Case 5

was her plan to construct her house in the said lot. When the
defendant refused, the Development Bank filed with the
lower court a petition to hold the said defendant in contempt.
Mrs. Luz Arcilla later intervened in the case filed by DBP and
was so allowed by the lower court.

Jabonete vs Monteverde, Legaspi, DBP, & Arcilla

GR# L- 17482
March 31, 1966
Facts

The Development Bank of the Philippines and Mrs. Luz Arcilla

contended that the refusal of the defendant to cause or allow
the making of an opening in his fence was a defiance of the
said court's decision of March 11, 1954 and was, therefore,
contemptuous. After due hearing, the lower court sustained
the petitioners and found the defendant guilty of contempt
with orders "to pay a fine of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00)
and to open the vereda or alley leading to the lot owned by
the Development Bank of the Philippines and conveyed to
Mrs. Luz S. Arcilla.

On March 11, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Davao,

found that Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question with
the knowledge that a "gravamen" or easement of right of
way existed thereon, promulgated a decision the dispositive
portion of which reads (dili ma basa kay spanish)
In view of the March 11 order, the plaintiffs (Jabonete)
immediately proceeded to the premises in question and
opened in the fence of the defendant (Antonio Legaspi) a
sufficient opening for the passage of men and vehicles. Even
then, however, the defendant filed with the court below on
that very same day, May 21, 1954, a motion for the
reconsideration of the order granting discretionary execution.

Issue
Whether DBP and Mrs. Arcilla has the right to the easement
granted to Jabonete

Thereafter, and upon the lower court's suggestion, the

parties entered into an amicable AGREEMENT which was later
embodied in an order or "auto" dated May 24, 1954. (dili
gihapon mabasa ang AGREEMENT)

Held
No.
Under the aforesaid order of May 24, 1954, the easement
awarded or secured by the lower court to the plaintiffs was
strictly a personal one. The right of way granted was
expressly limited to the latter and their "family, friends,
drivers, servants and jeeps." In the very language of the
agreement the following appears:

Both parties complied with terms of the AGREEMENT until the

plaintiffs, unable to continue with their repair shop,
transferred to another place in December 1959 whereupon
the defendant reconstructed his fence and its footing, closing
thereby the opening previously made by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' lot was foreclosed by the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) which, later still, conveyed it under a
conditional sale to Mrs. Luz Arcilla.

El demandado Antonio Legaspi, permitira el uso y paso en la

calle privada construida por el en su terreno a lo largo del
terreno de los demandantes, a estos, su familia, sus amigos,
chofers, servidumbre y de sus jeeps.

On her acquisition of the said lot, Mrs. Arcilla demanded of

the defendant the re-opening of the fence in question as it
1

The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of

the plaintiffs and the persons above enumerated and it is
clear that the lower court, as well as the parties addressed by
the said order, did not intend the same to pass on to the
plaintiffs' successors-in-interest. In other words, the right
acquired by the original plaintiffs was a personal servitude
under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not a predial
servitude that inures to the benefit of whoever owns the
dominant estate.

violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.On the other

hand, DEFENDANT RETA CLAIMED that the land is beyond the ambit
of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since it has not been proclaimed as
an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the applicable law is Batas
PambansaBlg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay the rentals for
the use of the land
On March 8, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to pay Reta certain sums
representing rentals that had remained unpaid.
On April 6, 1994, plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.

Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal

to the plaintiffs is the fact that the same was granted to the
latter without any compensation to the respondent-appellant.

On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed the TCs

decision.

Digest by: KRH

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Case 6
Alcantara vs Reta Jr.
372 SCRA 368

The issue is whether petitioners have the right of first refusal

under Presidential Decree No. 1517.

Facts

Ruling:

Edilberto Alcantara, Florencio Villarmia, Policarpio Obregon, Ricardo

Roble, EscolasticaOndong, Esteban Rallos, Henry Sesbino, Sergio
Sesbino, Manuel Centeno, Renato Cruz, Marcelo Ceneza,
Buenaventura Ondong and Benjamin Halasan, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14, a complaint against
Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the exercise of the right of first refusal
under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary
injunction, attorney's fees and nullity of amicable settlement.

The petition is without merit.

The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform
Zone (ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National
Housing Authority requesting that the land they were occupying be
declared as an ULRZ
Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would
not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ.
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land
Reform Act," pertains to areas proclaimed as Urban Land Reform
Zones. Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the
said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.

THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIMEDthat they were tenants or lessees of the

land located in Barangay Sasa, Davao City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-72594, owned by Reta; that the land has
been converted by Reta into a commercial center; and that Reta is
threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that they have
the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance
with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are
legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.

