
fully exhaust this process. In t he course and <?n the baSIS of
formation of o perational structures of varymg deipees of
complexity, t he child graduaUy masters the refllity s':!r
rounding him " During t he first seven years of hfe I wnte
Piaget and InhelderJ th~ c h ~d graduallr .discovers the. elementary principles of mvanance pe~mng to t~e o.bJect,
quant ity number space and t ime, which lend hIS picture
of the ~orld an ~bjective structure; "11 The .most impor
tant components in the interpretation of thiS proce~, as
suJ,tgested by Pia~et, are (1) depende!1ce of ~e a';l~YslS of
the reality as constructed by the child on. hIS actiVIty; (2)
the child 's spiritual development as a growmg syste~ of m
variants mastered by him; (3) development of logtcal rea
31
Vl adislav
is head of th
tute of PhilOi
Sciences, His
covering dia l
of science, h
tlV of know
ItOres of pap
that were hil
number of
foreign scien1
;/
bl
32
struct,ures
'3
Vledisl81
is he~ of
tu te of Phil
Sciences. H
c:overing di
of science,
gy of knc
ICOrelof Pl
hat were I
number 01
foreign $Cie
things. "1
Most measurements in physics. Born believes
d,o not pertain to ?bjects themselves but to their projec:
tion~ on other objects. "The projection ... is defined in
relatIon tc! a system of reference... There are in general
many eQulV~ent syste~s of reference. In every physical
theory t~ere IS a ~uJe which connects the projections of the
same object on different systems of reference. "15
. ~owever, the attempts to identify construction of obJectlve knowl~~e with ~stablishment of the object's iovaria!lt charactenstlcs run mto serious philosophical difficultIes. The a~p~tus .used by the physicist durinE experi
!1lents f~nctl~n in thlS aspect as quite real physical bodies
mteractmg wIth other. bodies according to objective laws
~ that the res~ts of. l!lteraction, just as, generall s eak:
~g, ;~e pr~perttes ans10g from the relation of on~ object
~
0 }ects, the so:calle~ pro)ections, must exist objee Ive y ~n~ really. Besides, mvanance is not an absolute
~hdeff~~~~~~fr: ~;e~~[operty, ~eing esta?lis~~ only in
in one system rna r
Ions.. an . that. which IS mvariant
nothing of all possful~ ~on-mvanant 10 another, to say
. r
=~a:hi~~
h~~~e\h~J~~~;~~~u:hP~~!~~~~c~f
;;lit
it.
r searc ers abroad ascribe to
16
.
thePiaget's
theo "ge
of n~t"IC ~pistem.ology"
endeavours to link u
Here the
th.e theory of eQuilibriuni.
con~eptions comes to li&ht :~it~~allweakness of Piaget's
Piaget believes that th
ar y.
structure of intelli ence e emergence of invariants in the
ance of reversible ~perati~~s~" ccisequently, the appearmutual balancing of 0 e . IS lTectly connected with
with the subject-object ~q~~~bn~ and, as a result of this
re~i must therefore Provid~ ~u~y T~e thedory of equilib:
ectual development E Ub
. . un erstandin~ inget as the maximum ~ q':l I num IS Interpreted by Pia~mpensating for certai~~!~~alf hthe subject's activity
lance ?[ ~orces in the state of restc anges, rather than as
n buildmg the model [
.'
~~ ~~~g;: of the equilib~u~b~~!;~~ject equ~ibrium on
li~rium ~oh~~f~~ ~n~ later <:,n the ~~l~~s~f~hsyste~
Piaget cannot ded glC orgamsm with the
. e equI~ies
of the kind or~~eqfUroil'?b~his model the S~C"IYfll"I'onment,
jeet d'
1 num" bet
c properties ~to Ih!h:;::~: &ompelled to int~:~c~u~~ect and obwith his own basic mo~~. the outside, in appar:nset dP!operlscord
rrundam~~t!:ltsh~lth
34
In mechanics, a closed system is believed to be in eQuilibrium if the sum of all possible types of work within the
system equals zero.
Using the term "equilibrium" in his theoretical aI1l\1ments, Piaget at first understood it in the sense that is
close to the above. The subject-object system (and by "object" he means, first of all, that part of the subiect's environment with which he directlv interacts, practically and
c09;nitively) may be regarded as being in eQuilibrium if the
sum of all possible interactions between the subject and
the object equals zero (that means that the sub.iect can
always perform an action reversin9; the first action thus
re~ainin~ the original situation). The external equilibrium
between the subject and the object is ensured by establishing an equilibrium within the operational structure: the
existence in this structure of an operation that is the
reverse of the basic one gives precisely this effect that the
sum of all possible operations within the structure equals
zero. 17
It soon turned out, however, that Piaget's analoy between equilibrium in a mechanical system and equilibrium
in the structure of intellectual operations is extremely imprecise. First, the mechanical principle deals with a closed
system, that is, one that is isolated from the influence of
the environment, whereas the whole purpose of the "balancing" of intellectual operations of which Piaa:et speaks
is the attainment of stability of the knowledge about the
object relative to the mutable experience. In other words,
Piaget deals with an "open" rather than "closed" system.
Second, it came to light that in physics itself system equilibrium is only rarely expressed by the above principle. In
the more general cases of system equilibrium, considered,
e.g., in thermodynamics, there is a minimum of potential
energy in the system (which is conditioned by the attainment of the most probable state by the system). Mechanical equilibrium proves to be only a special case of the
more general eqUilibrium state. In recent years, a number
of physicists and mathematicians (I. Prigozhin and others)
have ..s.eneralised the concept of equilibrium to include
"dynamic eQuilibrium". It provea to be possibleto apply
the mathematical theory of dynamic equilibrium of a system to the study of "open systems", Le., systems exchanging matter and energy with the environment. Some biologists have made attempts to apply the theory of dynamic
equilibrium to the study of living organisms as "open systems".
Piaget speaks of "balancing" operations within a cognitive structure , believing this
"balance" attainable due
.
Vled;sl,
is hef(! of
1Ute of Phi
Sciences.
awering d
of tcience,
!IV of krH
ICOrH
of p
th.t were
number 0
foreign scie
~~~dei~~!h:sp:%~hf~~~~estu~~in:,
f:k~t:e,!nf
~~~~~~:l ~hq~7~bes
p~~~~ ~~;
a~alo-
which can in no way be deduced from the model of equilibrium of a physical system or a biological organism. Referring to "instrumentally" and "structurally" possible
operations, Piaget is compelled to speak of consciousness,
of contemplation by the subject of his possible actions and
of other specifically psychical states as the necessary component of the subject-object equilibrium.
Recognisinji! the insufficiency of the physical theory of
equilibrium for understanding the subject-object equilibrium, Piaget demonstrated, in fact, the weakness of his own
epistemological stand, although he failed to work out a
conception that would adequately explain the facts which
he analysed.
Characteristically when Piaget had to define the concept of " reversibility" of an action (i.e., the concept of
operation, for an operation is a reversible action), he could
not restrict himself to pointin~ out the connection between
reversibility and the possibility of performing an action in two opposite directions and had to indicate the importance of realisation of t he fact that the action remains
18
the same as it is performed in either of the directions.
NaturallY, t he concept of reversibility cannot be defined in
this way in physics.
Piaget admits that the reversibility of intellectual operations of which he speaks has nothing to do with the reversibility of actual physical processes. Thus, speaking of the
formation of the concept of time, he remarks that reversibility of time does not mean for the subject that actual
physical time can flow in the opposite direction (actual
time is irreversible) but merely the fact that the subject
can mentally proceed not only from the previous moment
of time to the subsequent one but also from the subsequent to the preceding (i.e., he can not only perform the
operation A -+ B but also the operation B -+ A), realiSing,
however , that t he actual sequence of moments does not
change (i. e., A precedes B). "Constructing time ... is an excellent example of joint action of the reversible processes
of t he subjec t and the irreversible processes of the object,"
remarks Piaget.19
Thus Piaget fails to deduce in the framework of his can
ception the normative character of cognit ive s~ructures
without resorting to the phenomena of conSCiousness,
those phenomena whose study cannot be carried out by interpreting the subject-object interrelations in terms of
mechanics physics, and biology, and thus does not accord
with the f~ndamental approach of "genetic epistemoiolr)'''.
It proves impossible to explain objectiveness of knowledge
and other fundamental characteristics of cognition bv the
t
)1
37
'ChIt were
number 0
foreilln SCif
'('I'u'd un4Ulostioningly.
tU((', "20
Vl.cIisJl
.. head of
of Phi
Scienou. t
OOriring d
of leienee,
!IV of kl'M
.,te
ICOI"n of p
tNt were
number 0
fort." scie
pie description of the b~havio~ of obje~ts gi~en in experience. But the expenence Itself which thIs assertion
claimed to describe was very narrow. When the range of
experience was broadened, and research became concerned
v.ith bodies roov~ng at hi~h velocities, the. untenability of
the concept of simultaneIty used by clasSiCal physics was
discovered.
Einstein showed, Bridgman writes, that the operations
which permitted the statement of siroultaneity of two
events involved measurement by an observer so that simUltaneity is not an absolute property of the two events
but one involving the relation of the two events to the
observer, the subject, his frame of reference the velocity
of these events relative to the observer's fr~e of refer
ence.
. Bridgman makes further specifications in his methodologlcal conception using a detailed operational analysis of
the concept of len~h as his proving lUound.
He asks this question: by what operations do we measure the length of ~y concre~e phYsical object? The mea
surement of the obJ~cts ~f ordinary experiment is effected
by ~ procedure which IS crudely described as follows. A
rod IS ~sed as the measure of length; it is imposed on the
o.bject I.n such a way that one of the ends of the rod coinwith one of the ends of the object then the position
a h~h~ second ~nd of the rod is marked dn the object, after
~o~c ih~ rod I~ moved alon~ the line that is the continuad of ~ previOUS position in such a way that the first
en ~d t edrod ~oincides with the previous position of the
0
of t~~ obI!I:. proceg~e is repeated until the second
cations of the roJs~e:~led 't~~~ nu..Thbe'r of sep~ate. appl}case.
en,:;~ a the object In this
Cites
:-ct
wh~~hd~~;;a1!~~~i~U~eth.at.
the
s n
';"h t
b
ilii
'0
Vlad ish
is head of
tute of Ph
Sciences. I
CQYering (
of science.
gy of kn
scores of f
that were
number c
fOfeign sci!
is ascribed to those concepts which may be defined by different sets of physical operations indt'pendent of each
other.
We bear in mind that the main idea of opt'rationalism is
that each set of operations essentially corn'sponds to one
concept only. If two (or more) sets of operations indepen_
dent of ea~h o~her yield t~e same results, we may. from
t~e o,PeratlOnailst standpomt, conditionally identify the
~Iffenng concepts corresponding to different sets, re~ard
mg .the,? as ?ne concept to which the status of physical
reahty IS ascnbed. Such a concept appears as an invariant
relative to different sets of operations or as an expression
of some correlation be~ween different sets of physical phe~o~ena. At the same tIme we should not forget Bridgman
InsISts, that the identification of the results o'f different
set.s o~ m:~urements is, to a certain degree, conditional
bemll!:,JustIfled by the availa~le measurements only; futur~
expenments may reveal discrepancies in the results of
meglasurements bel.on~n2 to different sets, and in this case a
sm e concept wIll have to be "split" into two or more
th\~ mayor may not have t~e status of physical realities. '
ehthus .see that the baSIS of operationalism is emphasis
,
on
'
formede umqueness 01
. th e expenmental
procedures perthe h b'y Jhe eXPe.nme,:ter, the need for singline out all
Pli YSIC oper~tions m defining concepts Continuing
th IS ne 0 1 reasonmg Brid'"
. 1 '
'
strictly speaking ea 'h
~m<l!' q~lte ~glcally i~fers that,
c
mented by the 2iven sin~r:~at~?n.dlsalumque,. bem~ impleplace. The operations m
m IVI u at a glVen tIme and
no method. to
ust not be generalised as there is
But if one ~~~~ht~e future o! such ge,:,eralisation ..
c1 usion is inevitable that set theloretlCal premIses, the conoperational definitions or~ on Y~on-operational but also
A. C. Benjamin an Amer' oncep are I~ fact impossible.
remarks: "Another opera~~an r~searcher m operationalism
must be a different one I?n, .oweyer similar to the first'
least by spatial or tempo~lc~ I\~lll be distinguished at
of the length of a given Objec~ca Ion .. Two measurements
same, ~an be distinguished N ,eyen If the results are the
be defmed by an operatio~ o~ If a concept is always to
cular, the c~n~ept itself tak:~ each oper~tion is a partimode of defIrution. Not only ~n the Particularity of its
tween the tapeline length of wrl there be a difference be~ngth (even if the measureda v~ld and the triangulation
ere will be a difference in m
~es are the same) but
al tapeline lengths of the field (~an.lng between all indi~idu
sured values ~ the same)."24 B;t"' even though the meaway are deVOid of any cognitive vCJncepts defined in this
42
ue at all, for they es-
\,
,
Vlaciisl
is head 01
1LIte of Ph
Sciences.
covering c
of science
gy of kn
ICQrel of I
that were
number (
foreign sci
4.
Chapter 2
THE INTERPRETATION OF COGNITION
AS DETERMINED BY THE STRUCTURE
OF CONSCIOUSNESS
VladisJ
is head 01
11.Ite of Ph
Sciences.
covering I
of science
gy of kn
IKOrel of 1
ttlat were
number (
foreign sci
tiS
48
Vladisl
is head 0
OJte of p ~
Sciences,
coYering
of sciencl
fI'{ of kr
lCOI'es of
1I1at w ere
number t
foreign sci
fundamentally different from all kinds and types of special scientific knowledge, that is, as a field where the data
of the special sciences cannot be used. (Thus the approach
to the study of cognition analysed here differs in its atti
tude to the special sciences from the approach considered
in the first chapter: the latter, as we remember, presup
posed wide use of the data of mechanics, physics, biology,
physiology, and other sciences.)
We must agree that the task of cognition consists in
overcoming errors and obtaining true knowledge. Episte
mological reflexion about knowledge indeed plays an important role in the solution of this problem. It is also true
that positing the problem of substantiation of lmowledge implies a critical attitude to certain areas of existing
knowledge. At the same time, the view that "pure" or "absolute" lmowledge can be established is false, and so is the
assertion that in substantiating knowledge we must ig
nore all the facts of the special sciences, In the second part
of the present work we shall characterise an approach to
the substantiation of knowledge which does not accept
these f'l!..lse premises, namely, MarxistLeninist epistemology.
The question of substantiation of knowledge was first
formulated, in classical form, by Descartes. The positing
of this problem and its acuteness were largely due to the
specific traits of the socio-<:ultural and scientific situation
in which Descartes' theoretical activity took place, a situation which was characterised, on the one hand, by the
emergence of the bourgeois mode of production (and thus
by a growing acuteness of individual selfconsciousness)
and, on the other hand, by the emergence of the science of
the New Times which set itself in sharp opposition to the
scholastic tradition, On the whole, however, Descartes'
theoretical arguments transcend the concrete historical
situation, for the mode of analysis which he accepted
proved to be archetypal and was many times reproduced
with various modifications in western bourgeois philosophy,
The starting point of Descartes' reasoning is his dis
trust for the cultural tradition: "I leamed not to believe
too firmly anything of which I was only persuaded by an
example or custom."34 "As soon as my age permitted
me to be free of the supervision of my tutors, I abandoned
the study of letters entirely ... resolving not to seek any
other science but that which I could find in myself or in
the great book of the world ... "3 5
For philosophy "had been cultivated by the most excellent minds that ever lived for many centuries, and yet
there was not a single thing in it which could not be dis61
Vledls
is heed 0
.,te of PI
Sciences.
coYering
of .cienel
IV of k,
ICOfh of
thl1 wife
numblr
fOf'ign
Ie
puted and consequently which would not be doubtful ... ";36 that was Descartes' fonnulation of the proposition which was later repeated by numerous philosophers
who tackled the problem of knowledge. And further:
"As for the other sciences, since they borrowed their principles from philosophy, I judged that it was impossible to
construct anything that would be solid on such infirm
foundations. "37
Thus the question here is one of a radical attempt to substantiate the entire system of theoretical knowledge.
Where could one look for the solution of this problem?
Descartes starts out from the premise that only that
sho,:!ld be taken. as true ,,:hich is cognized as such quite
obVIOusly, that IS to say, It appears to the mind so clearly and distinctly that there is no reason to call it in
question.
