PEOPLE v.

BACALSO
FACTS: That on or about the 8th day of December, 1994, at Tagoloan,
Lanao del Norte, the said accused, with treachery, evident premeditation,
taking advantage of superior strength, and with intent to kill and/or attack
upon the persons of ARTEMIO, REMELIE, and JERRY CARIIT by throwing
a hand-grenade at said victims, inflicting upon them multiple mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of the deaths of said Artemio
and Remelie and the serious wounding of said Jerry.
Witness Artchel Maglangit, an eye witness testified that he, together
with his friends, were inside the house of the Cariits at the time of the
incident. He likewise saw Edgar Bacalso threw the hand grenade. Witness
testified that he is a friend of the accused whom he had known for a year;
that although the father (with whom the accused stays with) of the accused
is a member of the CAFGU, he knew the accused to be a farmer; that prior
to the incident, there was a friendly atmosphere inside the Cariits'
residence and as a matter of fact, the tuba Bacalso drank was offered for
free; that there being no electricity, the house, which was approximately six
(6) meters wide was lighted by three (3) kerosene lamps made from
bottles; that accused after thirty (30) minutes of drinking tuba left and came
back ten (10) minutes later with the hand grenade; that accused was about
three (3) arms-length away from witness who was seated at the balcony
when the latter saw the former trying to destroy the bamboo wall of the
house; that although there was no light outside the house, witness saw
accused clearly because there was a full moon that night; that when
accused threw the hand grenade inside the house of the Cariits, some of
them were able to jumped out of the house before it exploded; that as a
result of the grenade throwing incident and the subsequent explosion, the
spouses Cariit died while their son Jerry suffered serious injuries. Witness
pointed twice to Edgar Bacalso, the accused, as the culprit.
Witness Evangeline Cariit in corroboration with the testimony of
Artchel Maglangit testified that accused Edgar Bacalso whom she had
known for two (2) years was at their house together with her parents, her
brother, Artchel Maglangit, Arnie Pescholele, Tony Pagente and Ramil
Tonongay; that after supper, accused was seen drinking the tuba which
was given to him for free by Mrs. Cariit alone; that after drinking tuba,
accused went home and returned with a hand grenade; that witness who
was at the kitchen when the accused returned, saw the accused clearly
despite the absence of light because there was a full moon; that witness
saw the accused from a distance of about 1 1/2 meters; that accused broke
the bamboo wall with his fist and then threw the grenade which eventually
exploded inside the sala of the Cariits; that as a result of the explosion, Mr.
and Mrs. Cariit and their son Jerry, the three who were not able to jump
from the house were hit; that Mr. and Mrs. Cariit died due to wounds
sustained while Jerry Cariit, who was seriously wounded was brought to
the Iligan City for treatment.

The last witness for the prosecution, Agustina Atulan, an assistant

embalmer of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor testified to establish the facts
of death of the spouses Cariit; that when she did an autopsy on the bodies
of the spouses Cariit on december 10, 1994, she measured the length of
the wounds and did a sketch; that the holes drawn on the sketch indicate
the wounds sustained by the victims while the line indicate that the left arm
was almost cut or blown off and there appears on the feet of the
deceased's wounds inflicted by splinters.
The defense presented as its lone witness, the accused Edgar
Bacalso. Bacalso is presented by the defense to refute the prosecution
evidence and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The defense
further alleges that the accused has no motive whatsoever to inflict injuries
against all the victims. Likewise, the accused worked as a farmer and is not
in the position to lease, possess, and use any explosives. Witness/accused
Edgar Bacalso, a resident of Sitio San Isidro, Tagoloan, Lanao del Norte for
the past six (6) years, testified that he started farming at the age of twelve
(12) in his grandfather's farm and lives with his sister Mirasol Bacalso
because his parents are deceased. The charge against him is untrue
because on December 8, 1994 at about 6:00 to 8:00 in the evening, he was
asleep at his sister's house, 6:00 p.m. being his usual sleeping time. He
further testified that on that particular day, as he usually does, after he
finishes his farming chores at 5:00 p.m., he went home to cook rice, ate
supper at 5:30 p.m. and went to sleep at 6:00 p.m.; that at 9:00 p.m. he
was awakened by the CAFGU Boy Gumari, who arrested him for the death
of the Cariits; that although said accusation surprised him as he has never
been charged of any crime since birth, he willingly went along with the
CAFGU who brought him to the residence of Mayor Rasmia Campong of
Tagoloan for investigation; that the house of the Cariits is more or less two
(2) kilometers away from his house and it would take thirty (30) minutes by
walking or fifteen (15) minutes by running to reach the place.
Following what would appear to be its own perusal of the divergent
testimony of the witnesses, the trial court came out convinced that the
evidence for the prosecution credibly reflected the actual facts of the
incident in question. The accused, having been found guilty, was
sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death. The case has been
elevated to this Court by way of automatic appeal.
ISSUE: WON the testimonies of the witnesses are enough to establish the
criminal liability of the accused? NO.
HELD: The task of the prosecution is always two-pronged, i.e., (1) to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged and (2) to
establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or
persons responsible therefor, for, even if the commission of the crime is a
given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor

being likewise clearly ascertained. The conviction of accused-appellant in

this case hinges on the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, namely,
Evangeline Cariit (Cariit) and Archel Maglangit (Maglangit). While it is
entrenched in this jurisdiction that findings of the trial court on the credibility
of the witnesses are accorded great weight since obviously it is provided
with ample opportunity to observe the demeanor of the declarants at the
witness stand, this rule, however, is not without exceptions. Generally put,
the saving instance is said to be when a fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has been overlooked, or its significance misconstrued, by the trial
court sufficient to harbor serious misgivings on its conclusions. It should not
be enough that the witness is determined to be credible but his testimony
must also be credulous. It is ineluctable that the identification of the
perpetrator of the crime bears heavily on the reasonableness or probability
of the testimony of the prosecution witness. There is, unfortunately, no
single test to determine with all exactitude the probity of testimony, and the
courts can only give conformity to the quotidian knowledge, observation
and experience of man. The courts are not required to believe that which
they judicially know to be incredible.
The Court has made a close scrutiny of each account given by
Evangeline Cariit and Archel Maglangit. Somehow, it cannot help but
entertain serious doubts on the veracity of the malefactor's identity, almost
as if, in fact, it were merely contrived to pin the liability of the crime upon
accused-appellant. The inconsistencies thereof, dismissed by the trial court
as being merely trivial, would, on the contrary, appear to be telltale signs of
unlikelihood. Maglangit testified that he was with the group, which included
accused-appellant, imbibing tuba, in the Cariit residence. He recounted that
accused-appellant had left the group but returned shortly thereafter.
Maglangit declared that he had an opportunity to determine the identity of
the grenade thrower from inside the sala through the view he got from the
1-1/2 x 2 feet hole "punched" on the wall by accused-appellant. Cariit, upon
the other hand, testified that she was in the kitchen when she saw
accused-appellant at a distance of about one and a half meters from their
house carrying a grenade.
The incident occurred on 08 December 1994. The records would
show, however, that the first quarter moon just started on the 10th and that
the full moon showed up only on the 18th, matters that the court could also
take judicial notice of. Just recently, in People vs. Faustino, the Court has
observed that the identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a vital
piece of evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case
for the prosecution, but, even while significant, an eyewitness identification
has been described by authors as being "inherently suspect," and, not
infrequently, inaccurate.
No motive or reason at all on the part of the accused to commit the
crime was shown. There was no evidence to indicate that the accused had
any axe to grind against the deceased or his family. Maglangit even

attested that there was nothing unusual in the group's conversation before
the accused had left the house of the victim. In People vs. Vidad, the Court
has said: "It is true that it is not indispensable to the conviction for a murder
that the particular motive be established at the trial, and that in general
when the commission of a crime is clearly proven, conviction may and
should follow even where the reason for its commission is unknown; but in
many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the
proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of
evidence disclosing the motive which tempted the mind to indulge in the
criminal act."
In this jurisdiction, the overriding consideration is not whether a
court has doubts on the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains
such doubts on his guilt. WHEREFORE, the accused Edgar Bacalso is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder for the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
DUTCH BOY PHILIPPINES, INC.,Petitioner v. RONALD SENIEL
substituted by Ligaya Quimpo and CESARIO SENIEL substituted by
Edelmira P. Seniel, Respondents. | G.R. No. 170008; January 19, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in manufacturing quality paint
products and selling them through authorized dealers in various parts of
the country. Jonathan Joyohoy (Joyohoy), on the other hand, was a sales
representative of petitioner for Mindanao, based in Davao City.
Sometime between May and June 1994, petitioner conducted an audit of
its sales accounts with its authorized dealers in Mindanao. In the course of
the audit, petitioner discovered that its authorized dealers had outstanding
balances consisting of paint products withdrawn from the Certified
Mindanao Marketing Corporation (CMMC) warehouse. Combining all the
dealers accountabilities yielded a total amount of P1,939,125.16.
The above findings prompted petitioner to send letters of confirmation to
the concerned dealers for the latter to confirm their respective balances.
Upon receipt of said letters, the authorized dealers disclaimed their alleged
accountabilities; and contended instead that the same had already been
paid or that they never ordered/received the goods stated therein. In view
thereof, petitioner issued a Memorandum to Joyohoy (being the sales
representative in the area) requiring the latter to explain the transactions
involving the concerned dealers and their corresponding accountabilities. In
response, Joyohoy explained that the subject stocks were withdrawn from
the warehouse by Ronald and Cesario Seniel, or their representatives and
delivered to Teknik Marketing, a sole proprietorship engaged as a painting
contractor.

For failure to collect the amount due it, petitioner commenced an action for
Collection of Sum of Money against Joyohoy, Ronald and Cesario.
Petitioner claimed that the three defendants, in conspiracy, acted
fraudulently in preparing sales invoices which were used to withdraw the
subject paint products delivered to Teknik Marketing, to the damage and
prejudice of petitioner. Petitioner likewise demanded from Joyohoy the
delivery of such additional amounts representing the payments made by
some authorized dealers which were not remitted by the sales agent.
In answer to petitioners complaint, Ronald and Cesario admitted that they
had transacted business with Joyohoy; specifically, the purchase of various
paint products offered by him which they used for their painting projects.
They, however, added that it was Joyohoy who prepared the necessary
purchase orders, facilitated the delivery of the paint products and collected
payments as well. Ronald and Cesario disavowed participation in any
fraudulent act committed by Joyohoy. For his part, Joyohoy denied liability
and contended that it was Ronald and Cesario who received the paint
products and were, thus, liable for petitioners claims
TC: In favor of petitioner and against Joyohoy, Ronald and Cesario. The
RTC gave credence to the positive testimonies of the witnesses for
petitioner. The trial court believed that the subject paint products were
withdrawn by Joyohoy, Ronald and Cesario, in fraud of petitioner.
CA: Reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and dismissed the
complaint as against Ronald and Cesario. The appellate court declared
that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish conspiracy
between Joyohoy, on the one hand, and Ronald and Cesario, on the other.
What was established, according to the CA, was simply the withdrawal of
the subject paint products from petitioners warehouse, upon the order of
Joyohoy. Even if Ronald and Cesario indeed purchased paint products
through Joyohoy, no anomaly can be attributed to the transaction
considering that petitioner had previously done business with persons or
entities who were not authorized dealers. Therefore, liability could attach
only to Joyohoy and not to Ronald and Cesario.

