Use Case Studies
Use Case Studies
Use Case Studies
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Problem-Solving Path: A02 B03 C04 D01 E01 and E02 and E06
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Problem-Solving Path: A07 B16 A02 B02 C02 A08 B19 C08
D01 E02 and E03
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Problem-Solving Path: A07 B16 A06 B07 C07 A08 B19 C07
A02 B03 C02 D01 E03
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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RESULT: Significant reductions in the return of NTF components and a reduction in the claim rates
LESSONS LEARNED: 1) Diagnosing intermittent fault conditions can be very difficult and time
consuming. 2) Components should only be replaced when fault conditions have been verified. 3)
Dealership repair personnel should be thoroughly trained on intermittent condition diagnostic strategies.
Problem-Solving Path: A07 B18 A10 B21 C11 D09 A06 B04
C07 D03 E01 and E04 and E06
Figure 18: Dealer Training Intermittent Fault Conditions (ZZ10)
Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Problem-Solving Path: A03 A02 B02 C02 A08 B18 C04 D04
E02
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Access is needed to dealers and technicians to help them understand warranty claims
and receive training.
Improved communication is needed to provide greater access and faster response.
Deep dive of the warranty data earlier in the investigation stage would have revealed
that it was the same dealer who requested all of the repairs.
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Problem-Solving Path: A02 B05 C07 B07 C02 D02 E03 and E05
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Problem-Solving Path: A03 B06 C07 A01 B02 A10 B01 B21
C01 C11 C12 D09 E01 and E06
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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ADJOINING PARTS: Rear crank seal, bearing cap, oil pan, oil pan gasket, front engine cover, front
cover gasket
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Initial concern was the quality of the
supplied component and attention focused on verifying quality records/systems. Field-returned product
was found to still function, it measured correctly, and no causal factor was visible. The Engine assembly
plant leak test records showed no issues, supplier quality records indicated parts were to print and passed
in-process functional audit testing. Reviewed past Lessons Learned and found similar issue occurred five
years earlier, which then helped to focus on the problem-solving area. All adjoining components
indicated the same increase in failure rate at the same time. Dealer visits to observe repairs confirmed
that it was a repeat issue.
ROOT CAUSE: Application equipment at the assembly plant had large positional variability resulting in
an insufficient gasket bead application. Variation continued to deteriorate over time resulting in rising
repair rates. Insufficient quantity of the bead combined with 5S (sanitize) resulted in improper curing
of gasket that leaked at +12 MIS. Leak path was across the rear main seal resulting in an incorrect
diagnosis and repair being made.
SOLUTION: Positional capability of robotic dispenser was improved along with 5S procedures for the
station being implemented. A Technical Bulletin was issued to repair the cap instead of only changing
the rear crank seal. Plant PFMEA was revised.
RESULT: 0.2 C/1000 @ 12 MIS after countermeasures were implemented. All adjoining components
also saw a similar reduction in failure rate. Warranty cost savings $500k.
LESSONS LEARNED: Prior Lessons Learned were not institutionalized resulting in a repeat issue. The
process was allowed to degrade over time and relied on air leak test to detect issues. Considerable time
was spent focused on investigating the single component. Had the adjoining component warranty been
reviewed at the beginning, it would have helped identify the problem more quickly, potentially triggering
an earlier review of past Lessons Learned.
Problem-Solving Path: A03 B06 A02 B12 B03 C07 D09 E01
and E02 and E06
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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DURATION: 6 months
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ROOT CAUSE: By using engineering problem-solving tools, the customer failure event (heater INOP)
was connected to the feature of a broken wire. The location of the broken wire was shown to be nonrandom, always in the same location where the drivers hip would roll off the seat cushion when exiting
the vehicle. To replicate the broken wire feature, an aggressive knee test was developed. This test
replicated the same failure mode as the consumer vehicles. This test was applied at the point of the seat
cushion where the drivers hip would roll off when exiting the vehicle. This test was cycled until the
heater wire fatigued and broke, causing the INOP condition.
SOLUTION: Short term: Change from a single wire design to a fanned wire design to dissipate the stress
input into the part. Long term: Relocate and reroute the wire to remove it from the high stress region.