But can we trust our sense perceptions? They often deceive us. Thus towers which seem round from a distance
prove to be rectangular at close quarters, while giant
statues at the top of these towers seem small if looked at
from below. Errors may result not only from the evidence
of ou~, ex~m.al senses but .also from that of the internal
ones. .:.F?or IS the~e anythmlit more intimate and interior
than pam. And stIll, I have heard on severa) occasions
from persons who had their arms or legs cut off that it
hmetlmes seemed to them that they felt pain in the parts
that ~ad ~en cut off, which gave me reason to believe
a hc\ouh not be certain that any of my limbs is ailing
lh o~g
s ould (eel pain in it. "38
1 rue, one can believe that there are things with regard
to which our senses can hardl d
F
.
can hon1ly be doubted that a ecelv~ us. or lIlst.ance, ~t
tahl('. informally dresse I hid m slttmg here behmd thlS
pte. "And how could (, 0 IIlg thIS paper m my hands,
bolly art' mine? Perha~s neg~te ~~lat these hands and this
&4.'\ to these inscnsates "?3~\ en when I compare myhowever, t~at all this ~merel t may very w.~Jl turr~ out,
conSider thiS idea, I see so cleaX ~~ drham. Stoppmg to
SIV, (('atures or sufficiently Y at t ere are no concluwhich it would he possible to ~':lquestl.onable marks by
hPin; awakE' and slN'pinR that Ilstmgulsh neatly between
my astonishment IS su('h'that it am qUite astounded: and
that I am I\sleep."40
can nearly persuade me
At. thf' aam(' time, Our mind (
tinct propositions ('onf'f'ming th e afe& such clear and disthinp; atudu'rl in arithmetic and ;.ementary and universal
Po ometn. (lh
.
li ona rM'rtam
to thE': extE'nsion or
.J
eM' proposlconrgurathm, magnitude numhf'.r c~rporeal things, their
..
Vlad it
is head (
tute of P
Sciences.
covering
of scienc
gy of k
ICOfes of
1I1u werl
number
foreign S(
54
Vlldi
is held ,
1Ute of F
Sciel'lCfl
covering
of scienc
gy of ~
ICOrel 01
'ChIt wer
number
foreign
So
Attempts at c~r~inal solution of the philosophical prob!em of su~stantJatlon of knowledge through subjectivist
toterpretat!on of the sense data took a most sophisticated
and techmcally elaborate form in the doctrine of the
~ 'sense ~ata" whir.h w~ the s~bject,.~atter of lively debate
tn Engbsh and American philosophical literature in the
first half of the present century,
The adherents of this doctime (which in different variants developed within the philosophical systems of neorealis'!l, critic~ realism, an~ logical positivism) tried to
combme the VIew that ObVIOUS and directly given knowle~ge expresses,. in one w!lY or another, the subject's refleXlon abou,t hImself, WIth the assumption that experience contams knowledge about really existing objects and
not merely to combine these propositions but to deduce
the latter from the fonner without invoking God, unlike
Descartes, With this aim in view, certain specific objects,
"sense data", the knowledge of which is intuitive and in
dubitable, were postulated to be the results of refiexion
about the content of perception.
Here is a typical mode of introducing "sense data" as
objects of epistemolOgical study: "When I see a tomato
there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it
is. a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted
pIece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing
there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really
a reflection; perhaps I am even the victim of some hallu
cination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there
exists a 'red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape
standing out from a background of other colour-patches,
and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field
of colour is directly present to my consciousness. "54
It is these colour-patches, sound tones, etc. that are regarded as "sense data". Importantly, they are not identified with sense perceptions, The "sense data" are ascribed t he status of objects of a special kind while sense
perCeptions are the result of direct, intuitive knowledge
of these objects. The elementary process underlying any
cognition is regarded as special "sensin~", direct p,erception of the "sense data" to the act of directly grasptng
their content. At the same time, the "sense data" are not
material things either, for possession of c:::ertain "sense
data" is no guarantee. yet of th~ actual eXlsten~ of the
material obje~t to whlc~ they wIi} pro~~ to pertai~; ~ach
cognizing subject has hIS own pnvate sense data different from the "sense data" of another person.
H. H, Price one of the well-known theoreticians of this
conception, thus describes the main characteristics of "sense
57
Vledil
is heed C
tuN of P
Sciences.
covering
of tcienc
gy of k
ICQres of
that wen
number
foreign sc
cl!,
Vh,d
is head
1I.tte of I
Science!
covering
of scien
gy of I
tcOI'es
fl.t weI
number
foreign
Vlod
is head
1Ute of I
Science!
COVerirlt
of scien
gyof
pass). 8
It thus proved impossible to substantiate the real sens~a.l experie,nc.es to which, in the empiricists' view, all cog-
ICOr es 0
'Ch,t wei
number
fore ign I
rutIon IS ultimately reducible, by the doctrine of the "sensedata", essences of a special kind having a private nature
an~ dependent on the subject. The concept of material
object mdependent of the individual observer is a necessary characte~stic of experience directed at the external
world, the kmd of characteristic that can in no way be reo
duced to some ensemble of "sense data".
2. TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT
EMPIRICAL SUBJECT. THE CONCEPTION
OF SelF-CERTAINTY OF TRANSCENDENTAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AS GUARANTEE OF THE
OBJECTIVENESS OF KNOWLEDGE
su~jec~ 's
VI'"
is heed
lUte of I
Science!
coverj~
of cien
gy of
ICO," 0
that wei
number
foreign!
64
65
..
VI"
Is head
1Ute of
Science
coverino
of ICier
gy of
ICOres (
1hIt we
number
foreign
66
67
VI"
is head
lUte of
Science
coverif'lo
of tciel
'" of
IeOr" (
#lit w!
number
foreign
cr
both
In
diverse scient~~ d~lP~;:~t for Husserl is the circumFundamen. Y "?P transcendental reflexion that CODs~nce esta~hshed m . ed or intentionally directed~ as
SClousness ~s .fw:~~!~hing at some object. This object
Husserl pu I, a il be a mat'erial individual thing, it may
need not nfd::F!.e~ence'" "eidos", a universal, or acts of
itself. The objec\ t r;;.a y
't may not be real but mere Y Ima 1
'd"
~onsciousness, If transcendental, regex~on,~~~~;~e~y~s~~t
that are not related to a certam r:n a en
,
f. if f
t'
the nature of consciousness ltsel, , or
~~~c:n~~e object is the "eidos" of "perception in general" the act of perception in this case may ~?t ac~:!J,
exist' as a subject of reflex ion but b,e merel~ ImaglD
in the free variation in fantasy of various cOl?les ?f perce~
tion associated with the meanin,g of pe,rceptlon l,n gener, '
In this case the act of percep~lOn, bemg an object dof
tentional analysis, is irreal, while the act of transcen . en
reflex ion directed at this object, pertains to the r,e~l!ty of
consciousness, continues HusserL Thus, the posslbillty of
real or irreal existence obtains not only fo~ such ,obJects
as material bodies but also for such pot~ntlal objects of
transcendental reflex ion as acts of consciousness. As for
the "eidoses" that are either included among the material bodies or else are fonnal (logical and mathematical)
"eidoses" 'or tl\e "eidoses" of consciousness itself, ~hey
have a special ideal existence in transcendental consclOUSness [or as distinct from the real events which "happen",
"eid'oses:' cannot "happen": their existence is inseparable [rom the existence of transcendental consciousness
itself. It is important, according to Husserl, that consciousness is in any case objective, it is objectively oriented,
Each act of consciousness assumes the existence of two
poles, the intentional object of some kind and the subject
himself implementing the act of consciousness of "I" the
ego, The object lies outside consciousness fo~ it is t;anscendental relative to the intentional act ~nd at the same
time it is in another respect immanent to consciousness for
it is assumed or "imagined" by consciousness while'the
question of the existence of reality corresponding to the
~~~~i~:Sness
eg:<~~~;,er~l~h:n~c:~~f
68
VII(
is head
1LIte of
Science
coveril'l<
of ICier
gyo!
lCOfes (
1hIt W!
number
foreign
tion underlie knowledge 3.!ld ex;pe~ien ce .. That knowled . the most adequate which c Oincides wIth absolute refle~~~ absolute self...co~ition , that is. the kind of k~owl.
ed e w'hich knows that It )mo ws, b~mg fully cogruzant
ofgboth its own object and Its own bemg and ~hose pr~ce.
dures by which it is attained. Let us pay SpeCial attentIon
to this important point of transct:nden~al phenomenology.
Let us further single out certam traits of the Tran scen.
dental Ego as Hussed understands it. It I?u~ not ~e viewed
kind of supraindividual essence umfymg various con~~e~e consciousnesses and , still less, different corpore~ in.
dividuals (the way Hegel presents the Absolute Subject).
Of course, at the level of transcendental. reflexlon
directed at the Transcendental Ego, Husser! behe.ves., ~here
is no question of diffe.renc~ between concre~e mdlvlc;tual
consciousnesses (and 10 thIS sense no q~estl(:m of d~ff~
renee between "me" and "thou"), for 10. this case. It IS
a matter of finding the "eidos" of .consciousness Itself.
But the main thing, from the standpomt of tran~endental
phenomenology, is that the Transcendental E~o IS i:tasped
as a result of a definite type of my reflexlOn drrected
at my own consciousness. The Transcendental Ego proves
to be the deep formative basis of my consciousness and,
consequently, the basis of myself. The ordinary language,
which is in the power of the "natural" attitude, H usserl
believes, is capable in this case, too, to lead into error,
for I can speak of "myself" as of a concrete corporeal
individual, with a characteristic figure, gait, facial
expression, as of the unique individual life of consciousness with its unique "biography", a specific attitude to it s
past and future, and finally as the supreme instance of all
cognitive activity and of all intentions, th at instance which
~xists. before any individual p~ychological biography (and
m thIS sense before any indiVidu al "I") and at the same
time underlies it. It is this supreme instance that is t he
Transcendental Ego which, as is clear from the above is
also I myself residing in me, not somewhere else. There is
no a~cess to the Tra~scendental Ego other than through a
special type of analysIs of my own consciousness.
~t us now go back t? the assertion of the subjectobject structure of conS;Clous~ess-a thesis characteristic
of pheno.men?logy. The mt~nttonal object in Hussed's inu:r~retatlon IS not s0t:nethmg ephemeral and urel indiVidual (as 'st
we have
mdicated
already ,
that
.Ps t heway
y
.
.
.
.
I
p h enomen al I empmcists mterpret such "spe . 1 b' t"
of consciousness as "sense data") fo r it is ~la 0 Je~ s
"on the horizon" of some "eido~" or other W<l:~h gl~~n
framework of certain essential, necessary obje~t~~ru~ure~
..
70
VIa<
Is head
tute of
Science
coveril')
of scier
gyof
ocores c
that we
number
foreign
1ft
72
73
VI"
is head
alta of
Science
coverio
of seier
gy of
scores (
that we
number
foreign
rual
.of
74
VI.
is heac:
1Ute of
Scienci
coverin
of sciel
fNo!
ICOres
th.t
WI
premises of transcendentalism in
a::K
~~~v~~~ t~~a~e
76
VI"
is head
tute of
Science
coverin
of sciel
gy of
ICQres (
that
Wt
number
foreign
However, can one remain in the framework of transcendentalism without claiming to deduce the substantive dependences of knowledge from the fact of self-consciousness <41 am I"? In this case the philosopher is forced to set
himself the task of establishing the conditions of the possibility of knowledge by logical analysis, by breaking
down and making a preparation of knowledge that actually
exists and is recorded both in the truths of everyday consciousness and in the propositions of the special sciences.
Clearly, in t his approach to knowledge, the relation between knowledge and self-consciousness has to be understood in a way different from that of Husser! and Fichte.
This possibility was realised in Immanuel Kant's "critical" transcendental epistemology. 69
Kant does not at all discuss the question "Is knowledge
possible?", and in this his philosophy differs significantly
from, let us say, that of Descartes. One of the fundamental
premises of Kantian epistemology is that knowledge is not
only possible but also real, it actually exists. In other
words Kant faces the fact of knowledge, as neo-Kantians
later put it. He believes this knowledge to be expressed
78
79
VI.
is head
!Ute of
Scienct
coyer;n
of sciel
g; of
scorel (
that Wf
number
foreign
t? the
VI ..
is head
tLlte of
Sciena
coverin
of sciel
!IV of
ICOres (
that W f
number
foreign
~ubject
b,?pres-
0:
namely "internal experience is itself ~ossible only mediately ar:d through external experie nce". 4
Kant regards this conseq uence as a direct refutation of
"the problematical idealism of Des Cartes, who admits the
undoubted certainty of only one empirical assertion (assertio) to wit, I am".75 Idealism "assumed [writes Kant]
that the only immediate experience is interna1, and that
from this we can only infer the existence of external things.
But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects
to determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much
haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause
of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we
ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows
that external experience is properly immediate, that only
by virtue of it- not, indeed, the consciousness of our own
existence, but certainly the determination of our existence in time, that is, internal experience is possible.,,76
From Kant's viewpoint, that means that where it is a
question of concrete individual consciousness, of the subjective, we cannot regard it in the spirit of Husserl as "pure
consciousness" but must necessarily correlate it with
those processes which are implemented by material objects
or bodies. True, Husserl a1so speaks of the need for correlating any subjective act with the object at which this act
is directed. But Husserl speaks only of the intentional
object, that is, the object which exists in the framework
of transcendental consciousness and does not have to be
real. In principle, therefore, Husserl does not go beyond
the boundaries of the Cartesian position at this point.
Kant's approach to the problem is fundamentally different:
the consciousness of self, the "internal sense", must be
mediated by the consciousness of external objects, of real
material things. Kant certainly realises that not always
does representation of external things signify their actual
existence, as the facts of illusions, hallucinations etc. show,
that is, precisely those facts which form the starting point
of the assertions of Husserl and Descartes on the "certainty" of t he givenness of consciousness to itself and the
"uncertainty" of t he givenness of external objects to consciousness. But Kant writes that the illusions, hallucinations etc. "are themselves created by the reproduction of
previ~us external perceptions, which ... are possible only
through the reality of external objects ... Whether this or
that supposed experience be purely imaginary, must be
discovered from ~ts parti~u l 3! determinations,. and by
comparing t hese WIth the cntena of all real expenence."7 7
Now what has Kant succeeded in showing? First, that
empiric~ selfconsciousness (the "inner sense") necessarily
83
VI.
is heac
1IJte of
SciencE
coverin
of sciel
gy of
ICOres I
that
WI
numbel
fore ign
thi
fu
to
~~i
~K~~~~n~~!led~e
~h~r~r~l~l~
~;~~~gs~~!"
tC~~
. us ant separates thinki WI not be cognition
:ousness from knowled e ng from cognition and conknPrelsseds an act of self_~onscT~e proposition "I think"
ow e ge, for the b
lousness B t h
.
ing ego is not . 0 )ect correspond . u t at IS not
transce~dental a gIven in. any experie mg to it, the thinkitself. It can onfP~ceptlOn cannot ~ce. The subject of
ly hinted at:" thise th?ug~t of or so~~e the object of
...
uruty IS nothin
ow symbolical84
g more than the unity
in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the Gategory of substance which always presupposes a given intuition-canno t be applied. Consequently,
the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates
these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the
categories ... 7 9
It is important to' note that the Transcendental Ego
which, in Kant's view, underlies the whole experience,
cannot be directly grasped in the framework of his system.
Kant merely suggests that we logically deduce it as a kind
of otherwoll:dly entity of a "thing-in-itself".
Even if empirical reflexion (the subjective unity of selfconsciousness) is not, from Kant's standpoint, knowledge
in its own right, since its objects, given in the internal
sense, are devoid of a number of traits of real objects with
which external experience deals, transcendental reflex ion
(the transcendental unity of self-consciousness) is not
regarded as knowledge at all. (Let us recall that for Husserl
it is precisely transcendental reflexion that is an expression
of "absolute knowledge".) According to Kant, the Transcendental Ego is absolutely outside experience. As for
empirical self-consciousness, that is merely the Transcendental Ego appearing to the empirical subject as a
"thing-in-i tself". 80
This means in fact that Kant fails to substantiate knowledge through transcendental self-consciousness. He is
himself compelled to admit that there are no instruments
for passing on from the latter to the former within the
framework of finite, actually existing experience. Husserl's
method for implementing this transition through "direct
insight" into some "certainties" is unacceptable to Kant:
the Konigsberg philosopher believes that "certainty" in no
way ~arantees the actual existence of the corresponding
81
object.
"Deduction" of apriori forms of any knowledge from
the activity of the Transcendental Ego (Fichte's method)
is also impossible for him, for in Kant's view the ego as
the basis of lmowledge cannot be the object of experience and of knowledge, being a fundamentally extra-experiential "thing-in-itself". There can be even less possibility of substantiating knowledge through empirical (subjective) self_consciousness. The latter, as we know, implies
the existence of the world of material objects, and a knowledge of the~ is itself substant.iated thereby,. far from
being the bastS of knowledge. BeSIdes, the emplncal ego, as
Kant emphasises, cannot be a guarantee of the universality and necessity of the characteristics of any knowl85
VI~
is heac
.. te of
Sciena
coverin
of sciel
gy of
IeOres I
that WI
"umbel
foreign
i 0i
o
VIM
is head
lUte of
Scje~
coyerin
of sciel
gy of
ICOrel (
that
w(
number
foreign
tr.
~~~l~~~~~3!r~f
~f kn~!~e~~e~~~h ~e ss~~~
act~~~tt~t~lr~~ti~~teOfV:~:ksUbjfecHt outlined
VI.
is
heM
1IIte 01
Scieno
coverir
of scie
.. of
ICQrel
1hat
WI
numbel
foreign
universal standards can consolidate the illusion of independence of the spatial relations of objects from the subject
and its body, However, Husserl continues, the standard of
measurement is not only chosen as such by the subject but
is constituted in its spatial properties only through its relation to the subject's body, that is, through the "here/there" relation.