Although the evidence adduced by plaintiff is stronger than that presented

by defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in favor of the former, if his
evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action.
It was established that the goods were brought out of the warehouse upon
the order of Joyohoy. Per his job description, Joyohoy should have
delivered the products to the authorized dealers, collected their payments,
then remitted his collections to petitioners depositary bank. Unfortunately
for petitioner, Joyohoy used his position as an authorized sales
representative and abused the trust reposed in him, in misappropriating the
subject paint products.
In finding Ronald and Cesario liable, the trial court relied on the testimony
of the warehouseman Romeo Gutierrez (Romeo) that Joyohoy instructed
him on several occasions to release to the former various paint products.
The testimony of Manuel Antolin (Antolin) was also cited to show how the
alleged defraudation was discovered by petitioner. Likewise adduced as
evidence was the handwritten response letter sent by Joyohoy to petitioner
stating that the subject paint products were withdrawn by Ronald and
Cesario and/or their representatives. Said pieces of evidence, however,
lack probative value.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner has sufficiently established the liability of Ronald

and Cesario.

A thorough evaluation of the testimony of Romeo shows that, indeed, the

subject paint products were withdrawn from the warehouse upon the
authority and instruction of Joyohoy. However, it is wanting in details as to
the alleged participation of Ronald and Cesario that would make them
conspirators in defrauding petitioner. While petitioner claimed in its
complaint that Ronald and Cesario had a hand in the preparation of
fictitious sales orders and invoices, Romeo admitted in his testimony that
he himself was the one who prepared them upon the instruction of
Joyohoy. If at all, Ronald and Cesarios participation was limited to receiving
the subject paint products. But apart from Romeos bare allegation, there is
no iota of evidence to show such fact of receipt. If we follow the procedure
in releasing petitioners products from the warehouse, as testified to by
Romeo, the signature of the person receiving the goods was necessary.
Yet again, the signature of Ronald and Cesario never appeared in any of
the documentary evidence presented.

HELD: No. It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight
of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[23]

The testimony of Antolin establishes a disparity in the accounts, as

appearing in petitioners records and those of the dealers. It shows that
Joyohoy was repeatedly involved in anomalous transactions by preparing
fictitious sales invoices, withdrawing paint products from the warehouse,
then selling them to various establishments in Mindanao with whom
petitioner had no dealings. Thus, apart from the P783,097.05 liability
charged to Joyohoy in concert with Ronald and Cesario, the trial court

likewise made Joyohoy answerable for the amount of P859,589.57 arising

from another illegal transaction. However, notwithstanding the
overwhelming evidence against Joyohoy, no clear evidence could link
Ronald and Cesario to these fraudulent transactions. Besides, as correctly
observed by the appellate court, sales transactions that were conducted
with non-authorized dealers were sanctioned by petitioner.
As to the letter of Joyohoy, wherein he narrated the participation of Ronald
and Cesario, considering that he did not testify on the contents thereof, the
same is hearsay. An unverified and unidentified private document cannot
be accorded probative value. It must be rejected because the party against
whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to crossexamine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its
executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other
party the opportunity to question its contents. The petitioners failure to
present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of no
probative value.
Neither can we consider said letter as an extrajudicial admission of a
conspirator against his co-conspirator.[30] For one, the admission made by
Joyohoy was made after the alleged conspiracy had ceased to exist. More
importantly, the fact of conspiracy was not clearly established.
At this point, we reiterate that a party who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. Whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must
substantiate it, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns, and that private transactions have been fair and regular.
Good faith is always presumed, and it is the burden of the party claiming
otherwise to adduce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. No
judgment for damages could arise where the source of injury, be it fraud,
fault, or negligence, was not affirmatively established by competent
evidence.
PEOPLE v. ADRIANO
FACTS: In an information dated 21 March 1989, accused-appellant Jose
Adriano y Vargas was charged with the crime of murder committed its
follows: That on or about March 19, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation, attacked one EDUARDO DE VEYRA y PUYAWAN, by
stabbing the latter with a bladed weapon hitting his left portion at the back,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge but RTCManila charged the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

MURDER, sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

On appeal, the defense assigned error to the RTC in giving weight to the
testimony of the stepson of the victim which was said to be plagued with
inconsistencies, thus failing to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Eleven (11) year old Alexander Reyes, a stepson of the victim,
testified that at about 4:30 in the afternoon of 19 March 1989, while he was
outside their house, he saw his stepfather conversing with the accusedappellant Jose Adriano. A few moments later, Adriano allegedly stabbed his
stepfather Eduardo de Veyra with a type of knife used by electricians.
Eduardo then ran to their store where he collapsed while the accusedappellant left the area casually. Eduardo was later declared Dead on Arrival
at the Chinese General Hospital, Dr. Florante Baltazar, the Medico-Legal
officer of the Western Police District, determined the cause of Eduardo's
death to be two (2) stab wounds, one at the back, specifically at the left
side of the waist and the second at the upper left breast, penetrating
downwards which lacerated the aorta the main artery which carries
blood from the heart. Before the incident, Alexander also testified that he
saw the accused and the victim's wife quarrel because the latter refused to
vacate a lot which the former claims he owns.
Accused-appellant Jose Adriano testified that at the time of the
incident, he was with his wife in their house which is admittedly in the
immediate vicinity of the crime scene. He allegedly heard some shouting
from outside the house and he immediately went out and saw the victim
Eduardo de Veyra sprawled on the ground. He approached Eduardo but
the latter stood up and ran towards their store. He denied knowing that
Eduardo had been stabbed, but he admitted having had a quarrel with the
victim's wife because of the latter's refusal to vacate their (Adriano's)
house. Adriano had earlier asked the de Veyras to vacate their house
because he needed the lot where it was built on.
Accused-appellant Jose Adriano alleges that the testimony of
Alexander Reyes contains material inconsistencies particularly on the
matter of whether or not the latter witnessed the actual stabbing of the
victim and whether it was an electrician's knife or kitchen knife that was
used in the stabbing. It is additionally argued that the inaction of Jose de
Veyra, the victim's brother who, according to Alexander's testimony, was
also present when the incident happened, is inconsistent with human
nature since he failed to come to the aid of his brother who was in danger.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that the circumstantial
evidence established by the prosecution is adequate to show that it was
accused-appellant, Jose Adriano, who stabbed and killed Eduardo de
Veyra on 19 March 1989. It is however recommended by the Solicitor
General that the accused-appellant be held guilty of the lesser offense of
homicide since the qualifying circumstances of treachery and/or evident
premeditation were not clearly established.