RESULT: Elimination of this warranty issue.
LESSONS LEARNED: The angle at which the seat heater wire passes through the seat cushion is critical.
If it is perpendicular, the resulting sharp angles will act as stress concentrators as the part is cycled. If the
pass-through angle is closer to parallel, this greatly minimizes the stresses on the part.
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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DURATION: 3 months
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Assembly Plant auditors are calling an out-of-alignment condition that
increases rework time and cost, and warranty cost.
MAGNITUDE: PPH failure rate
ADJOINING PARTS: Door outer sheet metal, side light, rear stationary glass, B-pillar appliqu
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ROOT CAUSE: By using engineering problem-solving tools, the failure location was shown to be nonrandom. It always occurred on the rear doors in the same location on both sides. The team was able to
converge to the source of variation being in the rear outer belt moldings. When looking at bad moldings
compared to good moldings, the team saw a twist in the bad moldings. The twist was allowed to manifest
itself as a misalignment because there are no locating features at the front of the molding to force it to
follow the door metal.
SOLUTION: Short term: Instruct the operator at the supplier to minimize the twist inherent to the part
when manufacturing it. Long term: Add a retention feature to the front edge of the molding to ensure that
it follows the door sheet metal.
RESULT: Elimination of this plant audit / J. D. Power / warranty issue.
LESSONS LEARNED: The checking fixture at the supplier did not represent how the part interfaced with
the actual vehicle. There was no check to measure the alignment with the front outer belt molding that it
was supposed to align with. Also, a clamp at the leading edge of the fixture providing positive location
was not present in the vehicle.
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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DURATION: 3 Weeks
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Implement control
Assemblies were initially inspected and found to be NTF. Statistical Engineering methods were used to
determine the contrast between warranty returned assemblies (Best of the Best [BOB]) and non-vibrating
mirrors (Worst of the Worst [WOW]). Aggravation with excessive energy in a controlled setting on a
vibration table was required to reveal the contrast. A laser was reflected off the mirror glass and
measured with a scale. With very large contrast between BOBs and WOWs, this measurement system
increased the ability to see differences between assemblies. While doing this, the vibration was revealed
in the warranty returned mirror, while the non-vibrating mirror remained good. The movement of the
vibration was non-random, which drove the project to the Powerfold Actuator. Upon confirmation that
the result of the vibration resided in the actuator, components within that assembly were exchanged. The
results showed a significant difference within a feature of a sheet metal stamped component.
ROOT CAUSE:
A feature of a sheet metal stamped component within the actuator assembly was found to drive the
vibration.
SOLUTION:
Stamping and trim dies were modified to bring the measurement of the feature within the distribution of
the BOB component.
RESULT:
Warranty returns were significantly reduced from previous results of 50 C/1000.
LESSONS LEARNED:
Listen to the consumer. Look for non-random patterns to the failure. By understanding the physics of the
failure on NTF parts, you can move forward by understanding how to aggravate the parts. With
aggravation, you want to see the potentially bad part get worse, while the good part remains good.
With a consistent measurement system, one can leverage the contrast between BOB and WOW
parts/assemblies going forward.
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Problem-Solving Path: A05 B04 C07 D07 A03 B04 C02 D02
E03 and E04
Figure 27: OEM Outside Read View Mirror Vibration (ZZ22)
Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ROOT CAUSE: By using engineering problem-solving tools, the concern was determined to be caused
by a stalled motor. The stalled motor condition was caused by insufficient power getting to the motor
through the thermal switch. The difference between the good switch versus the bad switch was the
amount of resistivity present. This was caused by the thermal switch wearing out due to repeated stall
conditions. This was confirmed with 95% confidence.
SOLUTION: Redesign part to be more robust to aggravated OEM customer usage.
RESULT: Elimination of this warranty issue.
LESSONS LEARNED: The part was susceptible to degradation in performance because it had excessive
grease applied inside it that was not well controlled when it was applied, causing it to get into the thermal
switch and degrade its performance.