To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges

granted by the said decree, one must be:
(1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more;
(2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and,
(3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years.

They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed

between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void ab initio for being

Facts:

Obviously, those who do not fall within the said category cannot be
considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the
right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of
the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a
reasonable time.

It appears that the plaintiff is the owner of a site in

which is located its sugar central, with its factorybuilding and
residence for its employees and laborers, known as the "mill
site." It also owns the adjoining sugarplantation known as
Hacienda "Begoa." Across its properties the plaintiff
constructed a road connecting the "millsite" with the
provincial highway. Through this road plaintiff allowed and
still allows vehicles to pass upon paymentof a toll charge of
P0.15 for each truck or automobile. Pedestrians are allowed
free passage through it.

Respondent Reta denies that he has lease agreements with

petitioners Edilberto Alcantara and Ricardo Roble.
Edilberto Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present proof of a
lease agreement other than his testimony in court that he bought
the house that he is occupying from his father-in-law.
Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two
(62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba. This
arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease.
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the
obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides.

Immediately adjoining the above-mentioned "mill site"

of the plaintiff is the hacienda of Luciano Aguirre,known as
Hacienda "Sagay," where the defendant has a billiard hall
and atubasaloon. Like other people in andabout the place,
defendant used to pass through the said road of the plaintiff,
because it was his only means of access to the Hacienda
"Sagay" where he runs his billiard hall and

Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land

because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in
the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil
Code.
Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion
would still be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct
and not of lease. Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant as
defined by Presidential Decree No. 1517.

Tubasaloon. Later on, by order of the plaintiff,every time that

the defendant passed driving his automobile with a cargo of
tubaplaintiff gatekeeper would stophim and prevent him from
passing through said road. Defendant in such cases merely
deviated from said road andcontinued on his way to
Hacienda "Sagay" across the fields of Hacienda "Begoa,"
likewise belonging to theplaintiff. Plaintiff filed a writ of
injunction to prevent defendant from entering his property
especially the sugarcentral mill site.

Indeed, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of

first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.Another factor which militates
against petitioners' claim is the fact that there is no intention on
the part of respondent Reta to sell the property.
Digest by: Joy Montero

Case 7
North Negros Sugar Co. Inc. vs. Hidalgo

Issues:

63 Phil. 664 (GR No. L-42334)

1. WON an injunction applies in the instant case.

October 31, 19836

2. WON an easement has been created for the use of the

community.
3

ART. 531. Easements may also be established for the benefit

of one or more persons or of a community towhom the
encumbered estate does not belong.

Held:

1. No, an injunction applies only when there has been

damage to third parties. The remedy sought by the plaintiff is
invalid because the property or his person does not sustain
damage every time the defendant passes through the road.
There has been a failure to establish either the existence of a
clear and positive right of the plaintiff specially calling for
judicial protection through an extraordinary writ of the kind
applied for, or that the defendant has committed or attempts
to commit any act which has endanger or tends to endanger
the existence of said right, or has injured or threatens to
injure the same.

As may be seen from the language of article 594, in

cases of voluntary easement, the owner is given ampleliberty
to establish them: "as he may deem fit, and in such manner
and form as he may consider desirable." Theplaintiff
"considered it desirable" to open this road to the public in
general, without imposing any condition savethe payment of
a fifteen-centavo toll by motor vehicles, and it may not now
go back on this and deny the existenceof an easement.
Voluntary easements under article 594 are not contractual in
nature; they constitute the act of theowner. If he exacts any
condition, like the payment of a certain indemnity for the use
of the easement, any personwho is willing to pay it may
make use of the easement. If the contention be made that a
contract is necessary, itmay be stated that a contract exits
from the time all those who desire to make use of the
easement are disposedto pay the required indemnity.

Defendant's sale of tuba at the Hacienda "Sagay" is

nothing more than the exercise of a legitimate business, and
no real damage to the third persons can arise from it as a
natural and logical consequence. The bare possibility that
plaintiff's laborers, due to the contiguity of the Hacienda
"Sagay" to its property, might come to the defendant's store
to imbibetubato drunkenness, does not warrant the
conclusion that the defendant, in thusrunning this business,
impinges upon plaintiff's property rights and should thereby
be judicially enjoined

The plaintiff contends that the easement of way is

intermittent in nature and can only be acquired by virtueof a
title under article 539. The defendant, however, does not lay
claim to it by prescription. The title in this caseconsists in the
fact that the plaintiff has offered the use of this road to the
general public upon payment of ascertain sum as passage
fee in case of motor vehicles. Having been devoted by the
plaintiff to the use of the publicin general, upon paying the
passage fees required in the case of motor vehicles, the road
in question is chargedwith a public interest, and while so
devoted, the plaintiff may not establish discriminatory
exceptions against anyprivate person.