ISSUE: WON the testimony of Alexander be given weight? YES.

HELD: The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the
trial court. Indeed, there are inconsistencies in the testimony of Alexander
Reyes but these are minor inconsistencies, considered in the light that the
witness was an eleven-year-old child who was even placed under the
custody of the City Warden for his own safety. The trauma of his stepfather
being stabbed and killed and his experience during the trial must have
placed him in a state of considerable anxiety and pressure. Instead of
being disbelieved and discredited, his testimony should be lauded for being
clear and credible enough to establish the circumstances which prove the
guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In People v.
Golendez, this Court held that there can be a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime. In
the present case, the Court has no doubt that Jose Adriano stabbed and
killed Eduardo de Veyra. However, treachery, which must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, was not clearly established. Alexander
Reyes did not witness the actual stabbing and the mere fact that the victim
was stabbed in the back did not necessarily make the attack treacherous.
Evident premeditation was likewise not established. In the absence of any
qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is homicide not murder.
PEOPLE v. TUNIACO
FACTS: The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused
Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder before
RTC General Santos City. Based on the findings of the RTC, in the morning
of June 13, 1992 some police officers from the Lagao Police Sub-Station
requested police officer Jaime Tabucon of the Central Police Station of
General Santos City homicide division to take the statement of accused
Alex Aleman regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon Cortez. On his
arrival at the sub-station, Tabucon noted the presence of Atty. Ruperto
Besinga, Jr. of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was conversing with
those taken into custody for the offense. When queried if the suspects
would be willing to give their statements, Atty. Besinga said that they were.
Some other police officer first took the statement of accused Jeffrey
Datulayta. Officer Tabucon next took the statement of accused Aleman,
whom he observed to be in good physical shape. Before anything else,
officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel of his own choice
and asked him if he was willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in
the affirmative. When asked if he had any complaint to make, Aleman said
that he had none. When Aleman said that he had no lawyer, Tabucon
pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the suspects

in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he would say may be
used against him later in court. Afterwards, the police officer started taking
down Alemans statement.
Accused Aleman said that in the course of a drinking bout with
accused Datulayta and Tuniaco at around 9 p.m. on June 6, 1992, Dondon
Cortez threatened to report his drinking companions illegal activities to the
police unless they gave him money for his forthcoming marriage. According
to Aleman, Datulayta and Tuniaco had already planned to kill Cortez in
Tupi, South Cotabato, for making the same threats and now they decided
to do it. They got Cortez drunk then led him out supposedly to get the
money he needed. The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the
dump site and, as they were walking, accused Aleman turned on Cortez
and stabbed him on the stomach. Accused Datulayta, on the other hand,
drew out his single shot homemade M16 pistol and shot Cortez on the
head, causing him to fall. Datulayta handed over the gun to Aleman who
fired another shot on Cortezs head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun
to pump some bullets into Cortezs body. Then they covered him with rice
husks. After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the substance
of it to accused Aleman who then signed it in the presence of Atty. Besinga.
On June 15, 1992 the police brought Aleman to the City Prosecutors Office
where he swore to his statement before an assistant city prosecutor. In the
afternoon, accused Datulayta and Aleman led Tabucon, the city prosecutor,
and a police inspector, to the dump site where they left their victims body.
After some search, the group found a spot covered with burnt rice husks
and a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot from the body, they found
the shells of a 5.56 caliber gun and an armalite rifle.
On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga,
pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. After the prosecution rested its
case, accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer to evidence which the Court
granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. On being rearraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of Homicide which the court granted. For some reason, the trial
court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric examination at the Davao Mental
Hospital. But, shortly after, the hospital sent word that Aleman had
escaped. He was later recaptured. When trial in the case resumed,
Alemans new PAO lawyer raised the defense of insanity. This prompted
the court to require the Provincial Jail Warden to issue a certification
regarding Alemans behavior and mental condition while in jail to determine
if he was fit to stand trial. The warden complied, stating that Aleman had
been observed to have good mental condition and did not commit any
infraction while in jail.
Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty. Besinga
assisted accused Aleman during the taking of his extrajudicial confession,
the latter, however, recanted what he said to the police during the trial. He
testified that sometime in 1992, some police officers took him from his