Problem-Solving Path: A05 B06 C07 D07 A03 B04 C07 D01
E02 and E04
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ROOT CAUSE: By using engineering problem-solving tools, the leak path was shown to be non-random,
always occurring at the same location on all returned parts. A comparison between bad lamps and good
lamps showed a large difference in the height of the back plate seal: the good lamp had a large seal and
the bad lamp had a small seal. This was due to process variation at the supplier. This was confirmed
statistically.
SOLUTION: Short term: Update service bulletin to replace on the back plate, not entire lamp assembly.
Long term: Add more material to seal to ensure adequate sealing surface.
RESULT: Elimination of this warranty issue after corrective action was fully implemented.
LESSONS LEARNED: The 100% online test at the supplier was masking this failure mode. The test was
to draw a vacuum on the lamp assembly and measure the decay rate of the vacuum. This drew the lamp
housing and back plate together increasing the seal between the two parts. This is the opposite of the
physics of how this system works. As the lamp generates heat and light, it causes the air internal to the
lamp to expand, causing the low areas of the seal to lose contact with the lamp housing and create a leak
path.
Problem-Solving Path: A03 B06 C07 C06 D06 E01 and E04
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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DURATION: 18 months, due to commercial issues. The concern was identified via early claims data at
2MIS. Solution was available for production 3 months later.
TIME IN FIELD: 1-36MIS (Occurs early and throughout warranty life cycle).
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Power seat track does not adjust before or after. System is inoperative.
MAGNITUDE: #1 reason for inoperative power tracks (based on analyzed returns).
ADJOINING PARTS: No adjoining parts contribute to this repair (included in same or related claim).
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1.
2.
Create low cost (component) service kit for field repairs. Flex shafts were made available to
dealerships in lieu of replacing entire power track adjuster.
ROOT CAUSE:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Shielding was removed pre-start of production as a cost savings per OEM customer direction.
SOLUTION:
Add a front motor trim plate that anchors the motor and shaft to the seat frame. This gives the assembly
more rigidity and does not allow the customer to reach the flex cable.
RESULT:
90% incident reduction in inoperative power track(s) has been realized.
LESSONS LEARNED:
Trim plate was removed from original design as a cost savings. The removal did not affect normal track
use or any life cycle validation requirements. However, it did allow for the inoperative/pulled off flex
shaft condition when subjected to unforeseen consumer use. Future cost-saving changes need to be RISK
analyzed more diligently.
Problem-Solving Path: A03 B04 C06 C02 D02 E01 and E03
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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Furthermore, a correlation analysis of claim rate versus average storage time (time in between vehicle
production date and sales date or repair date) yielded a high correlation index (0.75-0.89 per vehicle)
between the two variables, giving a strong indication that the occurrence rate of 0-1 MIS battery repairs
varied jointly with average storage time.
Figure 31: Example: Claim Rate vs. Storage Time Correlation Study
c ase /1 0 0veh ic le s (0 - 1
C o r re la tio n fo r M o d e l 1
20
40
60
80
10 0
s to rag e d ay s
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ROOT CAUSE:
1.
2.
Dealer negligence of the OEM warranty policy. Under this policy, dealerships are not
permitted to submit warranty claims for dead batteries due to lack of maintenance on the lot.
SOLUTION: A formal audit of the two dealerships was conducted in order to assess their procedures in
routinely checking vehicles before the date of sale. In addition to the go-and-see audit, both dealerships
were retrained on the OEM warranty policy concerning battery replacement.
Taking the approach and Lessons Learned of this pilot study, the OEM Warranty Group released a
bulletin on the dealer network in order to explain the policy regarding battery warranty claims. For future
occurrences, they also developed a dealer scorecard to identify each region's top dealerships in terms of 01 MIS battery warranty. If a dealership is flagged on this scorecard, the OEM Field Specialists shall
conduct an audit of the dealership in the same manner as the pilot study. In addition, the OEM Warranty
Group may elect to seek reimbursement for these warranty claims at specific dealerships. However, this
option has proved more difficult to pursue due to the lack of sufficient evidence that the battery
replacements are a result of lack of maintenance.
RESULT: 0-1 MIS battery warranty was reduced by 86% for the two dealers involved in the pilot study.
Warranty results for post-implementation of scorecard/audit are still being monitored closely.