2. Yes, it is clear and evident that the road was constructed in

favor of the general public. No specialcondition or
requirement was made for the passage of those who wished
to pass. There were manifest acts of theplaintiff allowing
laborers, employees and other members of the community to
freely pass through.

Digest by: CN
4

each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while

the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport to
its central upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of
the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in
said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of
Cadiz, Occidental Negros.

Case 12
Valderama vs. North Negros Sugar Central
48 Phil 482
1925

Issue:
Whether or not North Negros Sugar Co. has the right to
transport sugar belonging to other hacienda owners?

Facts

Held:

Several hacienda owners of Manapla, Occidental Negros

entered into a contract with Miguel J. Osorio, known as
milling contract, wherein Osorio agreed to install in Manapla
a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons, for
grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by
the hacienda owners, who in turn bound themselves to
furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in
their estates for thirty years from the execution of the
contract, all in accordance with the conditions specified
therein.

Yes.
This is a case of an easement for the benefit of a corporation,
voluntarily created by the plaintiffs upon their respective
estates for the construction of a railroad connecting said
estates with the central of the defendant. Once the road is
constructed, the easement is apparent because it is
continuously exposed to view by the rails which reveal the
use and enjoyment of said easement. It is evident, as above
stated, that the cane of the plaintiffs if to be transported to
the central by means of wagons passing upon the railroad;
but as the easement was created for the benefit of the
corporation, owner of the central, it may cause its wagons to
pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit,
according to the needs of the central. If the plaintiffs do not
produce sufficient cane to cover the capacity of the central, it
would be unjust to impose upon the defendant corporation
the burden of maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain
from another source sufficient cane with which to maintain its
business; this is especially true here, because in the milling
contract with the plaintiffs, there is nothing to prohibit the
defendant from making milling contracts with other planters,
and obtain in that way all cane necessary to cover the
capacity of the central.

Later on, the defendant North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,

acquired the rights and interest of Miguel J. Osorio in the
milling contract aforesaid.

Under the contract an easement of way 7 meters wide upon

the lands of the plaintiffs was given for the construction and
operation of a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane,
said easement of way was established without any restriction
whatsoever, as regards the ownership of the cane to be
transported over the said railroad; that said contract was
then in full force and effect and had never been annulled or
modified.
The plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging that the
easement of way, which each of them has established in his
respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through

Another reason advanced by the appellees in support of their

theory is that by transporting upon the road, through the
5

servient estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz, it would

alter the easement, making it more burdensome. It is true
that the owner of the dominant estate, in making on the
servient estate the necessary works for the use and
preservation of the easement, cannot alter it, nor make it
more burdensome (art. 543 of the Civil Code); but this does
not mean that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons
passing upon the railroad other cane that of the plaintiffs.
What is prohibited by the legal provision above cited is that
the defendant, in excavations or building materials outside of
the area of 7 meters, because in the first case, the easement
will be altered, and in the second it would become more
burdensome. But nothing of the kind happens when the
defendant transport on the railroad, crossing the servient
estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz; the railroad
continues to occupy the same area on the servient estates,
and the encumbrance resulting from the easement continues
to be the same, whether the tractors traverse the line 10, 20
or 30 times a day transporting cane for the central.

Restrictions[3] which
constituted Cypress Gardens into
a
condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress
Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the
condominium project and to hold title to all the common
areas. Title to the land on which the condominium stands was
transferred toCypress under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S67513. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level
penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the
condominium registered under Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) No. S-1079 of the Register of Deeds
of Makati City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and
assigns
likewise
controlled
the
management
and
administration of the Condominium until 1995. Following the
turnover of the administration and management of the
Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it
was discovered that certain common areas pertaining
to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by
Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with
damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to
vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to
remove the structures it built thereon. Upon the directive of
HLURB Arbiter San Vicente, two ocular inspections [5] were
conducted on the condominium project. During the first
inspection, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the
common area fronting the two elevators on the ninth floor as
a storage room. It was likewise discovered that Goldcrest
constructed a permanent structure which encroached 68.01
square meters of the roof decks common area. [6]

Digest by: SLA

Case 13
Goldcrest Realty Corp. vs. Cypress
G.R. No. 171072
Apr. 7, 2009
Facts

Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is

the developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building
located
at Herrera
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April
26,
1977,
Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of

During the second inspection, it was noted that

Goldcrest failed to secure an alteration approval for the said
permanent structure. In his Decision[7] dated December 2,
6

1999, Arbiter San Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. He

required Goldcrest, among other things, to: (1) remove the
questioned structures, including all other structures which
inhibit the free ingress to and egress from the condominiums
limited and unlimited common areas; (2) vacate the roof
decks common areas and to pay actual damages for
occupying the same; and (3) pay an administrative fine for
constructing a second penthouse and for making an
unauthorized alteration of the condominium plan. Cypress
appealed to CA because nanu ge delete daw ang award and
then the ruling was partially granted mau toh ge pasaka sa
SC na dayun.

only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also illegally

altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section 22[18] of
Presidential Decree No. 957.[19]
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of
the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the
servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary
for the use of the easement;[20] (2) it cannot use the easement
except for the benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated;[21] (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any
other manner than that previously established;[22] (4) it cannot
construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and
preservation of the easement;[23] (5) it cannot alter or make
the easement more burdensome;[24] (6) it must notify the
servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works
on the servient estate;[25] and (7) it should choose the most
convenient time and manner to build said works so as to
cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient
estate.[26] Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of
the easement.

Issue:
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IMPAIRED THE EASEMENT
ON THE PORTION OF THE ROOF DECK DESIGNATED AS
A LIMITED COMMON AREA.[12]
Ruling:
Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof
decks common limited area is for its exclusive use, building
structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons do
not impair the subject easement. The question of whether a
certain act impairs an easement is undeniably one of fact,
considering that its resolution requires us to determine the
acts propriety in relation to the character and purpose of the
subject easement.[17] In this case, we find no cogent reason to
overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office of the
President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right
to erect an office structure on the limited common area
despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not

Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it

breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions. First,
it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office
structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation
of the roof decks limited area. Second, the weight of the
office structure increased the strain on the condominiums
foundation and on the roof decks common limited area,
making the easement more burdensome and adding
unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit
owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure
clearly went beyond the intendment of the easement since it
7

illegally altered the approved condominium project plan and

violated Section 4[27] of the condominiums Declaration of
Restrictions

The court held: And in the present case, what is expressly

reserved is what is written in TCT No. T-481436, to wit "that
the 3.00 meter strip of the lot described herein along the
Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved for public easement
purposes.. x x x"

Digest by: WJLB

The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to

possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved
for public easement purposes and that only the local
government of Las Pias City could institute an action for
recovery of possession or ownership.

Case # 15

Referring to Section 210 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9921 of the DENR, the CA ruled that the 3-meter area being
disputed is located along the creek which, in turn, is a form of
a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. It said
that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact,
which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was
indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the TCT,
it is then estopped from claiming ownership and enforcing its
supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however, the CA noted
that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession
of the contested portion is not the City of Las Pias, but the
Republic of the Philippines, Pursuant to CA 141.

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. RAMON

DUMADAG et al
G.R. No. 194336
March 11, 2013
Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with
damages against respondents for allegedly building their
shanties, without its knowledge and consent in its property. It
claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its
name was designated as an open space of Pilar Village
Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and
amenities for subdivision residents. Respondents denied the
material allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted
that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has
jurisdiction and authority over them.

Issue: WON petitioner, as the owner of the subject party of

land, the proper party to file an action for recovery of
possession against respondents conformably with Articles
428 and 539 of Civil Code.
Held: We deny.

The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint, finding that

the land being occupied by respondents are situated on the
sloping area going down and leading towards the Mahabang
Ilog Creek, and within the three-meter legal easement; thus,
considered as public property and part of public dominion
under Article 502 of the Civil Code, which could not be owned
by petitioner.

An easement or servitude is a real right on another's

property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of
the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else
to do or something to be done on his or her property, for the
benefit of another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena,
inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively
belongs, indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property
8

right, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. The

Code defines easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to
a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one
or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong.

shall be considered as forming part of the open space

requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216. Said law is explicit:
open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond
the commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for
parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be nonalienable public lands, and non-buildable."

While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule
that "the owner of the servient estate retains the ownership
of the portion on which the easement is established, and may
use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise
of the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that
"all matters concerning easements established for public or
communal use shall be governed by the special laws and
regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by
the provisions of this Title Title VII on Easements or
Servitudes."

Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the

Philippines which provides:
Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of
the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a
zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters
in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas,
along their margins, are subject to the easement of public
use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing
and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone
longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
(Underscoring supplied)

In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21,

cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the
governments program of biodiversity preservation. Section
2.3 of which further mandates:

Thus, the above prove that petitioners right of ownership

and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek.
Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the trial courts
opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that
respondents have a better right to possess the subject
portion of the land because they are occupying an area
reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to
petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it
precisely because it is public land. Likewise, we
repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights
over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they
may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they
are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that
the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained
the same character throughout their occupancy.

2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision

Surveys for Housing/Residential, Commercial or Industrial
Purposes:
When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-subdivided
into lots for residential, commercial or industrial purposes the
segregation of the three (3) meter wide strip along the banks
of rivers or streams shall be observed and be made part of
the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.
The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to
subsequent subdivision.
Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the
allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream,
like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and
9

As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute

a case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, We find and so
hold that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the
OSG and the local government of Las Pias City, may file an
action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The
former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion
under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action to
enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279
(otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992). Under R.A. 7279, all local government units
(LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish persons or
entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways,
and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds.

Pacific Banking
Lorilla
Villanueva

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the

parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it
from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said
property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo
and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983.
When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small
house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of
the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel
spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of
private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of
Way.

Yet all is not lost for petitioner. It may properly file an action
for mandamus to compel the local government of Las Pias
City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the eviction,
demolition, and relocation of respondents and any other
persons similarly situated in order to give flesh to one of the
avowed policies of R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban
dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public
health, safety, and ecology.

As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to

enforce the contract of easement.
Villanuevas Arguments:

Digested by: MTDP

The Contract of Easement could not be enforced against him.

First, he says that a right of way cannot exist when it is not
expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title. According
to him, even if an easement is inherent and inseparable from
the estate to which it actively belongs as provided in Art. 617
of the Civil Code, the same is extinguished when the servient
estate is registered and the easement was not annotated in
said title conformably with Section 39 of the Land
Registration Law.

Case 16
Villanueva vs Velasco
GR# 130845
November 27, 2000
Facts
Sps. Gabriel

Sebastian &

Ease
ment

He adds that Section 76 of P.D. No. 1529 also requires that

when a case is commenced involving any right to registered
land under the Land Registration Law (now the Property

Espinola

10

(3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of

the dominant estate;

Registration Decree), any decision on it will only be effectual

between or among the parties thereto, unless a notice of lis
pendens of such action is filed and registered in the registry
office where the land is recorded. There was no such
annotation in the title of the disputed land, according to
Villanueva.

(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial

to the servient estate; and
(5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.

Issue

The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide

easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement
mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the
needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs
of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.
Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever
edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of
private respondents estate.

Whether the contract of easement of right of way binds

Villanueva considering that it was entered by Sps. Gabriel
and the Espinolas
Held
At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of
way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement
between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the
instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a
voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity
or a legal easement.

Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the

contract of easement because the same was not annotated
in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint
to enforce the easement was not recorded with the Register
of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious.

A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted

for public use or for private interest, and becomes a
continuing property right.[14] As a compulsory easement, it
is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as
provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code.

Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding

upon the parties to said case and those who are their
successor in interest by title after said case has been
commenced or filed in court.[18] In this case, private
respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil
Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991,[19] against the original
owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the
name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds[20]
on March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the
bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the
decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For,
although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in
court.

The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory

are:
(1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(2) proper indemnity has been paid;
11

appellant's premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian

Road, the nearest, most convenient and adequate
entrance/exit to the public road or highway.

Digest by: KRH

Case 17
Ramos, Sr. vs Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,
GR# 75905
Oct. 12, 1987

3.)he addressed separate request/demand letters to

defendant company to allow him to exercise a right of way on
the subject premises

FACTS:

4.) that in September 1977, a meeting/conference was held

between petitioner and his counsel and Mr. Roberto
Gatchalian and counsel on the other, during which defendant
Corporation manifested its conformity to grant the requested
right of way upon payment of proper indemnity, with the
request that appellant inform defendants Asprec of their
aforesaid agreement.

Petitioner Ramos is the owner of a house and lot containing

an area of 901 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 14927 situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Metro Manila. The lot was acquired by the petitioner from
Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.In the subdivision
survey plan of Lot 4133-G-11.
Two road lots abut petitioner's property:
lot 4133-G-12 with an area of 2,160 square meters clearly
appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan
Lot 4135 as Gatchalian Avenue owned by respondent
ASPREC.
LLpr
Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is
alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was
granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to
service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivisions, by the
respondent Asprecs.

