AVASHDEO GAGOOMAL,

Petitioner,

- versus -

spouses ramon and natividad villacorta,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 192813
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J.,
Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 18, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 8,
2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 109004, as well as the Resolution2 dated July 7,
2010 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Orders dated August 5, 2008 and March 20, 2009 issued by Hon. Danilo S.
Cruz of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig City are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered, the Motion to Quash
Writ of Possession filed by spouses Ramon and Natividad Villacorta in Civil
Case No. 67381 is GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the Writ of Possession issued
in Civil Case No. 67381 is ordered QUASHED.
SO ORDERED.

The Facts
Albert Zearosa (Zearosa) was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in Ayala Alabang Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 170213. He mortgaged the same in
favor of BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI) which was duly annotated on the
title on June 7, 1990.
Subsequently, Zearosa obtained a loan in the amount of $300,000.00
from RAM Holdings Corporation (RAM), secured by a second mortgage3
over the property and a Promissory Note4. The parties likewise executed a
Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) dated March 2, 1995 whereby
Zearosa, through an Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney, authorized
RAM, among others, to sell the subject property in case of his failure to
pay.

Zearosa failed to settle his obligations

prompting ram to file a complaint6 for collection
of sum of money with damages against him and
bpi before the rtc of pasig city, branch 152,
docketed as civil case no. 67381. Ram also
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens
on tct no. 170213 on june 11, 1999.
Pending Civil Case No. 67381, Zearosa failed to pay his obligation to BPI
resulting in the foreclosure of the subject property. The certificate of sale
was annotated on TCT No. 170213 on March 24, 2000.
Meanwhile, RAM sold its rights and interests over the subject property to
New Summit International, Inc., represented by its President, Vashdeo
Gagoomal, herein petitioner. The assignment was annotated on TCT No.
170213 on October 16, 2000.
On August 29, 2002, one Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr. (Lorenzo) filed a complaint
for recovery of sum of money with application for a writ of preliminary
attachment against Zearosa before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 64,
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-1038. A writ of preliminary attachment was
issued on September 20, 2002, pursuant to which the Branch Sheriff of
Makati City attached the subject property. The lien was annotated on TCT
No. 170213 on September 30, 2002.
On the other hand, Zearosa redeemed the foreclosed property
from BPI on March 23, 2003. Thereafter, he sold the property to a
certain Patricia A. Tan (Tan) in whose favor TCT No. 102067 was
issued on April 4, 2003. The annotations of the notice of lis
pendens in Civil Case No. 67381, as well as the notice of levy on

attachment in Civil Case No. 02-1038, were carried over to her

title.
In the meantime, in Civil Case No. 02-1038, Lorenzo obtained a favorable
decision which had become final and executory. A notice of levy and
execution on the subject attached property was issued and annotated on
the title. On January 15, 2004, the property was sold at public auction to
Lorenzo for P9,034,166.00 and the Certificate of Sale was annotated on
TCT No. 10206 on January 30, 2004, giving Zearosa until January 29,
2005 within which to redeem the property.
Subsequently, or on April 30, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
RAM in Civil Case No. 67381 for sum of money.8 Pending Zearosa's
appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84523, RAM filed a motion
for execution pending appeal, which was granted.9 On December 14,
2004, the property subject of notice of lis pendens was sold at
public auction to petitioner, the successor-in-interest of RAM, for
P19,793,500.00.10 The certificate of sale was annotated on Tan's
TCT No. 10206 on December 17, 2004.
On January 29, 2005, in view of Zearosa's failure to redeem the property
from Lorenzo, the title over the subject property was consolidated in the
latter's name. A writ of possession was issued in favor of Lorenzo, who
subsequently sold the property to Natividad Villacorta, one of the
respondents herein, for P6,000,000.00. Immediately after purchasing the
property, respondents took possession thereof.
Meanwhile, Zearosa's appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 84523 was dismissed,
and the decision in favor of RAM became final and executory on October
7, 2005. With a sale annotated in its favor, and without Zearosa
exercising his right of redemption, a final Deed of Sale was issued in favor
of petitioner, the successor-in-interest of RAM, on December 14, 2005. By
virtue of a writ of possession11 issued by the RTC on February 1, 2007 in
Civil Case No. 67381, petitioner divested the respondents of possession of
the disputed property.
The foregoing developments prompted the respondents to file a Motion to
Quash Writ of Possession12 in Civil Case No. 67381 before the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 152, on March 20, 2007. They also filed a case for quieting of
title and recovery of possession before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch
276, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-011.
On August 5, 2008, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 152, issued an Order13
in Civil Case No. 67381 denying respondents' Motion to Quash Writ of
Possession. It also directed the Registry of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to
issue a new transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner Vashdeo
Gagoomal. The motion for reconsideration14 thereof was similarly
denied.15

