ALBA VS CA

Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] are the February 27, 2004 decision [2] and the
May 14, 2004 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883, which
dismissed petitioners original action for annulment of judgment [4] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 37, and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts show that on October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C.
Herrera filed a petition[5] for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of
Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., to wit: (1) the surname Herrera as appended to the name of said
child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.;
and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the childs mother, Armi A. Alba
(Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the challenged entries are
false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of
said birth certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with
Ezperanza C. Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba
Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he presented certifications from the Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong City[6] and the National Statistics Office, [7] both stating that they have no
record of marriage between private respondent and Armi.
On November 12, 1996, private respondent filed an amended petition, [8] impleading
Armi and all the persons who have or claim any interest in th[e] petition. [9]
On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing
on January 24, 1997, and directed the publication and service of said order to Armi at her
address appearing in the birth certificate which is No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, and
to the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor General. The full text of the
order, reads:
In a verified Amended Petition for Correction of Entry, the Petitioner prays, inter alia, that
the following entries appearing in the subject Certificate of Live Birth be deleted:
1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned therein;
2. The surname Herrera appended to the childs name;
3. His alleged marriage with the natural mother of the child.

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Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the Petition be set for
hearing on January 24, 1997 at nine oclock in the morning before this Branch at Rooms
447-449, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall. All interested parties are hereby notified of the
said hearing and are ordered to show cause why the Petition should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila,
and raffled pursuant to P.D. 1079.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
City of Manila with copies of the Petition and of this Order.
Let the same be likewise furnished the Private Respondent Armi Alba Herrera at the
address indicated in the subject Certificate of Live Birth.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On January 13, 1997, before the scheduled January 24, 1997 hearing, the trial court
issued an Amended Order[11] with substantially the same contents, except that the hearing
was re-scheduled to February 26, 1997. A copy of said Amended Order was published in
Today, a newspaper of general circulation in Manila in its January 20, 27, and February 3,
1997 issues. Copies thereof were also sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila,
on January 17, 1997, the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Solicitor General.
At the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the Office of the
Solicitor General appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the other hand
was not present. The return of the notice sent to her had the following notation:
This is to certify that on January 17, 1997, the undersigned [process server] personally
served a copy of the Amended Order in Sp. Proc. No. 96-80512 dated January 13, 1997 to
the private respondent, Armi Alba Herrera at 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, but failed
and unavailing for reason that (sic), private respondent is no longer residing at
said given address.[12]
On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and
executory on June 2, 1997.[13] The dispositive portion thereof, states:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo
Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entry under the name of the child, the surname

Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and that
the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong,
MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila for proper
correction and entry.
SO ORDERED.

[14]

Private respondent filed a motion [15] for amendment of the decretal portion of the
decision to include the cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father of
petitioner minor. This was granted in the August 11, 1997 order of the trial court as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo
Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entries under the name of the child, the surname
Herrera, Jr., and the name of the father Rosendo Caparas Herrera are ordered deleted, and
the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and the entry under the date and place of
marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or
cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[16]
On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction over their person. She allegedly came to know of the decision of the trial court
only on February 26, 1998, when San Beda College, where her son was enrolled as a high
school student, was furnished by private respondent with a copy of a court order directing
the change of petitioner minors surname from Herrera to Alba.
Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302 Plaza
Towers Condominium, 1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because such was her
residence when she and private respondent cohabited as husband and wife from 1982 to
1988; and her abode when petitioner minor was born on March 8, 1985. Even after their
separation, private respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998; and that
Unit 302 was conveyed to her by private respondent on June 14, 1991 as part of his
support to petitioner minor. According to Armi, her address i.e., No. 418 Arquiza St.,
Ermita, Manila, as appearing in the birth certificate of their son, was entered in said
certificate through the erroneous information given by her sister, Corazon Espiritu. She
stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418 Arquiza St., is the residence
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of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of notice therein to prevent her
from opposing the petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his
purported cohabitation with Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as false
statements coming from a polluted source. [17]
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among
others, that petitioner failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and
purposely deprived them of their day in court. It further held that as an illegitimate child,
petitioner minor should bear the surname of his mother. [18] Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments may
be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. [19]
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and
her minor child depends on the nature of private respondents action, that is, in
personam, in rem orquasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against a person based
on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. [20]
Hence, petitions directed against the thing itself or the res,[21] which concerns the
status of a person,[22] like a petition for adoption,[23] annulment of marriage,[24] or correction
of entries in the birth certificate,[25] as in the instant case, are actions in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdictionover the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. [26] The
service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. [27]
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested
the latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in
civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected
through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the
proper Regional Trial Court.[28] Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over

the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the
trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication
thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the
requirement of due process, the essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said
address appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the residence of Armi.
Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears her signature, the entries appearing therein
are presumed to have been entered with her approval. Moreover, the publication of the
order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which
binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. [29] The absence of personal
service of the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial courts compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for correction/change of
entries in a minors birth certificate to reflect the name of the minors real father as well as
to effect the corresponding change of her surname. In seeking to annul said decision, the
other children of the alleged father claimed that they are indispensable parties to the
petition for correction, hence, the failure to implead them is a ground to annul the decision
of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition which was sustained by this
Court on the ground, inter alia, that while petitioner is indeed an indispensable party, the
failure to implead her was cured by the publication of the order of hearing. Thus
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest
was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the
daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be
established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition
for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule
108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a
petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or
illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her
petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply
with Section 3 as quoted above.

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Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which
requires notice by publication, thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover
even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but
were inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted:
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of
January 7, 1985. The actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred
jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try and decide the case. While nobody appeared
to oppose the instant petition during the December 6, 1984 hearing, that did not divest
the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue trying the case.
For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues until termination of
the case.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the
whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication
is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in
the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [30]
Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private respondents alleged concealment of
Armis present address, was not proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent
act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Here, Armi contended that private
respondent is aware of her present address because they lived together as husband and
wife in the condominium unit from 1982 to 1988 and because private respondent
continued to give support to their son until 1998. To prove her claim, she presented (1)
private respondents title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts allegedly issued to

private respondent for payment of homeowners or association dues; (2) a photocopy of a

January 14, 1991 deed of sale of the subject unit in favor of Armi; and (3) the subsequent
title issued to the latter. However, these documents only tend to prove private
respondents previous ownership of the unit and the subsequent transfer thereof to Armi,
but not the claimed live-in relationship of the parties. Neither does the sale prove that the
conveyance of the unit was part of private respondents support to petitioner minor.
Indeed, intimate relationships and family relations cannot be inferred from what appears
to be an ordinary business transaction.
Although the January 14, 1991 deed of sale[31] stated that Armi resides at 1175 L.
Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, the same is not sufficient to prove that private respondent
has knowledge of Armis address because the former objected to the offer of the deed for
being a mere photocopy.[32] The counsel for petitioners even admitted that they do not
have the original of the deed and that per certification of the Clerk of Court, the Notary
Public who notarized the deed of sale did not submit a copy of the notarized document as
required by the rules.[33] The deed cannot thus be the basis of ascribing knowledge of
Armis address to private respondent inasmuch as the authenticity thereof was neither
admitted by private respondent nor proven by petitioners.

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, where only questions of
law may be raised. The resort of petitioner to the instant civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is therefore erroneous. The special civil action of certiorari will not be allowed as a
substitute for failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45, which should be
instituted within 15 days [37] from receipt of the assailed decision or resolution. The wrong
choice of remedy thus provides another reason to dismiss this petition. [38]
Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial courts
decision. In an action for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the court
that something may indeed be achieved should the assailed decision be annulled.
[39]
Under Article 176[40] of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9255,
which took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
fathers surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar,[41] it was held that an illegitimate child
whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mothers
surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only
when said child is recognized that he may use his fathers surname, reflecting his status as
an acknowledged illegitimate child.

While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they
were only attached as annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence before
the Court of Appeals. More importantly, said letters/notes do not have probative value
because they were mere photocopies and never proven to be an authentic writing of
private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits [34] of Armi and her sister, Corazon
Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such
affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written
statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for crossexamination.[35] Inasmuch as Armi and her sister were not presented before the Court of
Appeals to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are considered hearsay and
without probative value.

In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an
illegitimate child because she was never married to private respondent. Considering that
the latter strongly asserts that he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is
therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his
mother.

Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove.[36] Armis claim that private respondent is aware of her present address is anchored
on the assertion of a live-in relationship and support to her son. Since the evidence
presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the purported cohabitation and support, it
follows that private respondents knowledge of Armis address was likewise not proven.
Thus, private respondent could not have deliberately concealed from the court that which
was not shown to be known to him. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed the
petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of failure to establish extrinsic fraud.

CERUILA vs DELANTAR

The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an

action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court is a petition for review
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In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not
warrant the annulment of the trial courts decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004 decision and the
May 14, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an action with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-818932, for the
annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn),
the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo Jaloslos. [1] The RTC granted the Ceruilas
petition in its decision dated April 11, 1997[2] which was nullified, however, by the Court of
Appeals (CA) on June 10, 1999.[3] The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[4]
Hence the present petition.

The antecedents are as follows:

Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar (Simplicio)
for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail
starting August 22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a petition for involuntary
commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), as the whereabouts of the mother, Librada Ceruila, was unknown. The petition
was granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 119 on November 9, 1996 and Simplicios
motion to vacate said judgment was denied by said court on January 20, 1997.[5]
On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila, entitled IN THE
MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA
ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR, praying that the birth certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and
declared null and void for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument
of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all
material entries therein, as follows:
a.) The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A.
Telin;
b.) The signature of informant referring to Librada T. Delantar being a
forgery;
c.) The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering
that, as already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and coguardian in fact of Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in
(sic) unknown;
d.) The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents
reflected in said certificate were (sic) actually full blood brother and
sister and therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
e.) The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is
actually not legitimate;
f.) The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father
merely made it appear that she was born at the time the informations
for the birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or
(sic) proper recording;
g.) The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth
of Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious Dr. Santos.[6]
On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing on March 19,
1997 and directed the publication of said order once a week for three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation. The Order also stated that any person who is
interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or opposition thereto on or
before the scheduled hearing.[7]
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Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. [8] However, no representative appeared
during the scheduled hearing.[9]
On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the Ceruilas as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria
Rosilyn Telin Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No. 8527325 of the office of the City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and
void ab initio: and
2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National
Statistics Office, Manila, to expunge from their respective marriage
registers the entry of the birth of said minor and such other documents
pertaining thereto, if any.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Office of the City Civil
Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The RTC explained in its Decision thus:
During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find out
if there is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioners
counsel, Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, then established the jurisdictional
requirements (Exhibits A to E). [11] Thereafter, petitioner husband Platon
Ceruila was placed on the stand as the lone witness for the petitioner and
after he completed his testimony, Atty. Paderanga formally offered his
evidence and rested his case.
The evidence on record reveals the following:
On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial
Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her
birth certificate as Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit I). In the said birth
certificate the name of the childs mother appear as Librada A. Telin (Entry
No. 6) while that of her father as Simplicio R. Delantar (Entry No. 9). The
birth certificate likewise shows that the parents of the child, Simplicio R.
Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married on February 14,

1977 in Manila (Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21 of the same
document, it is made to appear that the mother of the child was 27 years
old when the child was born and that she was attended in her delivery
thereof by Dr. Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth certificate was signed by
one Librada T. delos Santos as the informant and mother of the child with
her given address as 2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry No. 14). This is
the very certificate of live birth that is being seriously impugned by the
herein petitioners.
In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal
certificates of Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit J) and Librada Delantar (Exhibit
K) to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could not have
been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said baptismal
certificates, the names of the parents of Simplicio and Librada are
similarly entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen (Exhibit J-1 and K-1).
The Court is inclined to concur with the observation of the petitioner that it
is highly unlikely that the alleged parents of Rosilyn would commit an
incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that they are the parents
of the herein minor. The court has also observed that in the baptismal
certificate of Librada Delantar, it is entered therein that she was born
on January 8, 1940 in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit K-2). Such being
the case, then Librada must have been 45 years of age at the time of the
birth of Rosilyn in stark contrast to her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic)
of the birth certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27 years
old at the time of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal
certificate of Librada Delantar as secondary evidence of her birth
certificate was resorted to after the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of birth
on file with the office for the period January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all
destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit L). And going for the jugular, so to
speak, the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the
birth certificate (Exhibit I) purporting to be that of the petitioner wife and
the signature of the latter appearing in the verification of the petitioner
(sic) (Exhibit A-6) are so strikingly dissimilar that they could not have but
proceeded from two different hands. For it does not require the trained eye
of an expert calligrapher to discern such discrepancy in the writing style.

petition. To let the birth certificate reamin (sic) as it is would adversely

affect the rights and interests of the herein petitioners. [12]
On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with the CA,
a petition for the annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her
birth certificate.[13] She claimed that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition
and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same only from the news onMay 16,
1997.[14] She argued that the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and in violation
of her right to due process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to be
illegitimate; and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire certificate,
is the appropriate remedy.[15]
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her mother,
still it was erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate; Librada is not an
interested party concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the father, the date of actual
birth, and the name of the physician who attended to the birth; [16] Libradas allegations are
also contradicted by (a) the Records Based on Cord Dressing Room Book dated April 13May 29, 1985, issued by Emelita H. Avinante, Head of the Medical Records Section and
Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which is attached to the petition for annulment as
Annex E and which states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 at the
Fabella Hospital and that her parents are Librada Telin and Simplicio Delantar; [17] and (b)
the admission of Simplicio in his Motion to Vacate Judgment [18] in Sp. Proc. No. 96419[19] regarding the custody of Rosilyn, which is attached to the petition to annul as
Annex F, where he stated that he, as the rightful parent of Rosilyn, should not be deprived
of his parental authority.[20]
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE,
is GRANTED.

premises

considered,

SO ORDERED.[21]
The CA reasoned that:

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instant

Petition

Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision of

the respondent Regional Trial Court dated April 11, 1997 in Special
Proceedings No. 97-81893.
With costs against private respondents.

In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the petitioners

claim that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified document, the Court is
left with no other alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in the

the

As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 9781893 entitled In the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth
Certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, herein petitioner Rosilyn
Delantar represented by her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a partyrespondent therein,contrary to the mandatory provision of Section 3 of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein, Platon
Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila, sought not only a cancellation or correction
of an entry in the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar but in effect
sought to annul, cancel or expunge from the Civil Register the subject
birth certificate. With more reasons, therefore, that all parties, particularly
Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or thru her legal guardian, the DSWD, whose birth
certificate was sought to be annulled or cancelled from the Civil Register
must not only be notified but must be made a party in the said petition.
Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest
which would be affected by the petition for the obvious reason that it is
the entry of her birth which is being sought to be annulled and cancelled.
In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of substantial
entries in the certificate other than mere clerical errors, should be passed
upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings with all the persons
interested are made parties therein Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462;
468-469; 470-474).
The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 is
indeed wanting of the required notice to all the parties having claim or
interest which would be affected thereby, and of the adversarial
proceedings, as disclosed in the decision dated April 11, 1997
With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April 11,
1997 null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of herein
petitioner Rosilyn Delantar and the DSWD as her legal guardian and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
said decision. Also, the said decision dated April 11, 1997 is considered
null and void for lack of due process there being no adversarial
proceedings (was) conducted by the public respondent Regional Trial
Court.