On November 26, 1981 = the PETITIONER FILEDan urgent

ex-parte motion for theissuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction as well as a preliminary
prohibitory injunction. On the same day, the lower court
ordered that the defendant corporation is temporarily
restraining petitonerramos from using, passing the said
GATCHALIAN AVENUE.
On December 1, 1981, Gatchalian Realty filed its answer a.)
They never into a verbal agreement with the petitioner to
grant them a road right of way, b.) The so-called Gatchalian
Avenue or Palanyag Road is not a public road but a private
street established and constructed by the defendant
Corporation intended for the sole and exclusive use of its
residents and lot buyers of its subdivisions.

The records of this case disclose that on April 30, 1981, a

complaint for an easement of a right of way with
preliminary mandatory injunction was filed by Ramos
against the private respondents. Among the allegations
in the complaint are:

On December 2, 1981, RESPONDENT ASPREC FILED THEIR

ANSWER which basically contained the same averments as
that of the realty company.

"1.) That Petitioner, (REMIGIO RAMOS) constructed his house

at 27 Gatchalian Avenue, Paraaque, and has since resided
therein with his family from 1977 up to the present.

the lower court rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against

the defendants ordering the latter to grant the former a right
of way.

2.) that during construction of the house, Gatchalian Realty,

Inc. built a 7-8 feet high concrete wall right infront of
12

RESPONDENTSAsprec and Gatchalian, likewise, FILED A

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of the lower court's grant of
a right of way through Gatchalian Avenue in petitioner's favor
would be in derogation of the "Contract of Easement of Road
Right-of-Way and of Drainage" executed between them and
Gatchalian Realty. cdphil

establishing the preconditions for its grant fixed by Articles

649 and 650 of the Civil Code of the Philippines :
(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1, end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts
(Art. 649, last par.); and

On July 8, 1983, the lower court under a new judge by virtue

of the reorganization of the judiciary, issued an order setting
aside and vacating its previous decision.

(4) That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.' (Art. 650).

The Court of Appeals on August 29, 1986, found that the

petitioner ramos failed to establish the existence of the
preconditions in order that he could legally be entitled to an
easement of a right of way.

"By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory

right of way cannot be obtained unless the four
requisites enumerated are first shown to exist,
On the first requisite, Thepetitioner failed to prove the
non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road
except through the Gatchalian Avenue.

ISSUE:
whether or not the petitioner has successfully shown that all
the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of a
right of way in his favor are present.

As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right

of way provided by the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos
Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan
for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still
undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the
petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway
does not bring him within the ambit of the legal
requisite.

RULING:
Since there is no agreement between the contending parties
in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the
other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between
the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other
private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is
whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a legal or
compulsory easement of a right of way.

We agree with the appellate court's observation that the

petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded from
the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement
and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way
because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot
and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents
Asprec.

FIRST, WE NEED TO KNOW THE REQUIREMENTS: (important

ni)
SOURCE: In the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company, Inc.
v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al. (17 SCRA 731, 735-6), we
held that:
". . . the Central had to rely strictly on its being entitled to a
compulsory servitude of right of way, under the Civil Code,
and it could not claim any such servitude without first

"mere convenience for the dominant estate is not

enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition
13

of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious

or artificial, necessity for it."- (important) Considering
that the petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the
first requisite as aforestated, we find it unnecessary to
discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory
right of way.

even the alternative passageway and preventing the private

respondents from traversing any part of it.

So, private respondents then filed an action for

injunction with damages against the petitioner before the CFI
of Cebu. They assailed the petitioners closure of the original
passageway which they claimed to be an ancient road right
of way that had been existing before WWII and since then
had been used by them and the general public. They also
alleged that the dike constructed by petitioner was without a
permit and obstructing the passage of the residents and local
fishermen, and trapping debris and flotsam on the beach.

Digest by: WynGatchalian and friends

Case 18
Costabella Corporation vs. CA, Katipunan Lumber Co.
GR No. 80511
January 25, 1991

In its answer, petitioner denied the existence of an

ancient road through its property and counter-averred that it
and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted the
temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of (or passage
through) is property by the private respondents and others
by mere tolerance and purely as an act of neighbourliness. It
also alleged that respondents were not entirely dependent on
the subject passageway as they had another existing access
to the public road through other properties. Petitioners also
said that the dike was merely a breakwater on the foreshore
land fronting its property and has been benefitting the
fishermen who used the same as mooring for their boats
during low tide. Lastly, they assailed respondents failure to
implead as defendants the owners of the other properties
supposedly traversed by the alleged ancient road right way.

Facts:
Petitioner owns the real estate properties designated
as Lot No. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre situated at
SitioBuyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had
constructed a resort and hotel. Private respondents, on the
other hand, own the adjoining properties designated as Lot
No. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon Cadastre.

Before the petitioner began the construction of its

beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from
their respective properties and the provincial road, passed
through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's
property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned
passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but
nonetheless opened another route across its property
through which the private respondents, as in the past, were
allowed to pass. But later on, or sometime in August, 1982,
when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its
beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing

The CFI ruled in favor of the respondents, finding that

they had acquired a vested right over the passageway in
controversy based on its long existence and its continued use
and enjoyment. The CA questioned the lower courts finding
on private respondents vested right by virtue of prescription
but nevertheless granted their right to an easement of way.

14

Issue:

therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be

proper as a controversy for a compulsory right of way, this
Court is constrained to hold that it was in error.

1. WON easement of right of way can be acquired through

prescription.
2. WON the private resp. had acquired easement of right of
way in the form of a passageway on petitioners property.

The SC also clarified that least prejudicial prevails

over shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt
necessarily the best choice).

Held:
1. No. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it
cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription.

Digest by: CN

Case No 26
JUAN GARGANTOS vs TAN YANON and THE COURT OF
APPEALS

2. No. One may validly claim an easement of right of way

when he has proven the: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3)
the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.

G.R. No. L-14652

June 30, 1960

Facts: The record discloses that the late Francisco Sanz was
the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square
meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon,
situated in the poblacion of Romblon. He subdivided the lot
into three and then sold each portion to different persons.
One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who
subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with
the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to
Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its
northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the third
portion, which, together with the camarin and small building
thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally
acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.

The private respondent failed to prove that there is no

adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public
highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that there is
another outlet for the private respondents to the main road
(yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents).
Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience
of the dominant estate was never a gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and
not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire
such easement. Also, the private respondents made no
mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioner for the
right of way to be established over its property.Hence, the
Private respondents' properties cannot be said to be isolated,
for which a compulsory easement is demandable. Insofar
15

On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor

for a permit to demolish the roofing of the oldcamarin. The
permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of
the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the
Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in
order to construct a combined residential house and
warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this
application.

respondent has not acquired an easement by prescription

because he has never formally forbidden petitioner from
performing any act which would be lawful without the
easement, hence the prescriptive period never started.
It is obvious, however, that Article 621, N.C.C. and the
doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein because
the two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that
owner by respondent, were formerly owned by just one
person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced
improvements on both properties. On that portion presently
belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in such a
way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of
the camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner. On
said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and
doors which serve as passages for light and view. These
windows and doors were in existence when respondent
purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did
not provide that the easement of light and view would not be
established. This then is precisely the case covered Article
624, N.C.C which provides that the existence of an apparent
sign of easement between two estates, established by the
proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is
alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue
actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of
the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of
alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear
before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors
and windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned
house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent
sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its
existence. It should be noted, however, that while the law
declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement
actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either
estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to
speak of, there being but one owner of both estates.

Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of

Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to
Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to
restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent
plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through
the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a
distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line
between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the
members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the
corresponding building permit to defendant. CFI rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff to
pay defendant to pay damages.
CA set aside the decision of the CFI and enjoined defendant
from constructing his building unless "he erects the same at
a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary
line of his property, in conformity with Article 673 of the New
Civil Code."
Issue: WON the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an
easement of light and view against the property of petitioner
Gargantos.
Held: The kernel of petitioner's argument is that respondent
never acquired any easement either by title or by
prescription. Assuredly, there is no deed establishing an
easement. Likewise, neither petitioner nor his predecessorsin-interest have ever executed any deed whereby they
recognized the existence of the easement, nor has there
been final judgment to that effect. Petitioner maintains that

We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an

easement of light and view against petitioner's property. By
16

reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his

land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less
than three meters from the boundary line separating the two
estates.

of any improvements in the latter house which might in any

manner be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the said
easement. He contends that the easement of light is
positive; and that therefore the period of possession for
the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title
is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of
the same commenced, or, in other words, applying the
doctrine to this case, from the time that said windows
were opened with the knowledge of the owner of the
house No. 63, and without opposition on this part.