Aggrieved, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief16 before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC in directing the transfer of title over the subject
property to petitioner; in denying their motion to quash the writ of
possession; and in refusing to restore to them the possession of the
subject property.
In its assailed Decision, the CA granted respondents' petition, ratiocinating
as follows:
Records show that spouses Villacorta derived their rights in the subject
property from their predecessor-in-interest, Lorenzo, who purchased the
same in a sale on execution on January 15, 2004. The title to the subject
property was consolidated in favor of Lorenzo on January 29, 2005 and
said annotation was reflected on the certificate of title. Gagoomal, on his
part, maintains that he has a superior right over Lorenzo because his
predecessor-in-interest, Ram, was able to cause the annotation of lis
pendens ahead of Lorenzo's writ of attachment.
The fact that the notice of lis pendens regarding to [sic] Civil Case No.
67381 was annotated ahead of the attachment of the subject property in
Civil Case No. 02-1038 is of no moment. Hence, We agree with spouses
Villacorta that Gagoomal did not acquire any title to the property since
what he purchased during the public auction on October 14, 2004 was
only the remaining right of redemption of Zearosa.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, the annotation of Ram of the lis pendens was
improper because the case filed by Ram against Zearosa was purely a
personal action. Civil Case No. 67381, entitled Ram Holdings Corporation
vs. Albert Zearosa, et. al., is for Collection of Sum of Money with
Damages. It has been held that the doctrine of lis pendens has no
application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery
of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property
may be affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected, as
where the relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of
possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between
conflicting claims of title, possession, or right of possession to specific
property, or requiring its transfer or sale [citation omitted]17
Essentially, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered the Register of Deeds to transfer to petitioner
the title and possession of the subject property notwithstanding
unrebutted evidence that Zearosa, the judgment debtor in Civil Case No.
67381, was no longer its owner and had only the remaining right of
redemption at the time the property was sold at public auction to
petitioner on December 14, 2004.

Corollary thereto, the CA held that the power of the RTC to execute its
judgment extends only to property belonging to the judgment debtor in
Civil Case No. 67381, Zearosa in this case, and did not include the
respondents. The CA likewise refused to give merit to petitioner's
contentions that the respondents can no longer ask for the modification or
abrogation of the decision of the RTC which had already attained finality,
and that since the writ of possession had already been implemented, then
it can no longer be quashed.
The Issues
Hence, this petition advancing the following issues for Our resolution, to
wit:
I.
RESPONDENTS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHTFUL CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY.
II.
RESPONDENTS HAD NO BASIS TO ASK FOR THE QUASHAL OF THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION.
III.
THE PASIG REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN RULE ON TRANSFER OF TITLE.
IV.
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS ARE SUPERIOR TO THAT OF RESPONDENT'S.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION OVERSTEPPED
ISSUES.18

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.
A writ of possession is an order by which the sheriff is commanded to
place a person in possession of a real or personal property. We clarified in
the case of Motos v. Real Bank (A Thrift Bank), Inc.19 that a writ of
possession may be issued under any of the following instances: (a) land
registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 49620; (b) judicial

foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty

and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened;
and (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7
of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 411821.
Corollary thereto, Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption
period; by whom executed or given. - If no redemption be made within
one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the
purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or,
if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other
redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for
redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the
conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall
have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of
the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer
making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall
have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had
continued in office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time
of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser
or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
In this case, the writ of possession was issued and executed in favor of
petitioner under the foregoing provision. However, a punctilious review of
the records will show that its grant and enforcement against the subject
property, over which the respondents third parties to Civil Case No.
67381 claim an adverse interest, are devoid of legal basis.
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only
against property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if
property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to
answer for another mans indebtedness, such person has all the right to
challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the
Rules of Court. Section 1622, Rule 39 thereof specifically provides that a
third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to
determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the
property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an
independent separate action to vindicate their claim of ownership
and/or possession over the foreclosed property.23 However, a person
other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over the
levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to
prosecute his claim.24