LESSONS LEARNED: Some warranty issues are not simply misdiagnosed by the dealer technician but
caused by the dealership practices. In these situations, the actual cause can be seen only by visiting the
dealership, and thus the OEM should allow for go-and-see opportunities at the dealership in order to
confirm this issue. For actual countermeasure, the OEM is the main stakeholder for the dealerships, thus
the OEM should be responsible for developing standardized tools to prevent future occurrences and
enforcing the warranty policy onto the dealer.
Problem-Solving Path: A09 B18 C10 C11 D09 E01 and E06
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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VEHICLE SYSTEM:
Powertrain/Engine Control
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SOLUTION: Improve the computer software to match the performance of the previous model.
For a field fix, re-program the Engine Computer with the improved software by issuing a TSB.
For production countermeasure and recurrence prevention, install the new Engine Computer that has the
improved software.
RESULT: Claim rate did not significantly decrease. Dealerships had already been denying consumers for
the repairs for the engine computer before countermeasure. The most substantial evidence of increasing
consumer satisfaction was through the use of consumer surveys, which decreased the overall Problems
Per 100 vehicles rating for engine performance by 50+%.
Warranty claim costs decreased by 35% due to TSB instructions not to replace full Engine Computers
during repair.
LESSONS LEARNED:
1.
Teamwork is required for quickly detecting and resolving field issues. Collaboration by the
supplier, the OEMs, and the dealership technicians allowed for comprehensive analysis and
dynamic evaluation of the problem and how it could be triggered by certain driving
conditions. Collaborative testing was done at the component levels (Supplier) and the vehicle
levels (OEM) in order to investigate and identify all possible root causes of the issue.
2.
Design specification does not always capture the consumers expectation. Finally, by
comparing design changes made in the previous model year changeover, the root cause was
identified as a fundamental software change due to the added complexity of the engine
control system itself. The information was quickly communicated to Design, with sufficient
evidence of actual customer verbatim, to instigate a change in the new design specification in
order to meet the customers expected usage.
Problem-Solving Path: A06 B07 C07 C06 D02 E01 and E03
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Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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VEHICLE SYSTEM:
Chassis/Tire Pressure Monitoring System
DURATION: Start of the 2007 model year (11/06) to February 25, 2007 (production month)
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Consumer Experiences TPMS warning light on after 20 minutes of vehicle
operation.
MAGNITUDE:
TPMS receiver warranty claim rate increased 12 times from 2006 model year to 2007 model year.
ADJOINING PARTS:
For customers with TPMS warning light on, the dealer would perform any of the following repairs in
order of most likely occurrence:
1.
2.
3.
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For a quick field fix, the OEM coordinated replacement of pre-countermeasure TPMS receivers with new
level hardware by issuing a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) to the dealer network.
For production countermeasure and recurrence prevention, the OEM changed over to the new level
receiver.
RESULT:
The warranty claim rate showed a reduction of 60% after the countermeasure. Furthermore, issues with
the ECU were discovered after the receiver countermeasure was completed; after ECU issues were
addressed, the claim rate dropped an additional 25%.
LESSONS LEARNED:
1.
Component level bench testing is not always sufficient to catch issues that may be related to
vehicle architecture. Thus, vehicle-level testing is needed in order to isolate individual system
components and measure working specifications and inputs/outputs while in a simulated
system of vehicle variation.
2.
This issue was captured in pre-production stages, however, it was allowed to flow out to the
field due to NTF condition of investigated parts and moderate tolerance for chronic TPMS
light-on issues. Vehicle-level system testing implemented at this stage could have intercepted
this issue before flowing out to the customer.
Problem-Solving Path: A06 B07 C07 A02 B03 C02 D02 E01
and E03
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Figure 34: Tire Pressure Monitoring System Poor Capture Rate (ZZ41)
Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details
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originating location versus having to struggle with going through the learning curve. Collaboration
resulted in a clear understanding of requirements, print interpretations, measurement methods, and
acceptance criteria. Final process verification was through multiple material lot trials to verify that both
the lower tier supplier and our organization were capable and correlate.
Applicable Manual: Phase 3Sections 3.1, 3.9 and Phase 4Section 4.1
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