Sps. Gauvain Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

97973, January 27, 1992

FACTS:
In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on the
decision made by herein respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the right of
private respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started
when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired through free patent,
however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed it into commercial complex.
Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former
failed to redeem such property within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners
Benzonan. Then Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and
granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint against CA, alledging,
among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re. the five-year period in
foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead
relied on the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court which was applied
retroactively. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the
foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles and
instead applied retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?
HELD:
Yes. At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still
the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar.
However, the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby
rendering a decision in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme Court
sustained the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that though they are bound
by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the Court also stressed that:
while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article
4 of the Civil Code which states that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided. Moreover, the Court emphasized that when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively xxx. Therefore, respondents cannot rely on the Belisario
ruling because it should be applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in
its decision regarding this case. Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set
aside.

Curata vs Philippine Ports Authority Case Digest GR 154211-12 June 22 2009

Facts:
EO 385 and EO 431 Series of 1990 delineated the Batangas Port Zone and placed it
under the Philippine Ports Authority for administrative jurisdiction of its proper
zoning, planning, development, and utilization. Pursuant thereto, the PPA instituted
a complaint for expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC. Owned by some 231

individuals or entities, the 185 lots, with a total area of about 1,298,340 sqm, were
intended for the development of Phase II of the BPZ. The PPA alleged that, per
evaluation of the Land Acquisition Committee for Phase II of the BPZ project, the
lots had a fair market value of P 336.83 per sqm. Prior to the filing of the complaint,
PPA offered PhP 336.40 per sqm as just compensation, but the lot owners rejected
the offer. PPA prayed to be placed in possession upon its deposit of the amount
equivalent to the assessed value for real estate taxation of the lots in question.

After proceedings, the RTC issued a compensation order directing PPA to pay the lot
owners the amount of P 5,500 per sqm as just compensation. Upon motion, the RTC
granted the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal and issued the writ of
execution thereafter. Subsequently, the sheriff served the Notice of Garnishment to
the LBP Batangas City Branch.
Issue 2: W/N RA 8974 is a substantial law that cannot be reapplied retroactively
Yes. The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of
payment thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not
merely a procedural, matter. This is because the right of the owner to receive just
compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a
proprietary right. RA 8974, which specifically prescribes the new standards in
determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to
national government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the
provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession, is a
substantive law.
Further, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in
any of its provisions. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively in relation to this
case.

People vs. Lacson, G.R. 149453, October 7, 2003

Petitioner asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing
judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be
applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the
basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the
retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it
being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely
crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective application
thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29,
1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondents right
to due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to the accused , can the time-bar
rule be applied retroactively?
HELD:
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State
and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed
resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or
two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. In fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the
orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State
and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a
reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that
the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public
prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the
criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so.

People vs Jarillo
On November 1979, the petitioner, being previously married in 1974, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage. The
RTC found petitioner guilty of bigamy in 2001. In 2003, judgment was promulgated
declaring petitioners 1974 marriage null and void ab initio on the ground of
petitioner spouses psychological incapacity. In her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction.
Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the
crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one
which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be
subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first

marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to -the determination of
the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. MARUBENI CORPORATION G.R. No.

137377. December 18, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Marubeni Corporation is a foreign corporation and is duly registered to
engage in business in the Philippines. Sometime in November 1985, petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a letter of authority to examine the books
of accounts of the Manila branch oce of respondent corporation. In the course of
the examination, petitioner found respondent to have undeclared income from two
(2) contracts in the Philippines. Petitioner's revenue examiners recommended an
assessment for deFciency

income, branch proft remittance, contractor's and commercial broker's taxes.

Respondent questioned this assessment. Respondent then received a letter Form
petitioner assessing respondent several defciency taxes. On September 26, 1986,
respondent fled two (2) petitions For review with the Court oF Tax Appeals. Earlier,
on August 2, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 41 declaring a one-time amnesty
covering unpaid income taxes For the years 1981 to 1985 was issued. Under this
E.O., a taxpayer who wished to avail oF the income tax amnesty should comply with
certain requirements. In accordance with the terms oF E.O. No. 41, respondent fled
its tax amnesty return dated October 30, 1986. On November 17, 1986, the scope
and coverage oF E.O. No. 41 was expanded by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 64.
ISSUE: Whether or not herein respondent's defciency tax liabilities were
extinguished upon respondent's availment oF tax amnesty under Executive Orders
Nos. 41 and 64.
RULING: Section 4 (b) oF E.O. No. 41 is very clear and unambiguous. It excepts From
income tax amnesty those taxpayers "with income tax cases already fled in court as
oF the eectivity hereoF." The point oF reFerence is the date oF eectivity oF E.O.
No. 41. The difficulty lies with respect to the contractor's tax assessment and
respondent's availment oF the amnesty under E.O. No. 64 including estate and
donor's taxes and tax on business. In the instant case, the vagueness in
Section 4 (b) brought about by E.O. No. 64 should be construed strictly against the
taxpayer. The term "income tax cases" should be read as to reFer to estate and
donor's taxes and taxes on business while the word "hereoF," to E.O. No. 64. Since
Executive Order No. 64 took eect on November 17, 1986, consequently, insoFar as
the taxes in E.O. No. 64 are concerned, the date oF eectivity reFerred to in Section
4 (b) oF E.O. No. 41 should be November 17, 1986. There is nothing in E.O. No. 64
that provides that it should retroact to the date oF eectivity oF E.O. No. 41, the

