CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

SEC. 14, ART. III:

1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused,
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

Q. Explain the requirement of due process in criminal cases.
A. The requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law simply that the rules prescribed by Section 14 and all
other provisions related to criminal prosecution are followed.
a) In Mejia v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457, the Supreme Court enumerated the
ingredients of due process as applied to criminal proceedings, as follows:
1) The accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction;
2) The accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes
of law;
3) The accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be
heard; and
4) The judgment rendered was within the authority of a
constitutional law.
b) Unreasonable delay in resolving complaint. In Roque v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999, it was held that the failure of the Office of
the Ombudsman to resolve a complaint that had been pending for six years
clearly violates the constitutional command for the Ombudsman to act
promptly on complaints and the right of the petitioner to due process of law
and to speedy trial. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the
dismissal of the complaint. A similar ruling was made in Cervantes v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108595, May 18, 1999, and in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70, where it was held that the unreasonable
delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan violated the due process clause.
i) However, in Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214, although
the offense was allegedly committed on or before October 17,
1988 and the information was filed only on May 9, 1991, and an
amended information filed on December 8, 1992, the delay did not
constitute a denial of due process, because there was continuing
investigation, snarled only because of the complexity of the issues
involved. In Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 559, it was
found that the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation was caused by petitioners own acts, not by inaction
of the prosecution. Accordingly, there was no violation of the

petitioners right to due process of law or of his right to speedy

disposition of the case.
TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NOS. L-72335-39, MARCH 21, 1988]
FACTS: Complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a
report" with the Legal Panel of PSC on October 1974, containing charges of alleged
violations of RA No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S.
Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until December
1979, when the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint
filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint in April 1980 by
referring the complaint to the CIS, PSC, for investigation and report. In June 1980,
the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges
for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero.
By October 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already
for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only in July 1985 that a resolution
was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the corresponding
criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan in June 1985, all against petitioner
Tatad. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional
mandate of "due process" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a
decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to due
process.
RULING: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of
the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but
under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close
to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of
the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative
assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by
the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In
the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which
must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of
three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the

absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such

investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation
cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting
back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained
to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and
filing the information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the
foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
c) Impartial court or tribunal. A critical component of due process of law is a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. In order to disqualify
a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove such
bias by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the petitioners failed to
adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that the respondent judge was
motivated by malice or bad faith when she issued the assailed rulings
[Webb v. People, G.R. No. 127262, July 24, 1997].
i) In Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995,
October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court, reiterating its ruling in
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, declared that the crossexamination of the accused and the witnesses by the trial court
indicated bias, and thus violated due process.
ii) But where the questions propounded by the court are merely for
clarification, to clear up dubious points and elicit relevant
evidence, such questioning will not constitute bias [People v.
Castillo, 289 SCRA 213; Cosep v. People, 290 SCRA 378; People v.
Galleno, 291 SCRA 761], Thus, in People v. Herida, G.R. No.
127158, March 5, 2001, where the trial court intensively
questioned the witnesses and the accused (approximately 43% of
the questions asked of the prosecution witnesses and the accused
were propounded by the judge), it was held that the questioning
was necessary. Judges have as much interest as counsel in the
orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence and have the
duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the
points overlooked by counsel. See also People v. Medenilla, G.R.
No. 131638-39, March 26, 2001.
d) Right to a hearing. In Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9,
1998, and in Concepcion v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131728, March 9, 1998, the
Supreme Court held that the accused were denied due process of law when
the trial court convicted them (after having declared that they had waived
their right to present evidence), but it was shown that there were
deviations from the regular course of trial, e.g., petitioners were not
directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor dates set for that
purpose, petitioners were not given an opportunity to present rebuttal
evidence nor dates set for that purpose, and petitioners had not admitted
the offense charged in the information which would have justified any
modification in the order of the trial. In Defensor- Santiago v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123792, March 8, 1999, it was held that the reopening of a case without giving the accused the opportunity to introduce
controverting evidence is an error and a denial of due process of law.

ALONTE VS. SAVELLANO [G.R. NO. 131652, MARCH 9, 1998]

FACTS: Juvie-lyn Punongbayan charged Bayani Alonte, the incumbent mayor of
Bian, Laguna, with the crime of rape. According to Punongbayan, on or about
September 12, 1996, Alonte offered her a drinking water which made her dizzy and
weak. Thereafter, Alonte unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with her
against her will and consent. During the pendency case, however, Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit desisting
her testimonies against Alonte. Nonetheless, respondent Judge Savellano found
Alonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of rape. Accordingly, the
accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did not
take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the
private complainant's aforementioned affidavit. They left everything to the so-called
"desistance" of the private complainant. In this petition, Alonte avers that
respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when respondent Judge rendered a decision in the case thereby
depriving him of his Constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of innocence stands in favor of Alonte.
RULING: NO. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient
opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into
consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or
defense. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse
for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the
first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable
right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. In the case at bar, the
affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan does not contain any statement
that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to
"be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied
other reasons. In People vs. Ballabare we have said that any recantation must be
tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely
affected by it to crossexamine the recanting witness. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Hence, when confronted with a situation
where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the
original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine
which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence.
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS. It does seem to the
Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings.
Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures
been, to the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the
records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of

witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after

arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require:
a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it;
b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial."
e) In People v. Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999, the
Supreme Court said that there was no denial of due process where the trial
court refused to grant the petition of Webb to take the deposition of
witnesses residing abroad, considering that the testimony of the witnesses
would be merely corroborative, the defense had already presented 57
witnesses and 464 documentary exhibits, and the trial court had already
admitted the exhibits on which the said witnesses would have testified.
f) In Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November
19, 2001, RA 7080 (Plunder Law), as amended by RA 7659, was challenged
on the following grounds:
1) it is vague;
2) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
prosecutions; and
3) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under the Revised Penal Code;
All of which are purportedly violations of the right of the accused to due
process of law and to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him. The Court ruled that every legislative measure is
presumed constitutional, and the petitioner failed to discharge the burden
to overcome the presumption of constitutionality:
1) The law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of the violation. Sec. 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or
forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity.
2) Sec. 4 does not circumvent the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The prosecution
has to prove beyond reasonable doubt the number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or a series which would
constitute a pattern involving an amount no less than P50million.
3) The legislative declaration in RA 7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is malum in se. If the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are

mala in se even if punished under special laws, particularly

because in plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in
se.
g) Plea of guilt to a capital offense. In People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No.
130663, March 20, 2001, the Court enumerated the stringent constitutional
standards impelled by the due process clause whenever the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, viz:
1) The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the
consequences thereof;
2) The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and
3) The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence
on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires.
In People v. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804, February 26, 2003, the Supreme Court
said that the procedure is mandatory, and a judge who fails to observe with
fealty the said rule commits grave abuse of discretion. The Court has
cautioned trial judges to proceed with meticulous care whenever the
imposable penalty for the crime charged is death.
h) The State and the offended party are entitled to due process. The State,
and more so, the offended party, is also entitled to due process of law. In
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274, the judgment of acquittal was
vacated upon a finding by the Supreme Court that there was bias and
partiality on the part of the judge and the prosecutor. In Merciales v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002, it was held that the petitioner
(mother of the victim in a rape with homicide case) was denied due process
when the public prosecutor, who was under legal obligation to pursue the
action on her behalf, reneged on that obligation and refused to perform his
sworn duty. But, in People v. Verra, G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002, it was
held that the People could not claim that it was denied due process,
because there was a public prosecutor who represented it at every stage of
the proceedings from arraignment to promulgation of the dismissal order
to protect its interest.
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NO. 72670, SEPTEMBER 12, 1986]
FACTS: On October 22, 1983, then President Marcos created a Fact- Finding Board to
investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The minority and majority reports of
the Board both agreed that Rolando Galman was not the assassin but was merely a
fall guy of the military which plotted the assassination itself. The minority report tags
26 persons, headed by General Ver, as respondents to the case. Marcos rejected the
reports of the Board and stuck to his claim that it was Galman who killed Aquino.
Thereafter, Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan acquitted the respondents of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. In
this petition, Petitioners Saturnina Galman, wife of the late Rolando Galman, and 29
others filed the present action alleging that respondent courts committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the sovereign people of the Philippines to due
process of law. Allegedly, then President Marcos had ordered the respondent courts
to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a
verdict of acquittal. In his comment, the Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera,
affirmed the allegations and revealed that Malacaang had planned the scenario of
the trial. Respondents-accused prayed for its denial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial was a mock trial and that the predetermined
judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
RULING: The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at which
the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of
the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent
Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President's
"Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without
precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from
the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very
Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being
summoned to Malacaang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and
exemplified... Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or
resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they
stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral
arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the AquinoGalman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court
martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military
men made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial
court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote,
"jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the
Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases. "This criminal collusion as to the
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacanang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict.
This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents
accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories,
that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the
erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory
of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of
the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the
cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of
justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law
and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be
used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favour
and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar
where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of
our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal,
Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law
and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead
once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an

unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial
the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio.
Q. May the Supreme Court review decisions of military tribunals?
A. Generally, the Supreme Court has no supervisory authority over military courts.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171; Martelino v. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106 (March 25,
1970). By the National Security Code, P.D. 1498, June 11, 1978 (74 O.G. 11066), the
SC does not review decisions of military commissions but of the Court of Military
Appeals in cases appealed to the latter by military commissions. Therefore, the issue
of denial of the right to present evidence should first be passed upon by military
authorities. Buscayno & Sison v. Military Commissions, 109 SCRA 273 (November 19,
1981). But see dissents of Fernando and Teehankee and Art VIII, Section 1.
Q. May military commissions or tribunals have jurisdiction to try civilians for
offenses allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts were open and
functioning?
A. No. Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987), explicitly
reversing Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 264 (1975) and all
decided cases affirming the same.
Q. The rule is that jurisdiction over a person is acquired only upon arrest. Does this
apply to military jusrisdiction?
A. No. This is a rule for ordinary courts. See Article of War 2 and Section 8 of Manual
for Courts Martial, AFP. Abadilla v. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92 (December 1, 1987). [The
reasoning here is unconvincing.]
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Q. What is the reason for the presumption of innocence?
A. It is based on the principle of justice. The presumption is not designed to protect
the guilty but to prevent the conviction of one who is innocent, for it is a rule that
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Proof must survive the test of reason. The
conviction must be based on moral certainty, for it is better to acquit a guilty person
rather than to convict an innocent man. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 60).
PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [G.R. NO. L-21325, OCTOBER 29, 1971]
FACTS: In a drinking session, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin brought up the
idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case which
Dramayo and Ecubin was a prime suspect thereof. That same night, Ecubin hit
Estelito with a piece of wood on the side of the head while Dramayo repeatedly
stabbed him with a short pointed bolo. The next morning, Dramayo went to the
house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just
seen the cadaver of Estelito. Upon interview, the Chief of Police noticed blood stains
on the trousers of Dramayo and asked the latter to explain where he obtained it.
Dramayo answered that it was caused by his daughter who has a skin ailment. It
was on this basis that Dramayo and Ecubin were charged of the crime of murder.
Upon trial, the lower court found Dramayo and Ecubin guilty beyond reasonable
doubt basing on the testimonies offered by the prosecution. In this appeal, AccusedAppellants invoke their constitutional right to be declared presumptively innocent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Accussed-Appellants constitutional right to be presumed
innocent can stand against judgment of conviction against them.

RULING: NO. The presumption of innocence could not come to appellants rescue as
it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the
prosecution.
ACCUSATION IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. It is to be admitted that the
starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called
upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must
be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been
committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony
of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could
arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on
trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did
he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. United States
v. Lasada, decided in 1910, yields this excerpt:
"By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may
arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof
and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute
the offense."
To the same effect is an excerpt from the opinion of the late Justice Tuason in People
v. Esquivel. Thus:
"In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the
attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before
the court the pertinent facts as their disposal with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and
loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not
escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to
the court, to the accused, and to the state."
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence
to establish the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi
interposed hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied though that
the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being
entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants.
The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other
three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the
requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present.
There is no question as to the other two who testified for the state being likewise no
long subject to any criminal liability. The reference then to opinion of the late Justice

Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental postulate that a finding
of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable doubt could be entertained, is
unavailing. This is evident from the very citation in the brief of appellants of the
opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. Thus: "Upon the other hand there are
certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a
grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let the
mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.)
The finding of the two gold teeth of the deceased the suitcase of Maradani, and the
testimony of Erajio Ello that he gave the hat ... to Maradani not only engender
serious doubt in our minds as to the guilt of the appellant but also seems to sustain
the theory of the defense and strengthen the suspicion of the trial court, that
Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin
Ige. In the light of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to
acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality
be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person
who may be innocent. ..." The facts of the present case certainly do not fit within the
above mold. Reliance on the part of appellants on the above decision is therefore
futile.
Q. What is the principal effect of the guarantee of presumption of innocence?
A. Its principal effect is that no person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has
proved him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Q. For purposes of disqualification in an election, Section 4 of Batas Blg. 52 says:
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such
fact (disqualification). Valid?
A. No. This violates the guarantee of presumption of innocence. The disqualification
put the candidates in the category of convicts without first finally convicting them.
Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [G.R. NO. L-52245, JANUARY 22, 1980]
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UPON THE FILING OF CHARGES VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. In so far as the petition of
Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenged, may be divided
in two parts. The first provides: "a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware
of the presumption of validity that attached to a challenged statute, of the wellsettled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally
defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to
hold that this in one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An
accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns
before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against

whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to
run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it
the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the
sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before
the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly
possible conflict of finding between two government bodies, to the extreme
detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative
administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a
judicial determination.
Q. Section 40 of the Local Government Code disqualifies from running from office a
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. If applied
to one who has not yet been convicted of any offense but was merely fleeing from
trial, would there be violation of the presumption of innocence?
A. This was defended against the suggestion that it violates presumption of
innocence on the argument that the disqualification is not a penalty and that
Congress is allowed to prescribe reasonable qualifications for local candidates both
by Article V, Section 1 and Article X, Section 3. Marquez, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
112889, April 18, 1995. (But the Court remanded the case to the lower court for
determination of the fact of being a fugitive from justice.)
MARQUEZ VS. COMELEC [G.R. NO. 112889, APRIL 18, 1995]
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs
no further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is
rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after
being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno;
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d
102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific
Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and
ordinary connotation of the term.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials
in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court
certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative
rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain
congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal
reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations),
that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer
only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in
fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted
and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since
the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead
of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee.
The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to
the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.
Q. Does preventive suspension pendent lite violate the right to be presumed
innocent?
A. No, because preventive suspension is not a penalty. Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 96131, September 6, 1991.
Q. Does presumption of innocence preclude the State from shifting the burden of
proof to the accused?
A. The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well
defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as
well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put
upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and
are not committed with any criminal intent or intention. US v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725
(1916).
a) Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken
into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment [People v.
Austria, 195 SCRA 700], Thus, in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, the
provision of an election statute which disqualified from running for public
office any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State
provided that the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal shall be prima facie evidence of such
fact, was declared unconstitutional for being violative of the presumption
of innocence clause. Likewise, in People v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 129691, June
29, 1999, it was held that the acquittal of the accused is inevitable if
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt.
b) The presumption of innocence was held not to have been overcome by
prosecution evidence where the victim had difficulty in identifying the
accused not only during the hospital confrontation but also in open court
[People v. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122]; or where the prosecution failed to
present the alleged poseur-buyer, because without the testimony of the
latter, there is no convincing evidence that the accused was a marijuana
peddler and not merely a victim of instigation [People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA
339]; or where the testimony of the prosecution witnesses is marred by
inconsistencies [Layug v. Sandiganbayan, 245 SCRA 123].
c) The presumption that official duty was regularly performed cannot, by
itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused,
and the other consistent with guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction [People
v. Martos, 211 SCRA 805]. Thus, in People v. Briones, 266 SCRA 254, the
fact that SP01 Alilio was presumed to have regularly performed his official
duty was held insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, as it
was inconceivable that the accused would still sell shabu to SP01 Alilio

when the accused knew Alilio to be the police officer who earlier arrested
his friend, Ormos, for allegedly selling shabu.
i) But where it is not the sole basis for conviction, the presumption
of regularity of performance of official functions may prevail over
the constitutional presumption of innocence [People v. Acuram,
209 SCRA 281].
d) The constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is some
logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed,
and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. In such a case the
burden of proof is thus shifted to the possessor of the dangerous drug to
explain the absence of animus possedendi [People v. Burton, 268 SCRA
531, citing Dizon- Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63]. This is reiterated in
People v. Balluda, G.R. No. 114198, November 19, 1999.
i) In order that this constitutional presumption may be overcome in
a prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be proven:
a) that the transaction or sale took place;
b) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was
presented as evidence; and
c) that the buyer and seller are identified.
To comply with the second element, it is imperative that the
integrity of the corpus delicti be preserved, and the chain of
custody requirement, as provided in R.A. 9165, performs this
function for it ensures that there are no unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence. [People v. De Guzman,
G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010]
ia) The seizure and custody of the drugs remain valid
despite failure to comply with the chain of custody
procedure, if:
1) the
non-compliance
is
attended
by
justifiable grounds; and
2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properply preserved.
However, in the case, not only did the prosecution fail to
present any justifiable ground for non-compliance, but
there is a gaping hole in the chain of custody. The length
of time that lapsed from the seizure of the items until
they were given to the investigating officer for marking
took all of 3-1/2 hours, despite the fact that De Guzmans
house was walking distance from the police station.
Moreover, it took more time before the items were
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory, without any
explanation on who had custody in the meantime. [People
v. De Guzman, supra.]
e) This constitutional presumption may be overcome by contrary
presumptions based on the experience of human conduct, such as
unexplained flight which may lead to an inference of guilt, or the inability of
an accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him which
is considered prima facie evidence of misappropriation.

i) However, in Madarang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112314,

March 28, 2001, and in Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926,
July 20, 2001, it was held that the prima facie presumption of
accountability does not shatter the presumption of innocence
which the petitioner enjoys, because even if prima facie evidence
arises, certain facts still have to be proved, and the
Sandiganbayan must be satisfied that the petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. And this finding must rest upon the
strength of the prosecutions own evidence, not on the weakness,
deficiency or absence of evidence for the defense. In Monteverde
v..People, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002, it was held that the
presumption that the possessor of a forged or falsified document is
the author of the forgery or falsification will not prevail over the
presumption of innocence.
f) In Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005, the
constitutionality of R.A. 1379 (Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property)
was challenged because it is vague, violates the presumption of innocence
and the right against self-incrimination,and breaches the authority of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. It was held that the law is not vague,
because it defines with sufficient particularity unlawfully acquired
property, and provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired
property. Neither is the presumption of innocence by Sec. 2 thereof, which
states that property acquired by a public officer during his incumbency in
an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property shall be prima facie presumed to have been
unlawfully acquired. The Court held that under the principle of presumption
of innocence, it is merely required that the State establish a prima facie
case, after which the burden of proof is shifted to the accused.
Q. When does presumption of innocence end?
A. Moreover, where the conviction by a lower court is still on appeal, it has not yet
reached finality and the accused still enjoys the constitutional presumption of
innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicateing
the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the
lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accuseds guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Until the accuseds guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of
innocence continues. Thus in Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that
respondent Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion, correctible by
certiorari, when it ruled that despite her conviction, the accused still enjoyed
presumption of innocence. Re: Judge Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31,
2008.
Q. What do you understand by the conscience test for conviction?
A. It means that only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been
committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction. If the
prosecutionss evidence miserably fails to pass the conscience test, then, the
accused must be acquitted. (People v. Frago, 51 SCAD 497, G.R. Nos. 104492-93,
May 31, 1994; People v. Abellanosa, et al., 76 SCAD 596, G.R. No. 121195,
November 27, 1996).
Q. What is the basis of the conscience test of conviction? Explain.