The "objectiveness" of space, he explains, "does not
lie in the independence of spatial meanings from the subject but in their equal repetitiveness. I can, in principle,
repeat the position which I onc,e assum~d relative to a
definite thing and then the spatIal meanmg of the latter
will be repeated. I can, in principle, repeat the position
occupied by another subject relative to some thing, and
then again the spatial meaning of the latter will be repeated. Objectiveness lies precisely in this repetition of meanings; it should be remembered,,~owever, that ~epetition of
meanings depends on the repetItIOn of the pOSItIons of the
subject. "8 3
As we see, from Husserl's viewpoint, "objectiveness" of
space assumes the existence of other empirical subjects and
my definite relation to these subjects. In general, the objectiveness of experience, Husserl indicates, implies its
intersubjectivity, that is, its universal significance for
all the other subjects.
But what does "another subject" mean?
Another subject, Husserl believes, is constituted in the
same way as the spatial dependences of experience are constituted by their relation to me, Among the bodies SUI
rounding me there are those that are similar to mine in
the mode of their functioning. If I were at the place w~ere
such a body is it might serve me and my conSCIOUS
intentions. (Thus the subject is for Husserl not just a body
of a special kind but a unity of conscious!1ess and corporeality.) In th is way, on the analogy WIt~ mysel,f, ,the
meaning of "another subject" is formed wh~ch, as dlstmc,t
from myself, is not given me directly but IS only constItuted by myself,
The body of another subject, on the one han~, belongs
to my world, for it is constituted by myself, while 0": the
other hand it belongs to the world of that other subject.
Therefore my world must coincide with his world. This
world, common to ourselves and ~l the ,?th~r sl:lbj~cts and
having a meaning common to all, IS the objectIve world.
In other words, the obj~tiven~ss of th~ \~o,rld consists, ~c
cording to Husserl, in Its uOlversal slgn~lcance, that IS,
in the universal meaning it has f<;>r any subject, rather than
in its independence from the subject.
91
VI.
is toIea<
tute 01
Scieno
coverir
of scie
gy of
IeOres
thlt WI
numbel
foreign
"here" meaning has sense only for that subject. At the same
time the meaning of "here" includes from the beginning' the' fact that it is "there" from another viewpoint
from another position, while "there" is that which exist~
outside the subject and its body. Therefore the reference
to the individual subject in the "here/there" relation
does not mean constituting that relation as depending on
the subject and its body but a realisation (with varying
degrees of clarity) of the incorporation of the empirical
subject in a certain network of objective spatial relations
appearing for it at the given point as the meaning of
"here".
Husserl shows the dependence of the relations
"above/below", "in fro nt/behind", "on the left/on the
right", etc. on my body and differences between its parts.
It can be conceded that these meanings have a certain
anthropomorphic colouring, implying as they do are
ference to the subject and the various parts of the subject's
body. However, the su bject 's body itself exists as a special
type of object for it only if it appears as included in an
objective network of relations, including spatial relations,
with other bodies, both material things and the bodies of
other subjects. For me to realise t he various parts of my
body (including those which I do not see under ordinary
conditions: face, head, back, etc.) as forming a certain
unity, belonging to one and the same object, I must
possess the faculty of perceiving my body from the outside, as it were, from the standpoint of another subject, that
is to say, as spatially localised and existing in certain
relations with other bodies. In other words, constituting
the "in front/behind" and other meanings already assumes
the existence for the subject of a definite network of
elementary objective spatial relations and is merely sup~r
imposed on this network, so to speak, far from determming the latter, as Husserl insists.
In other words the subject may conceive of itself as
being in the place 'of so~e other object.a~d ta~e this other
object. as a reference pomt for determmmg dIstance, e.g.,
for determining the "close/far" relations, only if it is simultaneously capable of conceiving of its body as replace
able by any other body as the determinant of spatial dependences.
.
. .
Husserl points to the connectIOn between the obJectivity of space and the possibility of repeating the position
taken up by t he subject relative to a certain thing. But the
conception of the possibility of repe~ting the subject's
spatial position already assumes the eXIstence for the subject of an objective network of spatial relations that lends
93
VI.
is hell
1Ute o
Scienc
coverir
of .:ie
gy of
leo...
'Ch,t w
numbe
foreign
not
94
work of his philosophy, the other subject cannot in principle be equipollent with myself, being ultimately constituted by myself, whereas I with my body am given to
myself directly and am the true starting point of constituting all the dependences of experience. An,d that r,n e3!ls
that the thesis of Husserl's philosophy of the mtersubjectlVity and universal significance of the world actually proves
to be fictitious, and that in the final analysis Husserl
cannot escape from the circle of solipsism which he himself drew.
5. THE INTERPRETATION OF COGNITION
AS CONDITIONED BY THE INDIVIDUAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND, AT THE SAME
'TIME, MYSTIFYING THE
ESSENCE OF THE LATTER, THE EGO,
"THE OTHERS", AND THE WORLD
OF OBJECTS
and Nothingness. 84
Let us point out from the beginning that epistemological problems the question of substantiation of knowledge, are not 'the f~cal points of Sart!e's analysis, al~hough
he offers his solutton of these questIOns. The relatton between subject and object is considered in his works within
the framework of a definite conception of consciousness
and man. But Sartre's interpretation of the relation between consciousness and knowledge is of interest for our
discussion.
The starting point of his cogitations is recognition of
the existence of two realities: of the objective material
95
vr.
is he,.
..... 0
Scienc
coverif
of scie
gyof
ICO'
"
1hat w
... mbe
foreign
of my body as a material object among other objects, connecting my definite experiences with processes in my bo~y
understood in this way. But the essence of the matter IS,
according to Sartre, that the individual's body. is not given
him in the basic primary experience as an object, and he
therefore cannot in principle connect any processes in
his consciousness with his body understood as an object
(he cannot in principle localise any sense perceptions,
e.g., the sensation of pain; he cannot associate his experiences with his own physical state, etc.). At the outset,
the individual is given only the world of external material
objects and himself as different from these objects, as consciousness, as Being For-Itself. To the extent in which experiences have a certain "density", they pertain to external
objects. For instance, if I sense resistance in acting upon an
external object, the resistance itself is not perceived as
connected with the action of my hand characterising my
subjective experience, one that is "in me", but as pertaining to the objective properties of the external objects
and expressing their traits, in this case the measure of their
resistance. Pain is not something localised in me either,
but that which expresses the properties of some objects
under definite circumstances. As for my body, in its
primary and basic sense it, first, determines the factuality
of my consciousness, that is, the concrete objective situation in which I find myself (in particular, it detennines
"where" exactly I am), and second, it functions as the
possibility and the mode of the activity of my consciousness, of Being For-Itself, essentially coinciding with the
latter. 85
Thus Sartre has an original conception of consciousness
which does not coincide with the widely accepted one.
Consciousness or Being For-Itself, writes Sartre, is not the
same as the psyche or the subjective world characterised
by certain processes, connections, dependences, complicated mechanisms special types of relations between conscious and uncon'scious phenomena etc., a world that is the
subject-matter of special studies in scientific psychology.
Consciousness, Being For-Itself, is in principle apsychological. The emergence of a special subje~tiv~ .wo!ld is,
according to Sartre, a consequ.ence of obJectlf~catIOn of
consciousness and expresses a dlstorted conceptIOn of the
basic and primary characte~istics of Being For-Itself ~nd at
the same time the ontological fact of the degradatIOn of
consciousness itself.
As we see far from relying on the assertions of scientific psychology, Sa~re endeav.ours to prove th~ dubi~ty
of some of its baSIC abstractIOns and assumptIOns. LIke
4 -763
97
VI,
b he.
"''".
Sc;:ienc
COYerj,
of sci!
"""
..
"'tw
!IV of
...mlle
foreign
ness, Being For-Itself, Sartre believes, is absolutely transparent, it is a complete vacuum which the inner eye pierces
without stopping anywhere or being reflected by anything.
Therefore self-consciousness, the relation of the subject to
itself which is characteristic of consciousness (and this
relation is continual ly realised, Sartre believes, for consciousness clearly distinguishes itself from the outset from
the world of things-in-themselves) is not reflexion. Consciousness is in principle pre-reflexive, in Sartre's view.
Reflexion emerges together with its object, the ego, and
in a certain sense produces the object itself. Sartre points
out the important fact which also played a fundamental
role in t he philosophical system of Fichte and which we
shall later analyse on the positive plane. The fact is .that individual refiexion aimed at consciousness does not simply
find before itself a ready-made object in the shape of the
ego and its states but, being an activity of a certain kind,
acts on its object, changes it, reconstructs and in a certain sense creates it.
For Fichte, this positing of oneself as the Absolute Subject in the form of one's own object was the kind of determination of the indeterminate which was not only
involved in the shaping of the ego and the contrapositing
of ego to non-ego but which also revealed the inner essence
of the Absolute Subject. For Sartre, the positing of the ego
as the object of reflex ion and the coming of the latter on
the scene does not in any way reveal the nature of consciousness. Moreover, Sartre believes that at the stage of reflexion the purity of consciousness is distorted and consciousness itself degraded. At the same time, according to Sartre
(and here there is another difference between him and
Fichte), there is no Transcendental or Absolute Ego, the
ego can only be empirical, expressing as it does the unique
traits of the given individual person distinguishing him
from all the other egos. Let us note that consciousness,
Being For-Itself, is, according to Sartre, also individual in
a sense, so that different empirical subjects have different
consciousnesses. However, if the ego expresses a certain
density, a unity of an individual biography, and the subject's personal traits, consciousness or Being For-Itself is
in itself empty and impersonal. Therefore different
consciousnesses differ from each other merely as different
centres of free activity, as structureless points of activity
included in different factual situations. Of course, in our
experience we distinguish between consciousnesses on the
basis of their connections with different individual egos.
But this differentiation does not characterise the metaphysical distinctions between consciousnesses, 50 to speak.
99
VI.
Is he"
"'to
Scienc
coverit
of scie
gyaf
-'"
that w
...mbe
tor.tun
VI.
.....
_..
tI he..
Selene
ClCWerj,
of tcit
OVof
1ho, w
num..
foreign
relati~m is
V"
is he.
lUte 0
Scienc
coveri!
of tcil
gyof
_os
....'w
... mbo
foreign
~~---- -
Vb
is hea
.. teo
Scienc.
coverj
of scit
gyof
_es
'that w
numbe
foreigr
the act of elementary reflexion emerges, consciousness already distinguishes itself from the world of external
objects, elementary cognitive experience being expressed
in the intentional orientation at the latter. As this starting
point of Sartre's analysis lacks substantiation, his conception as a whole proves to be basically defective.
We have no grounds for distinguishing self-consciousness pertaining to "pure", non-objectified consciousness,
from ordinary reflexion aimed at the individual ego as an
object. In any case, the experience of the consciousness
of an adult gives no grounds for this differentiation.
(The facts of the development of the child's psyche will
be discussed somewhat later.) Moreover, the very emerg
ence of consciousness as a unified centre of psychic life,
as a certain individuality distinguishing it from other consciousnesses, implies that its states are related to the activity of a certain object that is my body (though not identified with this activity). The very differentiation between
consciousnesses, the possibility of their individuation,
assumes their correlation with the bodies of different subjects included in objective relations with other things.
Sartre agrees that distinguishing myself as the ego from
the others implies a relation to myself as an object of a
special kind connected with other material objects and
other egos appearing before me as other objects. In his
view, however, the true individuality of my consciousness
is not expressed in the ego but in the very fact of the existence of a pure stru~tureless pOint-Being For-Itself.
But pure con:OClOusness as something absolutely empty
and ~ontent1ess mdeed proves to be "nothingness", though
not m the sense of Sartre, who not only ascribes abso.
lute eI?ptiness to ,con~iousnes~ but interprets it at the
same tIme as a speCIal kind of bemg, as a metaphysical real.
ity, as a centre of activity: it proves to be "nothingness" in
the se,nse of absolu~e fiction, Structureless and con tentless
?onS~OU,8ness de'Y0I~ ?f a~y properties or qualities cannot
10 pnn~lple ,be md~~lduallsed. Consciousnesses interpret.
ed as nothmgness must merge, they must be "gl ued
106
together", But in this case Sartre's fundamental philosophical premise falls-the assumption of uniqueness of
separate consciousnesses, of the impossibility of one con
sciousness penetrating another,
Let us consider in this connection the development of
child psychology, which provides additional arguments for
a critical evaluation of Sartre's conception,
As we have seen, consciousness distjnguishing itself from
the external world is, according to Sartre, the starting
point of experience which does not as:oume a ~elation of
consciousness to other persons and theIr conSC10usnesses,
But there are grounds to believe (and psychological data
confirm this opinion) that the individual who does not
treat himself as an object of a special kind included, on
the one hand, in the world of material objects and, on the
other in the world of interpersonal relations, does not possess ~onsciousness and self-consciousness, that is, simply
does not distinguish himself from the rest of reality, But
that means also that cognitive experience itself is not in
this case ful ly endowed with the features of unity and con
tinuity which Kant believed, with every justification, to
be indications of its objectiveness,
Indeed objectiveness of experience implies that the
subject i; at least capable of distinguishing those of its
features which are produced by the action of the external
objects themselves from those which are caused by the
subject, that is, those which are conditioned, o~ the, one
hand , by changes of its position relative to certam o.bJects
(its movement, changes in viewpoint, the perspective ,?f
perception, etc,), and on the other hll?d, by cha~es m
the states of consciousness, But the eXlstence of thIS faculty in the subject means that he can conceive of ,himself as a special object possessing consciousness, that IS, he
can perform an act of elementary self-cogni~ion, It also
means that to the extent in which self-conSCIOusness and
self-cognition are absent in the subject (and there are no
grounds for distinguishing between them, as we ha~e
endeavoured to show), cognitive experience cann~t retam
its unity and continuity, that is, it cannot be VIewed as
fully objective,
,
Jean Piaget whose works on the psychology of mtellectual develop~ent and genetiC epistemology were discussed
in the first chapter, singles out different stages in th,e
development of the child's cognitive, structure on th,e b.asls
of the results of experimental studIes, At the begmmng,
at the stage of the so-called sensori-motor intellect, the
child is absolutely unconscious of itself as an object and,
consequently, as a subject, For this reason the objects sur107
VI<
b he,
.... 0
Sc:ienc
coveril
of sci(
<z,of
ICO",
.... tw
...mbo
foreign
At the same time it would be quite wrong to interpret the characteristics of the initial stages of intellectual
development established by Piaget as a kind of "experimental confirmation" of the proposition of philosophical
subjectivism that what is given to the subject initially is the
subject himself and the states of his consciousness, and
not the world of objective things. The subject is from t he
very beginning of the development of the psyche objectively included in definite relations with external objects and
other men. Although subjectively these things do not
initially appear before him as objects, and other persons
as subjects, only a knowledge of the development mechanisms of these objective relations, in which man is included
immediately after birth, enables one to explain the development of consciousness. As for the form in which the
subject perceives the objective relations indicated here, its
knowledge cannot by itself explain the nature of the succes
sive changes of the cognitive structures. On the contrary,
the subjective form itself can and must be explained from
the system of objective relations. Finally let us point out
that at the initial stages of intellectual development the
subject is not given either the world of objects or the
subject himself, the states of his consciousness. Therefore
that picture of the initial cognitive relation which philo
sophical subjectivism outlines is completely at variance
with the actual data of cognitive experience.
Piaget shows that the development of cognitive structures from non-reversible to reversible intellectual operations
(see Chapter 1) includes a change in the child's psychological relations with adults. At the initial stage these structures are "centred", that is, they offer no possibility for
distinguishing between the immediately given standpoint
and the objective relations of things. "Centring" necessarily implies also that imitation of the adult, who appears as
an absolute authority, is the main mechanism of the child 's
involvement in socio-cultural experience. The stages of
cognitive development characterise the phases of consecutive "decentring" of the intellectual structures, that
is, achieving the view of oneself from the outside, as it
were. But simultaneously that means a change towards
complete reversibility of relations with adults. In other
words, the child begins to treat the adult as in principle his
equal, as another subject. The adult's authoritarian pressure gives way to intellectual exchange and cognitive cooperation. It therefore becomes possible for the child to treat
himself fully as an ego, that is,
'.
other.
of intellecThus what Piaget calls
tual operations necessarily
reflexive
109
VI,
is hea
W.. 0
Scienc
coveri
of $Cil
gyof
ICC'"
that w
numlle
foreigr
relation to himself.
The fundamental features of the emer~ence of individ_
ual reflexion were formula~d. on .the phIloso~hical plane
by Marx: "In a sort of wa.y, It IS wIth man as ~Ith commo_
dities. Since he comes mto the .world nel~er with a
looking glass in ~is h~d.' nor as a F~chtean philosopher, to
whom 'I am l' IS suffICIent, man fIrst sees .and recognises
himself in other men. Peter only establIshes his own
identity as a m~ by first comparing h~mself with Paul as
being of like kind. And thereby Paul, Just as he stands in
his Pauline ~rsonality, becomes to Peter the type of the
genus homo. "91
Thus the subject's relation to himself as the ego is neces
sarily mediated by his relation to another. Reflexion
is not born as a result of the inner needs of "pure", isolated consciousness, as Descartes, Fichte, and Husserl
believed, but in interpersonal relations, as a complex
product pf the development of a system of communications. At the same time it would be wrong to interpret
the words of Marx quoted above in the sense that the
individual first recognises the other as a subject, another
ego, and only after that begins to treat himself as a subject,
on the analogy of that other. In actual fact there is mediation of dual kind: the individual not only perceives himself
o.n the analogy with the other-he perceives, at the same
tune, the other on the analogy with himself. In other
words, t~e ego and another ego emerge simultaneously and
necessarily presuppose one another. This fact is, by the
way, clearly recorded in Piaget's studies.