original issuance. Neither is it necessarily implied From E.O. No. 64 that it or any oF
its provisions should apply retroactively.

BONA vs. BRIONES

G.R. No. L-10806
July 6, 1918

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills

FACTS:
Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased
Francisco Briones who died on August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of the will
which the said deceased husband on September 16, 1911. The petition was granted
on January 20, 1915.
The counsel of the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator, opposed
the probate of the will alleging that the said will was executed before two witnesses
only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence exercised upon the person
of the testator who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and prayed that for that
reason the said will be declared null and of no value.
On March 27, 1915, the judge rendered judgment, denied probate to the will. dated
March 27, 1915, denying probate to the will. Counsel for Monica Bona appealed On
March 31, 1915, the judge admitted the appeal, ordered the original records to be
brought up, and reiterated his order of December 28, 1913, declaring Bona as a
pauper, for the purposes of the appeal interposed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by
section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.

HELD:
Yes. It is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by Francisco
Briones on September 16, 1911, the order denying probate was rendered on March
27, 1915, both dated being prior to that of Act No. 2645 amending said section 618
and promulgated on February 24, 1916, which took effect only from July first of the
last named year: so that, in order to explain whether or not the above-mentioned
will was executed in accordance with the law then in force, the last named law
cannot be applied and the will in question should be examined in accordance with,
and under the rules of, the law in force at the time of its execution.

The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and
signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other. But the absence of such form of
attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact
signed and attested as in this section provided.
A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will shows in a clear
manner that the said will in its form and contents expresses without shadow of
doubt the will of the testator; and that in its execution the solemnities prescribed by
the above-mentioned section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.
Moreso, it is not proper to just invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely
because of some small defect in form which are not essential or of great
importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente was also
a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he understood
the contents of the will better than the two other attesting witnesses, for he really
was a witness and he attested the execution of the will during its making until it was
terminated and signed by the testator, by the witnesses, and by himself, even
though he did it in the capacity of a notary.
The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section
618 cannot be required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document
was executed in September, 1911, five years before said amendatory law began to
take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died on August 14, 1913, two years and
some months before the enforcement of the said law; and so, the only law
applicable to the present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No.
190, and in accordance with the provisions of this section, the said will should be
probated; for it has been presented to the court many months before the
amendatory act went into effect.
It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not have
retroactive effect only governs the rights arising from acts done under the
rule of the former law; but if the right be declared for the first time by a
subsequent law it shall take effect from that time even though it has
arisen from acts subject to the former laws, provided that it does not
prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and it should be declared that the
will has been executed in due form by Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911,
and that the said will contains and expresses the last will and testamentary wishes
of the deceased testator. Without any special ruling as to costs.So ordered.

G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009

Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner

vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Respondent
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of
kidnapping for ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was
bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in
his waist. The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not been
issued to the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched
(without a search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their
guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went
back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the
room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the
petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the
necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court
to be reconsidered.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has
merit and valid
HELD/DECISION:
1.Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person
who was arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any
weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the
welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to
find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid
arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within
the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the
petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the
gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could not be in his
immediate control. Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are
permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest
under the plain view doctrine. However, the firearm was not found accidentally
but was actually searched and therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was
illegal, a violation of Velorosos right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used
against him.