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 7

And, even if the same judgment had already become final and executory,
and had in fact been executed, as in the instant case, still the execution
thereof produces no legal effects. [22]
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. [23] Hence, the present petition
raising the following issues
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 38 DATED APRIL 11, 1997 IN SPEC.
PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893 ENTITLED: IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION
AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN
DELANTAR
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY POWER TO DECLARE THE SUBJECT BIRTH
CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.[24]
As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the falsification of the entries in the birth
certificate of Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the case should be liberally
construed as an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of falsified documents based
on Article 5 of the Civil Code [25] and Section 15, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court [26]and not as a
special proceeding; petitioners were only constrained to utilize the provisions of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry since
Article 5 of the Civil Code provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents
which happens to be a birth certificate in this case; since the present case involves an
ordinary civil action, the cases relied upon by the CA which are applicable only to special
proceedings should not be applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an indispensable
party, was duly served summons by mail; respondent, meanwhile, is not an indispensable
party and granting that she is, she was deemed duly impleaded as her name was clearly
stated in the caption of the case; respondents location could not be determined as she
was reported to have ran away from the custody of Simplicio, thus the publication of the
petition and the order of the RTC setting the case for hearing once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation should be considered substantial
notice and the requirements of due process deemed substantially complied with; there
was no adversarial proceeding in court because the parties were declared in general
default thus, just like an ordinary civil case, the court should receive evidence ex parte.[27]
As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have exercised its
peremptory power to declare the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab

initio following the doctrine that where an instrument is void ab initio for being contrary to
law, no amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity; otherwise, there will be
multiplicity of actions as the parties will have to file cases anew to annul respondents birth
certificate.[28]
They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be reversed and that the RTC
judgment dated April 11, 1997 be reinstated.[29]
Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent, contends that: since the
petitioners chose to file a petition under Rule 108 they cannot in the present action turn
around and claim that their case is not a special proceeding; in any case, due process was
not complied with rendering the proceedings a quo annullable; petitioners sought to
establish Librada Ceruilas status, i.e., whether or not she is the mother of respondent,
thus, the action falls within the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court;
[30]
petitioners did not allege that they are bringing the suit to enforce or protect their right
or to prevent or redress a wrong, for their case to be categorized as an ordinary civil
action; Art. 5 of the Civil Code which is being invoked by petitioners is a general provision,
while entries of record of birth in the civil register are governed by Republic Act No. 3753
(Civil Registry Law) as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 651; since the law provides
for a remedy when an entry in a record found in the civil registry is erroneous or falsified,
petitioners cannot, by their mere allegation, transport their case from the realm of the
rules on special proceedings for the correction of entry to that of an ordinary civil case for
annulment of a falsified document; in Republic vs. Valencia, [31] it was held that the parties
who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register are the civil registrar and all persons who have or who are
claiming interests who would be affected thereby; respondent, being a person whose
interests would be adversely affected by the petition, is an indispensable party to the
case; publication cannot be substituted for notice; respondent cannot be declared in
default since she was not properly notified.[32]
Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority to rule on the
merits of the case since in a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, its authority is limited to ruling on whether or not the petitioner was denied
due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the merits of the case, it would have
deprived respondent of due process; and that in any case, respondents record of birth is
not void as Librada was only able to prove that she is not the mother of respondent. [33]
Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for review
on certiorari, it claimed at the same time that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is properly a ground for a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Considering however the substance of the issues raised herein, we shall treat the present
petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review on certiorari.[34]
CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 8

Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn an ordinary
civil action or a special proceeding? Considering that the petition, based on its allegations,
does not question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters assailing the truthfulness of any
entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry.
Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as
having been falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section
3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in the negative.
Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that:
SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto. [35] As enunciated in Republic vs.
Benemerito,[36] unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements
of the rules.[37]
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of Rosilyns birth
certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake.
Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the proceeding, it is
enough that her name was included in the caption of the petition. Such reasoning is
without merit.
As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[38] where the mother sought changes in
the entries of her two childrens birth certificates:
since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only
respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is
required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office
of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child
but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as

their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons
who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented . . ..[39] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who, however,
did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to comply with
the requirements laid down by the rules.
Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the publication
of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts
with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. [40]This
is but proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she
so chooses.
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested party was not
impleaded in the petition, such defect was cured by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on
publication. In said cases, however, earnest efforts were made by the petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties.[41]
Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings
seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to
summon the Solicitor General.
It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the cancellation
of Rosilyns birth certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the DSWD, and the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, parties to the petition. Rosilyn
was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos, where her father, as appearing in
the birth certificate, was said to have pimped her into prostitution. In the criminal case,
the defense contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been
considered by the trial court to prove Rosilyns age and thus find basis for statutory rape,
as said birth certificate has been cancelled by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special
proceeding antecedent to this petition. Their efforts in this regard, however, were
thwarted when the CA overturned Branch 38s decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos.
132875-76[42] considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyns age at the time of the
commission of the crime.
There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the false entries in
the birth certificate of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence should be nullified under
Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be nullified by the CA in exercise of its peremptory
power to declare null and void the said certificate.
CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 9

The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court,
is not to replace the trial courts decision sought to be annulled. The action under Sections
1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:
Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside the
questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and
void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.
However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, nothing more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the
petition for the amendment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to
substitute its own findings thereon.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
*******************************************

ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE A.K.A. MARIA

ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the
Philippines assails and seeks to set aside the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
October 21, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74398 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bangued, Abra in Special Proceeding Case No. 1916, a petition for change of name
thereat commenced by herein respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as
Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following:
1.

2.

3.
4.

That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses

Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth
of Bangued, Abra;
That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
Bangued, Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas
Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use
but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;
That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well
as in her other public and private records; and
That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.

Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to
conform to the name she has always carried and used.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered respondent, as
petitioner thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication,
and set the hearing on February 20, 2001.
At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving
respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish
jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001. In the
afternoon of February 20, respondent filed her "Offer of Evidence for Marking and
Identification Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts."
On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial courts express March 26,
2001 directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001hearing. Following another
resetting, what actually would be the initial hearing was, after notice, scheduled
on September 25, 2001 and actually held. At that session, respondent presented and
marked in evidence several documents without any objection on the part of
herein petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), thru
the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra. Among the documents thus submitted
and marked in evidence were the following:
Exh.
Exh.
Exh.
Exh.
Exh.

A - The Petition
B - The Notice of Initial Hearing
C - The Certificate of Posting
D - The Appearance of the Solicitor General
E - The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 10

Exh.
Exh.
Exh.
Exh.

F - The Affidavit of Publication

F-I -The Newspaper Clippings
G - The Norluzonian Courier
H - Another copy of Norluzonian Courier

Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case,
respondent took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition was to have
her registered name changed to that which she had actually been using thru the years.
She also categorically stated she had not been accused of any crime under either her
registered name or her present correct name.
An excerpt of other portions of her testimony, as recited in the Republics petition
which cited the decision of the trial court:
At the witness stand the petitioner [herein respondent Bolante] testified,
among others, that she is now married to Jorge Marbella, Jr. and presently
residing at Bliss Angad, Bangued, Abra since 1995 but before she resided
in Zone 4, Bangued, Abra since birth. She presented her birth certificate
and was marked as Exhibit J to establish such fact of birth and to effect
that the name Roselie Eloisa B. Bolante entered therein is not her true and
correct name but instead Maria Eloisa Bolante which she had been using
during her school days, while being a government employee, and in all her
public and private records.
She presented her professional license issued by the Professional
Regulation Commission, Certificate issued by the Philippine Institute of
Certified Public Accountant and a 'Quick Count' document all issued in her
name Maria Eloisa B. Marbella, which documents were marked as Exhibit K
and Exhibit L and Exhibit M respectively. She likewise marked her marriage
license as Exhibit N to prove her marriage xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that, she
wanted to secure a passport and wanted that the same be issued in her
correct name and that she would not have filed the petition was (sic) it not
for the passport.
On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing the
petition is her realization that there will be a complication upon her
retirement.[2] (Words in bracket added.)
On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby approved and is

granted by this Court for being meritorious.
The Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, is hereby directed:
a) To change the name of the petitioner in her record of
birth from Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante to Maria
Eloisa Bringas Bolante; and,
b) To record this decision in the Civil
accordance with Registry Regulations.

Registry

in

Furnish copy of this Order to the Municipal Civil Registrar of

Bangued, Abra for recording and compliance.
SO ORDERED.[3] (Underscoring added)
In time, the Republic, through the OSG, went to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed Decision ofOctober 21, 2003,
[4]
the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, the Republics present petition on the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SEC.
3, RULE 103 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL
COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A
QUO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY, UNSUPPORTED BY
ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF
HER NAME IS NOT RESORTED FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name. As we articulated in Republic v. Hon. Judge of Branch
III of the CFI of Cebu,[5] citing pertinent jurisprudence,[6] non-compliance with these
requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine a
petition for change of name. The provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where
the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such
filing;
CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 11

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall
fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of
the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published
in the province, .The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30)
days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice. (Underscoring added.)
On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be set
within four (4) months from the last publication of the notice of such hearing, petitioner
submits at the threshold that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
want or defective publication.
We are not persuaded.
As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on October
18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on November 13,
2000. The notice of hearing was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000
and December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian Courier.Counted from the last
day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled
on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed under
Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the CA,[7] must emphasize, however,
that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed respecting the 4-month
limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all
concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25, 2001.
It is the Republics posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September 25,
2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional defect since
notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic
would state and correctly so that the in remnature of a change of name proceeding
necessitates strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on
publication, in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. [8]
The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice to the
whole world that the proceeding in question has for its object to bar indifferently all who
might be minded to make an objection of any and against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in
the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [9]