Let us emphasise that we use in this context only
experimen.tal facts obtained by Piaget, and certain concrete
Psych~logIcal generalisations. As for the general epistemologl~ and ~sychological conception of that author,
~cordmg to WhICh the development of intellectual operabonal. structures is detennined by inner "spontaneous"
~atu~~ of the subject's schemes of acti~ty its substanlYe cn lque was given in the first chapter.
'
f ~~ us also.~ote that the theory of gradual "de-centring"
~orkse r:;,~~ltIV: t!tructures developed in Piaget's latest
con.fused with his early propositions
concemin s theO
al "egoCe~trism~.v~rc~hmg of the child's initial intellectuthat the thesis ab m
course .of development. We know
by the Soviet s ~ht I e~ocentnsm" was sharply criticised
reproached Pi~it f~r ~~st ~. S. Vygotsky.92 He correctly
?f the investigation: the ~Ji~~ ~ongly the starting point
~nvolv~d in the system of sociai re~ ~nly gradu~y beco~es
mg hIS cognitive instruments .atIthns , essentIally mOdIfym e process. Vygotsky
..e
110
51
... -""
Vil
is hea
...'" 0
Scienc:
coveri
of scil
gy of
ICOrel
th.t ....
numb!
foreigr
The subjective experience expressed in the act of self-consciousness and self-cognition is different from the objective experience pertaining to the world of external objects.
But t hese are not simply two series of experience existing
independently from each other and following parallel
paths, as it were. A3 we hav~ tried to show, both o~ th~se
series presuppose and medIate one another. Subjective
experience only becomes possible as a result of a relation
to oneself as an object induded in the network of objective relations with things and other persons, In their turn,
the external things emerge before the subject as a world of
objects independent of him and of his consciousness only when the first elementary act of self-consciousness
appears.
The subject realises not only his inclusion in an objective network of relations but also the uniqueness of his
own position in the world. The latter manifests itsel!. first,
in his body occupying a place in the system of spatIo-temporal connections which is not taken up by any other
subject, and second, in the fact that only he has "inner
access" to his own subjective states, The objective fact of
the uniqueness of this position, just as the subjective
realisation of this fact, is assumed by the very structure of
experiential knowledge (any attempt to apply theor~tical
knowledge to the description of the data of expenenc:e
also assumes this fact). As we have seen, however, thls
circumstance has nothing to do with "centring" the world
around the individual subject, a thesis which Husserl
endeavoured to substantiate in his later works.
Let us note in this cOlUlection that some epistemological
conceptions of the empiricist variety current in modem
bourgeois philosophy, criticising the Cartesian thesis ("I
exist" as the supreme substantiation of any knowledge),
often deny any serio us cognitive significance t~ t~e act of
individual self-consciousness. Thus A: J. Ayer mSIsts t~at
the proposition "I exist" does not m ~act say anthm~
about me , being devoid of any content! It d?es not Identi
fy me with any object (Ayer stresses III thlS respect that
this assertion is different from the statement that there
exists a person of such and such a sort), The utterance "I
exist", the English empiricist believes, may be likened to
simply pointing to an individual object withou~ words.
This pointing, as we know, does not carry any mformation. Besides, he believes that there can be knowledge that
is not accompanied by self-consciousness. 95
But self-consciousness, as we have endeavoured to show,
is impossible without reference to oneself as a definite
object possessing specific unique characteristics and in113
VI.
is hel
.... e
Scienc:
coveri
of scil
gy of
_os
"'t
numtM
\'I
fortig,
eluded in a netwo.rk of obj~ctive relations. The act of individual self-consclOusness Itself can only emerge due to
the existence of certain meaningful dependences of expe.
rience (subjectively one may not, of course, be immedi_
ately aware of all these dependences, but implicitly they
are always present). The relation to oneself as the ego thus
includes a whole system of connections of knowledge. Descartes, Fichte and Husserl.wcre therefore righ~ in ~sserting
that the act of self-consciousness and reflexlOn Implicitly assumes the fundamental characteristics of knowledge.
Their error lay elsewhere: in the attempt to interpret the
specificity of knowledge and of the cognitive process by
analysing the act of reflexion, a "pure" self-conscious ego.
The real dependence is directly the reverse: the emergence of the ego and of its self-consciousness and reflexion
must be understood as a result ! of the format ion of cognitive experience, as a consequence of the development of
definite objective relations of the given subject to the
world of material objects and other persons.
The fundamental error of transcendentalism and subjectivism lies in their assumption that lmowledge of one's
own existence is more indubitable than knowledge of the
existence of the external world. In reality, the most elementary act of self-consciousness always implies recogniti?n of the world of external objects independent of conSCIousness and cormected by stable relations.
Thus . th~ attempts to substantiate lmowledge undertaken WIthm the framework of philosophical subjectivism
an~ t~ ~terpret cognition as determined by the structur~
of mdividual consciousness, could not in principle be suc
cessful.
. That do.es not. me~ that the adherents of the conceptions consIdered m thlS chapter have not established any
re~ facts abou~ the cognitive relations of subject and
?b)ect. In our cntical analysis we have pointed to the most
~po~t of these facts. Summing up what has been said
m thl~ chapter,. we can say t~at philosophical su bjectivists
explOlt fo r the!! p.urposes, first, the specificity of the natu:e and func~lOrung of the subject's consciousness (the
eXlste!lce of dn ect "inner access" to the states of one's
conscIOusness,. se!f-consciousness as the necessary feature of the ?bJectlveness. o~ experience, etc.) and, second,
the no~m~tlye c~aract:enstlcs existing in any knowledge.
Idealistic luggling.~lth.thes~ facts of cognition and with
the real prob~ems ansm~ In epIstemological research makes
~ adeq~ate m~rpretat~on .o.f th~ cognitive relation impos~Ible .. Philosophical subjectiVISts mevitably find themselves
In blInd alleys because of the very mode of specifying the
114
Part Two
THE MARXIST APPROACH: COGNITION
AS SOCIALLY-MEDIATED HISTORICALLY
DEVELOPING ACTIVITY
OF REFLECTION
VI,
Is hea
.... e
Sciellt
cover;
of .:iI
gyof
teo,..
1hIt~
IKImb<
fore tor
IS a .
. a special type, and explanation
e .t
Pio~e:les requrres substantive additions to the
pIS e~~ oglc conc~p.tion propounded by pre. Marxian
matenahsm, .the addltl~:mS being of a kind to radically
d the
transform thIS conception without taking t b
framework of materialism b t l eyon .
it more flexible and
u , ~:m the contrary, makmg
is, dialectical.
at the same hme more consistent, that
The task that we shall here tt
demonstrate the fruitfulne
~mpt to solve will be to
cognition the cognitive rei\? t e mode of interpreting
the object, which is sugge~e~Ob ~tw~n the subject and
ophy. Our goal is to outline ( Y arxIst-~~ninist philostical materialism, the Princi' J0":l th~ pos!hons of dialec
on the one hand of th
p dIrections m the solution
history of Philo;OPhicalili~~~~lems hat emerged in th~
questions actively discussed in c ' an . on the other, of
o~ment of modem SCience, the ~~~~c~on with the develscientology, and logical and method~l ~taal of p~ychology,
oglc studIes.
116
)(
Chapter 1
REFLECTION.OBJECTRELATEO
PRACTICAL ACTIVITY
ANO COMMUNICATION
VI.
is he,
.... e
Scief\(
coveri
of sci.
lIVof
ICOt es
....t~
101mb!
foretg t
Jr/
VI,
I
.n<
eri
sci,
o!
'--
VI.
is hell
1IItee
Scien<
coveri
of sci~
gy of
ICOres
that Yo
numb<
foreigr
VI,
is het
IUtee
Seienc
COYerj
of scil
lIVof
- ..
that
\1\
... mll<
for,ta l
124
ings which cannot in principle be incorporated in a sensuous texture and cannot therefore be sensually perceived.
These referential meanings are reconstructed by a special
type of thinking, one that consciously operates with abstractions.
The limitations of. perception arising from its distinctive
properties (the subjective immediacy, the unconscious
nature of interpretation) are the source of possible contradictions between perception and understanding of the
object (it would be more precise to say, between two
different levels of understanding-in terms of perception "\
and of abstract thinking). Thus the moon is perceived as J
a disc some 30 cm in diameter at a distance of about a
kilometre and a half. All humans apparently perceive the
size of and distance to the moon in an approximately the
same way, erring by a factor of one million. Such examples
are numerous.
In this context, however, it is more important to stress
the similarities rather than the differences between perception and thinking, those similarities which permit to refer
to the fonner as a kind of "visual thinking", an activity
of solving tasks in object recognition.
The Marxist epistemological position is opposed to both
metaphysical materialism and gnoseological empiricism,
which in its fully developed form inevitably becomes
subjectivist and idealistic. It is at the same time interesting
to compare this position with the transcendentalist interpretation of cognition.
\
We recall that, according to Kant and Husserl, cognition }
never deals with subjective perceptions but with objects
(it is a different question how the objects themselves are
understood, what ontological status is ascribed to them by
these philosophers). Let us note, though, that for Husserl,
the intentional object which may in certain cases coincide
with the real one is' given immediately, with apodictic
certainty and kno'wledge of that object cannot in principle be a r~sult of the subject's constructive activity (the act
of intentional orientation at the object is, according to
Husserl, the act of grasping some certainty). :rhe theoretical objects with which science deals are not, In fact, genuine from the standpoint of phenomenology, they do not
characterise adequate knowledge but merely play the role
of auxiliary conceptual constructions. Kant's position on
this point appears at first glance essentially different. Kant
insists that the object given in experience, and knowledge
of that object, are in fact a result of the creative activity
of the Transcendental Subject, a product or synthesis of
perceptions. Let us observe, however, that for Kant, too,
125
VI,
is
he~
'n"
kien(
COYerj
of sci.
lIVof
ICOres
1h.t
VI
numb!
forejgr
VI.
It he.
.... ,
Sciel"ll.
coveri
of scil
gyof
ICOra,
...t VI
...mll<
foretgr
?f
re~l
.
mencan
psycholOgist,
h as perfor:r e? the followmg experiment Three peepholes are
~a e:c~n oaf St~~~ thro~~ whi~h on~ can look with one eye
of them is percei::do l'Jts dlSpl~yed in the distance. Ea~h
But when we 1 k u~ er the gIven conditions as a chalr.
angle we discov~~ t a the three objects from another
a chair. The other t : at only one of the objects is ind~d
can nevertheless prod are ettremel y str~ge objects WhIChe
projection on the retin~c~s rom a c~rtam angle the s.am
is not even one coherent a .real chau. (One of the objects
tended in front of a ba ~~]ect but a variety of wires exwe took to be the seat ~f t~~P 0t:l which is painted what
chairs which we see in this e ch.au.) T~us only one of t~e
xpenment lS a real chair, while
128
,..",
129
VI;
is hea
"'te,
Scienc;
coveri
of scil
gyof
ICO'"
that VI
numb<
f oreigr
130
of the image
of a' head turned inside out e. g., 01 thelOner
f
sur I ~ce 0 a castmg mould or of a plaster mask. Such an
illUSIon expresses n~t only the weakness but also the
st~n~h of perceptIOn. The perception hypothesis in
pnnclple behaves m the same way with regard to sensory
"facts" as theory with regard to the facts of science.
However, ~he replacement of one perception hypothesis
by another, IS, as ~ ru~e, a more difficult matter, than the
replacef!1ent o.f sCientific theories or even paradigms, for
perceptIOn ~bJecthypotheses are too intimately conne~
ed WIth ordmary human practice. In this connection the
problem of perception of unusual objects arises whi~h is
particularly acute today when man has created a world
o~ supercomplex technical apparatus often behaving
d!-fferently from the o~dinary bodies of everyday expe
~ence. Let us emphasIse once again one of the most
Important features of the cognitive relation. On the one
hand, what is. g!ven to. the subject in the act of cognition is
the. really eXlStl':lg ~bJe~t and. not his own subjective sensa~IOns. T~~ ob}eC~lVe 1l"':l~e 15 not realised as a specific
~hmg requmng special actIvity of objectification or project
mg for its correlation with the external object. On the
other hand, cognition necessarily assumes a realisation of
the difference between the subject and the object cognized
and, consequently, a realisation of the difference between
the objective image belonging to the subject and the actual
o~~ect ~tsel~. True, under ordinary conditions, when cog
mtIOn IS duected at the external object rather than the
subjective world, the realisation of the subjective relevan
ce of the objective image belonging to the subject is, as it
were, at the periphery of consciousness, while the centre
of the consciousness field is occupied by the real world of
external objects. In this case, the objective image is "transparent", as it were, to the object presented in it. However,
even when consciousness is oriented at the world of one's
own inner experiences (and that orientation is secondary,
derivative from the orientation at the external world), the
object (in this case the state of consciousness) and the
subject of cognition do not merge, being separate from one
another.
The subject may be involved in cognizing objects of
at least three kinds: objects external not only with regard
to his consciousness but also to his body; his own body
(reference here is to my body only, and not to the body
of another subject); and finally, his consciousness. Cognition which deals with the objects of the first kind is primary, basiC, and determining all the other types of knowl
edge. This cognition necessarily presupposes the presence
131
I
\
(
.I
VII
is he'a
lUte c
Scier1(
coveri
of sci!
gy of
ICOre.
1hat
VI
numbt
foreigt
ana
fr
133
VI.
Is he,
.... 0
that is, outside the subject's body: In any case. ,the process
of cognition, of conscious reflecti0!l o~ the obJ~c~, cannot
/" coincide with the process of creatmg It. (CognItIon itseU
is always creative in nature, b~t we h~ve ~ mind here only
the reproduction of the cogruzed object m the system of
knowledge and not its creation.)
Seien(
coveri
of scil
gyaf
ItOr"
tha,.
numb<
for.igr
r:
134
V I;
Is hea
"'Seier\(
to
0
COYeri
of lCi~
gyo!
ICOrel
'Chat VI
numb<
foreigr
appears before his eyes bu.t does n?t take into account
the object's movell?-ents gomg 0!l rIght befo~ his eyes.
The object is a reallty for the chil~,. but a. reahty at a definite place in the presence of a deftnIte acbon.
At the fifth stage (between the end of the first and the
middle of the second year) t~e child ~iscov~rs new patterns of action through active expen~entt~g. Actions
are performed involving the ':Ise of auxIh~ Implements,
the simplest instrumental actlOns. In searchmg for a Concealed object, the child begins ~. take i~to acco~nt the
consecutive movements of the VISIble object, Iookmg for
it in the place where it was hidd~n I.ast. .
.
Finally the sixth stage (begInnmg Wlth the mIddle of
the second year) signifies the transition from sensori-motor experience to imagining the results of the child's own
actions on the one hand, and to imagining objects and
their ~ovements, on the other. At this stage, the child
learns to take into account several consecutive movements
of the object in searching for it even though the object
is invisible during these movements (after being shown
to the child, it is moved in a closed fist or box),24
"Implicitly, perception models, in a way, reality both
present and future, and also the future states of the object
trasnformed by man,"25 points out A. M. Korshunov.
The works of Soviet researchers have shown that initially perception processes are formed and develop as integral components of practical activity, and the overall
effect of this activity as a whole consists in establishing
the features of the observed situation. The practical
object-oriented activity develops the operations of singling out and analysing the features of a thing. As the child's
activity becomes more complex and he faces more difficult cognitive tasks, the limitations of a purely practical
stU?y of the obj~ct and the need for special perceptive
actlOns come to light. However, perceptive actions too are
at ~he. fi~st ~tag~s externally similar to actions with things.
ThIS slmilan.ty IS observed even in the case of distant receptors WhICh do not come in direct contact with
things. 26
At the ~me time the realisation that cognitive norms
and <?perabo~ are f?rmed in the subject's practical activity With matenal objects is not enough to understand the
~ature and. mod~s of functiOning of the norms of cogni- 1
tion. MarxISt philosophy posits that practical activity itsel~ I'!lust be unders~o~ in its speCifically human characterist~cs,. ~mely, as J?mt or collective activity in which
136
137
Vb
is hea
.. tee
Scienc;
coveri
of x:i.
act~t~~
gy of
ICOres
that VI
numb<
foreigJ
138
Vh
is he.
.... 0
Sciel'l<
COYeri
of setl
gyof
IC'"''
..".t
\'I
numb<
fore;gf
- ~
. .-
VI.
is hea
.... c
$ciel'K
coveri
of lCi~
gy of
....,.
leO'"
numb<
forto r
u:
142
143
vr.
is hea
lUte 0
ScieO(
coveri
of sci,
gyof
ICOres
#lIt 11\
numb<
foreigr
_
.
144
III
V"
..... ,
is hea
$cieO(
coveri
of scil
gy of
scores
that
1ft
numb:
f oreigr
nar
146
VI,
II hel
..teo
Scient;
coveri
of lCil
IW of
- ..
tho . .
numb<
for.;g.
Ib
,.8
VI,
is hea
tute c
Sciel'l(
coveri
of scil
gy of
scores
that
VI
numbf
foreigl
kid
n s 01 ac IVI y are hnked together at th
. f th
formation of consciousness: external
e (:lUtset o. ' e
the process of cognition and
. practical actIVlty,
,mg one and the same objective
'
commulllcatl
t'
on, I n per f ormac lon, the subject simulta-
\
bU
150
1\
VI.
is he,
"'te,
Scient
coveri
of scil
gyof
"""
..
lhat.
numb<
foreigl
objectified fonn rather than the phenomena of consciousness taken by themselves, in which these referential meanings and standards appear transfonned, in hidden fonn, as
it were, and are not always sufficiently ap~arent, for the
subject himself, -This idea should be ~xplaJ..!led m sO,me
detail Let us note first of all that In eplstemologlcal
analy~is the process of co~rr~.unica,tion ,is not ,studied in
all its complexity and multIdImensionality: thIS task can
only be solved through coordination of the efforts of a
number of sciences, mc1udlO~ mfonna~lOn theory, semiotics psychology, psycholinguistics, social psychology,
sociology etc, In communicative activity, epistemology
singles otlt only that aspect which has a direct bearing on
it: reified, objectified, universaJ. nonns and standards of
( production and evaluation of knowledge, Strictly speaking,
\ epistemology does not therefore study the living process
of communication itself but some universal conditions of
its possibility relative to transmission of knowledge,
Inasmuch as these conditions are implemented in the
process of transmission itself, the latter provides empirical
data for epistemological analysis (that assumes, rather
than excludes, interaction between epistemology and the
specialised sciences studying both communicative processes and the mechanisms of cognition).
Let us further note that in the light of Marxist philosophy communication of knowledge presupposes objectification of knowledge not only in the form of texts or utterances but also of man-made objects carrying socia-cultural
meaning, Epistemology therefore must analyse objectoriented activity in the unity of its practical-transformative, cognitive and communicative functions as the
basis of the entire cognitive process. At the same t~e epistemology must conSider, without fail, the givenness of
referential meanings in consciousness, if only because
Object-related activity corresponding to some of the deeplying cognitive standards (in particular, perceptive objecthypotheses) has so far been quite inadequately studied
in science and we have no modes of establishing the content of these meanings other than through the data of
consciousness.
Thus Marxis~Leninist epistemology radically re-orientates the traditional epistemological range of problems
'- fundamentally' changing the m~de its.elf of specifying
and investigatmg them, The ~tartmg pomt of analysis of
cognition is understood as mvestigation of functioning
and development of systems of collective, inter-subjective activity, ~nd not as the stu~y of the relation of an
individual subject (whether organlsm or consciousness) to
153
152
"
VI,
is hea
... tee
Seiene
coveri
of scil
gy of
lCores
lhat ~
numb
foreigl
Chapter 2
THEORY AND THE WORLD OF OBJECTS
him:r
vrl
is hes
"'te,
Scien(
caved
of sci,
gy of
ICOre.
'Chat
'f1
numb
f oreigl
VI,
is hea
"'to
Scien<
0
coveri
of scil
SlY of
leo, "
that
numb:
foreig,
158
--V I>
is hea
tute 0
Scien(
caveri
. It
of scil
gy of
scores
that III
numb!
forei gl
160
16 1
VI,
is hea
. .. . 0
Scien(
cover j
of scil
gy of
ICOres
1h. t
numbf
f oreigl
162
V I<
is hea
lI.Ite '"
Sc:ien<
cover;
of scil
gy of
ICOrel
that VI
numb
1or8;gl
VI;
is hea
tIIte 0
Sc;el"l(
cover;
of scil
gy of
ICOres
Chit
111
... ml>
foreiQI
166
V I;
is hell
,,"'"
$ciel'\(
coyeri
of sci.
gy of
ICOres
th.t
11\
numb!
foreig l
169
VI;
is he!
.... ,
Sciet'K
coveri
of .:;:i
gy of
- ..
that
y,
numb
foreig'
- - -VI.
.". ,
is he,
Scienc
coveri
of sci
gy 01
ICOrel
th.t
numb
foreigJ
.- ..
Chapter 3
"ALTERNATIVE" WORLDS AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONTINUITY OF
EXPERIENCE
VI,
il hee
.... ,
Scierl(
cover;
of sci
1. OBJECTIVENESS OF KNOWLEDGE
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A GAP
BETWEEN PERCEPTIVE AND
CONCEPTUAL -SYSTEMS
flY 01
lCO,es
1h.t v
numb
foreigJ
Different things keep intruding on the field of my perception and passing beyond it. Objects may be given in
the experience of other men with whom I communicate
which are not given in my own experience. All these
facts, however, do not prove discreteness of experience.
Incorporated in the very mechanism of my perception is
the realisation that the object's existence is not discontinued simply because I cease looking at it. The objects of experience of one subject may simultaneously
or after some time become part of the experience of
another.
Objects which are not perceived by any subject at the
given moment also exist in reality. If some object disappears, if it ceases to exist, that happens only due to certain
events at a previous stage of experience. At the same time,
the disappearing object always leaves some trace, which
is expressed in the transformation of some objects into
others, so that there is a definite continuity of events and
processes relating to different stages of experience. The
realisation of the continuity of the objective processes to
which experience relates is not merely a product of interpretative reflexion, a result of reasoning, but a direct condition of the givenness of experience itself as a kind of
knowledge. In other words, the process of perception assumes the action of an amodal objective scheme of the
world, which makes possible the realisation of the independence of the objects from the act of their cognition
(see Chapter 1 of Part One). This scheme also underlies
scientific theoretical thinking which starts from the premise that the world of objects is independent from the
subject's cognitive activity. If there are gaps in experience,
we have every right to doubt its objectiveness, to suspect
that we deal with hallucinations, illusions, etc.
The question arises, however, whether we might not assume the existence of experience distinctly different from
ours iliat is, one that would relate to objects of an essentially different kind, so that there would be no direct
transition from one type of experience to another. That
would mean a gap between these two kinds of experience.
At the same time this experience of an unusual kind would
be quite nonnal al1:d objective, that .is, not o~ly inter~~ly
cohesive and contmuous but also mcluded m a deflmte
type of object-related practical <;lctivity-: true, an activity
different from ours. Such expenence mIght be characteristic of beings different from man (e.g., the inhabitants of
other cosmic worlds). Kant accepted this possibility, but
he believed this question to be insoluble, for any answer
to it involves going beyond the domain of human ex175
VI.
i, he2
..... c
Scient
coveri
of sci
IIY 01
ICOres
'Ch.t "
numb<
foreigl
'I
176
VI.
is he
'.It"'
Scienc
coveri
of sci
gy of
ICQras
that y
... mbo
foreigl
there is no geographical transplantation; outside the laboratory everyday affairs usually continue as before. Nevertheless, paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the
world of their research-engagement differently. In so far
as their only recourse to that world is through what they
see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution
scientists are responding to a different world. "61 Dif
ferent paradigms are mutually intranslatable and incommensurable with each other, asserts Kuhn. Adequate
communication between representatives of different par
adigms is impossible: the same words are given different
meanings. There exists a gap between the paradigms. 62
To substantiate the thesis of the possibility of different
conceptual and perceptive worlds, some theoreticians go
even farther than Kuhn in some respects, linking up these
worlds not only with certain theoretical systems but also
with the modes of dissecting the world which are embod
ied in everyday language. The American linguists Edward
Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, generalising the results of
ethnolinguistic studies (in particular, Whorf's studies in the
language of the Hopis, an Indian tribe) came to the conclu
sions fonnulated as the so-called hypothesis of linguistic
relativity, or the SapirWhorf hypothesis. (Kuhn mentioned
the influence of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis on the shaping
of his own conception.) According to this hypothesis, the
world we perceive and interpret is unconsciously built on
the basis of definite language norms. We break up reality
into elements in accordance with classification rules
(embodied in lexical units) and grammatical structures
inherent in the given language. Inasmuch as there are no
two similar languages, different societies may be said to
exist in different worlds. "We dissect nature along lines
laid down by our native languages," writes Whorf. "The
categories and types that we isolate from the world of
phenomena we do not find there because they sta.r:e
every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world IS
presented in a kaleidoscop~c flux of impressions which has
to be organized by our mmds--and thIS means largely by
the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up,
organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we
do, largely because we are parties ~o an agreement to
organize it in th~ ~ay ... ~e are thus mtroduced to a new
principle of relatlVlty, WhICh holds that all observers are
not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture
of the universe, unless their lin~istic ba,~kgrounds ~e
similar or can in some way be cahbrated. 63" Accordmg
to the 'hypothesis of linguistic relativity, different language
pictures of the world can implement different categorical
119
VI,
is
he~
.... ,
Scienc
coveri
of sci
gy 01
ICOras
that y
numb
foreigl
th
9u ine. started
out from the fact that there are alternfabve, Le., logically incompatible interpretations of a
ormal system.
'
For example, to define what kind of objects are nurnb~rs, ~~ mll:st give an interpretation of the fe nnal system
0. ant mebc t~at wO.uld satisfy the arithmetical opera~~R~ed~dw:~ 10 partI~ular, the primitive tenn 0 must be
t};e~bon S the application of which to
any element
ment Sn Two
~ gIVen system generates the next elemelo chose the v:~~0t"s If number are known. Ernst Zer{x]
for every x as sy cThs A as 0 and the singular class
respectively" ( ,I, [(xU, e a't~I\Ys 0, 1, 2, 3,,,. become
In Neumann's version th
' etc.
and the natural number' e er;npty class A is chosen as 0
ceding nurn bers that is
defmed as the class of aU precase, the numb~r 1 will 'be'
as x V {xJ ' In this
,)l
the number 3 , {tohe number 2- {0,1j ,
i.e.,
{I'll etc. 66 ,
,1,2,jor("PL
0:
f' \
180
{ar],ars
. . naturalist view of
the psyche and Ian
a behaVH:mnst,
a kind of fiction A~age. ~e belIeves consciousness to be
be described in' , I?syc ~cal phenomena may and must
higher nervo~s ~~~i~~leM In ~rms of the physiology of
world of consciousness' earungs ~ p~~nomena of the
do not exist. There are o~of a supra-IndiVIdual ideal world
ru~~s for "attaching" definite
language expressions ~
methods for transfonn' s un 1 of the given sort and
be inac~g some language expressions into
others. It
inte ur~te, however, to draw the conelusion that
believes ~70 s ~anfage as a purely formal
system. r
e ndamentally erroneous
:?i.
VI,
~
he,
IUtee
$cienl
coveri
of sci
gy 01
ICOres
th.t v
numb
foreigl
ft
182
VI
is hee
lUte'
Sciellt
CIOVer j
of sci
IIY 01
ICOres
'&hIt'll
.... mb
oforeigl
tribe speakin
c er .observmg the life of an unknown
at the very b~g~n:.ntIrely unfam~iar 13!lguage attempts
sions unrelated d'
to t.ranslate lOto hIS tongue expreshe will hardly su~~~el ~~t.h what is given in experience,
. at much is obvious. Indeed, he
184
VI
is he.
",,"
Scieo.
coveri
of sci
gy 01
lCores
1het \I
numb
foreig
wJt
'f
186
VI
is he,
.... ,
Scieno
cove,
of sci
gy 01
ICOres
thot,
numb
forei{l
Ib
188
VI
is he.
"'t8 (
Scien.
coveri
of sci
gy
0'
teOTa!
lhat
II
numb
foreig
VI
is hel
1Ute (
Scie,..,
cove<
of sci
flY 01
ICOt el
th.t ~
numb
f oreig
SUe
"
,~
--763
193
"-------~ -
VI
Is he
tute,
Scien
c;:over
of ..
gy 0
..."
1I>at
numl
fort il
or
194
'
. .,
VI
I, he
....
Scien
COY"
oI sc
..."
gy 0
Ihot
numl
foreit
196
197
VI
is he
...te j
Scien
cove,
of ..
gy
teO,.
"'at
numl
foreil
OJ
198
d'
direct~d
langu~r~~~f~~~~~ii~~rl~~~e~~~~diff~!.
199
VI
is he
lUte
Scien
""""
ofsc
!IV 0
100,.
thot
num!
foreij
I
and 'green'. The word qwyrdd also refers to that part
of the spectrum which we call green... And in the language of one of the Negro peoples living in Liberia, all
colours of the rainbow are designated by two words only:
one refers to the colours which painters call 'wann' (red,
orange, yellOW, etc.), and the oth~r, 'cold ' (blue, viol.et,
etc ).,,78 Inasmuch as language is drrectly conne~ted WIt~
thought not only serving as a means of expressmg cogOltive stnlctures evolved in object-related practical activity
before language but also creating for the first time the
possibility of the emergence of new cognitive structures,
it may be assumed that th.e d.ifference. between .the g~~
matical and lexical means mdlcates a dIfference In defiOlte
cognitive schemes (although these diff~rences do n?t
involve the principal schemes of reasoOln~ expressed In
language universals). One may even go still further, asswning that the difference in langua~e structu~s det~r.
mines to some extent the difference 1!1 pe.r~ept~on .. It I~,
for instance, possible that the Negro. tnbe .hvmg m Llbena
referred to above rerceives colours In a dIfferent manner
from the carriers 0 modem Eurol?ean languages ..
To evaluate this line of reasorung, .let us conSIder some
facts. A difference in the ~matlcal stru~ture of tw?
given languages does not by Itself p~edete~m~ the. POSSIbilities of rendering certain senses WIth therr ald. I~ 18 ':'Iell
known for instance that the category of detennmatlOnindeter'mination is ..Jery essential ~or Romance an~ ~fr
manic languages and is exp~ssed. m them ~ma IC y,
through definite and indefinIte artIcles. There IS no. sys~m
of articles in Russian, but the ca~go~ of detennmatIonindetermination can be expressed 10 thiS languaghethtoo-bY
.
h th
matical means (throug
e prod k k y-to nekotoriy in
leXIcal rat er 3:" gram
0. 0 ,
e
nouns etot tot m one case an
the other). 'Generally speak.ing, identIcal sen~e~ are ~~~h~
sed in. different ways in dtI~f~fnt i~ar:,~~:s'I~~ig~lY (the
' ) The vosense IS expressed gramma IC Y.,
phenomenon of lexic::o-grammatlcalte~nisn~h: ~ost flex~abulary, being. con~~11th:ra~~age system, a kind of
Ible and dynamiC p
I asmuch as there are no essen-
gua:
200
201
VI
......
I, he
Scien
cover
of ..
gy 0
100"
"'It
numl
forei!
h
i
l
'
mg,
warran t Q ume ~ p ,OSOphical conclusions,
nowh Imagme
that we have to d eal WI"th a reasonLet us
h
'
"
up, the mesooamoct
f bt"
a bl e b emg w ose p YSICal make202
I
ing and processing infonnation from the surrounding
environment, and the type of interaction with the world
are essentially different from the human (extraterrestrials
are favourit~ c~aracters in scien~e fiction, as we know),
Assumedly, It will be extremely dIfficult to understand the
language of this being, It is this case, rather than what
we usually observe in ethnolinguistic studies, that is closest
to Quine's view of the situation of an anthropologist
studying the language of an unknown tribe. Yet even this
case does not fully answer Quine's interpretation. Assume
that the extraterrestrial's system of perception of the
world was formed under conditions essentially different
from terrestrial ones, that his environment did not include
solid bodies, that is to say, it was something like liquid or
gas. (Of course, this assumption is highly hypothetical if
not improbable. We temporarily accept it entirely as a
kind of "mental experiment".) In this case, the extraterrestrial will either have no means of perceiving the world
of objects with which we deal or will perceive these objects
in a specific manner different from ours. If we observe,
however, that our guest out of space fairly successfully
orients himself in our terrestrial world, we must conclude
that he perceives, in one way or another, ?ur s~stem, of
objects. And if we consider as well that object dIssectIon
of the world characterises definite systems of dependences of reality itself, far from me~ely expressing the
properties of our language (and we tned to show the necessity of exactly this interpretation of the facts), '!Ie
inevitably come to the conclusion that a reasonable bemg
different from ourselves perceives, under terrestrial co~
ditions essentially the same types of objects as we do. ThlS
conclu~ion may serve as the basis for the search for .the
modes of understanding the language of extraterrestnals.
It also allows the assumption that we shall be ~ble to translate a certain part of this language, though thIS appare~tly,
does not obtain with reference to the eX,traterrestnals
language as a whole, for the modes of eXlstenc~ of the
Earth's inhabitants and of the guests from spa7e dIffer too
greatly Success is more likely if we deal wIth. messages
contai~ing scientific infonnation: it ,is through sc.tence that
we acquire knowledge about r.ea! ~bJects an~ then dependences regardless of their beuw. mcluded l,n som,e [~nn
or other in direct practical actlvl~Y ,at the glven hlSton~al
sta e It is not accidental that I~ IS ~1?I?ed, to e~tabhsh
co~~unication with extraterr,est~~ CIvilIsatIOns (If they
exist' ) through transmitting SCIentIfIC texts. ,
'
"
II however that Thomas Kuhn belIeves that 10
Wereca,
'
science itself the assertions
about Iaws assume essen t"U
la y
203
V
is he
....