Case Digest by: MTDP

Case 27
Maximo Cortes vs Jose Palanca Yu-Tibo
GR# 911
March 12, 1903

The DEFENDANT, on the contrary, CONTENDS that the

easement is negative, and that therefore the time for the
prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the
date on which the owner of the dominant estate may
have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the
servient estate from doing something which would be
lawful but for the existence of the easement

Facts
House No. 65 Calle Rosario is the property of the wife of the
plaintiff (Maximo Cortes), has certain windows therein,
through which it receives light and air. The said windows are
adjacent to house, No. 63 of the same street. These windows
have been in existence since 1843.

SUMMARY of CONTENTIONS

Defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has

commenced certain work with the view to raising the roof of
the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in
said house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving the
building of a large part of the air and light formerly received
through the window.

Easement of Light
Period of
Possession for
Acquisitive
Prescription

The Trial Court found that plaintiff has not proven that he
has, by any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63,
from making improvements of any kind therein at any time
prior to the complaint.
The CONTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFF is that by the constant
and uninterrupted use of the windows referred to above
during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired from
prescription an easement of light in favor of the house No.
65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63, and,
consequently, has acquired the right to restrain the making
17

Plaintif
Positive
From the time that
said windows were
opened with the
knowledge of the
owner of the house
No. 63, and
without opposition
on this part.

Defendant
Negative
From the date on
which the owner of
the dominant
estate may have
prohibited, by a
formal act, the
owner of the
servient estate
from doing
something which
would be lawful
but for the
existence of the
easement

Issue
[NOTE: Please be guided accordingly that the issue and
ruling in this case digest is different from Case#16
Villanueva vs.Velasco as this aims to focus on the issue of
voluntary easement in conformity of AttyGravadors Topics
in the Syllabus: Topic 7: Easement and Servitudes subtopic
25- Voluntary Easement.]

Whether the easement is positive or negative and whether

plaintiff has acquired the easement through prescription
Held

Facts

It is our opinion that the easement of lights in the case of

windows opened in one's own wall is of a negative
character, and, as such, cannot be acquired by prescription
under article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the
time of possession from the date on which the owner of
the dominant estate (House No. 65) may, by a formal
act have prohibited the owner of the servient estate
(House No. 63) from doing something which it would be
lawful from him to do were it not for the easement.

Sps. Gabriel

Easeme
nt

Pacific Banking
&Lorilla

Espinola

Sebastian

Villanueva
[Diagram source: Case #16 Villanueva vs Velasco - KRH]

The plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of

opposition to the right of the owner of the house No. 63 Calle
Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein
improvements which might obstruct the light of the house
No. 65 of the same street, the property of the wife of the
appellant, at any time prior to the complaint, as found by the
court below in the judgment assigned as error, he has not
acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such
easement of light, no matter how long a time have elapsed
since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house
No. 65, because the period which the law demands for such
prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run,
the act with which it must necessarily commence not having
been performed.

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the

parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it
from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said
property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo
and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983.
When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small
house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of
the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel
spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of
private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of
Way.
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the
Gabriels had constructed the small house that encroached
upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware
that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla,
had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case for easement, damages
and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order against the spouses Gabriel.

Digest by: KRH

Case 28
Villanueva vs Velasco
346 SCRA 99
18

was not annotated in the title of the land and the notice
of lispendens was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, in
legal easement, the servient estate is bound to provide the
dominant estate ingress from and egress to the public
highway. Further, the decision enforcing the right of
easement against the previous owner, is conclusive and
binding upon the successor-in-interest.|||

As successors-in-interest of Espinolas, Sebastian and Lorilla

wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to
demolish the small house encroaching on the easement.
Gabriels filed a Motion for recon but was denied by the CA
and upheld RTCs issuances.

Moreover, Villanueva was bound by the contract of

easement, not only as a voluntary easement but as a legal
easement.

Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Writ of Demolition =

CA DIMISSED.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari asserting that the
existence of easement was ot annotated in his titles and he
was not a party to the civil case, thus the contract of
easement of Gabriels and Espinola cannot be enforced
against him = DISMISSED.

At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of

way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement
between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the
instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a
voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a
legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and
becomes a continuing property right.

ISSUE:
Is this a voluntary kind of easement considering that
Petitoners predecessor in interest, theGabriels had granted
an easement of right of way to the Espinolas who are the
predecessor in interest of private respondents?

The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide

easement obstructs the entry of private respondents' cement
mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the
needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs
of the dominant estate determine the width of the
easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish
whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs
of private respondents' estate.

RULING:
The easement in the case at bar is both voluntary and legal
easement. The settled rule is that the needs of the dominant
estate determine the width of the easement. Hence,
petitioner ought to demolish the small house on the
easement obstructing the entry of private respondents'
cement mixer and motor vehicle. And even if the easement

Digest by: Joy M.

19