aunts house in Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos City, and brought
him to the Lagao police station. He was there asked to admit having taken
part in the murder of Cortez. When he refused, they tortured him until he
agreed to sign a document admitting his part in the crime. Accused Aleman
also testified that he could not remember having been assisted by Atty.
Besinga during the police investigation. He even denied ever knowing the
lawyer. Aleman further denied prior association with accused Tuniaco and
Datulayta. He said that he met them only at the city jail where they were
detained for the death of Cortez.
The RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution was able to present evidence of corpus
delicti? WON Alemans extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence?
HELD: 1. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or
substance of a crime. The evidence of a dead body with a gunshot wound
on its back would be evidence that murder has been committed. Corpus
delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain result has been established, for
example, that a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally
responsible for it. The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus
delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial or presumptive evidence.
The defense claims that the prosecution failed to prove corpus
delicti since it did not bother to present a medical certificate identifying the
remains found at the dump site and an autopsy report showing such
remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds that resulted in death; and the
shells of the guns used in killing the victim. But corpus delicti need not be
proved by an autopsy report of the dead victims body or even by the
testimony of the physician who examined such body. While such report or
testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim
suffered, they are not indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of
death. Nor is the presentation of the murder weapons also indispensable
since the physical existence of such weapons is not an element of the
crime of murder. Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at
the place pointed to by accused Aleman. That physical confirmation,
coming after his testimony of the gruesome murder, sufficiently establishes
the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course, that statement must be
admissible in evidence.
2. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; c) express; and d)
in writing. These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or
was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman
during the custodial investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw

accused Aleman, before the taking of his statement, conversing with

counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga did not dispute this claim.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession.
The appellate court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is
a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of
compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence
was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness.
Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he
never brought this to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the
prosecutor who administered his oath. Accused Aleman claims,
citing People v. Galit, that long questions followed by monosyllabic answers
do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is amply informed of his
rights. But this does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke to
Aleman clearly in the language he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga,
even signed a certification that the investigator sufficiently explained to him
his constitutional rights and that he was still willing to give his statement.
Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not
fully realize the consequences of a confession. But as the CA said, no law
or jurisprudence requires the police officer to ascertain the educational
attainment of the accused. All that is needed is an effective communication
between the interrogator and the suspect to the end that the latter is able to
understand his rights. This appears to have been done in this case.
Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police
fabricated Alemans confession and just forced him to sign it. The
confession has details that only the person who committed the crime could
have possibly known. What is more, accused Datulaytas confession
corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine
of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is circumstantial evidence
against the person implicated in it.
The Court notes that, when the CA modified the award of civil
damages to the heirs of Cortez, the CA made both accused Aleman and
Datulayta, jointly and severally liable, for the damages as modified. But the
appeal by one or more of several accused cannot affect those who did not
appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to them. Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay 50K to the heirs
of Cortez. The CA erred in expanding that liability when he did not appeal
from his conviction. This is deleted. SC affirms CA judgement.
YU TEK
Trent, J.

v.

GONZALES G.R.

No.

L-9935

February

1,

1915

Doctrine:
There is a perfected sale with regard to the thing whenever the article of

sale has been physically segregated from all other articles.

Facts: Gonzalez received P3,000 from Yu Tek and Co. and in exchange,
the former obligated himself to deliver 600 piculs of sugar of the first and
second grade, according to the result of the polarization, within the period
of three months. It was also stipulated that in case Gonzales fails to deliver,
the contract will be rescinded he will be obligated to return the P3,000
received and also the sum of P1,200 by way of indemnity for loss and
damages.
Plaintiff proved that no sugar had been delivered to him under the contract
nor had he been able to recover the P3,000.
Gonzales assumed that the contract was limited to the sugar he might raise
upon his own plantation; that the contract represented a perfected sale;
and that by failure of his crop he was relieved from complying with his
undertaking by loss of the thing due.
Defendants contention: He alleges that the court erred in refusing to permit
parol evidence showing that the parties intended that the sugar was to be
secured from the crop which the defendant raised on his plantation, and
that he was unable to fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure
of his crop.
Issue: Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale
Held: No. This court has consistently held that there is a perfected sale
with regard to the thing whenever the article of sale has been physically
segregated from all other articles.
In the case at bar, the undertaking of the defendant was to sell to the
plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar of the first and second classes. Was this an
agreement upon the thing which was the object of the contract? For the
purpose of sale its bulk is weighed, the customary unit of weight being
denominated a picul. Now, if called upon to designate the article sold, it is
clear that the defendant could only say that it was sugar. He could only
use this generic name for the thing sold. There was no appropriation of
any particular lot of sugar. Neither party could point to any specific quantity
of sugar and say: This is the article which was the subject of our contract.
We conclude that the contract in the case at bar was merely an executory
agreement; a promise of sale and not a sale. There was no perfected sale.
***
This case appears to be one to which the rule which excludes parol
evidence to add to or vary the terms of a written contract is decidedly
applicable. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the

sugar was to be raised by the defendant. Parties are presumed to have

reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol
evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned
at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. In an early
case this court declined to allow parol evidence showing that a party to a
written contract was to become a partner in a firm instead of a creditor of
the firm. (Pastor vs. Gaspar, 2 Phil. Rep., 592.) Again, in Eveland vs.
Eastern Mining Co. (14 Phil. Rep., 509) a contract of employment provided
that the plaintiff should receive from the defendant a stipulated salary and
expenses. The defendant sought to interpose as a defense to recovery that
the payment of the salary was contingent upon the plaintiff's employment
redounding to the benefit of the defendant company. The contract
contained no such condition and the court declined to receive parol
evidence thereof.
In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the sugar was to be obtained
exclusively from the crop raised by the defendant. There is no clause in the
written contract which even remotely suggests such a condition. The
defendant undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a
specified time. The contract placed no restriction upon the defendant in the
matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on
the market or raise it himself. It may be true that defendant owned a
plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, but he did not limit his
obligation to his own crop of sugar. Our conclusion is that the condition
which the defendant seeks to add to the contract by parol evidence cannot
be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the writing
itself.
The second contention of the defendant arises from the first. He assumes
that the contract was limited to the sugar he might raise upon his own
plantation; that the contract represented a perfected sale; and that by
failure of his crop he was relieved from complying with his undertaking by
loss of the thing due. (Arts. 1452, 1096, and 1182, Civil Code.) This
argument is faulty in assuming that there was a perfected sale. Article 1450
defines a perfected sale as follows:
The sale shall be perfected between vendor and vendee and shall be
binding on both of them, if they have agreed upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and upon the price, even when neither has been
delivered.
Article 1452 reads: "The injury to or the profit of the thing sold shall, after
the contract has been perfected, be governed by the provisions of articles

1096 and 1182."

This court has consistently held that there is a perfected sale with regard to
the "thing" whenever the article of sale has been physically segregated
from all other articles Thus, a particular tobacco factory with its contents
was held sold under a contract which did not provide for either delivery of
the price or of the thing until a future time. McCullough vs. Aenlle and Co.
(3 Phil. Rep., 295). Quite similar was the recent case of Barretto vs. Santa
Marina (26 Phil. Rep., 200) where specified shares of stock in a tobacco
factory were held sold by a contract which deferred delivery of both the
price and the stock until the latter had been appraised by an inventory of
the entire assets of the company. In Borromeo vs. Franco (5 Phil. Rep., 49)
a sale of a specific house was held perfected between the vendor and
vendee, although the delivery of the price was withheld until the necessary
documents of ownership were prepared by the vendee. In Tan Leonco vs.
Go Inqui (8 Phil. Rep., 531) the plaintiff had delivered a quantity of hemp
into the warehouse of the defendant. The defendant drew a bill of
exchange in the sum of P800, representing the price which had been
agreed upon for the hemp thus delivered. Prior to the presentation of the
bill for payment, the hemp was destroyed. Whereupon, the defendant
suspended payment of the bill. It was held that the hemp having been
already delivered, the title had passed and the loss was the vendee's. It is
our purpose to distinguish the case at bar from all these cases.
In the case at bar the undertaking of the defendant was to sell to the
plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar of the first and second classes. Was this an
agreement upon the "thing" which was the object of the contract within the
meaning of article 1450, supra? Sugar is one of the staple commodities of
this country. For the purpose of sale its bulk is weighed, the customary unit
of weight being denominated a "picul." There was no delivery under the
contract. Now, if called upon to designate the article sold, it is clear that the
defendant could only say that it was "sugar." He could only use this generic
name for the thing sold. There was no "appropriation" of any particular lot
of sugar. Neither party could point to any specific quantity of sugar and say:
"This is the article which was the subject of our contract." How different is
this from the contracts discussed in the cases referred to above! In the
McCullough case, for instance, the tobacco factory which the parties dealt
with was specifically pointed out and distinguished from all other tobacco
factories. So, in the Barretto case, the particular shares of stock which the
parties desired to transfer were capable of designation. In the Tan Leonco
case, where a quantity of hemp was the subject of the contract, it was
shown that that quantity had been deposited in a specific warehouse, and
thus set apart and distinguished from all other hemp.
A number of cases have been decided in the State of Louisiana, where the

civil law prevails, which confirm our position. Perhaps the latest is Witt
Shoe Co. vs. Seegars and Co. (122 La., 145; 47 Sou., 444). In this case a
contract was entered into by a traveling salesman for a quantity of shoes,
the sales having been made by sample. The court said of this contract:
But it is wholly immaterial, for the purpose of the main question, whether
Mitchell was authorized to make a definite contract of sale or not, since the
only contract that he was in a position to make was an agreement to sell or
an executory contract of sale. He says that plaintiff sends out 375 samples
of shoes, and as he was offering to sell by sample shoes, part of which had
not been manufactured and the rest of which were incorporated in plaintiff's
stock in Lynchburg, Va., it was impossible that he and Seegars and Co.
should at that time have agreed upon the specific objects, the title to which
was to pass, and hence there could have been no sale. He and Seegars
and Co. might have agreed, and did (in effect ) agree, that the identification
of the objects and their appropriation to the contract necessary to make a
sale should thereafter be made by the plaintiff, acting for itself and for
Seegars and Co., and the legend printed in red ink on plaintiff's billheads
("Our responsibility ceases when we take transportation Co's. receipt `In
good order'" indicates plaintiff's idea of the moment at which such
identification and appropriation would become effective. The question
presented was carefully considered in the case of State vs. Shields, et al.
(110 La., 547, 34 Sou., 673) (in which it was absolutely necessary that it
should be decided), and it was there held that in receiving an order for a
quantity of goods, of a kind and at a price agreed on, to be supplied from a
general stock, warehoused at another place, the agent receiving the order
merely enters into an executory contract for the sale of the goods, which
does not divest or transfer the title of any determinate object, and which
becomes effective for that purpose only when specific goods are thereafter
appropriated to the contract; and, in the absence of a more specific
agreement on the subject, that such appropriated takes place only when
the goods as ordered are delivered to the public carriers at the place from
which they are to be shipped, consigned to the person by whom the order
is given, at which time and place, therefore, the sale is perfected and the
title passes.
This case and State vs. Shields, referred to in the above quotation are
amply illustrative of the position taken by the Louisiana court on the
question before us. But we cannot refrain from referring to the case of
Larue and Prevost vs. Rugely, Blair and Co. (10 La. Ann., 242) which is
summarized by the court itself in the Shields case as follows:
. . . It appears that the defendants had made a contract for the sale, by
weight, of a lot of cotton, had received $3,000 on account of the price, and
had given an order for its delivery, which had been presented to the

purchaser, and recognized by the press in which the cotton was stored, but
that the cotton had been destroyed by fire before it was weighed. It was
held that it was still at the risk of the seller, and that the buyer was entitled
to recover the $3,000 paid on account of the price.
We conclude that the contract in the case at bar was merely an executory
agreement; a promise of sale and not a sale. At there was no perfected
sale, it is clear that articles 1452, 1096, and 1182 are not applicable. The
defendant having defaulted in his engagement, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover the P3,000 which it advanced to the defendant, and this portion of
the judgment appealed from must therefore be affirmed.
The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment of the trial court on the
ground that it is entitled to recover the additional sum of P1,200 under
paragraph 4 of the contract. The court below held that this paragraph was
simply a limitation upon the amount of damages which could be recovered
and not liquidated damages as contemplated by the law. "It also appears,"
said the lower court, "that in any event the defendant was prevented from
fulfilling the contract by the delivery of the sugar by condition over which he
had no control, but these conditions were not sufficient to absolve him from
the obligation of returning the money which he received."
The above quoted portion of the trial court's opinion appears to be based
upon the proposition that the sugar which was to be delivered by the
defendant was that which he expected to obtain from his own hacienda
and, as the dry weather destroyed his growing cane, he could not comply
with his part of the contract. As we have indicated, this view is erroneous,
as, under the contract, the defendant was not limited to his growth crop in
order to make the delivery. He agreed to deliver the sugar and nothing is
said in the contract about where he was to get it.
We think is a clear case of liquidated damages. The contract plainly states
that if the defendant fails to deliver the 600 piculs of sugar within the time
agreed on, the contract will be rescinded and he will be obliged to return
the P3,000 and pay the sum of P1,200 by way of indemnity for loss and
damages. There cannot be the slightest doubt about the meaning of this
language or the intention of the parties. There is no room for either
interpretation or construction. Under the provisions of article 1255 of the
Civil Code contracting parties are free to execute the contracts that they
may consider suitable, provided they are not in contravention of law,
morals, or public order. In our opinion there is nothing in the contract under
consideration which is opposed to any of these principles.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is modified by
allowing the recovery of P1,200 under paragraph 4 of the contract. As thus

modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs in this

instance.
AMADO T. GURANGO and ESTER GURANGO, petitioners,
vs.
NTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and EDWARD L. FERREIRA,
respondents. G.R. No. 75290 | November 4, 1992 | NOCON, J.:
FACTS: Private respondent Edward Ferreira sold to petitioner Amado
Gurango one (1) booklet of raffle tickets valued at Five Hundred (P500.00)
Pesos consisting of one hundred (100) tickets bearing ticket numbers
162501 to 162600 in connection with a fund-raising project sponsored by
the Makati Jaycees to be held in the evening of April 14, 1977 at the Manila
Peninsula Hotel.
At around 10:00 p.m. of April 14, 1977, ticket number 162574 in the name
of Armando "Boyet" Gurango, a minor son of the petitioners, but in the
custody or possession of private respondent, won a Toyota Corolla car.
Petitioner Amado Gurango alleged that on April 14, 1977, he issued Check
No. 00730 dated April 12, 1977 for the payment of the sixty (60) raffle
tickets in the amount of Three Hundred (300.00) Pesos. Thereafter,
petitioner called his cashier, Miriam Burgo, and instructed the latter to fill up
the stubs of the one hundred (100) raffle tickets with the names of his
family members before surrendering the same to the messenger of private
respondent who would go there to collect the check for the payment of said
raffle tickets.
When petitioner arrived at his office in the afternoon of that same day, his
cashier gave him the one hundred (100) claim stubs and informed him that
the messenger of the private respondent took the check as well as all the
raffle tickets. Thereafter, petitioner instructed his cashier to keep said claim
stubs as he was in a hurry to return to Cavite City for the induction of the
officers and directors of the Cavite Jaycees.
The following morning or on April 15, 1977, private respondent called up
petitioner Amado Gurango to inform the latter that he had already paid
petitioner's remaining unpaid balance of Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos to
the Makati Jaycees the previous night during the raffle and, subsequently,
arranged a meeting with the petitioner for the latter to turnover the forty
(40) claim stubs representing the unpaid balance. During said telephone
conversation, petitioner inquired from the private respondent if any of his
tickets won a car during the raffle but was told by the latter that no Jaycee
had won any car in said raffle.
Upon private respondent's arrival at the office of the petitioner, the latter

inquired again from the former if any of his tickets, won a car to which
private respondent answered again in the negative. When private
respondent asked for the forty (40) claim stubs from the petitioner, the latter
informed the former that he is still willing to honor their previous agreement
and even tendered a check for Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos dated April
30, 1977 but private respondent refused to accept said check maintaining
that the money he advanced the previous night will be charged against his
company and he only needs the claim stubs of said tickets to justify said
expenses.
As petitioner was in a hurry to finish his income tax return, he handed all
the claim stubs to the private respondent who selected forty (40) claim
stubs from the lot representing the unpaid balance. Thereafter, private
respondent asked the petitioner to put down their agreement into writing
which the latter did in a piece of yellow paper and in his own handwriting, to
wit:
14 April 1977
This is a mutual agreement between Mads Gurango & Ed Ferreira that they
bought a booklet of Raffle Tickets of Makati JC worth P500.00. All the stubs
in our possessions remains our share and any number happened to win in
the raffle corresponding to the stub numbers each one of us is holding will
own the prize solely w/o the other party claims co-ownership, even that the
name printed in the such raffle stubs is in the name of one party or any
other person.
(SGD.) (SGD.)
MADS GURANGO

EDWARD L. FERREIRA

Further any holder of the winning stub shall be printed as the sole winner
and owner, even though it was in other's name.
This is a Gentlemen and Jayceely agreement that both of us will stick to
this simple and binding agreement.
(SGD.) (SGD.)
MADS GURANGO

EDWARD L. FERREIRA 4

On April 18, 1977, petitioner was shown a copy of Daily Express and
learned from an item in said newspaper that ticket No. 162574 won a
Toyota Corolla car but was surprised to find out that the winning stub was
among those taken by the private respondent.
That same evening, petitioner attended a meeting of the Metropolitan