..."
..."
Sci."
of IC
VV 0
!hot
nurnl
fOl'eis
at all.,
of a common background for different
Th~ exIstence,
ossible to apply common measuring
~hem That does not mean that they
paradlgms mdk~s
rods or tst:uy aiullY transh~table, since that would imply
f ommon referent systems and common
are m~ u
the e:,ustence 0 cadi s are characterised precisely by
~eamngs, BUt~rft:r by~iving different interpretations to
~iffe~ent con ulas' and sometimes even by different refe!IdentiEal fOli~e assume that there is no complete semantIC
ents, ven
aradigms but merely a certain difference
r~eea~h~lt7~~~hPon this point somewhat later), complete
to
205
204
V
is he
IUto
Seier
co."
or"
gy (
0<0"
thot
numl
for.~
:~e;~e";~g~s::u~:n~h~h%ilJ~s !O~fih~in~r~t~~rt':.';esd~i
207
.....
is he
Seier
cove,
of"
IIV'
ICOn
"'at
numl
foreil
,t
visual informatIon
WIh the ta ct I1e percept lVe
~orre a hee has and the earlier developed modes of tactile
unages,
'
, t t' n cannot function
as successI uII y as belore.
gr~n a ~duallY new perceptiv.e s~ructure~ are developed
hiYh fr{nk up visual and tactile mformatlOn. Apparently
w C . I gap (though not complete here eit her) between
a
terels
h
209
Is
V
he
....
_.,
Seier
ofoc
-..
IIV'
....t
numl
oforeil
MId
210
ru;
211
is he
"'te
Seier
covet
0/"
IIY'
lCore
1f>at
nurn!
foreil
hf:
212
art. 8 6
Chapter 4
REFLEXION ABOUT KNOWLEDGE AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITION
V
is he
lUte
Seier
cove,
of"
gyc
ICO"
thlt
nurnl
fore~
not reflective in its very nature and therefore does not ini
tially know itself, let alone the world of external objects.
However, it immediately realises itself as different from
the world in itself (therefore Sartre names consciousness
"Being For-Itself"). In this way the philosopher separates
self-consciousness and knowledge of self (reflexion).
Let us note that both Kant and Sartre believe that under
ordinary conditions there exists a relation of the subject to
himself which appears as knowledge of himself. It is a dif
ferent matter that, according to these philosophers, the
individual empirical su.bject's experientially given knowledge of self is not the same as grasping the true deep
nature of this subject (the latter appears as the Transcendental Subject, according to Kant, and as "pure" consciousness, Being For-Itself, according to Sartre),
Inasmuch as we begin our analysis with the study of
individual empirical subjects and their mutual relations,
the statement that a certain kind of knowledge is given in
ordinary self-consciousness can hardly raise any objections, Later we shall also try to explain the facts interpreted by Kant and Sartre as a fundamental difference between
consciousness (self-consciousness) and knowledge, W,e
have noted the very important circumstance, recorded 10
modern psychology, that the objec~ive amodal sc~eme of
the world underlying all types and kmds of percep,tio~ also
assumes the incorporation of a scheme of the subject. s body in it, The knowledge of the position of one's b?dy m the
objective network of spatio-temporal cor:n~tlOns, the
knowledge of the difference between the obje~tlv~ changes
in the real world and the succession of the sUbjectIv~ states
of consciousness, the knowledge, of the connectl<?n ~e
tween the perspectives of expenence and the ,obJec,tIVe
position of the subject's body-all of these van~ kmds
of knowledge are included in a compress~ fO!ID. 10 an elementa act of consciousness, the ac~ WhICh IS 1Odee~ assumed1,y any cognitive process,~6 WIthout ,sel~-consciousthe subject cannot determ10e the objectIVe state of
~f~irs in the world. In the s!)ecific l!lnd supreme f0!ffi of
reflection termed cognition, the subject does n?t Slmp~y
k
omething-he also realises that he knows It, that l~
no~ sa s stands in a certain relation to knowledge 8:n
~~
YIf that were not so, cognition could not ,ex~t.
unse, tated: "The animal is immediately one ~Ith l~
~s Mar:'. s It does not distinguish itself from It. It IS
~lfe .actlVl~rv'ity Man makes his life activity itself the,obl,tS life at;
'n 'and of his consciousness. He ~as conS?lous
J~t of ,h~~ W~t is not a determination with WhICh he ~lrect
life actlVl Ye'onscious life activity distinguishes man Immely merges,
215
is hE
... to
Seier
""""
ofK
IIV'
teO"
!hot
num!
for'~
. ae tt
"87
d" tely from animal hfe
IVl y.
18Since all this is quite true a sit~ation ~m'erges whic~
"te paradoxical and even unposslble. Indeed, If
appear~ qUI me object can I simultaneously also cognize
~ cO~~~~Z~g self and 'the act of my cognition! Does not
Y
g the thesis that knowledge of an object also asaccep lknowledge of the cognizing subject and the act of
h~~~~gnition lead to an insoluble logica~ para~ox? Is n6t
the latter similar to the paradoxes WhICh anse when an
utterance has itself for a referent? (These,para9-9xes, alo~g
th me others were discovered early In thls century m
Wl
so
,
.
51Udles In
. th e f ound a
set theory
and stimulated
I~tense
tions of mathematics.) ConsIder these facts. My eyes c~
see everything that surrounds me. They a.Iso see c~rtain
parts of my own body. They see oth.er sU.bJe.cts lookmg at
certain objects. But my eyes cannot m pnnclple see ~hem.
selves and the process of their vision. (It can be objected
that the eyes see themselves in the mirror. But what w~ see
in the mirror is not the eyes themselves bu~ only theu: reflection. Of course, the reflection in the mm:or has a lik:e.
ness to my eyes, and I can imagine with the aid of the mu
ror the way I myself, my face and my eyes loo~ to an. e~
temal observer. However, when I look in the mirror, It IS
not my eyes that are the object of my experience ~ut only
their physical reflection on the surface of a. certam body.
The fact that this reflection resembles the picture my eyes
present to a stranger is not at all evident and not known
at the early stages of the development of .the psyc.he.)
Keith Gunderson, a modem Amencan philosop~er,
points out that the cognizing subject cannot be the object
of his own experience, an object of his knowledge. Experience is directed at the world of external objects. I can
know the states and relations of physical objects. I also
know other individuals, both at the level of everyday
knowledge and through special scientific inquiry (e.g.,
physiology, psychology, sociology, etc.). In his turn,
another subject may study me and in this case I shall be
the obj~ct of this other subject.' But I cannot know mys~lf,
the subject, as an object of my own experience. Otherwise,
Gunderson believes, we would get lost in an insoluble
parado;< similar to the paradoxes of set theory. It has to be
rec<?gms~, states the American philosopher, that the
subject himself, the carrier and generator of knowledge,
drops <?ut of ~he domain to which his knowledge refers.
T~ere IS ,nothmg sU:P~ing about it, he continues, since
this fact 15 ch~ctenstlc not only of man but in general of
all syst~ms, m~luding artificially constructed techn~cal
mechanisms, which have to do with receiving informatlOn
tv.
from the environment. Any such system gathers information about objects different from the system itself, but it
cannot obtain infonnation concerning the process itself of
gathering information. Periscope lenses reflect everything
that happens around, but they cannot reflect themsel.
ves. 88
We may agree with Gunderson that the situation where
cognition of the world of objects also implies the subject's
cognition of himself and the process of such cognition
indeed appears rather paradoxical. 89 At the same time,
we cannot discard the real and basic fact of human cogni.
tion really involving self-consciousness. The examples
cited by the American philosopher do not contradict that
fact. The point is that artificial mechanisms gathering in
formation do not implement the process of cognition,
they do not have selfconsciousness or consciously realise
the world of objects. The information gathered by these
mechanisms only becomes a fact of cognition when it is
assimilated by man. A submarine's periscope by itself does
not see anything: the man using it does. Man 's perception
of the external world presupposes an elementary act of
self-consciousness, otherwise it will not see anything even
with the aid of a periscope (selfconsciousness thus per
tains to the man using the periscope rather than the peri
scope itself).
What is the way out of this paradox? Let us describe
the solution in the briefest outline, with the intention of
later recurring to this problem. The point here is that al
though selfconsciousness is knowledge, it is knowledge
of a special kind. So far we have assumed that knowledge
presents to the subject the world of objects that are real
ised as such. This is true both of perception, which is a
kind of knowledge associated with the individual subject,
and of scientific theories, which are objectified forms of
knowledge. However, the object of selfconsciousness is
not given to it (selfconsciousne,ss should not be c,!nfused
with reflexion). When I perceIve a group of objects, I
realise at the same time the difference between my con
sciousness and these objects, I realise the spatiotemporal
position of my body, etc. But all these f~cts of consci0ll:5ness are in the background or .on the penpherY ,and not I,n
the focUS of consciousness. DIrectly, my conSCIOusness IS
imed at external objects that are the object of knowledge.
a body my consciousness, my cognitive process do not
~y this c~se fonn part of the objects of experience and
In owledge. Thus knowledge of self implied by any expe.
~ ce and expressed in the fonn of self-consciousness is
~~wledge of a special kind. It might be somewhat tenta217
tive~y
V
is he
lUte
Sc;iel
coY"
of K
gy <
ICOn
!hit
numl
foreil
Th
Many philosophers argued that, inasmuch as a most irnporta~t .and probably the only task of epistemological
F.YslS IS substant~ation of knowledge, it should obvious.y s~gle out and dlSsec::t all premises of knowledge, inc1ud~ ~:se c~nnected wl~h self-consciousness. Epistemologimentin::~bso:::~~e~e~i~~te what is implicit, thus impleof'te:oo.miS:th~~~hat ~ne 'of the solutions to the problem
ive relation of "I ..c~on~~t~ in the. assertion that the reflexdation of an k
1 se
constitutes the supreme founthis reflexive ~ela~i~~ledget ~he proposition fonnulating
as a. en to be. absolutely indub itable and irrefutable
knowledge was interpre~ deplStemologlCal reflex ion about
self.
e as reflexion of "I" about itWe have endeavoured t h
insoluble difficulties to h~ s ow the cul-de-sacs and the
tation in epistemology l;;d lC~ the ac::ceptance of this orienshow that any knowled e s. n.partIcular, we have tried to
edge of the world of e~tec;n~ m t~e first place the knowlt~e subject's self-consciousn~ objects, though it assumes
Clple I?e reduced to the sub' SS't~annot ~ a matter of prinAnd msofar as knowled ]e c s reflexlOn about himself.
never be absolutely unqu get. a b out external objects can
es lonable (such as not to allow
Th
218
V
is hE
....
Seier
COII&I
ofK
OY<
100"
"'ot
numl
forej
i;-
220
"
is h
.,,'
Scill
"'"
of
gy,
teO"
"'at
num
forej
0:
,
h
222
Where implicit knowledge becomes explicit, thus becoming the object of reflexion, it undergoes certain changes.
Theoretical reflexion about a system of objectified knowledge means its dissection, fonnulation of a number
of assumptions and idealisations and at the same time
(which is particularly essential) specification of the knowl.
edge itself, rejection of certain implicitly accepted premises
(the procedure of reflexion is prompted exactly by the
need for revising some premises of knowledge). What
previously appeared clear, intuitively understandable and
simple, proves to be complicated enough as a result of
reflexion, and often problematic, sometimes even simply
erroneous. The result of reflexion is not therefore some
simple and self-obvious truths or a set of absolutely
indisputable assertions forming an "absolute foundation"
of the system of knowledge to which different kinds of
knowledge can be reduced in one way or another. The
result of reflex ion is a theoretical system which is a relatively
genuine reflexion of some real dependences in a definite
context and which at the same time implies a whole series
of assumptions, a certain implicit knowledge as a premise.
Reflexion thus takes one beyond the framework of the
existing system of knowledge, generating new knowledge,
both explicit and implicit. What originally seemed (e.g., in
mathematics) a purely substantiating procedure, is in
reality a mode of development of the content of knowledge
itself and one of the important ways of theoretical development. This procedure results in increasingly more precise reflection of the objective dependences of reality and
exact reproduction of the structure and content of the
scientific theories themselves. A study whose immediate
goal was merely increasing the rigour of an argument
generated in fact greater theoretical content in the given
scientific field. Summing up his investigation of the history of proofs of the stereometrical theorem, lmre Lakatos
writes: .. 'Certainty' is never achieved (the reference here
is to metaphysical absolute certainty.- V.L.), 'foundations' are never found-but the 'cunning of reason' turns
each increase in rigour into an increase in content, in the
scope of mathematics." 96
As for the factual sciences, the links between the procedure of substantiating knowledge and the development
of theoretical content are here even more explicit. We have
noted already that in these sciences the problem of substantiation does not usually figure as an independent one.
To the extent in which the existing system of theoretical
notions allows the solution of scientific problems arising
in this system, pennitting at the same time definite prac-.
223
V
is he
....
Seier
co..,
of k
......."'" "
numl
foreil
pendences. At the same time, the adoption of a new paradigm implies a procedure for correlating it with an old
paradigm. The latter figures in this case as an object of
reflex ion. Its postulates, concepts, and semantic connec_
tions are reco nstructed and compared with the real objects
and actual connections with the aim of retaining all that
has objective real content in the old paradigm, and of
eliminating everything that has no such content that is
proves to be fictitious. Here, the new paradigm functio~
as an instrument for presenting the real objects and dependences. Thus, theoretical reflexion acts as an important
element of transition from one paradigm to another
(though Polanyi and Kuhn reject this), albeit it does not
exhaust the content of the transition. This reflexion essentially means reconstruction ' of and inquiry into the
old paradigm in the light and by means of the new one.
Thus the theory 'of relativity allowed a clarification of the
latent premises of classical mechanics which were not
(and could not be) clear to its creators themselves. Galileo
in his turn, had to subject the system of premises and as:
~umpt!ons of Aristotelian physics to theoretical reflex ion
10 laymg the foundations of classical mechanics But he
could only solve this task successfully insofar as' he went
be?,ond . the fran:tework of the conceptual system of
Arist~telian phYSICS. Theoretical reflex ion is the result
of gomg beyond the limits of a given conceptual system
~d at the ~me time the means of such a step, As we see,
10 any case It proves to be closely linked with the development of.the conte~t of theoretical knowledge.
. In thlS c~mnecbon,. one should consider the untenabil.
~ty of ~ne, mterpretabon of the special theory of relativ.
Ity. ~hlS mterpretation, wh!ch gained currency thanks
to Bndgman, r~d.uces the enbre significance of the special
theory of rela~lVlty to reflective analysis of primary con.
cepts of ,phYSICS (~ch 8S: the concept of simultaneity),
Fro~ thlS standpomt, Emstein created not so much a
PhY~lcal theory as a, meta theory which deals with the
pro em of the mearung of physical concepts. The Iabo.
224
raiory operations of measurement referred to in the special theory of relativity are viewed as an absolutely reliable
basis of science, the foundation on which physics must
be built, In acrual fact, the operations of measurement
used in the special theory of relativity, in their rurn,
assume a number of theoretical premises that are not operational in nature. The task of this theory is by no means
solutio n to the problem of meaning of scientific concepts but the discovery of new content dependences in
actual reality, Reflective analysis, that is, discussion of
the problems of the nature and meaning of the concepts
of physics, indeed played an important role in the elaboration of the principles of this theory, But this analysis
is intimately linked with comparing the old and new pa
radigms--classical mechanics and Einstein's conception.
Besides, theoretical reflexion was not and could not be
the only tool of substantiating the new theory,
Reflexion about knowledge thus proves to be closely
linked with the development of its content and with going
beyond the limits of the existing conceptual system,
(That does not mean, however, that the reverse proposition is also true, that is, that any development of the
content of knowledge appears as reflexion. For instance,
the development of a theoretical system within the given
paradigmal premises obviously cannot be taken as an
example of reflexion.)
If that is how things stand, the question arises, does
the problem of substantiation of knowledge have any
meaning at all? Classical philosophy and science presented
the solution to the task of substantiating knowledge as
finding a set of assertions which would be absolutely
indisputable and unshakeable, assertions to which ~l
other kinds and types of knowledge could be reduced 10
one way or another. Since such a task cannot be solved
(and we have tried to show that that is so), should we
not recognise that the problem of substantia~i~g k,nowl.
edge does not exist at all? ,Many W,estern spec18lists 10 the
foundations of mathematlcs, logiC, methodology, and
philosophy of science, in the theory and history of natural
science come to this conclusion,97
One can hardly agree with this view, What is the mean
ing of the task itself of substantiating knowledge? Appar
ently, it is the establishment of the sphere of aPI?lication
of the given system of knowledge and, separatmg that
which is true knowledge from that which only lays an
empty c1~im to th~ title. <?n ,the general e~iste,mological
plane it IS a question of f1Od1Og general cntena for the
soluti~n of this task, which may be applied to different
22.