In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following
requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place
for the hearing must be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a week for
three successive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating
ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being heard within 30 days prior to an
election or within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice of the hearing.
It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person
may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his
deputy shall appear on behalf of the Government. [10] The government, as an agency of the
people, represents the public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf
of the government, effectively represents the public. [11] In this case, the Solicitor General
deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his
behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of
the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial
notice of the hearing.
Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which,
to reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the
provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity,
relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements
exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and
knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances
obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity
to the proceedings a quo.
On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional
law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals for purposes of identification, and that changing ones name is a privilege and
not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in
either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or
any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name. [12] Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying
grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid
confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest. [13]

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 12

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of
what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court.
The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best
evidence available.[14] What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to
borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, [15] not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of
the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the
event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
lodged in the courts.
With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name
is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started
schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the
name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic records, as well as
records in government offices, including that of her driver's license, professional license as
a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the
"Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her
life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted.
But beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to
avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so
without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. [16]
The OSG's argument that respondents bare testimony is insufficient to show that
the requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any
entanglement with the law deserves scant consideration. Surely, the issuance of a police
and NBI clearance or like certification, while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG
suggests, be a convincing norm of ones good moral character or compelling evidence to
prove that the change of name is not sought for any evil motive or fraudulent
intent. Respondents open court testimony, given under pain of perjury and for which she
was cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any crime under her registered
name or under her present name (name that she is using) had convinced the trial court of
the bona fides of her request for change of name. As the CA correctly ratiocinated:
In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her
registered name in order to avoid confusion having used a different name
all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-mentioned enumeration
not to mention that the instant remedy presents the less cumbersome and
most convenient way to set her records straight.

Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed

to prove that the petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to
her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect that
she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements of Rule
103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to
establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This
purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration and affirmation of the
petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for a
legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the
petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition
for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that
the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we
see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused by oppositorappellant. (Word in bracket added).
At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the
basic petition is whimsical or based on a consideration other than to avoid confusion. The
trial court appears to have exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition.
Like the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the action thus taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
********************************
RE: FINAL REPORT ON Adm. Matter No. 06-7-414-RTC THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Present: BR. 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC.
This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases
conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch
67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006.
As of audit date, the RTC had a total caseload of 523 cases consisting of 309 criminal
cases and 214 civil cases, including 33 unaccounted LRC cases. The Audit Team made the
following observations:
In the conduct of the audit, the Team used the case numbers in the
Docket Books from January 2003 up to [the] present as reference in the
inventory of cases. Entries in the docket books are insufficient especially
in the special proceedings cases which merely indicate the title of the
case and the date the case was filed and the word decided.

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
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During the audit, it was observed by the Team that there was no special
proceeding case records presented. Upon inquiry, Clerk of Court Paulino
Saguyod averred that mostly [sic] of these cases are for Petitions for
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry and mostly [sic] are already
decided and there are only few pending. Considering that the docket
books have insufficient entries, the Team Leader used as reference the
case numbers filed from January 2003 up to [the] present. During the
random sampling of records, the same cannot be produced as the
records were already bundled. x x x
COC Saguyod gave the team four (4) [folder] copies of decisions in the
special proceedings cases. Initial findings reveal that the date of filing
indicated in the docket books and the date of decision was so near that it
will be highly improbable that the required publication will be complied
with. Hence, the Team demanded for [sic] the production of 608 case
records of special proceeding[s] cases.
In the copies of decisions presented, common in the second paragraph of
the pro-forma decisions, are statements that finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, the same was set for hearing on x x
x. On said date and time, the petition was announced in open
court. Nobody interposed any objection. Accordingly, the counsel for
petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts
([Exh.] A and series). Thereafter, he moved and was allowed to adduce
further evidence before the Clerk of Court and at [sic] the presence of
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor who appeared in behalf of the
State. However, during the course of the audit it was observed by the
Team that almost all of the petitions are pro-forma and notarized by COC
Saguyod as ex-officio notary public. There are even unsigned, unverified
and not notarized petitions granted by the Court. Further, almost all of
them have no hearings conducted that it will be improbable if not
possible that the court orders be published in a newspaper of general
circulation as required by the Rules of Court. The docketing of cases was
not also in sequence as to its date of filing (Annex A).
Moreover, there are eighty-six (86) petitions [where] the date of filing
were simultaneous or ahead of the date of [the] alleged hearing/decision
(Annex B) and fifty-eight (58) petitions [were] found to have either no
[c]ourt action or no further action for a considerable length of time
(Annex C). Also, nine (9) petitions have similar docket numbers and
three (3) cases with the same docket number (Annex D) while one

hundred seventy-nine (179) cases [sic] records were not presented to

the Team (Annex E).
Further, in the reconciliation of the Semestral Docket Inventory for the
period July-December 2004 of Land Registration Cases, thirty-three (33)
case records are unaccounted [for] x x x.
The Team also observed that there is no Certificate of Arraignment
attached to [the] criminal case records. Minutes of the Hearing have no
summary of what transpired during the hearing of the case. Docket
books for criminal and civil cases are [sic] not updated. [The] [d]ocket
book for special proceedings cases merely indicated the title of the case
and the date it was filed with [a] notation decided. There is no docket
book shown for land registration cases.

(d) why nine (9) petitions had similar docket numbers and three (3) other cases
had the same docket number; and
(e) why the records of 179 special proceedings and those of 33 land registration
case were not presented to the Audit Team.[3]
It was also recommended that Clerk of Court Saguyod be required to: (a) explain
why the initial deposit of P500.00 per ballot box for 61 ballot boxes made by the
protestant in Election Protest No. 001-04 pursuant to the order of 4 June 2004 was not
remitted to the Fiduciary Fund Account; and (b) explain the discrepancy in the official
receipts representing the payment of filing fees for Spec. Proc. Nos. 1028, 1029 and 1030
which appeared as payment for Spec. Proc. Nos. 1032 and 1033. [4]
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod jointly filed an Explanation dated 1
August 2005,[5] giving the following reasons for their actions:
(a)

As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without hearing and

publication
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod explained that almost all
of these petitions may be covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 [6] which
authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to correct clerical or
typographical errors in an entry and/or change the first name or nickname
in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. The petitions were
filed before the trial court because there was no incumbent Local Civil
Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on these petitions under
R.A. No. 9048. Since R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of entries without
hearing and publication for as long as the necessary documents are
submitted, the trial court considered the same procedure as applicable to
the petitions for correction of entries filed before it. The Clerk of Court still
held ex partehearings to receive the evidence. In resolving these petitions
which are summary and non-adversarial in nature, the trial court adopted
the procedure in civil cases where the defendant is declared in default and
the court renders judgment based on the pleadings filed by plaintiff and
grants such relief as may be warranted, following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The trial court adopted this procedure to expedite
the resolution of said petitions to afford the court more time to devote to
the resolution of criminal and civil cases that required more attention.

