Heirs of Concha v. Lumocso
Heirs of Concha v. Lumocso
Heirs of Concha v. Lumocso
DECISION
PUNO, C.J :
p
Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of
the subject lots.
The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr. 7(7) and his
children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto, Bernardo, Teresita,
Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha, filed a complaint for Reconveyance
and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and
Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name
of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC
of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended
Complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1.
Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate of
Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and void ab initio;
2.
Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private property
of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 otherwise known as the
Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942;
HcISTE
3.
Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the properties
(sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of the
plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case and if
they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute
the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the
defendant[s] themselves;
4.
Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for the 21
forest trees illegally cut; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for
Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the
proceedings;
5.
Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the area of
the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total volume of 2000
board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they] being cut, collected and taken
from the land possessed, preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;
6.
The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies
which this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
8(8)
and 7529-A. The two complaints were also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of
Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In
Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1.
Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT (P23527)
4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western portion of Lot 4888 as
private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise known
as Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA No. 1942;
2.
Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1)
hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of the plaintiffs
within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one
hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located at its Western portion and if she
refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute
the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the
defenda[n]t herself;
3.
Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees
illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees;
P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.
10(10)
The three complaints 12(12) commonly alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958,
petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea Concha) acquired by
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causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled
by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered which, if
computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents.
15(15) The respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration, 16(16) to no avail.
17(17)
HDTCSI
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases
of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. 28(28) It is
conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the
parties. 29(29) To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and
of the relief sought. 30(30)
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for
reconveyance. 31(31) An action for reconveyance respects the decree of
registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and
legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right. 32(32) There is no
special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party
has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner 33(33) and
that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
34(34)
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for
reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three
complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:
(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse
Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the
area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled
forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they
were newly married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or
possession; 35(35)
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha
have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the
exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to
November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil
Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and]
stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a
total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees
for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various
sizes; 36(36)
(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or
that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already
acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,]
otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No.
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[7691]; 37(37)
(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when
they] surreptitiously filed 38(38) [their respective patent applications and
were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title
[that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners]; 39(39)
(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original
certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and
misrepresentation; 40(40) and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent
purchaser. 41(41)
These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title
as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a
claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the
enjoyment of their alleged title. 42(42)
AaEcHC
xxx
xxx
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in
Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00, to wit:
Civil Case No.
Lot No.
5188
6195
5433
6196-A
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Assessed Value
P1,030.00
4,500.00
5434
6196-B
7529-A
4,340.00
1,880.00. 43(43)
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section
19 (1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance 44(44) of
or for cancellation of title 45(45) to or to quiet title 46(46) over real property are
actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein."
The original text of Section 19 (2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner,
Section 44 (b) of R.A. 296, 47(47) as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of
first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under
R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect
on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, under Section 19 (1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to
property under Section 19 (2). The distinction between the two classes became
crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 48(48) in 1994 which
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all
civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction
over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real
property or any interest therein" under Section 19 (2) of B.P. 129 is divided
between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real
property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog
the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier
administration of justice." 49(49)
cAaDCE
Plant Corporation v. CA, 51(51) relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to
the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not
one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether
the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention
that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees of P10,000,
hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining
whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the
issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and
Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal
action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor
can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort to
petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not
jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of
redemption period which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of
R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the
action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the
property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly
laid."
Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA 52(52) and Santos v. CA 53(53) cited by
the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the instant cases
falls under Section 19 (1) of B.P. 129. The complaints in Swan and Santos were
filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the
action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under
Section 19 (2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that the complaint
for cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and
possession of real property under Section 19 (2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court
held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of
title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve
"title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" under Section 19
(2) of B.P. 129.
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties
constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be
computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is
unavailing. Section 19 (2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that
the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
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(P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the
subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the
law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the
assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed. 54(54) In this case,
there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by
their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant
cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has no jurisdiction in Civil
Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
Id. at 296-301.
Order dated May 10, 2000; id. at 305-306.
Id. at 307-334.
Dated November 29, 2002; id. at 7-14.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 568-641.
Id. at 703-710.
Id. at 722-733.
G.R. No. 97805, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 457.
G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114.
G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162.
G.R. No. 125008, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 439.
Allied Domecq Phil., Inc. v. Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30, 2004, 439
SCRA 667, 672, citing Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941).
Republic v. Sangalang, L-58822, April 8, 1988, 159 SCRA 515.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, et al. v. Padilla, et al., 106 Phil.
591 (1959), citing Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514 (1941).
Rollo, pp. 283, 288, 293.
Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. Baikal Realty Corp., G.R. No. 149992, August 20,
2004, 437 SCRA 121, 143, citing Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387,
January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431, 442.
Ponce, D.R. Florencio, The Philippine Torrens System (1965), p. 213.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 138971, June 6,
2001, 358 SCRA 489, 499, citing Lucena v. CA, G.R. No. 77468, August 25,
1999, 313 SCRA 47.
Rollo, pp. 94, 120, 144.
Id. at 95, 121, 145.
Ibid.
Id. at 95-96, 121-122, 145-146.
Id. at 96, 122, 146.
Ibid.
Id. at 97, 123, 147.
See Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines Vol. II (1992), pp. 148-149.
Rollo, pp. 105, 132, 157, 158.
Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 421;
Estate of the late Mercedes Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 120435, December 22, 1997,
283 SCRA 474.
Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162, 163; Swan v.
CA, G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114, 121; Heirs of Susana De
Guzman Tuazon v. CA, G.R. No. 125758, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 219.
Mendoza v. Teh, G.R. No. 122646, March 14, 1997, 269 SCRA 764, 768; Heirs of
Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA, supra.
Also known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," as amended, which provides that:
SECTION 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction: . . .
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48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
(b)
In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment,
except actions of forcible entry into and detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts; . . . .
An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980," approved on March 25, 1994.
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Biazon, Record of the Senate dated October 6,
1993.
Supra Note 24.
Supra Note 27.
Supra Note 25.
Supra Note 26.
Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 826; See
also Aquino, H.L., Remedial Law, Doctrines Enunciated in Ponencias on
Jurisdiction, Procedure and Evidence Including Useful Outlines (2002), p. 218.
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Endnotes
1 (Popup - Popup)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Id. at 124.
11 (Popup - Popup)
11.
Id. at 148-149.
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12 (Popup - Popup)
12.
Id. at 93-106 (Civil Case No. 5188), 119-132 (Civil Case No. 5433), 143-158
(Civil Case No. 5434).
13 (Popup - Popup)
13.
Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses for the Dismissal of the
Complaint and the Instant Case (Civil Case No. 5188), id. at 169-189; Motion to
Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 191-210; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No.
5433), id. at 212-231.
14 (Popup - Popup)
14.
Opposition to Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint (Civil Case No. 5188),
id. at 233-248; Opposition to Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at
249-264; Opposition to Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at
265-280.
15 (Popup - Popup)
15.
In its separate Resolutions all dated December 9, 1999; id. at 281-285, 286-290,
291-295.
16 (Popup - Popup)
16.
Id. at 296-301.
17 (Popup - Popup)
17.
18.
Id. at 307-334.
19 (Popup - Popup)
19.
20.
Id. at 36-37.
21 (Popup - Popup)
21.
Id. at 568-641.
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22 (Popup - Popup)
22.
Id. at 703-710.
23 (Popup - Popup)
23.
Id. at 722-733.
24 (Popup - Popup)
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Allied Domecq Phil., Inc. v. Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30, 2004, 439
SCRA 667, 672, citing Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941).
29 (Popup - Popup)
29.
30.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, et al. v. Padilla, et al., 106 Phil. 591
(1959), citing Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514 (1941).
31 (Popup - Popup)
31.
32.
Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. Baikal Realty Corp., G.R. No. 149992, August 20,
2004, 437 SCRA 121, 143, citing Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387, January
29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431, 442.
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33 (Popup - Popup)
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
Ibid.
38 (Popup - Popup)
38.
39.
40.
Ibid.
41 (Popup - Popup)
41.
42.
See Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines Vol. II (1992), pp. 148-149.
43 (Popup - Popup)
43.
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44 (Popup - Popup)
44.
Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 421;
Estate of the late Mercedes Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 120435, December 22, 1997,
283 SCRA 474.
45 (Popup - Popup)
45.
Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162, 163; Swan
v. CA, G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114, 121; Heirs of Susana De
Guzman Tuazon v. CA, G.R. No. 125758, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 219.
46 (Popup - Popup)
46.
Mendoza v. Teh, G.R. No. 122646, March 14, 1997, 269 SCRA 764, 768; Heirs
of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA, supra.
47 (Popup - Popup)
47.
Also known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," as amended, which provides that:
SECTION 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction: . . .
(b)
In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment,
except actions of forcible entry into and detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts; . . . .
48 (Popup - Popup)
48.
49.
50.
51.
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52 (Popup - Popup)
52.
53.
54.
Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 826; See
also Aquino, H.L., Remedial Law, Doctrines Enunciated in Ponencias on
Jurisdiction, Procedure and Evidence Including Useful Outlines (2002), p. 218.
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