A. It is based on the right of the accused to be presumed innocent. In the case of

People v. Mejia, et al., 84 SCAD 245, G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407, July
7, 1997, it was said:
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution. Save in certain circumstances as where, for
instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts alleged to
constitute a crime but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden
never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of his defense.
Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully discharges that burden, the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. (People v. Garcia, 215
SCRA 349).
In our jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
freedom of the accused is forfeited only in the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most
careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary,
independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every
circumstance favouring the accuseds innocence must be duly taken into
account. The proof aginst the accused must survive the test of reason.
Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the
responsibility of the offense charged. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). If
the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the
accuseds right to be freed, it is, even more, the courts constitutional duty
to acquit him. (People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45; People v. Cordova, 43 SCAD
135, G.R. Nos. 83373-74, July 5, 1993)
Q. Give the concept of derivative, not positive, identification of an accused and cite
an example.
A. Derivative identification is one patterned from the identification of an accused by
another person, not by the witness himself/herself. (People v. Frago, 51 SCAD 497,
G.R. Nos. 104492-93, May 31, 1994, citing People v. Domingo, 165 SCRA 620
[1988]).
Example:
The accused was identified by two (2) sisters on September 28,
1960. The victim identified him on October 8, 1990. They are neighbours.
The possibility that they conferred with one another is not remote, hence,
she got the identification from them.
g) Circumstantial evidence. In People v. Bato, G.R. No. 113804, January 16,
1998, the Supreme Court held that in order that circumstantial evidence
may warrant conviction, the following requisites must concur:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned
from the sole testimony of the son of the deceased, the prosecution
evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading, beyond
reasonable doubt, to the guilt of the accused and, therefore, cannot
overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence.

h) Equipoise rule. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable

only where the evidence adduced by the parties are evenly balanced, in
which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
scales in favor of the accused [Corpus v. People, 194 SCRA 73].
i) The right to presumption of innocence can be invoked only by an
individual accused of a criminal offense; a corporate entity has no
personality to invoke the same [Feeder International Line v.
Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 842].
CORPUS VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 74259, FEBRUARY 14, 1991]
EQUIPOISE RULE. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the
constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims
of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield
to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of
the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE VS. CA [G.R. NO. 94262 MAY 31, 1991]
Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it
bears mention that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to
invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an
individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
NOTE: The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence of the parties
in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favour of the accused. There is no
equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. The equipoise rule cannot
be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.
[Malana v. People, G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008]
RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL
Q. Discuss the importance of the right to counsel.
A. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent person may not have the skill in law,
especially the rules of procedure, hence, the accused may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he may not know how to establish his innocence. ( Borja v.
Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422; Abriol v. Homeras, 84 Phil. 525; People v. Holgado, 85
Phil. 752). In People v. Lucero, 61 SCAD 401, G.R. No. 97936, May 29, 1995, it was
said that if the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who
cannot stand for themselves. Thus, it protected those under custodial investigation
with the all-important right to counsel. The right to counsel cannot be diluted
without tampering the scales of justice.
BORJA VS. MENDOZA [G.R. NO. L-45667, JUNE 20, 1977]
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Borja, accused of slight physical injuries, was convicted
and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor
by respondent Judge Senining, despite the absence of an arraignment. The judge
proceeded with the trial in absentia and promulgated the assailed decision. An
appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by

respondent Judge Mendoza. Without any notice to petitioner and without requiring
him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered
against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision was validly rendered despite the absence of an
arraignment.
RULING: NO.
ARRAIGNMENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT OF THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the
means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is
required to meet . . ." Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as
1916 in the leading case of United States v. Binayoh. He pointed out that upon the
accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court]
upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his
demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own
motion, must perform, unless waived." To emphasize its importance, he added: "No
such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused
which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must
assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In other words, in
the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, . . . ." In the terse and apt
language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in
any criminal prosecution." Procedural due process demands no less.
Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly
arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by
the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware
of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the
prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that
purpose. Thereafter, he is no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or
information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse
position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge.
With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full
knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so immediately. He
may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that he be
fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances
under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional
rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [G.R. NO. L-2809, MARCH 22, 1950]
FACTS: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of
Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a
private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain
one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours. On the
day set for trial, he appeared alone without the assistance of a lawyer. He was
subsequently arraigned and pleaded guilty upon the instruction of a certain Mr.
Numeriano Ocampo. Judgement was rendered convicting him of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was afforded of his right to be heard by himself and
counsel.

RULING: NO. Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the
accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the
trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of
prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and
clarify the true facts of the case.
DUTIES OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE WHENEVER AN ACCUSED APPEARS
BEFORE IT WITHOUT COUNSEL. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular
from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our Rules of Court, Rule 112, section
3, that:
"If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed
by the court that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned, and
must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable
to employ attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him.
A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney."
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with:
1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before
being arraigned;
2) After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the
aid of an attorney;
3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him; and
4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must
grant him a reasonable time therefore.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law",
and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
Q. What are the elements of the general right to be heard?
A. It includes:
1) the right to be present at trial;
2) the right to counsel;
3) the right to an impartial judge;
4) the right of confrontation; and
5) the right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses.
Q. Why must an accused enjoy the right to counsel?
A. This is a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does
not have the professional skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with

power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is represented by an

experienced and learned counsel. Johnson v. Zerbist, 304 US 458 (1938).
Q. What duty is imposed on the judge by the guarantee of the right to counsel?
A. If the defendant appears without counsel he must be informed by the court that
he has a right to have counsel before being arraigned, and must be asked if he
desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and is unable to employ counsel, the court
must assign counsel to defend him. This is a right which the defendant should not be
deprived of, and the failure of the court to assign counsel or, after counsel has been
assigned, require him to perform this duty by appearing and defending the accused
would be sufficient cause for the reversal of the case. US v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236
(1905).
Q. What are the pre-arraignment duties of the trial judge?
A. Under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the four-fold duties are:
1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel
before being arraigned;
2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the
aid of counsel;
3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant
him reasonable time to do so; and
4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court
must assign counsel de oficio to defend him. People v. Agbayani,
G.R. No. 122770, January 16. 1998, 284 SCRA 315, 333 (citing People
v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756 [1950]).
PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI [G.R. NO. 122770, JANUARY 16, 1998]
THE FAILURE OF THE RECORDS TO DISCLOSE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS
INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE VIOLATION
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. This obviously means that the appointment
had taken place earlier. The trial court's order of 22 December 1994 states that said
de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the
accused." Since appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of
his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty
has been regularly performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court
is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 of Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, namely:
1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own
counsel before being arraigned;
2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires
the aid of counsel;
3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must
grant him reasonable time to do so; and
4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the
court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him.
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse
conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied
with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that
such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary.
Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is
positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to
counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such
right.