(b)

As to the 86 petitions that were resolved on the same date as the date
of filing or date of hearing
These petitions were for correction of entry/ies and involved
innocuous errors that may be subject of administrative corrections under
R.A. No. 9048. The trial court resolved these petitions with dispatch to

Anent Election Protest No. 001-04, the Court in its order dated 04 June
2004 directed the protestant to make an initial deposit of [P]500.00 per
ballot box (61 ballot boxes) as compensation for the revisors within five
(5) days from notice. There was no receipt attached to the records of the
case. COC Saguyod explained that the receipt was with the protestant
and that the same was not per official receipt and not deposited to [sic]
the Fiduciary Account as the same will be paid to the revisors. He
claimed that he will also render an accounting of the expenses incurred
at the end of the hearing.
Likewise noted are the payments made in SP Nos. 1032 and 1033, both
undocketed petitions, [having] the same Official Receipts Numbers which
when compared with the original receipts[,] referred to other cases
and/or transactions x x x.[1]
In view of its observation, the Audit Team recommended in its Memorandum dated 11 July
2005[2] that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod be directed to explain the
following within ten (10) days from notice:
(a) why 375 petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries in the civil
registry were granted without the required hearing and publication, in gross
violation of the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules on Civil Procedure;
(b) why the dates of filing of 86 other petitions were either the same as or ahead
of the date of the alleged hearing/decision;
(c) why 70 petitions had no court action after their filing or no further
action/setting for a considerable length of time after the last order/incident of
the case;

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(c)

(d)

accommodate the petitioners need to have their civil registry documents

immediately corrected to conform with their passport applications,
applications to take board examinations and petitions to travel
abroad. The petitioners discovered the errors after they submitted the
required documents and yet they were given a limited period to secure the
correction of the erroneous entries. If the corrected documents were not
submitted on time, the applications of the petitioners would be denied and
the denials would mean lost opportunities, particularly for the applicants
for
overseas
contract
work
and
applicants
to
take
board
examinations. Judge Sotero was more lenient in such instances since in his
view no substantial prejudice would ensue. In any event, he resolved to
adopt, henceforth, a stricter policy in cases where no publication is
required, by imposing a ten (10) day period for posting of the petition after
its filing and seeing to it that the petition is set for hearing only after it is
so posted.
As to the 70 petitions where no court action was taken for a
considerable length of time after filing
Some are petitions for adoption awaiting the submission of the
Home Study and Child Study Reports by the social welfare officers
assigned to the cases. The initial hearing cannot proceed without the
reports being submitted to the court.
Others are petitions for correction of entry/ies where the
petitioners have not yet submitted the required supporting
documents. They will be either dismissed for lack of interest in due time or
resolved within the next thirty (30) days.
The rest are petitions for judicial reconstitution of title which are
still pending because the reports and recommendation of the Land
Registration Authority have not yet been submitted to the court.
As to the petitions with similar/same docket numbers
According to the docket clerk, Mr. Ruben A. Gigante, the nine (9)
petitions with similar docket numbers were either cancelled or withdrawn
by petitioner/s (they bear the notation no action taken).
As to the three (3) cases with the same docket number, Mr.
Gigante admitted that he failed to enter the first filed petition in the
docket book, and that he accepted for filing the succeeding petitions but
assigned the same case number without indicating a letter after the
number to distinguish the second and third petitions from the first.
It was admitted that the irregularity was the offshoot of
inefficiency in the docketing system. To avoid similar incidents, the Clerkin-Charge of Civil Cases was assigned to take charge of the docket in

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 15

(e)

special proceedings and land registration cases in place of Mr. Gigante

who is only a utility clerk.
As to un-audited records of 179 special proceedings and 33 land
registration cases
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod reported that as of the
time of the submission of the explanation, the records of 124 special
proceedings and 10 land registration cases had been accounted
for. Thereupon, they requested another 15 days to retrieve the remaining
records which they believe were soaked in floodwater in 2004.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum dated 8 May 2006,
[7]
deemed the explanation bereft of merit or deserving of scant consideration. The OCA
noted that the petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries in the civil registry
are special proceedings governed either by Rules 103 or 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Sec. 3, Rule 103 specifically provides when the order for hearing of such petitions
shall be issued and what the order should contain, thus:
SEC. 3. Order for hearing.If the petition filed is sufficient in form
and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least
once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem
best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days
prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of
the notice.
Sec. 4, Rule 108 similarly requires the issuance of an order of hearing and the
publication of the order in petitions for correction of entries in the civil registry, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province
The OCA maintained that the provisions of the Rules of Court on publication of the order of
hearing should have been strictly observed as publication is a jurisdictional requirement.
Hence, the OCA remarked, it is appalling that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod
favorably acted on the petitions even though they were only pro-forma and notarized by
Saguyod as an ex officio notary public and still others were unsigned, unverified or

unnotarized. Some 86 petitions were found to bear dates of filing which are the same as
or ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision, clearly belying the claim of Judge
Sotero that hearings on these petitions were conducted or that they were referred to the
Clerk of Court for presentation of evidence ex parte. Said practices, according to the OCA,
constitute a mockery of established procedure under the Rules of Court, especially since
nothing in R.A. No. 9048 or its Implementing Rules and Regulations would justify the
procedure that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod adopted.
The OCA observed that what R.A. No. 9048 mandates is the administrative
proceeding for change of name/correction of entry in the civil registry which has no
application to a petition for change of name or correction of entry filed in court. Thus, the
OCA went on to say, Judge Soteros ratiocination for adopting the procedure under R.A. No.
9048 or for treating the petitions in the same manner as ordinary cases where the
defendant is declared in default displays a deplorable lack of grasp or total ignorance of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding his claim that he did so for the purpose of
expediting the resolution of the petitions.
As to the fifty-six (56) petitions where no action was taken by Judge Sotero for
almost one year, the OCA found him to be decidedly remiss in the performance of his
duties and responsibilities. As court manager, it was incumbent upon Judge Sotero to
adopt a system of record management since the prompt disposition of the courts business
is attained only through proper and efficient court management, the OCA added.
The OCA recommended that Judge Sotero be fined for gross ignorance of the law and
gross inefficiency in the amount of P100,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement
benefits, and that the amount of P50,000.00 be withheld from such benefits pending the
outcome of the financial audit.[8]
As to Clerk of Court Saguyod, the OCA recommended that he be directed to
submit a report of the actions taken on the civil and criminal cases then pending before
the RTC which Judge Sotero was directed to either decide with dispatch or immediately act
upon. Saguyod complied with the submission of his Report dated 22 September
2006which was in turn referred to the OCA for further action. [9]
After careful consideration of the findings and recommendations of the OCA, the Court
agrees that indeed Judge Sotero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Articles 376[10] and 412[11] of the New Civil Code are the substantive laws covering the
alteration or correction of entries in the civil registry. Civil registry records are public
documents and are accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein,
[12]
which is why prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9048, changes or corrections thereof
could be made only upon judicial authorization. Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide the procedure for such alterations in the civil registry.
The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a proceeding in rem and as such
strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 16

essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction. [13] The reason for this is that a change
of name is a matter of public interest.[14]
Petitions for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are governed
by Rule 108. This rule covers petitions for corrections of clerical errors of a harmless or
innocuous nature, as well as petitions which seek to effect substantial changes or
corrections in entries for as long as all the procedural requirements in said rule are
followed. In Republic v. Bautista,[15] citing Republic v. Valencia,[16] it was declared that the
proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversarial in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil registry is clerical, the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it
is deemed substantial and the procedure to be adopted is adversarial. [17] The procedure
under Rule 108 becomes the appropriate adversarial proceeding to effect substantial
changes in the registry only if the procedural requirements therein are complied with. [18]\
R.A. No. 9048, enacted in 2001, substantially amended Articles 376 and 412 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname.No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can
be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
Thus, under this new law, clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname may be corrected or effected by the concerned city or municipal registrar or
consul general, without need of any judicial order.
At first glance, the seeming effect of the amendment is to remove from the ambit
of Rule 108 the correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of entries in the
civil register and to make Rule 108 apply only to substantial changes and corrections to
entries in the civil register. Hence, we clarified in Republic v. Benemerito[19] that the
obvious effect of R.A. No. 9048 is merely to make possible the administrative correction of
clerical or typographical errors in entries and the administrative change of first name or
nickname in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in
the
civil
registry
in
appropriate
adversarial
proceedings. Hence,
the
question thatnow arises is whether trial courts still have jurisdiction
over petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name and nickname in
the civil registry. Assuming that the trial courts retain such authority, the corollary
question is whether the summary procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 9048 should be
adopted in cases filed before the courts, or should the adversarial proceeding under Rule
108 be followed.
The answers to these queries are central to the resolution of the case at bar, as
they determine whether Judge Sotero had indeed acted with gross ignorance of the law or