V
is hE
....
.....
Seier
of
'l'I'
ICOn
"'It
nurnl
foreil
is hE
"'to
Sciel
COY.
of.
u.'
ICOn
thlt
num
forej
u;\
228
is ht
.. t.
Seier
COY.
of.
gy.
1<0"
thlt
num
'Ofei
iveTyh~h~O~S;~~!~. of ~rror
fl
231
V
is t'Il
....
the mdlVldual.
Sciel
CO'"
4. THE COLLECTIVE SUBJECT.
of.
gy.
ICon
"'at
num
forei
IS
mseparable from
the individual
is ~
lUte
Scie.
COY.
of.
gy.
ICOn
"'at
num
forei
234
V
~h<
"'to
Seier
"".
of.
1lV'
leo
"'0'
num
forei
ani
ili!i:al~~et~tdrsex~~c~u~~
indf;~nd~~~y ~
is hE
"'to
$cie,
""'.
of.
gy,
'c',,'
"'at
num
forei
if
::;etail
239
V
is he
.. to
Seier
""'.
of.
..
'
ICOn
h'
num
forei
object in logic, one must take into a('c o~nt al so l~(' general
premisses of being of the conc:ete sub~ect (= I I (e 0 f
man) in the objectivE; surro~ndmgs:' ~ 0 stated Lenin.
The individual subject, hIs conSCiousness and cognition
must be understood in terms of their incorporation in dif.
ferent systems of collective practica~ an,d ,cognitive, activity.
But that does not mean that the mdlvldual subject is in
some way dissolved in the collective. First, the collective
subject itself does not exist outside concrete persons, real
individuals interacting among themselves according to
the specific laws of collective activity. The collective sub
ject cannot be regarded in the sa~e ~ig~t as the.indi~dUal
one. The fonner is not a personahty in Its own nght, It has
no individuality of its own and does not perform any acts
of cognition other than those perfonned by the separate
members. Second, cognition, which is inseparable from the
individual subject, does not directly coincide with the
objectified systems of knowledge, though it is closely
linked with and ultimately determined by them. The
individual traits of my perception, my memories and
subjective associations constitute knowledge that is important for me personally and is accessible to me alone.
They do not form part of the system of objectified knowledge that is the property of all individuals and is included
in the structure of the collective subject. And that means
that the types of knowledge intrinsically characteristic of
the individual and the collective subjects do not fully
coincide with or dissolve in each other but rather mutually
imply each other.
We may recall that Kant, Fichte, and Husserl posit, along
with the individual subject, the transcendental one. The
latt~r ~~resses the inner community of the various empirical md!-Vlduals.. in this respect, it may appear similar to the
collectIv~ subject. Indeed, the conceptions of these philo~ophers mclude some steps towards the collective subject
Idea. But. these are merely initial steps, and they could
o~y J:>e discerned after the Marxist doctrine of the sociohistOrIcal nature of the process of cognition was formed.
In m?re c~mcre~e term,s, the Transcendental Subject as
c?ncelVed m philosophical transcendentalism is basically
dlf~erent from the collective subject as a concrete socio-histoncal co~muni~y, ~e TI:anscendental Subject, as transcendel!tal.lS~s believe, IS an mdividual of a special kind the
supra-mdivldual
"I"
At th e same time, it is supra-em'pin-"
, .
, '.
cal,. eXlstmg outs~de tune and space. But the collective
subject,
"d al one,lsq
"u,"te
""although
d different
' . from the '"nd"IVIU
empmc an set 10 defmite spatio-te
al r 'ts The
Transcendental Subject is acee,Sleoy
"bl mnlPor om
lIDl WI:th"In,
fr
240
at
is he
....
Scief
COY'
of.
OY'
ICO"
"'at
num
forei
th!
242
SU
243
V
is he
....
Scief
COY.
of.
OY'
100"
"'It
num
forei
..
.. to
....
Sciel
of.
flY'
ICOn
!hot
... m
fOl'el
or
the matter is that any external mediation of consciousness must be sublated in the unity of the immediate and
the mediated, in a dialectical identity of consciousness
with itself.
Purely immediate consciousness (whether this is taken
to mean empirical lmowledge or intellectual intuition)
does not exist, Hegel insists. Immediate certainty
inasm~ch ~ it is f!le~ely immediate, is not knowledge, Th~
latter ImplIes medlatlon. Only that knowledge is adequate
in which unity is attained of the immediate and the
mediated in the fonn of the new dialectically mediated. In
the immedia.te, which exists at the beginning of the
development of cognition, the possibility and necessity of
mediation are embedded, and the nature of the latter is
predetennined. The result of the development of
cognition and mediation is a return to the immediate on a
new basis, Hegel believes. "Mediation is nothing but
equality to itself in motion, or else it is refiexion in itself.,.
The 'I' or becoming in general is, owing to its simplicity,
precisely the immediate in the process of becoming and
the immediate itself... 116 (In real cognition, however,
there is always, in a definite sense, a unity of the
immediate and the mediating elements in knowledge. This
unity does not in itself guarantee the truth of knowledge.)
In the final analysis, Hegel reduces th~ essence of ~y
cognition to reflexion. Insofar as the object of reflexlon
changes in the course of t~e latte~. H~gel concludes that
cognition deals with an object whIch IS a product of ~h.e
Absolute Spirit itself. Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spmt
is the story of the struggle of self-consciousness with the
object as a result of which the object proves to be a
prope: moment of Absolute self-consciousness. "As. it
drives itself towards true existence, it wi.ll reach a pomt
where it will discard the appearance of belOg encumbered
th the foreign which exists only for and in the capacity
Wi another or where appearance will be equal to the
o ence its' presentation coincides thereby with precisely
e;: oint of the science of the spirit properly speaking;
t IdS f~"a1IY as it captures this its being itse1t it will express
1.1"
Id
an
h nature
of absolute k
now
e ge Itself . ,,111
.
t ~'The roain point is," wrote Marx, "that t~e object of
seiousness is nothing else but self-co11SClousness, or
ilint the object is only objectified self-consciousnessseU.consciousness as
object. (Positing of man"" self-conusness
.) therefore, IS
. to surmount the 0 bJect
.
f
scio"The
issue,
0 con. lllelS. ObjectifJity as such is regarded as an estranged
SCIOU
relationship which does not correspond to the
human
247
....
Sciel
co'"
of
'"
ICon
!hOI
num
forel
' . . . 118
9- _763
249
S-_~_ _ _ _
v
is he
..to
Sc;;iel
""'.
of.
gy,
-,
....,
num
for.1
'h'*"
e,
'00
men '"""
251
V
is he
""
Scier
co."
otK
gy,
leort
"'ot
num
forei
VI
is he
....
Sciel"
covel
of "
9Y<
score
"'"
nurnl
forei
science of science.
Although epistemology is in some basic aspects sim ilar
to all the other scientific theories, it differs in some points
from most theories. We must not fo rget that epistemology
is a reflective theory .
Most scientific theories deal with objects of which they
have no previous knowledge. No science can ignore the
data of everyday experience, of course, ~ut the develop.
ment of scientific knowledge means gomg beyond the
limits of this experience. The latter sa~s n othing of the
nature of those objects with which, for Instance, modern
physics deals. The knowledge . of .t~ese objects. is only
acquired in the process of SCIentifiC research Itself. A
reflective theory, however, has, as we have noted, so~e
preliminary, implici~ ~nowledge of the o~ject about whIch
it formulates explICIt knowledge. EpIstemology as a
reflective theory proceeds from an implicit knowledge of
what knowledge and cognition are and what the basic
cognitive norms are, i.e., it begins with implicit knowledge
which is contained in individual consciousness, in everyday
language, and in the paradigmal premises of scientific
theories.
At the same time reflex ion about knowledge, translati~m
of the latter from its implicit into explicit form, and Its
theoretical formulation, involve certain changes of the very
object of reflex ion, revealing the imaginary character of
some formations which were included in knowledge
without proper foundation before the implementation of
the procedure itself. We have already cited examples ~f
reformulation of the object of refiexion as a result of thIS
procedure in the special sciences. Epistemology differs
from reflexion in the special sciences in that it tries to
establish the necessary conditions for any cognition and
universal cognitive norms. The links between an episternolo~cal system and a certain particular t heory of a special
science are therefore rather mediated. Nevertheless.,
formulation of an epistemological conception is always a!'l
a~tempt not merely to state the ex isting practice of cog~l
tIon . but also to change this practice, to reject certatn
~~bhshed canons of. cognitive activity as distracting cog
n.ltlOn f~om the attamment of its goal, and at the same
~e to mtroduc~ ~ew standards of this activity. The gener~ 1:IDage ?f cogOltJ?n and science created by epistemolo~
IS It~1f mcluded m the real course of cognition and 10
?ertam .respe::ts restructures it. Therefore any seriOUS,
~nfluentia1 . epistemological conceptions are not only an
mtel)l.retatlon of the existing practice of cognition but alsO
a cntIque of some aspects of this practice in the light of
254
VI
is he
"'..
"".
of
Seier
K
OV<
"""
.,,'
num
fOfal
j~ st
or
~~:'Li~d.~e~as,
worked out by Lenin in his
,
(the entire complex of
of reflection, the
the dialectics of
the inexhaustireflection as a
CONCLUSION
VI
is he
.,,'
Seier
co."
of "
gy ,
.,,'"
thot
nurnl
foral
x:
VI
is hel
"'te
.
Scien
""""
of "
IIV ,
leO"
"'ot
numl
forai
)1
~atul,e of cogni
for further
at the
of
inter
widely discussed in
of science, scientology,
o
260
ed act.ivity Theref
WI pract.lcal obJect-onentstudy is, fj'rst of a8r~h~h~ proI per field of ep~~m ological
t.he hiJ
.
'
eve opment. of cogmtlVe norms,
lecti~al ~~~~:~I~ndd
on~geneSis of cogn~t~on ~n their dia
e
changes in the c ~~ opmen.t of cogmtlon unplies also
individual and ino~hlZtng subjects, ?a th collective and
same time it encomp~~fheoJ colgmzed objects. At the
eve opment of certain cog
nitive s ta~d d
some charact:ri:tic~~f ~~g~i~~~:~lf~he development of
a Principle of Dialec
Problem of the
of doctoral
th'
NOTES
VI
i, M I
tut. I
Selin
'"'''"
'l'/ ,
ICO'I
II",
~ml
'.n
In troduc tion
See e g B M Kedrov Lenin and Ihe Dialectics of the Naturnl
Sclen~e
'ZOih Century. Mosco:-v 1971 (in Russi~n).
. .
:1 See P. S. Dyshlevty. Materialist Dialectics and Physical Re/alwlSm,
1
oiihe
'6'
{Uosofii ,
I Q uantum
"Philosoph ical
Objective and
,; ,~P;.
Dyshlevly,
10
"The Dialec
S.
'n
<
'63
VI ,
is hel
Sci!!n
"""
Part One
tute f
of~
OV ,
, J,
IeOfe
"'ot
numl
"I.Con-
th,
fore~
Th,
"
Paris, 1950.
in the FQnnation of Think
.43 (in Russian).
Pergamon Press, London,
264
VI,
is he.
tute (
Scien
Objedlv~~~
In
st
~.
'"'''
of "
'JY 0
leore
5
I., p. .
23 Ibid., pp. 5, 6.
21
22
"'"
numi
Wd
24 Ibid., p. 10.
fore~
'
R~lJjew,
~~~tyWPre~, Prin~ton,
Co
S~:temg:~ai~onal
1
(P VI : ~Jtem pt
13-1~:'~5.
't. ...
r:3
3:
Ibid., p. 435.
266
"6 Ibid.
,,7 Ibid .
.&II Ibid., p. 171.
"9 Ibid ., p. 174 .
M Ibid. , p. 169 .
iii Ibid., p. 214.
li2 Ibid., p. 216.
li3 Ibid., p. 453.
Ii" Quoted from R. J. Hirst, The Problel1U of Perception George
Allen and Unwin LTD London 1959 p '8
'
" Ib'd
L ., pp. 67 .6 .8 '
,"
,..
~':"
~ii~t2
Ibid. p. 102.
li9 See E~mund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur
Genea/ogJe der Logik, Academia Verlagsbuchhandlung Prague
1939, pp. 12-13.
'
'
60 .~~?ted from Z. M. Kakabadze, The Problem of "Existential
CrI~I.S. and Edmu~d Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology,
Tblhsl, 1966, p. 76 (In Russian).
61 See Quenti n Laue r, I'henomenologie de Husser! Presses univer
sitaires d e Fran~, Paris, 1955 pp. 188, 315; Joseph Kockelmans,
Edmund Husserl s Phenomenological PsYchology Duquesm Univer.
sity Press, Pittsburgb, 1967, pp. 225231, 260, 26L
62 For an analysis of the p roblem of the subject and object in
Fichte's philosophy see also A. M. Deborin, "Dialectics in Fichte",
Man: and Engels Archiues, Book 3, Moscow.Leningrad, 1927;
V. F. Asmus, Essays on the History of Dialectic! in the Philosophy
of the New Times , MoscowLeningrad, 1930; T. 1. Qizennan, The
Philosophy of Fichte, Moscow, 1962; M. Bur, Fichle, Moscow,
1965; K. N. Ly ubuti n, The Problem of lhe Subject and Object in
Classical Gennan and MarxistLeninist Philosophy, pp. 35-47 (all in
Russian).
63 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage der gestJmten wissenschafts
/ehre, Fritz Eckardt Ve rlag, Leipzig, 1911, p. 8.
U Ibid., p. 10.
61i Ibid. , p. 17.
66 Ibid., p. 16.
67 Ibid ., p. 104.
68 Ibid., p. 105.
69 For an anal ysis o f Kant's ep istemology see also the following
works: Yu . M. Borodai, Imagination and Epistemology, Moscow,
1966' The Ph ilosophy of Kant and Modem Times (ed. by T. 1. Qi2er
man)' Mosca w, 1974 ; Critical Essays on Kant's Philosophy (ed. by
M. A: Bulatov), Kiev, 1975; T. 1. Oizennan, The Philosophy of Kant,
MoSCOW 1914; V. F. Asmus, Immanuel Kant, Moscow, 1973;
V 1. Shi'nkaruk, The Epistemology, Logic, and Dialectics of Kant,
Kiev 1974; Zh. M. Abdildin, The Dialectics of Kant, AlmaAta,
1974 ' N V. Mot roshilov1, " Husse rl and Kant: the Problem of 'Transcend~ntal Philoso phy"', in: The Philosophy of Kant and Modem
Times, MoscOW, 1974, I. S. Narsky, Kant, Moscow, 1976 (all in
Russian).
267
tute (
Scien
co,",
of "
'lV 0
score
"'"
numl
foreil
93
81 One may get the impression that what has been saId here is inap.
plicable at least to the Kantian conception of "pure mathematics".
The latter is considered in the Critique of Pure Reason as a science
whose subject.matter is determined by the apriori sense fonnsspace and time, That means that, from the Kanlian standpoint, the
speculative elements playa fundamental role in mathematical knowl.
edge. However, mathematics as a science assumes, according to
Kant, application of the logical categories of reason to the pure
apriori sense forms. Kant's conception of mathematics is thus dif.
ferent from Husserl 's. It is the latter rather than the former that
underlies that modem trend in the substantiation of mathematics
that became known as intuitionism.
82 Quoted in Z. M. Kakabadze. The Problem of "Existential Crisis"
and Edmund Husserl~ Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 87.
83 Ibid., p. 90.
84 For an analysis of Sartre's philosophical conception see
V. N. Kuznetsov, JeanPaul Sartre and Existentialism, Moscow,
1969; G. Va. Streltsova, A Critique of the Existentialist Conception
of Dialectics (Analysis of the Philosophical Views of J .. p. Sartre),
Moscow, 1974 ; M. A. Kissel, The Philosophical
Evolution of
J._P. Sartre, Leningrad, 1976; L. I. Filippov, The Philosophical
Anthropology of JeanPaul Sartn, Moscow, 1977 (all in Russian).
85 See J .. p. Sartre.l. L'etre et Ie neant. Essai d'ontologie phenomeno.
logique, Librairie liallimard, Paris 1943 pp. 372 388 390.
86 Ibid., pp. 332.333.
"
"
87 Ibid . pp. 198-202.
88 Ibid. , pp. 342.343.
89 Ibid. pp. 220.240.
90 See je8!l Piag~t, The Language and Thought of the Child, The
New Am.encan LIbrary, Inc;, New .Yor~, 1974; Jean Piaget, "Pensee
egocentnque et pensee soclocentnque Cahiers internationaux de
sociologie: VOl...X, 1951, pp. 34-49; jean Piaget, Comments on
~d S,~ructure
~2
268
Part Two
1
p.253.
'""e Theory of Reflection and CreatilJity, p. 20
2 A. M. Korshunov, "'
(In Russian).
Z kennann L I Information and Vision,
~ See V. O. Glezer,
uc 89 (in Ru$;an).
Moscow.Leningrad, 1961'l' AVenger, V.~. Zinchenko, A.. G. Ruz.
4 See A. V. Za.porozhets, .' Moscow, 1967, p. 55 (in RUSSian).
skaya, Perception and Action,
1974 p.77.