In U .S. v. Labial, this Court held:

Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question
to be determined in this case is whether the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to have
counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to
send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are all agreed that in
the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did in fact fail to
advise the accused of their rights under the provisions of sections 17 of
General Orders No. 58, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere
omission from the record brought here upon appeal of an entry
affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be
presumed in matters of this kind to have complied with the provisions of law
prescribing the procedure to be followed in the trial had before him. While in People
v. Miranda this Court explicitly stated: However, said counsel calls attention to the
fact that the record is silent as to whether or not, at the time appellant was
arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney,
under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil. 87, 88), in the
sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the
defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. ". . . If we should insist
on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense
against the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to
crime. Much must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less difficult
to do things correctly than to describe them correctly." (United States vs. Labial,
supra.) The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in
United States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. It is more
than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. It means that the accused is amply accorded
legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause of the
defense and acts accordingly. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive
legal assistance, and not simply a perfunctory representation [People v. Bermas,
G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999]. In Estrada v. Badoy, A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC, January
16, 2003, the Supreme Court said that a PAO lawyer is considered an independent
counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution since he is not a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney
whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused.
Q. Both the transcript of stenographic notes and the order issued by the trial judge
failed to disclose categorically that the court informed the accused of his right to
counsel. Is this sufficient ground to reverse conviction?
A. No. The trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure
prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and such a presumption can
only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. People v. Agbayani,
G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 315, 334. However, the Court
admonished all trial courts to have their compliance with their pre-arraignment
duties put on record. Id. at 335-36
a) The right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver [Flores v.
Ruiz, 90 SCRA 428], because even the most intelligent or educated man
may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of

procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is

guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence
[People v. Holgado, 86 Phil 752]. Thus, the conviction of the accused in
the lower court was set aside and the case remanded for new trial, as the
accused was represented by someone who was not a member of the
Philippine Bar [People v. Santociles, G.R. No. 109149, December 21, 1999],
But the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial court
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to
reverse conviction. The trial court must be presumed to have complied with
the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and such
presumption can be overcome only by an affirmative showing to the
contrary [People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998].
b) The decision of conviction was set aside where it appeared that there
was merely a pro forma appointment of a counsel de officio who did not
exert his best efforts for the protection of the accused [People v. Magsi, 124
SCRA 64]. Where the accused manifested that he had lost confidence in his
counsel de officio and wanted to retain a counsel de parte, but the court
still appointed the same lawyer as counsel de officio, and proceeded with
the trial, there was deemed a denial of this constitutional guarantee
[People v. Malunsing, 63 SCRA 493]. Likewise, in People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA
325, where the accused, a Cantonese, could not understand English,
Pilipino or any Philippine dialect, it was held that he was denied the right to
counsel because although he was provided with one, he could not
understand or communicate with his counsel concerning his defense.
c) Although the right to counsel is not indispensable to due process of law
[Feeder International Line v. Court of Appeals, supra.], there are
instances when the Constitution and/or the laws provide that the same may
not be waived. Thus, the accused cannot waive the right during the trial,
and no valid waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel can be made
by a person under custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel.
However, while the right to be represented by counsel during the trial is
absolute, the option of the accused to hire one of his own choice is limited.
Such option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to
trifle with the Rules of Court, or to prejudice the equally important rights of
the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice [People v.
Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997].
Q. The accused contends that the judges appointment of a counsel de oficio
deprives him of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.
Decide.
A. The preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a
person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in criminal
prosecution. Amion v. Judge Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999.
d) An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the
right to counsel will show that the preference in the choice of cqunsel
pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under custodial
investigation rather than one who is accused in criminal prosecution. And
even if the application of the concept were to be extended to an accused in
a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of
discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel
refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. Thus, there is no denial
of the right to counsel where the counsel de oficio was appointed during
the absence of the accuseds counsel de parte pursuant to the courts
desire to finish the case as early as possible under the continuous trial

system [Amion v. Judge Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22,

1999]. This is reiterated in People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001.
AMION VS. JUDGE CHIONGSON [A.M. NO. RTJ-97-1371, JANUARY 22, 1999]
FACTS: At the scheduled hearing of the criminal case against Amion, trial was not
held because on the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that his
retained counsel, Atty. Depasucat, was ill. The hearing was reset with a warning that
no further postponement would be entertained. On the date of re-scheduled hearing,
Atty. Depasucat again failed to appear. To avoid further delay, the court appointed
Atty. Jacildo of PAO as counsel de oficio who was however, prohibited to represent a
party who has retained the services of a counsel of his own choice. At the next
scheduled hearing Atty. Depasucat still did not show up in court. In view of the fact
that the victim's wife, Mrs. Vaflor and another government witness both reside about
70 to 80 kilometers from Bacolod City, and that the appearance of Atty. Depasucat
remained uncertain, Judge Chiongson, appointed Atty. Lao-Ong from the Free Legal
Aid Office to represent Amion without prejudice to the appearance of Amion's
counsel de parte. Amion filed a complaint charging respondent judge with Ignorance
of the Law and Oppression relative to the former's criminal case. Amion asserts that
his right to due process was violated and that he was deprived of his constitutional
and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio
constitutes a violation of accused-complainant's right to due process and a
deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.
RULING: The accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his
choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would
preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing him.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE HEARED BY COUNSEL
CANNOT BE EXERCISED TO THE PREJUDICE OF OTHER PARTIES. The claim of
accused-complainant that respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio
constitutes a clear violation of his right to due process and a deprivation of his
constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice cannot be
countenanced by this Court.
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to
counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly
and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused
in a criminal prosecution.
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice
of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion
cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of
counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina:
"Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer
by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule
were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely
in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of
the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or

another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could
not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter"
Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the
accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is
not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other
equally competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the
pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to
be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this
right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings.
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity
to present his side which would have led to the expeditious termination of the case.
A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present
his side.
Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the
court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial
system.
Thus, it has been held by this Court in the case of Lacambra v. Ramos:
"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers
resorted to and repeated importunings of the accused or his counsel, which
resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of the
judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused by the delay to the
victim's family."
Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which
brought upon the need for the appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the
criminal case had been dragging on its lethargic course.
e) The long standing rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his
lawyer [Andrada v. People, G.R. No. 135222, March 4, 2005], except when
the negligence or incompetence of counsel is deemed so gross as to have
prejudiced the constitutional right of the accused to be heard. Thus, in U.S.
v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74, the case was remanded for new trial when counsel
for the accused inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an earlier plea
of not guilty, thus resulting in the precipitate conviction of his client. In
Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 456, the dismissed appeal from a
conviction for estafa was reinstated after it was shown that the failure to
file the appellants brief on time was due to the sheer irresponsibility on the
part of appellants counsel. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
103276, April 11, 1996, the case was remanded for reception of evidence
after counsel filed a demurrer to the evidence notwithstanding that his
motion for leave of court was denied, thus precluding the accused to
present his evidence. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111682,
February 6, 1997, a new trial was ordered after a showing that counsel for
the accused abandoned the accused without explanation. In People v.
Bascuguin, G.R. No. 144404, September 4, 2001, it was held that the
counsel de officios haste in proceeding with the arraignment falls short of
the standard mandated by the rules of effective and adequate counselling.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION

AGAINST HIM
Q. What are the purposes of the requirement that the accused should be informed
of the nature of the accusation filed against him?
A. The accused must be informed of the nature of the accusation against him in
order to prepare his defense. He should not be made to guess the charge against
him.
Q. What is the purpose and scope of the right to be informed?
A. The object of the written accusation is first, to furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and
second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for prosecution against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied,
facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts
and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. US v. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223 (1904).
a) Rationale. In People v. Valdesancho, G.R. No. 137051-52, May 30, 2001,
reiterated in People v. Monteron, G.R. No. 130709, March 06, 2002, the
Supreme Court said that the reasons for this guarantee, as explained in US
v. Karlsen, are:
1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to prepare for his defense;
2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
3) to inform the Court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.
i) In People v. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653, the conviction of the
accused who was a deaf-mute was reversed by the Supreme Court
because no one who knew how to communicate with the accused
was utilized by the trial court during the entire proceedings.
Similarly, in People v. Parazo, G.R. No. 121176, July 8, 1999, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court was vacated
where there was no showing that the accused, a deaf- mute, was
aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully
understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of the
appellant. See also People v. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People v.
Montes, 122 SCRA 409.
ii) Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers
that an accused is apparently in a condition of insanity or
imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it
be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not,
with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of
the court to suspend proceedings and commit the accused to a
proper place of detention until he recovers his faculties. To arraign
the accused while he is in a state of insanity will violate the right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him [People v. Alcalde, G.R. Nos. 139225-26,

May 29, 2002].
Q. What must a criminal information contain in order to comply with the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him?
A. According to Sections 6 and 8 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it must state the
following:
1) the name of the accused;
2) the designantion given to the offense by the statute;
3) a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting
the offense;
4) the name of the offended party;
5) the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and
6) the place where the offense had been committed. People v. Quitlong,
G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 360.
PEOPLE VS. QUITLONG [G.R. NO. 121562, JULY 10, 1998]
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of
conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular,
mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due
process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be
informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. The practice
and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him has been
explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen; viz:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.,
542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated,
not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent;
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short,
the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the
name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a
statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. In embodying the
essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts
and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused
so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such
fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of
conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not
excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute

criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in

order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own
participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime.
Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being
imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information
whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts
of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy
or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the
facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language,
with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be
held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the
accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or,
following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them."
b) Requisites. In order that the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him may not be
violated, the information must state the name of the accused, the
designation given to the offense by statute, a statement of the acts or
omission so complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the
offended party, the approximate time and date of the commission of the
offense and the place where the offense had been committed. The
information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing
on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that the accused can
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more persons is conspiracy. Where no such
allegation is made in the information, the courts finding of conspiracy
violates the constitutional requirement [People v. Quitlong, G.R. No.
121502, July 10, 1998]. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the
complaint or information, because the accused is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense charged
[People v. Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, October 20, 1999]
i) But it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise time when the offense was committed, except when
time is a material ingredient of the offense. The act may be
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual
date at which the offense was committed as the information or
complaint will permit [People v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 126714, March
22, 1999], This rule was reiterated in People v. Alba, G.R. Nos.
131858-59, April 15, 1999 and in People v. Flores, Jr., G.R. No.
128823-24, December 27, 2002, where it was held that the exact
date the rape was committed is not an element of the crime.
ii) Due process requires that the acts or omissions constitutive of
the offense must be stated in the information to fully apprise the

accused of the charge against him [People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA

463; People v. Bolatete, G.R. No. 127570, February 25, 1999]. The
nature and the cause of the accusation must be reasonably stated
in the information [People v. Ambray, G.R. No. 127177, February
25, 1999], Thus, in People v. Puertollano, G.R. No. 122423, June 17,
1999, where the information (for rape) failed to allege the victims
exact age, it was held that the imposition of the death penalty was
not warranted, considering that for the imposition of the death
penalty the special qualifying circumstance of the victims age and
her relationship to the offender must be alleged. Likewise, in
People v. Bonghanoy, G.R. No. 124097, June 17, 1999, because the
information failed to allege the relationship between the accused
and the victim, the death penalty was not imposed. See also
People v. De la Cuesta, G.R. No. 126134, March 2, 1999.
iii) The description not the designation of the offense controls
[Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 184; Santos v. People,
181 SCRA 487; Pecho v. People, 262 SCRA 918], The accused
can be convicted only of the crime alleged or necessarily included
in the allegations in th,e information [People v. Legaspi, 246 SCRA
206], Thus, in People v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 123094, January 31,
2000, where during the trial for murder, it was shown that the
mother and the brother of the victim were also injured during the
same incident, it was held that the accused-appellant could not be
convicted of the said injuries because they were not properly
charged in the information.
iv) While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more
criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot
convict the accused of the complex crime constitutive of the
various crimes in the two informations. To do so would violate the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of
the accusation against him [People v. De Vera, G.R. Nos. 12146263, June 9,
1999].
v) The fundamental test to determine the adequacy of the
averments in an information is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of
the crime. [People v. Robert Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26,
2011]
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NO. L-65952, JULY 31, 1984]
FACTS: Thomas Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then
an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded
P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to
the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. The
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner as guilty for violation of Section 3, paragraph
(b) of R.A. 3019 which penalizes: "Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law."Petitioner contends that the preliminary investigation of a complaint does not
constitute a "contract or transaction" and thus he cannot be convicted for violation
of R.A. 3019. And if acquitted, he cannot be subsequently convicted of direct bribery

because that would violate his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not preliminary investigation constitutes a "transaction or
contract."
2) Whether or not, if previous conviction for violation of R.A. 3019 were wrong,
he can now be convicted for direct bribery without violating his right to be
informed.
RULING:
1) NO. The term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or
meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of
transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending
with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so
stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not. The
investigation was also not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because
this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in
credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner. We agree with the petitioner that
it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3
(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
2) YES. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under
the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has
been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the
petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
THE DESCRIPTION IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION CONTROLS OVER
THE DESIGNATION OF THE OFFENSE. The principal issue in this petition to review
a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the preliminary investigation of a
criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction" so as to bring
it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised
Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of
the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of
bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
PECHO VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 111399, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996]
FACTS: Petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre were alleged to have conspired in
representing Pecho as a representative of Everson Commercial Trading of Cotabato
City, which turned out to be not-existent. Pecho was then tried and convicted by the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019. The SC modified the
Sandiganbayan decision, holding the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents.
Although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019, as amended because the said section penalizes only
consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not consummated
he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of official and commercial documents, which is necessarily
included in the crime charged. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration as the

conviction for estafa after his acquittal from violation of R.A. 3019 constitutes double
jeopardy. As such, he could not be convicted without violating his right to be
informed of the accusation against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction for estafa after acquittal from the original
crime charged violates his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him.
RULING: NO.
AN ACCUSED MAY BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE WHICH IS NECESSARILY
INCLUDED IN OR NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE OFFENSE PROVEN. In short, we
held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz.,
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended -- because the said section
penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not
consummated -- he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, which
is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof. When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that
which is proved.
Analyzing this provision, this Court stated in Esquerra vs. People:
"Stated differently, an accused may be convicted of an offense
provided it is included in the charge, or of an offense charged which is
included in that proved. Still stated differently, an accused can be convicted
of an offense only when it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged
although proved, or if it is not proved although charged, the accused
cannot be convicted thereof. In other words, variance between the
allegation and proof cannot justify conviction for either the offense charged
or the offense proved unless either is included in the other."
Section of Rule 120 states when an offense includes or is included in the other:
"Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
In view of the aforesaid rules, it follows then that:
a.

When the offense proved is less serious than, and is necessarily included in,
the offense charged (as when the offense proved is homicide and the
offense charged is murder), in which case the defendant shall be convicted
of the offense proved (U.S. vs. Macalintal, 2 Phil. 448; . . .)

b.

When the offense proved is more serious than and includes the offense
charged (as when the offense proved is serious physical injuries and the
offense charged is slight physical injuries), in which case the defendant
shall be convicted only of the offense charged (U.S. vs. Guzman, 8 Phil. 21).

As earlier adverted to, the evidence established by the prosecution proves beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime of estafa was only at its attempted stage and that it
was sought to be consummated through the falsification of the following documents:
the packing list (Exhibit "A-3") and Invoice (Exhibit "A-4"), which appear to be
prepared by the exporter, Kowa Tsusho Co. Ltd. through one Masayuki Higuchi, its
general manager; Bill of Lading (Exhibit "A-5") which appears to be issued in
Yokohama by the Kisen Kaishe Ltd.; the sworn Import Entry Declaration (Exhibit "A6") all of which show that the cargoes imported were "agricultural disc blades and
irrigation water pumps; as well as the Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration
signed by customs broker Constantino Calica and prepared on the basis of the
foregoing documents. The falsifications consist in making it appear that the
importer-consignee indicated is a legitimate importer or an existing importer which
had participated in such importation and authorized the accused to request the
release of the imported articles although, in truth, it is non-existent and, therefore,
had no participation in the importation; and in the untruthful statements that what
were imported were agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps when in
truth they were automotive diesel engines.
Q. Accused is charged with two informations containing two set of facts. May the
facts in the two informations be combined to allow a conviction for a complex crime
consisting of the allegation in the two informations?
A. No. Although the trial of the two cases may be joint, there should be two separate
verdicts for the two informations. To combine the two set of facts to form one
complex crime would violate his right to be informed of the accusation against him.
People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 92167-68, July 14, 1995.
c) Void for Vagueness Rule: The accused is also denied the right to be
informed of the charge against him, and to due process as well, where the
statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible
for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or
omissions are punished. In such a case, the law is deemed void. See Joseph
Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.
i) In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371, the petitioner
argued that Sec. 5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
which penalizes any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree of the President who intervenes in any business
or contract with the Government is void for being vague. The
Supreme Court said that the term intervene should be
understood in its ordinary acceptance, which is to come
between. The challenged provision is not vague.
NOTE: Void for Vagueness and Strict Scrutiny
The doctrine of strict scrutiny is different from void for vagueness
rule. Strict scrutiny and overbreadth are analytical tools developed for
testing on their face statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute,
the established rule is that one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other

situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. As has been

pinted out, vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] as
applied to a particular defendant. The rule established in our jurisdiction
is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against
employing a facial challenge in tha case of penal statutes, if the same is
allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement
of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at
best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to
consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition
to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would
be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to
prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal
statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him. Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011,
December 11, 2008.
d) Waiver. Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him may not be waived, but the defense may waive
the right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not guilty
[People v. Bryan Ferdinand Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002]. The
right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative
that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to
meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements Of
the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused
cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged
or necessarily included in the complaint or information [People v. Flores, Jr.,
G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002].

of as many offenses charged in the information and proved during

the trial, where he fails to object to such duplicitous information
during the arraignment.
iii) An information which lacks certain material allegations (in this
case, rape through force and intimidation) may still sustain a
conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during
the trial, and the deficiency is cured by competent evidence
presented therein [People v. Palarca, G.R. No. 146020, May 29,
2002].
e) Political Offense Doctrine. Under the political offense doctrine, common
crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are devisted of
their character as common offenses and assume the political complexion
of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently,
cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. [People v.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515. 541 (1956)].
i) Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the
killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must
be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone. However, this is
not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently
charge respondents with simple rebellion instead of common
crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom
and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
public prosecutor.
ii) But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense
in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine
whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political
end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated. Thus, in Saturnino Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem Abando,
G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014, the Court said that the
burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged
by the defense; the proof showing political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to
present evidence. It is not for this Court to determine this factual
matter in the instant petition for certiorari.

i) However, it is altogether a different matter if the accused

themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the
court by such refusal. Thus, in this case, it was held that there was
substantive compliance with this right when the counsel of the
accused received a copy of the Prosecutors resolution sustaining
the charge for rape and acts of lasciviousness. The failure to read
the information to the accused was a procedural infirmity that was
eventually non-prejudicial to the accused. Not only did they
receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the
trial, cross-examined the complainant and her witnesses and
presented their own witnesses to deny the charges against them.
The conduct of the defense, particularly their participation in the
trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them.

Q. What is the concept of a speedy trial?

A. It is one that is free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the
purpose of which is to free the accused from anxiety and expenses of a court
litigation. (Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216; People v. Jardin, 124 SCRA 167;
Gonzales v. SB, et al., G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991; Hipolito v. CA, et al., 48 SCAD
385, G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1994)

ii) Failure to object to the multiple offenses alleged in the criminal

information during the arraignment is deemed a waiver of the
right [Abalos v. People, G.R. No. 136994, September 17, 2002],
Thus, in Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, May 18,
2004, the Supreme Court said that the accused may be convicted

Q. What is the meaning of speedy trial?

A. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative and determination of whether
the right has been violated must be based on the balancing of various factors.
Length of delay is certainly a factor to consider, but other factors must also be
considered such as the reason for the delay, the effort of the defendant to assert his

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

right, and the prejudice caused by the defendant. Conde v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 650
(1924), is the leading case on the subject of speedy trial. After reciting the pitiful
plight of petitioner Conde, Justice Malcolm concluded:
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting
officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he
be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain freedom. Id. at
652.
CONDE VS. RIVERA [G.R. NO. 21741, JANUARY 25, 1924]
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena,
Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various
crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings
no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice
been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the
passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when
originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde,
like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent
she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law.
Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts
while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is
palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of upon
the appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary
examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her
grievances. We thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties. We hope
propose to do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the
one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but
fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the
Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an example of
delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a
moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that
the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs.
Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of
First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No.
21236.
Q. What is the test in determining whether there is a violation of the right to speedy
trial?