whether his liability, if any, can be tempered as he acted in good faith on a doubtful
question of law.
A review of the deliberations on R.A. No. 9048 clearly shows that it was enacted to
give the people an option to have the erroneous entries in their civil records corrected via
an administrative proceeding before the local civil registrar that is less expensive and
more expeditious. In his sponsorship speech at the Senate, the main proponent mentioned
in particular that the judicial process under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court for the
correction of clerical errors is tedious and expensive. To address the problem, it was
proposed that Article 412 of the Civil Code be amended by providing, by way of an
exception thereto, that clerical or typographical errors be corrected by the city or
municipal civil registrar. The sponsor specified that the errors that may be corrected under
the proposal are only those committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as a misspelled name or place of birth which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing records, and that in no case may the correction involve the change of
nationality, age, status or gender of a person. [20] Further debate led to the proposal to
include change of first name or nickname which was approved. However, such change of
first name or nickname would only be allowed if based on some reasonable ground such
as when the name to be changed is ridiculous.[21]
Subsequent deliberations revolved around specific provisions of the bill. Thus,
under the bill, any person who wants an entry corrected needs only to file a verified
petition supported by certain documents with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the records sought to be corrected are kept and, in case the petitioner
has already migrated to another place, the petition may be filed with the local civil
registrar where he resides. Publication of the petition for correction of entry is dispensed
with and in lieu of publication, the petition needs only to be posted in a conspicuous place
in the office of the local civil registrar for ten (10) consecutive working days. However,
regarding petitions for change of first name, the petition has to be published once a week
for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, with the petitioner
also submitting a certification that he has no pending case or prior criminal record. The
local civil registrar is mandated to decide the petition not later than five (5) working days
after the prescribed posting period. The decision of the local registrar is subject to the
automatic review of the Civil Registrar General who shall act within ten (10) working days
from receipt of the decision. If the Civil Registrar General finds that the correction is not
clerical or typographical in nature or that it affects the civil status of the person, he shall
set aside the decision and advise the petitioner to file the necessary petition with the RTC
in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
The authority or jurisdiction of the trial courts over petitions for correction of
entries and change of first name or nickname was never taken up at the deliberations. In
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 17

contrast, it is quite clear from the deliberations that the local civil registrar is given the
authority to act on such petitions filed before his office, yet there was nary a mention or
even insinuation that such petitions can no longer be filed with the regular courts. In fact,
it was clarified that the grounds upon which the administrative process before the local
civil registrar may be availed of are limited under the law; hence, outside of such limited
grounds, the judicial process should be availed of. Indeed, there was no intent on the part
of the lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of
entries in the civil registry. It can thus be concluded that the local civil registrar has
primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and
change of first name or nickname, with R.A. No. 9048 prescribing the procedure that the
petitioner and local civil registrar should follow.
Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceeding
before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to
petitions for the correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts. The
promulgation of rules of procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive domain of the
Supreme Court.[22] Moreover, as observed by the OCA, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9048
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations that warrants the adoption of the procedure
set therein for petitions before the courts even for the purpose of expediting the resolution
of said petitions.
Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if R.A.
No. 9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the procedure provided in the Revised
Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding and should be followed by the
courts. The procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be
complied with. In the case at hand, Judge Sotero should have applied the procedure
prescribed in Rules 103 and 108 in resolving the petitions before him, not the procedure
prescribed in R.A. No. 9048 or the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 9 which applies in
civil cases where the defendant is declared in default.
Under Rule 103, the petition for change of name should be signed and verified by
the person desiring a change of name, and set forth compliance with the residency
requirement, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the new name asked
for. The court, after finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, shall issue
an order reciting the purpose of the petition and fixing the date and place for the hearing
of the petition, and direct the publication of the order before the hearing at least once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition, with
the Solicitor General or city fiscal appearing on behalf of the Government. The court shall
grant the petition only when satisfactory proof has been presented in open court that the
order had been published as directed, the allegations in the petition are true, and proper
and reasonable causes appear for changing the name of the petitioner. [23]

Rule 108 requires publication of the verified petition for cancellation or correction
of entry once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province; and that the civil registrar and all persons who claim any interest and who
would be affected by the petition be made parties to the proceeding and be allowed to file
their opposition to the said cancellation or correction within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the petition or from the last date of publication. It is only after a hearing that the court
may either dismiss or grant the petition. [24] Whether the proceeding under this rule is
summary or adversarial, depending on the type of errors to be corrected, the procedural
requirements under this rule still need to be complied with, the nature of the proceeding
becoming adversarial only when any opposition to the petition is filed and actively
prosecuted.
Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil registry are
actions in rem, the decision on the petition being binding not only on the parties thereto
but on the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication gives notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against
the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party to the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.[25]
In the case at bar, the more than 300 cases for correction of entries filed before
the RTC of Paniqui and decided by Judge Sotero do not fall within the purview of R.A. No.
9048. In other words, not all of said petitions pertain to the change of first name or
nickname or the correction of typographical errors in the entries of the registry. Some of
said petitions involve substantial changes in the registry such as change of age, sex,
status, and nationality, and even of middle names and surnames of the petitioners. Judge
Soteros conduct in acting on the petitions, without full compliance with the procedural
requirements under Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, is appalling. He
explained that since R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of entries without need of hearing
and publication for as long as the necessary documents are submitted, the same
procedure under R.A. No. 9048 is applicable to the petitions filed before the court. The
explanation does not impress. The records of the cases show that Judge Sotero did not
comply with the administrative procedure under the said law. Thus, while R.A. No. 9048
requires that the petition for correction of entries be posted in a conspicuous place for ten
(10) consecutive days, the records show that some of the petitions were decided less than
ten (10) days from the date of filing. Clearly then, there was no way that the 10-day
posting requirement could have been accomplished. The petitions for change of name
were also granted even without publication of the order of hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Observance of the procedure under R.A. No. 9048 does not excuse Judge Soteros
blunders. It appears though that he could have acted under the false impression that the
petitions could be filed only with the local civil registrar and not with the courts. Verily, he
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 18

claims that he resolved the petitions with dispatch in order to accommodate the need of
the petitioners to have their civil registry documents corrected with immediacy and that
he was more lenient since no substantial prejudice would ensue. His misapprehension
affords him no justification or extenuation. Moreover, his concern and compassion for the
petitioners are misplaced. As a member of the bench, he should be equipped with the
basic knowledge of rules of procedure, including Rules 103 and 108, which govern the
disposition of the petitions. Judge Soteros actuations clearly exposed a deplorable
deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles of law and rudimentary rules of procedure,
for which he should be held administratively liable.
As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is
expected to be proficient in the interpretation and application of our laws. Competence
and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. [26] When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less than
that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [27]
Judge Soteros ignorance of the law is aggravated by his gross inefficiency in failing
to take prompt action on some of the petitions for almost one year. Proper and efficient
court management is ultimately the judges responsibility since he is the administrator of
the court. Canon 3, Rule 3.08[28] and Rule 3.09,[29] of the Code of Judicial Conduct [30]requires
judges to manage their dockets in such manner that the work of their courts is
accomplished with reasonable dispatch.[31] Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence,
ignorance and carelessness. There is inexcusable inefficiency on the part of a judge when
he fails to observe in the performance of his duties that degree of diligence, prudence,
and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service. When the
inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving
of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority. [32]
Gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge under Section 8 of A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and
Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001. It is penalized either by dismissal from
service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00. The serious infractions would have required the imposition of
dismissal as penalty had respondent judge not retired. So, instead, we now impose a fine
in the maximum, i.e., P40,000.00, as the infractions which correspond to the sheer
number of the petitions decided by Judge Sotero all in disregard of basic rules of
procedure, are treated as aggravating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent retired Judge Cesar M. Sotero of the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Paniqui,
Tarlac,
Branch
67,
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the lawand FINES him in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos

(P40,000.00) to be deducted from the One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)

withheld from him pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated27 March 2007. The remainder
of the withheld amount is ordered released to him.
SO ORDERED.
*********************

REPUBLIC
OF
MERCADERA

THE

PHILIPPINES

VS

This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN, which affirmed the September 28, 2005
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8 (RTC), in a petition for
correction of entries, docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427), filed by
respondent Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and
duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given
name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn
L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).[2]
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the
case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the
correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. Under said law,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the coverage
of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied[3] and removes correction or changing of clerical errors in entries
of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 108. Hence, what is left for the scope of
operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register.[4]
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect
the correction unless a court order was obtained because the Civil Registrar therein is not
yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for
corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048. [5]
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries
as
Appearing
in
the
Certificate
of
Live
Birth under
Rule
108
before
the Regional TrialCourt of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads:

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SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon

good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name. [Underscoring supplied]
Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order,
dated June 10, 2005, which reads:
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice is
hereby given that the hearing of said petition is set on JULY 26, 2005 at
8:30 oclock in the morning, at the Session Hall of Branch 8, this Court,
Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Dipolog City, on which date, time and place,
anyone appearing to contest the petition shall state in writing his grounds
there[for], serving a copy thereof to the petitioner and likewise file copies
with this Court on or before the said date of hearing.
Let this order be published at the expense of petitioner once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper edited and published
in Dipolog City and of general circulation therein, the City of Dapitan and
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, and copies hereof be furnished to
the Office of the Solicitor General of (sic) 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi
Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog, and
posted on the bulletin boards of the City Hall of Dipolog, the Provincial
Capitol Building, and of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the Republic
of the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case only
on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset the hearing on September
5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition, counsel for Mercadera moved for leave of
court to present evidence ex parte. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the
trial court designated the branch clerk of court to receive evidence for Mercadera
On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of
documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never
used the name Marilyn in any of her public or private transactions. On September 26,
2005, the RTC issued an order[6] admitting Exhibits A to I[7] and their submarkings, as
relevant to the resolution of the case
The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral
testimony of Oga, as reported by the lower court:

Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19,

1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of spouses Tirso U. Mercadera
and Norma C. Lacquiao. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of
the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. It was
recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in the Registry of Births of said civil
registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same
registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn (Exhibit C).
On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the
rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As
reflected in her certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was
baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibit D).
In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng
Estaka, Dipolog City; her high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga
del Norte School of Arts and Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma
issued by the Silliman University, Dumaguete City, where she earned the
degree of Bachelor of Secondary Education, uniformly show her name as
Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibits E, F, and G).
Presently,
she
is
working
in
U.P.
Mindanao,
Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of membership issued by the
Government Service Insurance System also bears his [sic] complete name
as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exhibit H).
When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live
birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given
name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition.
In its September 28, 2005 Decision,[8] the RTC granted Mercaderas petition and
directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing
in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Office of
the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City is hereby directed to correct the
given name of petitioner appearing in her certificate of live birth, from
Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented by
Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering
that she had used Merlyn as her given name since childhood until she discovered the
discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was
justified

The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of
the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the
remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief[9] filed with the CA, the OSG argued that
the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change of name in a petition for
correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary evidence and
hearsay testimony of Oga
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercaderas given name might seem
innocuous enough to grant but it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or
increase substantive rights.[10] What the lower court actually allowed was a change of
Mercaderas given name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule
103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court, may not substitute one for
the other for purposes of expediency.[11] Further, because Mercadera failed to invoke a
specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower courts order in effect allowed the
change of ones name in the civil registry without basis.
The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, [12] the appellate
court affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN. The CA assessed
the controversy in this wise:
Appellants insistence that the petition should have been filed
under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. This
Court does not entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial court
was one for the correction on an entry in petitioners Certificate of Live
Birth and not one in which she sought to change her name. In Co v. Civil
Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court
reiterated the distinction between the phrases to correct and to
change. Said the High Court:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the
kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of
the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries include not
only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of
the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths
about the facts recorded therein.
That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is
patent to the Court from the allegations in her petition, specifically,
paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof
xxx

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Anent the RTCs error in admitting the photocopies of Mercaderas documentary

evidence and in vesting probative value to Ogas testimony, the CA cited the wellestablished rule that evidence not objected to may be admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. [13]
On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed its Comment [14] on July 3, 2009. The OSG declined to file
a reply claiming that its petition already contained an exhaustive discussion on the
following assigned errors:[15]
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENTS NAME UNDER RULE
103.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or
surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. [16] This rule provides the
procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a
person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to,
the rest of the community. [17] In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy
to alter the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he
lives and is best known. [18] When granted, a persons identity and interactions are affected
as he bears a new label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him. [19] Judicial permission for a change
of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court
decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication
of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to
oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties
impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all
who might make an objection. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [20]
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of ones existing
family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter ones legal
capacity or civil status.[21] However, there could be instances where the change applied for
may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the
applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because
the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind. [22]Hence, in
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requests for a change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of
the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant
x x x.[23]
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.
[24]
Entries in the civil register refer to acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons,[25] also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. [26] Before, only
mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry
may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned
case of Chua Wee v. Republic,[27] this Court declared that,
x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights,
which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil
Code."
In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,[28] however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in
a separate concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements,
contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures because the provision does
not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the procedure to be used
is summary in nature. In Republic v. Judge De la Cruz, [29] the dissenting opinion penned by
Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view:
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered
unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than mere
harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or modify substantive
rights which the Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the
Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented by Rule 108,
allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting
the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid
Wong Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere
implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. x
x x it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412
contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature,
procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the manifest
purpose of Rule 108.

x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not

be considered as establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively
beyond dispute or controversion, x x x the books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Hence, the status as
corrected would not have a superior quality for evidentiary purpose.
Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a mere
rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. x x
Finally in Republic v. Valencia,[30] the above stated views were adopted by this
Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and
the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the
clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may,
under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as
repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues
involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the
issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the
complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x.[31] Where such a change is ordered,
the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an
erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the
substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the
Constitution.[32]
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from MARILYN to MERLYN
is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change
of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this
is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not
Rule 108.
It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the
scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a change of name will necessarily
be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of
both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under
either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the
two rules with respect to alterations in a persons registered name can effectively clear the
seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in
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the petition itself will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief
prayed for.
The change of name contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be
granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name,
there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of
the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings. [33]
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration
in Section 2, Rule 108[34] also includes changes of name, the correction of a
patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations
allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be
set right under Rule 108.
This rule in names, however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the
correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As
explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in
other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108
provided there is an adversary proceeding. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is
to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.[35]
A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSGs
assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that the
petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of Mercaderas
petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was brought up to
convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the adversarial
proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found the
documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that she had been known
as MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of
substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest
the petition despite full compliance with the publication requirement.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108
as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means to
make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from. To change means to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.[36] From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower
court to remove the faults or error from her registered given name MARILYN, and to make
or set aright the same to conform to the one she grew up to, MERLYN. It does not take a
complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical
error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No.
9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was
constrained to take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the petition was clear in stating:

7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as

appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN to
conform to her true and correct given name that she had been using
and had been known within the community x x x.
8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City and requested them to effect such
correction in her Certificate of Live Birth, however, the Local Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect such correction unless an order is
obtained by herein petitioner from this Honorable Court because the
Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with permanent
appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections
filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048, hence
the filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied]
Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercaderas case
which recognize the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic[37] it was held that to change
Sincio to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in the first name
into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. In Labayo-Rowe
v.Republic,[38] it was held that the change of petitioners name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary
proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida
P. Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so that
what appears as Midael as given name would read Michael. In the latter case, this Court,
with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such
that, changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot
possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the
same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).[39]
In this case, the use of the letter a for the letter e, and the deletion of the letter i,
so that what appears as Marilyn would read as Merlyn is patently a rectification of a name
that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between Marilyn and Merlyn may well be the
object of a mix- up that blemished Mercaderas Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood,
thus, her interest to correct the same.
The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could
remember.
It is worthy to note that the OSGs reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez[40] is
flawed. In that case, this Court said that a change in a given name is a substantial matter
and that it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that would in effect
render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding. While this Court
stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said pronouncement therein was stated in a
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different tenor and, thus, inapplicable to this case. Hernandez was decided against an
entirely different factual milieu. There was a petition for adoption that must not have led
to a corresponding change in the adoptees given name because it would be procedurally
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of a
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law. In the present case, the issue is the
applicability of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief sought by Mercadera can in fact
be granted under the latter. This Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera to
render the requirements under Rule 103 illusory as in Hernandez.
Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the
procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot be
denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding
before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil
Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the
petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same
and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did
not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were
procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons
why the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and
according probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera.
WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
*********************

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS

COSETENG-MAGPAYO
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique MarquezLim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth [1] shows, contracted marriage on
March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed
on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his
name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No.
Q-0863058, was entitled IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National
Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear in [its] National
Indices of Marriage.[2] Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary
up to college[3] showing that he carried the surname Coseteng, and the birth certificate of

his child where Coseteng appears as his surname. [4] In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections,
respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3 rd District using the name
JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.[5]
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, [6] respondent amended his petition
by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section
2,Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[7]
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in
the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13,
2008, and November 14-20, 2008. [8] And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was
entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte.[9]
By Decision of January 8, 2009,[10] the trial court granted respondents petition and
directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry March 26, 1972 in Item 24 for DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES [in herein respondents
Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry MAGPAYO in the space for the Last Name
of the [respondent] to COSETENG;
3. Delete the entry COSETENG in the space for Middle
Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the
space for FATHER of the [respondent] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, [11] hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged
the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this wise:
I.

. . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEINVOLVES

THE CHANGE
OF [RESPONDENTS] CIVIL
STATUS
FROM
LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE
MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS

II.

THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT

DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENTS FATHER

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FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.[12] (emphasis and underscoring

supplied)
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of
marriage of respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person
must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.[13]
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondents parents date of
marriage and the name of respondents father from the entries in respondents birth
certificate,[14] the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord with
respondents prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed
that the Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of name of
petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the Honorable
Court order the Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant government
agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the
premises.[15] (underscoring supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in
nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil
Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the
notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the hearing; the
delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the
Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for
three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled
hearing.[16]
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using
valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.[17] Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or
analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of

the Philippines.[18] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use
the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did
not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother
which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was
lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies
his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal
status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
illegitimacy.Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[19] categorically holds that changes which may affect the
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .
Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
[RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be
filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected that
ofMakati in the present case, and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding.
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As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not

in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the abovementioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil
registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote[20] in support of his claim that
his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,[21] illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and
in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one
for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise
would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the
change of ones name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only
upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring
supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two
statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule
108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the
civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador[22] mandates that a petition for a substantial correction or
change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well
as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby. It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his
parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
Labayo-Rowe[23] highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a
petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein
petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of
entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the
Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in
the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz;
and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as married on
1953 Bulan are erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one
who furnished the data in said birth certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatrizs petition and accordingly directed the
local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her childrens birth certificates from
Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in Victorias birth certificate from
married to single and the date and place of marriage to no marriage.
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the
trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial courts order directing the

change of Emperatriz civil status and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the
following observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable
parties should
have
been
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of
the child but the child as well, together with the paternal
grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely
affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change
should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under
an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would
be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
legitimate to illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the
notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all
the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules shall
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to
be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so
as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship,
legitimacy
of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing
the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby
become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase
or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated
under Article 412 of the Civil Code.[24] (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)

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consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the

province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person

having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly
mandates two sets of notices to different potential oppositors. The first notice is that given
to the persons named in the petition and the second (which is through publication) is that
given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are
mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5,
also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of potential
oppositors) within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of
publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[25] In that
case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth
certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion Gustilo,
Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughters real father. Gustilo in fact filed
before the trial court a CONSTANCIA wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The
trial court granted the petition.
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of Junes family
name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann
Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy
had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial courts Order as Mary Joy was, by Barcos
claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-inintervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in
Nadinas petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a
petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the
subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of Barco as a party to the
case.Thus the Court explained:

Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section

3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction,
as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando
would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be
established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time
she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be
cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of
all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting
of a petition.For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to
be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of
his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the
whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep
of the decision would cover even parties who should have been
impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently
left out. x x x x.[26] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and
Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos
petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their mother Epifania
herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of
Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be
affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading,
however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not established to
be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually
participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy
of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The
January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP
Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
**********************

CORPUZ VS STO. TOMAS

Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho, Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil
registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in
their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and correction of
entries in the birth certificates of Carlitos minor children. Carlito and his siblings requested
the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to
Filipino, instead of Chinese, and the deletion of the word married opposite the phrase Date
of marriage of parents because their parents Juan and Epifania were not married. And
Carlito requested the correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his
wifes date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their marriage as appearing in their
marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the
correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to Marivel.
The Khos mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was
not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos petition.
The trial court granted the petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos parents
rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial
courts judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural requirements under
Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead
an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted that the affected parties were already
notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones
[27]

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Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (present petition)
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce onDecember 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina
to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign

divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the
Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that
the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition
only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party,
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vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, [14] both support
Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void [15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce,
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino
and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under
the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v.

Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to
be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject
to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse]
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [23] The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have
his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating
him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the

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Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest
to petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of
a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a)

In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific

thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing; and

(b)

In case of a judgment or final order against a

person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a wantof
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. [27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and

laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. [28] This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. [29] The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept
in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, [30] but failed to include
a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. [31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the
foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition
and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
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marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. [34] We

consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the
bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law
on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording
the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

births;
deaths;
marriages;
annulments of marriages;
divorces;
legitimations;
adoptions;
acknowledgment of natural children;
naturalization; and
changes of name.
xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name

and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decreesregistration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, [36] and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 [37] both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the
decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of
the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries
in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with
the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 31

or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE,
we GRANT the
petition
for
review
on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
*****************************

ZAYCO AND HINO VS ATTY. JESUS HINO JR

This is a petition for review[1] of the June 27, 2005 decision [2] and October 27, 2005
resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82129.
After Enrique Hinlo died intestate on January 31, 1986, his heirs filed a petition for
letters of administration of his estate in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Silay City, Branch 40. Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was initially appointed
as special administratrix of Enriques estate. On December 23, 1991, petitioners Nancy H.
Zayco and Remo Hinlo were appointed as co-administrators in lieu of their mother
Ceferina who was already sickly and could no longer effectively perform her duties as
special administratrix.
On March 4, 2003, respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of Enrique and
heir to his estate by virtue of representation, [3] filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in his favor and an urgent motion for the removal of petitioners as coadministrators of Enriques estate.[4] Petitioners opposed both the petition and the motion.
In an order dated July 23, 2002,[5] the RTC revoked the appointment of petitioners
as co-administrators of the estate of Enrique and directed the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of respondent on a P50,000 bond. Respondent posted the required
bond, took his oath as administrator and was issued letters of administration.
Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2002 order on August 2, 2002 and moved for its
reconsideration on August 9, 2002. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration in an
order dated July 23, 2003.[6]
Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2003 order on July 31, 2003 and filed a
notice of appeal the same day. They submitted a record on appeal on August 29, 2003.
In an order dated January 5, 2004, [7] the RTC denied the notice of appeal and
record on appeal. It ruled that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the July 23, 2002

and July 23, 2003 orders were interlocutory and not subject to appeal. Even assuming that
appeal was the proper remedy, it was filed late:
Granting [a]rguendo, that the Orders dated July 23, 2002 and July
23, 2003 maybe the subject of appeal, the Notice of Appeal and the
Record on Appeal were already filed out of time. Records will show that the
Order of this Court dated July 23, 2002 removing the former coadministrators were received by them on August 2, 2002. Subsequently,
they filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 9[, 2002] which was
denied by this Court in its Order dated July 23, 2003 and was received by
them on July 31, 2003. A Notice of Appeal was filed on July 31, 2003 but a
Record on Appeal was only filed on August 29, 2003. The 30 days
reglementary period to file an appeal in special proceedings started to run
on August 2, 2002 when [the] former [co-]administrators received the
order of this Court and stopped to run when they filed their Motion for
Reconsideration and started to run again [on] July 31, 2003 when they
received the order denying their Motion for Reconsideration until they filed
their Record on Appeal on August 29, 2003. Thus, from August 2, 2002
to August 9, 2002, [the] former [co-]administrators already
consumed a period of 7 days and from July 31, 2003 to August 29,
2003, a period of 29 days[,] or a total of 36 days. x x x[8] (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners challenged the January 5, 2004 RTC order in the CA by way of a petition
for certiorari and mandamus. In a decision dated June 27, 2005, the CA dismissed the
petition.[9] It ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as
the notice of appeal and record on appeal were in fact filed beyond the prescribed period.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, this petition.

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Page 32

Petitioners contend that the RTC erred when it ruled that the July 23, 2002 and July
23, 2003 orders were not appealable. They also claim that their notice of appeal and
record on appeal were filed on time.
We agree.
An order appointing an administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final
determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration,
management and settlement of the decedents estate. [10] It is a final order and, hence,
appealable.[11]
In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of
appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the
notice of judgment or final order. [12] Pursuant to Neypes v. CA,[13] the 30-day period to file
the notice of appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their motion
for reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003, they had 30 days or until
August 30, 2003 to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal. They did so on August
29, 2003. Thus, the appeal was made on time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 27, 2005 decision and
October 27, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82129 affirming the
January 5, 2004 order of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Silay City, Branch
40 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is hereby directed to approve the
notice of appeal and record on appeal and, thereafter, to forward the same to the Court of
Appeals.

SO ORDERED.