.
!> Karl Marx, Capital .. Vol. I, ~~';r La
des structures 109!'
nise
6 Quoted from J. PI~et, B.
e
,
ques etementaires, Pans'th195 t re of the Image , Moscow 1963,
7 V S Tyukhtin, On
e a u
40' 50 (in Russian).
.
NY 1961 p.363fPSee t. H. Gombrich, Ar! andfn~lo~1S~~1 'World,'Cambridge, Mas9 J G'bson The PercephOn 0
"
'950 , pp. 2627
sachusetts, 1
, .
P ception'"
10 Ibid., p. 42;. "" tyev "On the Ways .of Strdt~ngVi~ral Spatiai
11 See A. N. Lo<'Vn
' . the GeneratIon 0
. n of
v. Stolin, "A S~udYk
In "Percepblal Activity u.nde~ I~:p~ocesen
...
A D Logvm
0,
. "Sense.Fonnatlon In
.)
I
mage '.
Image'" A. A. Puzyrel, t"
nd Activity (in RussIan.
the Retm
al A~tivity", in Percep /On ~e to para 4; quoted from
ses of Per~ptu Elements of Drawmg, no
12 J. RGusk~n,. c~~rt and Jflusion, p. ~91' t"vity under Inversion or the
E. H. om n 'inenko, "Perceptu ..c I
252.256.
13 See A. D. ~~~ Perception and AC~lJlt~ll~ Problem of the Ade.
il:t!~alNImt':.
V~rgiles.,
Vo~'fZinn,!e~o Visual Perception)", Voprosy
.:;ICe.
age {wIth""" ere
quacy of the 1m
4 (all in Russian).
filosofi~, ~967, No.
, Book The Science of
1 ~ See Ibid., p. ~~n, "Conspectus of He~11972, p. 171.
. "
16 ~!, VcJie~ed Works, Vol. f3~ Mg~~OOk The Science of LolPc ,
L<>..' i
. "Conspectus 0 e e
17 V. 'dLeW~~ks Vol. 38, p. 195 . . ents with the Ames chairs see
Col/ede
'ptiOn or the experlm
18 For a de~~ op. cit, pp. 248-49.
E. H. Go
op. cit., p. ~!~ach" in: Karl Marx, Frederick
H mG~~~rich,
19 E.
"Theses on Fe
,
20 Karl Marx,
269
ee
V.
ai
fi karl
tufa (
Scien
colier
of '"
gy 0
Itar.
"'at
nurnl
fore ~
N.Y., l lh
956{ PPt ~;PI!~)'leU!:~!e~~~i~i~~~~I~~~lel;VO~et
ff- A
~m
fl'i
285~e
cl.
lll'f'!~ents
the- .following
of Spinoza about the essence of the
';Ircle. A CIrcle may be defined as a figure, such that all straight
lInes drawn from the centre to the c1rcumfert!nce
aI" (B Sp'noza, How to Improve Your Mind, PhiloSOPhi~ i.~~rary, 'Inc.I,
270
3,2
Ij,
~;:~on~,
Moscow, 196fJ>,(ibIR~':f{he Development of t~e Mind,
36 See A. N. Leontyev,
0 e
, idem Activity. ConscIousness.
~~ i~
not In e eas
d
d ' tI e secondary property a
a.
properties" (Ibid .), ~ at defi~~t'io~, 'A real definition m~ e~pre51
That II merely a nom ~ th'n and that in Spinou's view," ~e
the proximate ~use 0 a d I "constructing the thing. The Circle. iR
same as 'PE;c1~r!ngdt~e:o ef~Uows: the rLgUrt! described by any line
thil case Will be elm as
to ('bid )
where one end \1 Cixed and ~.e .othe.r ere; te I d. '~physique contemUSee G. Bachelard, L.ac~lVlte ratlona
'51951, p. 90.
.
. e Presses universltane1l de France, iof the Higher PsychIcal
p ora," 'L S Vygotsky. The Deve!opmen
VI
is hel
bel' e "dOH
PersoTUllity (in
36
See A.
.,
R. Lunya,
nta/.Psychological Study,
Processes. An Expenme
OSCO
thes".~tudy~~s ~e
Child's
\ in RuSSpian). Galperin The Development of
"See . "'ia,
'.
'dem "On the ...
1 'd m
tion of Mental Actions; I
}~~~~~ti~n
into PsYCholo'gy~0n:=i~9~~~t
38 See A. V, Zaporozh,ets,
. )
-<
0{ Arbitrary Moue-
60 (m RUSSIan,
"
ments, Moscow, 19 Ty esofGeneralisation In
39 See V, V. Davydo v"
p f the Structure of
1972; idem, "AnalYSIS 0
l!.S~EJ,;.o~~e~ of Dialectical
and Ped~goglcs , iR
"
e Problem of the Adefin Russ,an4' V rgiles V. P. Zincb~nko, ~ 4' A. V. Zaporozhets
40 See N. u. ~'voprosy filosO/iI, 1967, 0, ,
<'"
Dok/ady API'!
60
43 See M. S. RogoVln,
. M uscripts of 1844" in:
79.
..
mic and PhilosophiC 'VOl 3 p.302.
" Karl Marx, E~Engels, Collected. Wo;ks
: d S. Gurgenidze,
Lift
Karl Marx, Fred~nCheryakoV, Awakenmgf ~viet 'Scie'nce" Vopro~y
46 See A. I. Me ..Outstanding Pro~
V Dyenkov, "Personal~ty
E V. Dyenkov, N
6 pp. 69-J9., 'E'
iment" Kommumst,
i
(iiosofi , 1975'the Jiesu'lts of a SCientific x p e r ,
"
n
Fonnatlo : on
.
hie Manuscripts of 1944 ,
1977, No.2.
"Economic and Philosop
., "
46 Karl Marx,
r Theoretical Entities,
tatu
p.298.
; ;cience, Vol. In, Univerwe1\ "The Qntolo,ical Sh
"
4" G Max
'n the Phl/osop Y 0
10
Minnesota Stud:Pr~ Minneapolis,1962, P'Gesprliche im Umkreis
[Minneso
'Td und das Ganze.
971 p 92 93
Co,
pp, IiI.
m.
Structure of Sclentl c
d " Atomphysl,
S
Kuhn
J
roe
49 Th.,
,
~~yw. Heisenb~:'RDKper 8.
135. 'd pp 28-29,
toO
Jbl.,
Verla~, M!-'finIC~e~luti!ns',
271
___. _
---;::=
= =...---
---
VI
is hel
?'? ,h;c
Understanding of S .
Scientific Theon'es, Univ.,,_,clen.
I Y or
ane (
Scien
cover
of",
'-:-
~;~ of
gy 0
ICO"
....
numl
fore~
P~i10S0Phical Encyclopedia
From Positivism to NeoposltJvism .....
Century, Moscow ,1974' V S Sh '
Problem. s of Empin'caf 'Su'bst ;(-
"
Moscow,
1960 '
Essays In the History of Po51't?~
a
5
1V18m
" V. J. Lenin
() II
'
~oscow. 1977', p. 34.
0 ected Works, VoL 34,
See e.g. B. S. Gryaznov, "Theory and Its World" B
g~aJo-' ThMeory and Its Object, Moscow 1973 pp 5 3S' . S. Gryaznov
n arx's method' C ,
,.of, "~arx 's "Capital", MO~~~al ]S;6r':'lKzent~,' The Dialectics
PrinCIple in Marx's Thea
d
, . . uzmm, The Systems
If~t?'?' of Marxist Diale"!h'~; fr~~t~o,::0~i.Y! Mo,scow, .1976; The
J.A:nlmst Stage (ed by M M R
ngm 0 Mar:C/sm to the
<
Vi
or
b.
i.e
67.
2 Ibid., p. 50.
. _I I ,- - "to th b rd'ty
73 The conception of ontologtclU re ~ IVlty pom. .
.e a su I.
of arguments, current in modem ,~encan and B,ntlsh eplstemologlc,
al literature, concerning the posslblhty of the eXlste!,ce of a,langu,age
(and congequently of reason and of a w<>,rld picture) ~n bemgs
h'ch we ordinarily do not regard as sentient (e.g., tulJps). The
:uthon of thege ar(Ume,nts substantiate their posi~ions by assuming
th t th language to which they refer may be so different from ours
o
canno' understand its meaning, the more so that the behav
at
we
'language
has no.th-109 -m comm~)fl w!-th
.th of the canien of thIS
lour
behaviOur, We can even fail to guess tnat we are dealing WIth
h~m~ge these authors say. Situations of this kind ~e possible in
~ ,:n 'ew 'in man's contacts with sentient extraterrestnals: the lat~r
ell ~I h.ve to be similar to rr.an in appearance, they may behave Ifl
do no er completely strange to us and communicate in a manner
a ~an~rrerent from ours. In this case we shall not recognise them as
qUIte ble beings. Generally speaking, we may be surrounded by a
reas on' sentient beings these authon believe, whose presence we
mass o~ f even suspect and whose world is com~let:ely impervious to
do nQulne sweeps aside all these arguments pomtlOg out that there
",-
273
are
ex~n~nce
Scien
""""
of",
~rative .~B:Jl1mars.
V,
is he.
1Ute (
gy ,
lCore
"'at
nurnl
foreh
the Carte.slan conception of innate ideas lour as.a basIs for reviving
of the primary semantic field ex re
. n reality, the universality
means in different languages ' is aet!sed. th~ough different language
the substantive structure of 'r t nmn~. by the community of
~rrs of different natiOnallanguP :gCe Ical actiVity characteristic of the
SeeNCh
sk y, Syntactic
. Structures
s.
om
1957
.
77
.
' 's-Gr aven h age, Mouton
See A N . Leontyev , A e fWI., y. Consciousness Personol'ty
'
140-158'
"SA'
.
',pp.
. Vasilyev A Ph '1
h'
finguislie Relati~ity P.' t~OP Ical Analysis of the Hypothesis of
9 The POSSib ilities' and ~a s
f'
e~feet of different language y st 0 expenmental research into th
?i scussed
ar:
Scris6ne~ms
in M. Cole S
on the nature of perception
~cgl~ntroduclion.
i974
' Culture and Thought: Psycholog81 Se' Bunge, Philosophy ofPhysics D
82 G.eH~t.oS. K'~Ohn, op. cit., pp. 202_20~~recht, 1973, pp. 181-182.
S.
n,
ntheRoleofTh
.
a::~~ne~, 25 April, 1975 Vol 188 Jm~i8m Scientific Thought"
Con~S!~.oJ continuous 'lines' in the d ,6, pp. 328-334. For ~
B
a IC ons in the Develo me
eve opment of science see
s~i~l}~dTh)' Moscow 1961 V
tyatural Science (ed. by
A. V' Ak' h ti.Ory , Minsk, 1976' V S B"b,pm, ~e ~onnation of a
u n, The H' t
'"
I er, Thmkmgas C
Ii'ty
(all 'in
Principles of
.
. . Lektorsky "V I
.
tical Logic" Le ..
'
.. Lenin and th
Moscow, 1969' i~mIS"!. as the Philosophy 0; ~hinciPles of Dialec
gels's Book ' .em, The Developm
. e Modern Epoch
Modem
F.
in F. En:
the Logic of the oscow, 1978; V. A Lek n 1- Uhnng" and the
N.t.
"J sf
W~e~scAoW,1967
og:i~~)he
Tim~ntMDUhring'"
Physjca'/;x~~r/
Engel~~t ~~E~!sDte~~logy
wit~I~~n
dirferentiati~n la~s
re
objectiv~
Vb
is hea
tu1e (
Scie ~
0",",
of sci
..,
score,
that '
numt
foreii
Lyubu~in, 'Th~
t~e
ri~71)bid., p. 72.
I II Ibid.
1 12 Ibid" pp. 72-73.
11 3 Ibid" pp, 73-74.
,
114 Ibid., p. 74.
.
h of Kant and Ficht.e "d id not
II r. In Hegel's view, the phiiOSOPt Y it is in and for itsclf but only
as
aUain the level ~r concept o,r spm other" (G. W. F. Hegel,Enzyh
that of spirit as It IS h~ r~latl~~ist~~~ha{len im Grunarisse, Aka-dc/oplJd, c der phll.osoP ~5 en 345).
mieVerlag, Berlm,
, p. en%gie des Geistes, p. 21.
"
116 G. W. F, Hegel,T"a nom
117 Ibid., p, 75."
. and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1841 ,
118 Karl Marx, EconomIC
, .
.
333334
,
' k Lectures on the //lspp,
.
'. "Conspectus of Hegel 5
278
119 V, I. ~nm, h " Col/ected \Vorks, V . 38, p,
. al'zed" The
tOry of Phllosop Y 'V Q .
"Epistemo
atur I
,
120 See Willard
" UlIIe,?
.
/
f Knowmg, pp. 9_3..
.
d la philosophle, Presse
Piagel,
Universitaires de Fra~ce,
P;ris 1970: idem, Psychology a
ces de /'homme, GalhNea:d.vork, i971.
lemoIOlly, Grossm.an,O
t p 77.
\ Essa)'on
122 L Wittgenstem, p. CI .~~ The Bounds of Sense. '1973' Barry
123 ~e e,g., peterIFp;;:a~eason MethUen'JLond~nof Phil~sophy,
Kant's Critique
tal Arguments". The ourna
It
.__
.--
;~c~eo~aon
8v"O,o ,ut*~~s;s9r1:;
2,
1968 ,PP;,rn~;~~al Philosophy T~:;::
,
V A l"ektorsky,
K I va Philosophy an
E
iC
\'sm"
NAME INDEX
VI<
Is Ile,
1Ut' (
Sci,no
co,",
of sci
gy 0
ICOrel
that '
numt
forei!
B
1I1'~,
Deborin, A. M.
267
Descartel, Rell~
8 17 18
51-r;..z, 63, 65, 71, 72 76' 77'
79, aa, 84, 100, Hh '110'
114, HO, 246, 248, 255, 266 '
Duchenko, N. V. - 263
Dyshleviy, P. S, - 263
E
,
Uyenkov, E. V. - 262. 263,
2702,277
Inhelder, Barbel- 265, 269
Ivanov, V. P. - 270
J
Mary 272
Heytlllll, L.
11,1.66
llilll, It. J.
267
Ilolton, Gl' rlld - 274
liullert, Edmund
17, 18,
63-77,79,83-96,98,101,110,
113, 114, 125, 127,240,248,
249,256
HUll, V. P. - 263
Kakabadze, Z. M. - 268
Kant, Immanuel - 8, 17, 18,
49, 79-87, 89, 96, 100, 101,
107, 125, 126, 140,175,176,
208, 214, 215, 222, 240, 246,
249, 255, 256, 277
Karmin, A. S. - 263
Kasymjanov, A. Kh. - 265
Kazyutinsky, V. V. - 263
Kedrov, B. M. - 262,276
Kissel, M. A. - 268
Kleene, Stephen Cole - 262,
276
Kockelmans, J<eph J. - 267
Kopnin, P. V. - 262, 264, 275,
276
Korshunov, A. M. - 136, 262,
265,269,270
KozloVII, M. S. - 277
Kuhn, Thomas - 13, 14, 19,
160,162,163,177-79 ,191.93,
203, 204, 206, 207,221,224,
276
Kuptsov, V.I. - 263
Kuzmin, V. F. - 263
Kuzmin, V. P. - 272
KuznetJOv, V. N, - 268
271
Naall, G. N. - 263
Narsky, 1. S. - 267
Naumenko, L. K. - 263
Neumann - 180, 189
Newton, Isaac - 207,233
o
OgurLsov, A. P. - 270
Oizerman, T. I. - 267, 276
Oml'lyanovsky, M. E.
263,
265,266
Orudthev, Z. M. - 263
219
VI<
is he,
tute c
Seier'll
cover
of sci
gy 0
teOf$l
that I
numt
forei!
o
Quine, Willard V, -
12, 14,
19, 180-200, 202, 203, 219,
228, 249, 276, 277
Tipukhin, V. N. - 263
Tolstoy, Leo - 233
Tomilchik, L. M. - 263
Trubnikov, N. N. - 270
TS('lUhchev, V. V. - 273
Tyukhtin, V. S. - 262, 266
u
R
Rogovin, M. S. -
Rozental, M. M. - 272
Rubinstein, S. L. - 117, 262,
264,265,269,270
Ruskin, John - 122
RuaseU, Berttand -17.26,27
Ruzskaya, A. G. - 264, 269
Ryie, Gilberl- 222
Sadovsky, V, N. - 268
Safari, Kh. - 274
Sapir, Edward - 19, 1 79 191
197,200
'.
SutTe, Jean-Paul - 18 96-108
111, 112, 209, 214 215 222'
228
'"
Sch,elling, Friedrich - 275
Sc:nbner, Sylvia - 274
Shapere, Dudley - 272
Sheptulin, A. P. - 263
Shinkaruk, V. I. - 262 267
276
'
,
Shorokhova, Yeo V. - 264
z
Zaporozhets, A. V. - 145, 264 ,
26971
Zermeio, Ernst -181 189
Zinchenko, V. P. - '145 264,
269.270
'
Zuckermann, I. I. - 269
Zutta, J. - 146