A. The test for a violation of the right to speedy trial has always been made to begin
from the time of the filing of the information (People v. Orsal, 113 SCRA 262). In
Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745, it was said that the conduct of the parties, the length of
delay, the reason for delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of the right
are some of the tests in determining whether there has been a violation. (See also
Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al. v. Hon. Padolina, 45 SCAD 165, G.R. Nos.
103259-61, Oct. 1, 1993)
Q. A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure
and the rules and regulations, free from vexations, capricious and oppressive
delays. In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held
that where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of
the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding
in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. The concept of speedy trial is
necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been violated
involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of delay, the reason for
the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforst exerted
by the defendant to assert his rights, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to
the accused. When is the right of the accused to speedy trial violated?
A. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than
a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, caprcious, and oppressive
delays; or
2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
a) Speedy trial: a trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. But justice and fairness, not speed, are the objectives. See Acevedo
v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745. Accused is entitled
to dismissal, equivalent to acquittal, if trial is unreasonably delayed.
i) The right to speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays
and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body
operations, etc. Speedy trial means one that can be had as soon
after indictment is filed as the prosecution can, with reasonable
diligence, prepare for trial. While accused persons do have rights,
many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the
same rights [People v. Ginez, 197 SCRA 481]. In determining the
right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of
scheduled hearings, of the case. What offends the right are
unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable
length of time. In this case, the hearing was only postponed twice
and for a period of less than two months; thus, there was no
violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial [People v.
Tampal, 244 SCRA 202]. The right to speedy trial is violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried [De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA
499; Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131483, October 26,
1999].

ia) The different interests of the defendant which the right

to speedy trial are designed to protect are:
1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and
3) to limit the possibility that the defense will
be impaired.
But the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to
sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due
process to the prosecution. In essence, the right to a
speedy trial does not preclude the peoples equally
important right to public justice [Uy v. Hon. Adriano, G.R.
No. 159098, October 27, 2006]
ii) A separate trial is consonant with the right of the accused to a
speedy trial. In this case, it has been eight years since the
information was filed, and the case has yet to be tried. The long
delay has clearly prejudiced the petitioner who is more than 73
years old. The inconvenience and expense on the part of the
government resulting from separate trial cannot be given
preference over the right to a speedy trial [Dacanay v. People, 240
SCRA 490]
iii) See Republic Act No. 8493 [The Speedy Trial Act], which
provides, among others, that the arraignment of an accused shall
be held within 30 days from filing of the information, or from the
date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court
in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall
have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence
within 30 days from arraignment as fixed by the court. In no case
shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the first day of
trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
iiia) R. A. 8493 is a means of enforcing the right of the
accused to a speedy trial. The spirit of the law is that the
accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a
trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be
held, in law, to have waived the privilege [Uy v. Hon.
Adriano, G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006].
iv) The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by
the Constitution or statute, may be waived except when otherwise
expressly provided by law. Ones right to speedy disposition of his
case must, therefore, be asserted. Due to the failure of the
petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to have waived it.
[Barcelona v. Lim, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014].
PEOPLE VS. TEE [G.R. NOS. 140546-47, JANUARY 20, 2003]
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the
law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652
(1924), the Court held that "where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a

reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom."
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the
right has been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of
the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused,
and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice
and damage caused to the accused.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in
general shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining the right of
an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation
of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The right to
a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or
2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as
of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if
the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening
events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal
at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the
issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on
the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process
where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is
incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the
apparent effects of such process.
Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered to
post a bail bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary
documents to establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in the
Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he
was under the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the
CID.
FLORES VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. L-25769, DECEMBER 10, 1974]
WHEN PROCEEDINGS ANTERIOR TO THE TRIAL IS DELAYED, THE TRIAL IS
LIKEWISE DELAYED. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a
recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, "means one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, . . ." Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may
within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising
from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the
fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to
present any valid defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento:
"The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by
habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case."

The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine announced, even before the 1935
Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera, a 1924 decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm
announced categorically that the trial, to comply with the requirement of the then
organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays." Further: "We lay down the legal proposition that, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance
for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus
to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People v.
Castaeda, where it was shown that the criminal case had been dragging on for
almost five years and that when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted by
irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted
the accused. As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel:
"The Government should be the last to set an example of delay
and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal
obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the
accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the
custody of the law."
It was on the basis of the above judgment that the dismissal of a second information
for frustrated homicide was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that
the first information had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months
from the time the original complaint was filed during which time on the three
occasions the case was set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for
postponements and once the trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the
month it was supposed to have been heard. The same result followed in Esguerra v.
De la Costa, where the first complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused
having been criminally prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the
peace court but after over a year and three months, with the lower court twice
dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the same offense on a new
information, thus compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel the lower
court to terminate the case was his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy
deemed appropriate by this Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this specific
issue. That was in Mercado v. Santos. Here, for a period of about twenty months, the
accused was arrested four times on the charge of falsifying his deceased wife's will.
Twice, the complaints were subsequently withdrawn. The third time he was
prosecuted on the same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal. Then came on
the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for reinvestigation. The lower court was in
a receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard on the merits. The accused
moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals, but he
failed again. He elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in
Justice Laurel's opinion:
"An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest
opportunity. . . . He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of
trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are
deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed."
The opinion likewise considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did
not intervene until an information was filed charging the accused with the crime of

falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say that the right to a
speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced
and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he
is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in
which it is authorized to be commenced." The latest decision in point, Acebedo v.
Sarmiento, presented an even clearer case. The information for damage to property
was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May 19, 1965, when the
accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion in his order of July 10,
1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering almost eight years, when
the trial was commenced. When one of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to
appear, the provincial fiscal sought the postponement, but the accused countered
with a motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him,
even if thereafter it changed its mind and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be
speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been
completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the
Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded
their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency
in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times
unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to
suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous
decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their
plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole basis for the
conclusion reached by us considering the controlling doctrinenannounced with
such emphasis by this Court time and time again.
Q. What is the remedy for violation of the right to speedy trial?
A. The accused is entitled to dismissal of the case, and, if he is under detention, to
release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy
trial is equivalent to acquittal and is a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense.
Q. May the right to speedy trial be invoked even if it would result in deprivation of
the States right to due process? Explain.
A. No. The right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would
result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not operate in
depriving the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or
generally in seeing to it that all those who approach the bar of justice is afforded fair
opportunity to present their side. For it is not only the State; more so, the offended
party who is entitled to due process in criminal cases. In essence, the right to a
speedy trial does not preclude the peoples equally important right to public justice.
(Uy v. Hon. Arsenio P. Adriano, et al., G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006).
Q. State the effect if a party to a case fails to timely question the delay in the trial of
the case. Explain.
A. Ones failure to timely question the delay in the trial to a case would be an
implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question the same.
Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the speedy trial right, like any other
right conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived when not positively
asserted. A partys silence may amount to laches. The right to a speedy trial is a
privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No.
8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Art. III of the
Constitution. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the
attitude of demanding a trial or resisiting delay. If he does not do this, he must be

held, in law, to have waived the privilege. (Uy v. Hon. Arsenio P. Adriano, et al., G.R.
No. 159098, October 27, 2006).
Q. What are the different interests of a defendant that may be affected by the
violation of his right to speedy trial? Explain.
A. The different interests of a defendant which may be affected by the violation of
the right to a speedy trial were identified. It was held that prejudice should be
assessed in the light of the interests of a defendant which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect, namely:
1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant to
adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die
or disappear during delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory,
however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can
rarely be shown. Even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion, and often hostility. After all, arrest is a public act that may seriously
interfere with the defendants liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may
disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations,
subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and friends. (Uy
v. Hon. Arsenio P. Adriano, et al., G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006).
b) Impartial trial. The accused is entitled to the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. In People v. Opida, 142 SCRA 295, the judgment of
conviction was reversed upon showing that the trial judge was biased
because of the appearance and criminal record of the accused. In Imelda
Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, supra., reiterating Tabuena v.
Sandiganbayan, supra., the cross examination of the accused and the
witnesses by the court constituted bias and partiality. But the impartiality of
the judge cannot be assailed on the ground that he propounded
clarificatory questions to the accused [People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282,
April 20, 1998], Indeed, trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway
in asking questions as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring
out the truth. This is not only the right but the duty of the judge who feels
the need to elicit information to the end that justice will be served [People
v. Vaynaco, G.R. No. 126286, March 22, 1999].
i) In Go v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court said
that the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, although required
for the benefit of litigants, is also designed to preserve the
integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and
maintain the peoples faith in the institutions they
have erected when they adopted our Constitution.
ii) In People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999,
the Supreme Court, citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA
54, rejected the appellants contention that he was denied the
right to an impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. Pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of the accused to a
fair trial.
Q. Give an example of a judge who lacks impartiality.