In the present case, respondents filed a motion to quash the writ of

possession substantiating their preferential rights over the subject
property which they had purchased from Lorenzo. As earlier stated,
Lorenzo, in Civil Case No. 02-1038, caused the annotation of a writ of
preliminary attachment on September 30, 2002 and thereafter, a notice of
levy and execution, finally acquiring the property in a public auction sale
on January 30, 2004. Similarly, respondents have instituted a separate
civil action for quieting of title and recovery of property before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-011.
Petitioner's argument that he acquired a superior right over the
subject property by virtue of the earlier annotation of a notice of
lis pendens on June 11, 1999 by his predecessor-in-interest RAM
on the same title cannot be given credence.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. - In an action affecting the title or the right
of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when
affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice
of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing
such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency
of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by
their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. [emphasis
ours]
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a dual effect: (1) to keep the
property subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until
the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the defeat of the final
judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide
or otherwise, of the property subject of the litigation to the judgment that
the court will subsequently promulgate.25
Relative thereto, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following actions
and their concomitant proceedings:
(a) an action to recover possession of real estate;
(b) an action to quiet title thereto;
(c) an action to remove clouds thereon;

(d) an action for partition; and

(e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to
the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.26
Thus, a notice of lis pendens is only valid and effective when it affects title
over or right of possession of a real property.

In this case, it cannot be denied that Civil Case

No. 67381, which RAM, predecessor-in-interest of
petitioner, instituted against Zearosa was for
collection of sum of money with damages a
purely personal action. Hence, the notice of lis
pendens in favor of RAM annotated on the
cancelled TCT No. 170213 and carried over to
Tan's TCT No. 10206 conferred upon it no rights
over the subject property and, as a necessary
consequence, upon petitioner, its successor-ininterest.
To be sure, in Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty Corporation27,
We have previously explained that the doctrine of lis pendens has no
application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery
of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property
be incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly
affected such as when the relief sought in the action or suit includes the
recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication
between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession
to specific property, or requiring its transfer or sale. Even if a party initially
avails of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a case in court, such
notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal
action. In such event, the notice of lis pendens becomes functus officio.
Accordingly, petitioner has not created a superior right over the subject
property as against respondents by reason of the prior annotation in 1999
of the notice of lis pendens by his predecessor RAM. Hence, the
subsequent levy on execution on October 14, 2004 arising from the final
money judgment in favor of petitioner cannot prevail over the earlier
annotated attachment made by Lorenzo on September 30, 2002 and its
subsequent notice of levy on execution and sale of the property to
respondents on January 30, 2004, who then took possession. On October
14, 2004, what petitioner merely levied upon on execution was the
remaining redemption rights of Zearosa until January 29, 2005 which
period expired without any redemption having been made. Consequently,
the writ of possession issued as a result of a wrongful execution was not

proper and cannot be enforced against the respondents who are third
parties in possession of and claiming an adverse interest on the property
in controversy.
It bears to stress that the court issuing the writ of execution may enforce
its authority only over properties or rights of the judgment debtor, and the
sheriff acts properly only when he subjects to execution property
undeniably belonging to the judgment debtor. Should the sheriff levy upon
the assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has not even
the remotest interest, then he is acting beyond the limits of his authority.
A judgment can only be executed or issued against a party to the action,
not against one who has not yet had his day in court.28
Neither can We affirm petitioner's contention that in seeking the quashal
of the writ of possession, the respondents were, in effect, asking the RTC
to abrogate its decision, which had already attained finality. As correctly
observed29 by the CA, the quashal of a writ of possession does not have
the effect of modifying or abrogating the judgment of the RTC. The
settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any
respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes all the issues
between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest.30 To
reiterate, however, the court's power with regard to execution of
judgments extends only to properties irrefutably belonging to the
judgment debtor, which does not obtain in this case.
Therefore, petitioner's contention that the writ of possession had already
been enforced and can no longer be quashed deserves scant
consideration. Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control
over the entire execution process, and such authority carries with it the
right to determine every question which may be invariably involved in the
execution.31 Respondents invoked this supervisory power when they
sought the quashal of the writ of possession.
Finally, considering the circumstances of this case, We cannot uphold the
RTC's directive to transfer the title over the subject property from
respondents to petitioner, for utter lack of legal basis. To emphasize, apart
from the motion to quash the writ of possession, respondents have
instituted a case for quieting of title and recovery of possession before the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-011.
In sum, We find that the RTC erred in implementing the writ of execution
against the subject property which does not irrefutably belong to
Zearosa, the judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 67381. Hence, the writ of
possession issued relative thereto was likewise improper and must
necessarily be quashed, as correctly ruled by the CA. Accordingly, since
the respondents were unduly deprived of possession of the subject
property, they must be immediately restored into its possession, without
prejudice to the result of Civil Case No. 08-011.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.