MANDATORY & PROHIBITORY LAW SHALL BE VOID

G.R. No. 147964. January 20, 2004]
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO., petitioner, vs. ARTURO L. MARQUEZ, respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Arturo Marquez entered into a Contract to Sell with Transamerican Sales
and Exposition (TSE), through the latters Owner/General
Manager involving a lot in Diliman, Quezon City with a three-storey townhouse unit
to be constructed thereon for a total consideration of P800,000.00.
TSE obtained a loan from petitioner FEBTC in the amount of P7,650,000.00 and
mortgaged the subject property. For failure of TSE to pay its obligation,
petitioner FEBTC extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and became
the highest bidder in the auction sale. Respondent had already paid a
total of P600,000.00 when he stopped payment because the construction of his
townhouse unit slackened due to the foreclosure. Consequently,
[respondent] instituted a case with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) to compel TSE to complete the construction of the townhouse and to
prevent the enforceability of the extra-judicial foreclosure made by
petitioner FEBTC and to have the mortgage between TSE and petitioner FEBTC
declared invalid, said mortgage having been entered into by the parties
in violation of section 18 of P.D. 957. The OAALA ruled in favor of the respondent.
Petitioner FEBTC interposed a Petition for Review from the decision
issued by the OAALA with the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB who affirmed in
toto the OAALA decision. Hence, petitioner FEBTC appealed the
Decision dated 18 July 1994 to the Office of the President, which dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the subject Decision. Petitioner then elevated the
case to the CA through a Petition for review. The CA found that petitioner had known
that a subdivision was forthcoming inasmuch as the loan was
obtained by TSE to partially finance the construction of a 20-unit townhouse project,
as stated in the Whereas clause in the mortgage contract.5 Thus,
the CA ruled that petitioner should not have merely relied on the representation of
TSE that it had obtained the approval and authorization of the proper
government agencies but should have required the submission of said documents.
Hence, this Petition. Petitioner contends, among others, that Section

18 of PD 957 is merely a directory provision, noncompliance with which does not

render the mortgage transaction void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 18 of PD 957 is a directory provision.
RULING:
No. In determining whether a law is mandatory, it is necessary to ascertain the
legislative intent. PD 957 aims to protect innocent lot buyers. Section 18
of the decree directly addresses the problem of fraud committed against buyers
when the lot they have contracted to purchase, and which they have
religiously paid for, is mortgaged without their knowledge. The avowed purpose of
PD 957 compels the reading of Section 18 as prohibitory -- acts
committed contrary to it are void.13 Such construal ensures the attainment of the
purpose of the law: to protect lot buyers, so that they do not end up
still homeless despite having fully paid for their home lots with their hard-earned
cash

WAIVER OF RIGHTS
Donato v People
Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion
FACTS
Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was
charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused
later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each
partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his
petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the continued
investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the
stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But
later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his
application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution.
The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has
waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of
agreement that he will be held in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his
petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas
merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of

his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of
withdrawing his petition for WoHC.
DBP v CA GRL28774
Facts:
DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159 lots, in the proposed
Diliman Estate Subdivision of the PHHC. However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2
and 4, which form part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the spouses
Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale were issued to them by PHHC. Upon learning of
PHHCs previous transaction with DBP, the spouses filed a complaint against DBP
and the PHHC to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of DBP. The CFI
held that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null and void, for being in violation of
Section 13 of the DBP Charter.
Issue:
Do the spouses possess the legal personality to question the legality of the sale?

Held:
Yes. The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their payment in full of the
purchase price for the same lots which had been sold to DBP by virtue of the
transaction in question.The general rule is that the action for the annulment of
contracts can only be maintained by those who are bound either principally or
subsidiarily by virtue thereof. However, a person who is not obliged principally or
subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is
prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show
the detriment which could positively result to him from the contract in which he had
no intervention.

PEFTOK
FACTS: The respondents were made to sign quitclaims by PEFTOK. Such waiver or
quitclaim was worded to preclude whatever claim they may have against PEFTOK.
However, respondents alleged that the quitclaims were prepared and redied for
their signature by PEFTOK and they were forced to sign those for the fear that they
would not be given their salary on pay day, or worse, their services would be
terminated if they did not sign the said quitclaims. The private respondents
asserted that the waivers of claims signed by them are contrary to public policy, for
it was written in English, a language which they do not understand and the contents
were not explained to them.

ISSUE: W/N the waiver signed by the private respondents were valid

HELD: No. There was no voluntariness. They were forced to sign the quitclaims.

REPEAL OF LAW AND ITS TYPES

Magno v Comelec
Facts :
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul and
set aside the resolution dated May 7, 2001 of the Commission on Elections as well
as the resolution dated May 12, 2001 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
This petition originated from a case filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001
for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner
was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery
penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision
granting the petition of private respondent and declaring that petitioner was
disqualified from running for the position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. On
May 10, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
by the COMELEC in its resolution dated May 12, 2001.
Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when
he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-year
disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired
on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001 elections. Sonia
Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the duly elected mayor of San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija. Thus, on June 19, 2001, petitioner filed a supplemental petition which
this Court merely noted in its resolution dated June 26, 2001. In his supplemental
petition, petitioner assailed the proclamation of Sonia Lorenzo on the ground that
the propriety of his disqualification was still under review by this Court. Petitioner
likewise asked this Court to declare him as the duly elected municipal mayor
instead of Sonia Lorenzo.
Issue :
WON petitioner was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections. In resolving
this, two sub-issues need to be threshed out, namely: (1) whether the crime of
direct bribery involves moral turpitude and (2) whether it is the Omnibus Election
Code or the Local Government Code that should apply in this situation.
Ruling :
Regarding the first sub-issue, the Court has consistently adopted the definition in
Blacks Law Dictionary of moral turpitude as:

x x x an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man

owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends on
the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law.
In this case, we need not review the facts and circumstances relating to the
commission of the crime considering that petitioner did not assail his conviction. By
applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of
direct bribery:
1.the offender is a public officer;
2.the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3.such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4.the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected
with the performance of his official duties.
It is the second sub-issue which is problematical. There appears to be a glaring
incompatibility between the five-year disqualification period provided in Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification period in Section 40
of the Local Government Code.
It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on
December 3, 1985 while the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on
January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable
conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will.[4] Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section
12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a
subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment,
the latter is deemed repealed.
Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner
nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12
of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioners disqualification ceased as of March 5,
2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for
mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.

Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule
on (1) the validity of Sonia Lorenzos proclamation and (2) the declaration of
petitioner as the rightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been
proclaimed as the winning candidate, the legal remedy of petitioner would have
been a timely election protest.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged
resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May 7, 2001 and May 12, 2001
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Villegas vs. Subido Case No. 314 G.R. No. L-31711, (September 30, 1971) Chapter X,
Page 411, Footnote No.96
FACTS:
The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer
of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. In an Administrative
Order, series of 1968, Petitioner, Mayor of the City of Manila, directed Gloria to
desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City
Treasurer, saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation.
Petitioner, appointed Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer. Respondent,
disapproved the appointment, basing his action, on an opinion of the Secretary of
Justice, to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still
governed by Sec. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Sec. 4 of
the Decentralization Law, RA 5185.
ISSUE:
W/N the Decentralization Law should govern.
HELD:
No. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not
favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so
intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908
decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be
shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter
and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. A subsequent statute, general in
character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a
special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest.

G.R. No. 192531, 12 November 2014

Petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome initiated a claim for death benefits under
PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union,
over the death of her son John Colcol (John), who she gave up for adoption,
and alleged that she was the sole remaining beneficiary. Previously, John was
employed as electrician by Defendant Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on

board the vessel Maersk Danville. He was covered by the governments

Employees Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, he met an accident
on board the vessel wherein steel plates fell on him resulting in his death.

When petitioner filed her claim, the SSS denied it stating that she was no
longer the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colocol
based on the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner herself. On
appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the SSS
ruling through a decision dated 17 March 17 2010 citing Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1)
of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.

HELD: Petitioner was entitled to receive the claim for death benefits. Based
on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on
October 26, 1987, or only less than three (3) years since the decree of
adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for
the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent,
Cornelio, has already passed away.

The ECC Rule limiting death benefit claims to the legitimate parents is
contrary to law. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor
Code, as amended Hence, it was held that Rule XV of the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase dependent parents to refer to legitimate parents.'

As the law does not define dependent parents, it should be understood to

have a general and inclusive scope. Thus, the term parents in the phrase
dependent parents in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is
used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited
to legitimate parents as what the ECC did. The phrase dependent parents
should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and
whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one
should not distinguish. Plainly, dependent parents are parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of
support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress
did not intend to limit the phrase dependent parents to solely legitimate
parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that in their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who
are secondary beneficiaries. Had the lawmakers contemplated dependent
parents to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said
descendants and not legitimate descendants. The manner by which the
provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
dependent parents was intended to cover all parents legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

The law is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession
to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part
of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted.

As a result, it was held that Cornelios death at the time of Johns minority
resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental authority over the adopted
child.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his

beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the Social
Security Law. While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related
deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who
are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate
act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a
way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence
of circumstances from Cornelios death during Johns minority, the
restoration of petitioners parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a
beneficiary effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death
benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent
parent.

In sum, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal
basis. Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner
of the right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a
dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority.
Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner,
Johns sole remaining beneficiary.

Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo, G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979
A partnership in the practice of law is a mere relationship or association for such particular
purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business or of
holding property.
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 786
FACTS: Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in
Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth about P300,000. Aida Sy-Gonzales et
al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration and alleged that
(a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their
knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's
marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him. The petition was
opposed by Yao Kee et al who alleged that she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat
whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the other oppositors are
the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee. Probate court ruled that
Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and the other oppositors were
legitimate children of Sy Mat. On appeal, CA simply modified probate courts
judgment and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales et al are natural children of Sy
Mat. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in
accordance with Philippine laws.
HELD: For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the existence of foreign law
as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any
competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage.
The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving

evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent
to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with
said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction