People vs. Loreno GR L-54414
People vs. Loreno GR L-54414
People vs. Loreno GR L-54414
compulsion
of
an
irresistible
enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for
escape or self-defense in equal combat (People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450).
In the case at bar, it does not met the requirements of under compulsion of irresistible
force or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear. A perusal of the appellants' statement of the
robbery-rape incident as, summarized in their joint brief, showed that they admitted their participation
in the commission of the crime of robbery and rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7,
1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury. The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata
Monge to the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the
"aparador" with her keys and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala,
appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in dark
sweater. And after the man in the dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the
teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to
kiss her and touch her private parts.
Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica
Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two
companions who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Marantal gave his companions
effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing
that he raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes. All these
demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The
foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions,
clearly showed their community of interest and concert of criminal design with their
unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of
the conspiracy itself.
Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when said acts
point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of interest, which unity of purpose and
concert of action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, and the degree of actual participation
petition by each of the conspirators is immaterial. Conspiracy having been establish, all the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation
because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.