A. The application of the right to criminal prosecution was recently emphasized in

Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18 (1972). One of the accused in the case had made
an extrajudicial statement, which he subsequently subscribed before the judge,
implicating his co-accused. Later, however, the same accused repudiated his
statement claiming that he had made it as a result of a threat by a government
agent. The co-accused then sought the disqualification of the judge claiming that
the repudiation of the statement would not sit well with the judge before whom it
had been subscribed. The Court, noting the imperative character of the safeguard
of due process connoting at the very least, an impartial tribunal, disqualified the
judge.
MATEO, JR. VS. VILLALUZ [G.R. NOS. L-34756-59, MARCH 31, 1973]
IMPARTIAL JUDGE. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in
the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure
litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation
that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found
by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing.
In the language of Justice Dizon:
"It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge."
He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth commitment
and concern to the cause of justice according to legal norms, a cerebral man who
deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and
prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals." A judge then, to
quote from the latest decision in point, Geotina v. Gonzales, penned by Justice
Castro, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the
duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as
to his integrity." Nor is this to imply that prior to Gutierrez, there had been no
awareness of the due process aspect of an impartial tribunal even if not explicitly
referred to. As noted by Justice Street as far back as 1926 in Government v. Abella, a
1926 decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the opinion that the litigant had not
had a fair trial, a new trial could be granted." There was a reiteration of such a view
in a case decided in 1933, Dais v. Torres, with Justice Vickers as ponente, in these
words:
"Although a judge may not have been disqualified [according to
the Code of Civil Procedure], nevertheless if it appears to this court that the
appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's
bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary, in
the interest of justice."
Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental
requisite of impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision
on disqualification when revised three years later in 1964 contains this additional
paragraph:
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above."

Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary
interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of
objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the
factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well,
therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist,
the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being
misunderstood. His reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even
more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus
is due process vindicated. There is relevance to what was said by Justice Sanchez in
Pimentel v. Salanga, drawing "attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a
situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes
to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record
that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A
salutary norm is that he reflects the probability that a losing party might nurture at
the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales
of justice against him. That passion on the part judge may be generated because of
serious charges misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether
remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore,
exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a
suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself
where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable
prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his
decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting a case where his motives or fairness might be
seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance
to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who
forestalls miscarriage of justice."
Q. When is a trial public?
A. It is public when attendance is open to all irrespective of relationship to
defendants. However, when the evidence to be presented may be characterized as
offensive to decency or public morals, the proceeding may be limited to friends,
relatives and counsel. Garcia v. Domingo, L-30104, July 25, 1973.
Q. What is the meaning of public trial?
A. It is one held openly or publicly. It is sufficient that relatives and friends, who want
to watch the proceedings are given the opportunity to witness the same.
Q. What is the purpose of the guarantee of a public trial?
A. The purpose of this guarantee is to serve as a safeguard against any attempt to
employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal
trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the form of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. Garcia v. Domingo, supra.
GARCIA VS. DOMINGO [G.R. NO. L-30104, JULY 25, 1973]
PUBLIC TRIAL. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the
antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the
right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made
clear, under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one
constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the

Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P.
Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him:
"Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of
conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner."
It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had
provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration of what
appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law.
Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an
organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of
the United States. Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the
United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver:
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to
an accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage."
He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved
long before the settlement of [the United States] as an accompaniment of the
ancient institution of jury trial." It was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee
to an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in
1776." Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
ratified in 1791. He could conclude his historical survey thus:
"Today almost without exception every state by constitution,
statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the
public."
Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.
The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The
Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify?
Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be
given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial
must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be
no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this
safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that
his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.
It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation of the
importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus
understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process.
Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what
cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events
that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well
recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the
evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties,
and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the
trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right?
The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was
thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in

his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being
public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present,
no matter with what offense he may be charged."
c) Public trial. This is intended to prevent possible abuses which may be
committed against the accused. The rule is not absolute. See Garcia v.
Domingo, 52 SCRA 143.
i) An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is a right that
belongs to him more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can
be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his
rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A
public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial; it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process [Re: Request for Live TV Coverage of
the Trial of former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 01-403-SC, June 29, 2001]
IN RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO AND TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH ESTRADA [A.M. NO. 00-1-4-03-SC, SEPTEMBER 13, 2001]
COURT PROCEEDINGS MAY BE FILMED FOR RECORD PURPOSES ONLY, AND
NOT FOR PUBLIC SHOWING. Thus, many important purposes for preserving the
record of the trials can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the
right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court set aside a lower
court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary
film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion
into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute matters of a public character."
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a
documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be
produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any
attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases
or causes clbres was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law
School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay
friends found similarly moving. An educational television network filmed a
trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and
broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after
the case was concluded concluded incidentally, with a verdict of
acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the
painstaking way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law

copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof,
and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the
familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary
purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of
completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I would be prepared to
welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an
actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact
on the public understanding. Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided
by our educational system, is now a desperate need.
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years
ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair
administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions
are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings
of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have
subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the
Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions:
a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan determine should not be held public
under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure;
b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom
and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with
the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings;
c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to
explain them;
d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan
shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former
President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and
other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition;
e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision
and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and
shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and
f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for
public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the
National Museum and the Records Management and Archives
Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
Q. If the trial of the accused is conducted inside the Bilibid Prisons without
objections, is this a public trial? Why?
A. Yes, for as long as the public has not been excluded. (Garcia v. Domingo, 52
SCRA 143; US v. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304; People v. Tampus, 96 SCRA 625).
Q. When is the exclusion of the public valid without violating the right to public trial?
A. The exclusion of the public from the trial is valid without violating the right to
public trial when the evidence to be produced is offensive to decency or public
morals. (Rule 119, Sec. 13, Rules of Court).
Q. When does publicity prejudice due process?

A. The rule is that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be

allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
subliminal effects of publicity... because these are basically unbeknown and beyond
knowing. Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995. See also People v.
Teehankee, Jr., G.R. No. 111206-08, October 6, 1995.
RIGHT TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE (RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION)
Q. What is the concept of the right to confrontation?
A. It is the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. It is
the right of the accused to cross examine the witnesses.
Q. What are the purposes of the right to confrontation?
A. The purposes are:
1) to cross-examine the witness to test their credibility. (Anciro v. People,
46 SCAD 967, G.R. No. 107819, Dec. 17, 1993); and
2) to enable the court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. (US v.
Javier, 37 Phil. 449).
UNITED STATES VS. JAVIER [G.R. NO. L-12990, JANUARY 21, 1918]
AFFIDAVIT OF A DECEASED PERSON WHO HAS NOT BEEN CROSS-EXAMINED
IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The foregoing statement of the facts and the law
disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred in
admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement
of sergeant Presca, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice
of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's
argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says,
"That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the
witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section
15 (5), which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . .
. to be confronted at the trial by and to crossexamine the witnesses against him."
With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day
said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it
"intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the
trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an
opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the
accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the
right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right
of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because crossexamination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may
have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S.
vs. Anastasio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has
applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of
cases. (See for example U.S. vs. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. vs. Bello [1908,
12 Phil. 87.) It is for us now to determine whether the present facts entitle the
accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some
exception thereto.
Q. What is the purpose of the right of confrontation?
A. The right has a two-fold purpose:
1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of
the witness by cross-examination; and

2)

secondarily to allow the judge to observe the deportation of the

witness.

Right to cross-examine complainant and witnesses. The testimony of a witness who

has not submitted himself to crossexamination is not admissible in evidence. The
affidavits of witnesses who are not presented during the trial and thus, are not
subjected to cross-examination are inadmissible because they are hearsay
[People v. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998; Cariago v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No.143561, June 6, 2001]. Thus, in People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689,
September 27, 2002, the Supreme Court said that to administer by final judgment
the dreaded lethal injection on the basis of circumstantial evidence consisting
mainly of the testimony of a witness who failed and refused to return to court and
submit to cross-examination four times is judicial tyranny of the highest order. But
the right to cross-examine witnesses may be waived.
a) In People v. Lacbanes, G.R. No. 88684, March 20, 1997, it was held that
the failure to present as witness the poseur-buyer in a prosecution for
illegal sale of marijuana, is not fatal to the prosecutions case, because
what is required is merely proof of the consummation of the sale
transaction, and in this case, the entire transaction was witnessed by Pfc.
Rosales who testified on the same. Distinguish this case from People v.
Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339, where the Supreme Court said that the failure of the
prosecution to present as witness the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation
was fatal to the prosecutions case, because without the testimony of the
latter there is no convincing evidence that the accused was a marijuana
peddler and not simply the victim of instigation.
Q. Is the right of confrontation absolute? Why?
A. No, because there is an express exception which is the admission of dying
declaration. This is because the dying declaration may be the only evidence of the
prosecution. (People v. Gueron, 121 SCRA 115).
Q. What are the principal exceptions to the right of confrontation?
A.
(1) the admissibility of dying declarations; and
(2) trial in absentia under Section 14(2).
Q. Is the right of confrontation available in preliminary investigation?
A. No. It is a right available during trial which begins only upon arraignment. Dequito
v. Arellano, 81 Phil. 128 (1948).
NOTE: From Section 5 of Rule 112 it is clear that unlike in the preliminary
investigagtion proper, an accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be
present during the preliminary examination nor to cross-examine the
witnesses presented against him before his arrest, the purpose of said
examination being merely to determine whether or not there is sufficient
reason to issue a warrant of arrest. The provision commanding the
determination of probable cause prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
requires no notice to an accused. A preliminary examination is generally a
proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has no right to participate
or to be present. Marinas v. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423, 437 (L-25707 & 257534, May 14, 1981).
Q. Several accused were tried separately. May one be convicted on the basis of the
testimony of another who was not cross-examined? Why?
A. No, because that is violative of his right to cross-examine the witness against
him. (Talino v. Sandiganbayan, 148 SCRA 598).

TALINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NOS. L-75511-14, MARCH 16, 1987]

IF SEVERAL CO-ACCUSED WERE TRIED SEPARATELY, TESTIMONIES MADE IN
ONE CASE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE OTHERS UNLESS THEY ARE
ACCORDED THEIR RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. It is settled that if a separate
trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony therein imputing
guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able
to cross-examine him. The issue in this case is whether or not such testimony was
considered by the respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in
fact the sole basis of his conviction.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness,
who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their
charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence
nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison
pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their
spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted
unless the affiant is presented in court and hearsay is barred save only in the cases
allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration.
Q. Must an informant who led the police to the arrest of the accused be presented
for cross examination?
A. No. There is no right of confrontation against informants who are not witnesses.

ROCO VS. CONTRERAS [G.R. NO. 158275, JUNE 28, 2005]

A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify
at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws
of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to
testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things
or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine
Vegetable Oil Company:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad
testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the
witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents,
or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court
must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present:
1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie
relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and
2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily
identified (test of definiteness).
Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow:

RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF

WITNESSES AND THE PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE
Q. What is the basic purpose of the right of the accused to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of the witnesses in his behalf?
A. The purpose is to assure a full and unimpeded opportunity for him to meet what
in the end could be a baseless suit or accusation. The due process clause simply
requires, too, that before a person may be deprived of his life, lipberty or property,
he must be given the opportunity to be heard.
Q. What processes may be resorted to compel the attendance of a person in court?
A. The different processes that may be resorted to compel attendance of parties in
court as well as witnesses are: subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, warrant of arrest,
contempt, perpetuation of testimony and modes of discovery.
a) A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and
to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation
conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his
deposition [Caamic v. Galapon, 237 SCRA 390], In this jurisdiction, there are
two kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad tbstificandum and subpoena
duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the
second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or
documents therein specified. Well- settled is the rule that before a
subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the
following requisites are present:
1) the books, documents, or other things requested must appear
prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy
(test of relevancy); and
2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be
readily identified (test of definiteness) [Roco v. Contreras,
G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005].

In determining whether the production of the documents

described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is
proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the
production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and
secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to
justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of
all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a
view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be
enforced. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al.,[9] we
held: Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the
issuance of a 'subpoena duces tecum, it must appear, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced
contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the
court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing
such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be
identified. (Emphasis supplied)
b) In People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128280, April 4, 2001, the Court reiterated
what, in US v. Ramirez, it declared as the requisites for compelling the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence, as follows:
1) the evidence is really material;
2) accused is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the
production of such evidence;
3) the evidence will be available at the time desired; and
4) no similar evidence can be obtained.
NOTE: In Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, the Court
ruled that, since a preliminary investigation can result in arrest and

therefore in a deprivation of liberty, the accused should not be denied

access to evidence favourable to him, in this case an earlier version of an
affidavit made by a witness for the prosecution.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
Q. What are the purposes of trial in absentia?
A. The basic purpose of trial in absentia is to speed up the disposition of criminal
cases considering that if the accused would not always be present, that would derail
the trial of the cases.
Q. What are the requisites of a valid trial in absentia?
A.
(1) the accused has already been arraigned;
(2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and
(3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Parada v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ96-1353, March 11, 1997, 269 SCRA 371, 376 (citing People v. Salas, 143
SCRA 163 [1986]).
Q. What is the scope of the right to be present at trial?
A. It covers only the period from arraignment to promulgation of sentence. US v.
Beecham, 23 Phil. 259 (1972). However, this has been modified by Section 14(2)
which says that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Q. What are the conditions for waiver of the right to be present at the trial?
A. The right may be waived provided that after arraignment he may be compelled
to appear for the purpose of identification by the witness of the prosecution, or
provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the
person named as the defendant in the case on trial. Reason for requiring the
presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all stages
of the proceeding without giving the Peoples witnesses the opportunity to identify
him in court, he may in his defense say that he was never identified as the person
charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to acquittal. People v.
Presiding Judge, G.R. No. L-64731, October 26, 1983; Aquino , Jr. v. Military
Commission No. 2, L-37364. April 24, 1975.
Q. What are the effects of the waiver of the right to appear by the accused?
A. The effects are:
(1) there is a waiver of the right to present evidence;
(2) the prosecution can present evidence if accused fails to appear; and
(3) the court can decide without the accuseds evidence.
Q. Is trial in absentia violative of the accuseds right to due process? Why?
A. No, because it does not mean that the judgment will result in conviction. It is not
also violative of the right to be presumed innocent because the judgment may not
necessarily result in conviction. The judgment will still be based on the evidence
presented as the prosecution is still bound to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. There is no violation of the right to due process because he was
given the opportunity to be heard. (Jimenez v. Nazareno, L-37933, April 15, 1988).
Q. Does the provision on trial in absentia preclude forfeiture of bail bond under the
Rules of Court for one who jumps bail?
A. No, the new provision does not lend itself to a latitudinarian construction.
People v. Judge Prieto, Jr., L-46542, July 21, 1978. (Prietos argument was that the
time to forfeit bail should be after conviction, not upon jumping bail.)

The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of
which could, in the past, be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely
abandoned, because of the defendants escape [People v. Agbulos, 222 SCRA 196].
Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizes the
promulgation of judgment in absentia in view of the failure of the accused to appear
despite notice. This is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process
could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of
judgment [People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140285, September 27, 2006]. Trial in
absentia is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has been arraigned,
notified of date/s of hearing, and his absence is unjustified. See Gimenez v.
Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1; People v. Judge Salas, 143 SCRA 163; Aquino v. Military
Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546.
a) Waiver of appearance or trial in absentia does not mean that the
prosecution is thereby deprived of the right to require the presence of the
accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the
conviction of the accused [People v. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA 37]. Even after
the accused has waived further appearance during the trial, he can be
ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear
for purposes of identification [Carredo v. People, 183 SCRA 273].
b) Thus, the
1)
2)
3)

presence of the accused is mandatory:

during arraignment and plea;
during trial, for identification; and
during promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense
wherein the accused may appear by counsel or a
representative.

c) An accused who escapes from confinement, or jumps bail, or flees to a

foreign country, loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have
waived his right to seek relief from the court, including the right to appeal
his conviction [People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79], One who jumps bail can
never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial.
Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the
case and promulgation can be made by simply recording the judgment in
the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided
that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation of judgment
is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel [People v. Acabal,
G.R: No. 103604-05, September 23, 1993].
PEOPLE VS. MAPALAO [G.R. NO. 92415, MAY 14, 1991]
AN ACCUSED WHO IS TRIED IN ABSENTIA WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE AS WELL AS HIS RIGHTS TO BAIL AND APPEAL. By the same token,
an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not been
apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court,
cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he submits
himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.
In Gimenez vs. Nazareno, this Court had occasion to rule on a similar case in this
wise "First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused-private respondent when he appeared during the
arraignment on August 22, 1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In
criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his

arrest or voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished

by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.

Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the
opportunity to be heard.

But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from
the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question
in the negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier cases, jurisdiction
once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is
terminated.

Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights
to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear
during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court
has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein,
his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit
and protection, may be waived by him.

To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused
appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction
is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of
the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited
a 'trial in absentia' may be had when the following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment;
(2) that the accused has been notified; and
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As
the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the
said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled
hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature
on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the
Police Blotter that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No
explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was
given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973
Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the
prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred
when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a
decision as to the other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the
evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused
who escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence
and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for
this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia.
As it has been aptly explained:
'. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a
provision as there were quite a number of reported instances where the
proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of
his non-appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial,
not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved.
With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence
cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is
the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.'
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still
presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence
presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by
the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1(c) of
Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to
wit:
'. . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at
the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a
waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under
custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all
subsequent trial dates until custody is regained . . .'
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has
been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him."
d) Under Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, an accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available against the judgment and the court shall order his
arrest. The accused on bail who fails to present himself during promulgation
of judgment loses his standing in court. Without any standing in court, the
accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief. Sec. 6, Rule 120 does
not take away substantive rights; it merely provides the manner through
which an existing right may be implemented. Like an appeal, a motion for
reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in the manner
provided by law; the party filing such a motion must strictly comply with
the requisites laid down by the Rules. [Reynaldo Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 183152, January 21, 2015]
PEOPLE VS. VALERIANO [G.R. NOS. 103604-05, SEPTEMBER 23, 1993]
A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MAY BE PROMULGATED AFTER THE ACCUSED
HAS BEEN TRIED IN ABSENTIA. The trial court further erred in holding that no
penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584
because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he
being a fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail
after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence commenced.
Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after
the accused has been arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and
his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a
justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial
in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be
made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof
served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the
promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.