Jaycees at the Metro Jaycee Clubhouse and confronted private respondent

about the winning stub. Upon being shown a copy of their agreement,
petitioner realized his mistake in dating said agreement on April 14, 1977
instead of April 15, 1977 which he distinctly remembered to be the date
said agreement was executed since it was the last day to file the income
tax return but must have erroneously wrote down the wrong date due to his
tight schedule on that day.
On the other hand, private respondent claimed that on April 12, 1977,
petitioner informed the former that he is only buying sixty (60) tickets and
offered to return the remaining forty (40) tickets since he needed the
money for the payment of his income tax on April 15, 1977, which was
accepted by the private respondent and the latter agreed to appropriate for
himself the remaining tickets.
Consequently, in the morning of April 14, 1977, petitioner turned over the
one hundred (100) tickets to be dropped in the "tambiolo" and his check for
Three Hundred (P300.00) Pesos for the sixty (60) tickets he bought from
the private respondent.
Upon noticing that all the returned tickets were in the name of the petitioner
Amado Gurango or members of his family, private respondent, during his
meeting with the petitioner at Manila Midtown Ramada Hotel at around 6
p.m. of April 14, 1977, asked the latter to write down their agreement
signed by them on April 14, 1977 (Exhibit "A").
Thereafter, private respondent and petitioner met at the Metro Jaycee
Clubhouse were the former asked the latter to comply with their agreement
but petitioner refused and wrote a letter to the Makati Jaycees disclaiming
said agreement. Eventually, the car was awarded to petitioners' son.
Subsequent demands by the private respondent to the petitioner to comply
with their agreement were ignored by the latter.
Consequently, on August 25, 1977, private respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XX in Civil Case No. 27163.
TC: the Court dismisses the complaint, for failure on the part of the plaintiff
to have established a cause of action against the defendants.
On the counterclaim, the Court orders the plaintiff to pay the defendants
the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages, and the
sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as and for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. However, the defendants are
ordered to reimburse the plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Pesos

(P200.00), the balance price of the forty (40) tickets paid for by the plaintiff.
PR appealed.
CA: reversed the decision of the TC.
ISSUE: W/N the agreement executed between the petitioner and private
respondent on April 14, 1977 is valid.
HELD: YES. As a rule, only legal questions are reviewable by this Court on
appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeals. However, one of the
exceptions to the rule is when there is a conflict in factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court. 7
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines
provides that:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the party
and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement
other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:
(a)
Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity if the
agreement is put in issue by the pleading;
(b)

When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.

Under the aforementioned provision, when the parties have reduced their
agreement in writing, the contents of said agreement are rendered
conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is inadmissible to change
a valid and enforceable agreement embodied in a document. "The mistake
contemplated as an exception to the parol evidence rule is one which is a
mistake of fact mutual to the parties," 8 which is not present on this case.
Moreover, in view of the parties' conflicting claims regarding the true nature
of the agreement executed by them, We find the version of the private
respondent more credible for the terms of said agreement are clear and
require no room for interpretation since the intention of the parties, as
expressly specified in said agreement, do not contradict each other.
The fact that the agreement was prepared and written by petitioner himself
further indicated that said agreement was entered into by the parties freely
and voluntarily which renders petitioners' claim of fraud in the execution of
the agreement unbelievable. Being the author of the agreement, petitioner

is presumed to have actual knowledge of the true intent of the parties and
the surrounding circumstance that attended the preparation of the
document in question including the date when said agreement was
executed. If it is true that the date if execution was on April 15, 1977,
petitioner should have written said date in the agreement and not April 14,
1977 considering that one does not usually forget a date that has a special
significance to him as alleged by the petitioner. In the instant case, it is
highly improbable that petitioner's consent was given through fraud since
the document was prepared and executed by petitioner himself. Therefore,
the agreement is valid and binding upon petitioner and respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the
appellate court, the petitioner for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
LECHUGAS V. CA
PRINCIPLE: As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of
Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be
invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one
of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established
thereby. (Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p.
155 citing 32 C.J.S. 79.).
FACTS: Victoria Lechugas (petitioner) bought a land from a certain
Leoncia Lasangue. After the purchase of the land, the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Leoncia Lasangue in her favor specified a certain land
Lot No. 5456 stated in the contract. When the defendants (respondents)
occupied Lot No. 5456, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with
damages (ejectment case) against the defendants but it was dismissed.
Petitioner appealed the case to the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo.
While the appeal for the ejectment case was pending, petitioner filed
another case in the RTC for the recovery of possession against the same
defendants involving the same Lot No. 5456. During the trial, the
defendants presented their star witness in the person of Leoncia Lasangue
herself.
Leoncia Lasangue testified during the trial. That according to her, the lot
that she sold to the petitioner was not Lot No. 5456 but another lot, Lot
5522. Lasangue did not know how to read and write, so the document of
sale was prepared by the petitioner, thereafter, the former was made to
sign it. Based on her testimony, the lot indicated in the Deed of Sale which
she sold to petitioner was erroneous. It was clear that she did not intend to

sell a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest

of the defendants (respondents). This was objected by the petitioner under
the Parole Evidence Rule.
TC: Dismissed the complaints.
CA: The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter sustained
the dismissal of the cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Parole Evidence Rule apply in this case?
HELD: No. The Parole Evidence Rule will not apply in this case because it
is Leoncia Lasangue who is one of the parties to the subject Deed of Sale
not the defendants. The defendants in the case were not parties to the
Deed of Sale executed between Leoncia Lasange and petitioner Lechugas.
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is
not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the
document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia
Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually
sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar,
through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she
really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522
but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of
her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of
paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of
land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.
ROBLES v. HERMANOS G.R. No. L-26173 July 13, 1927 Street, J.
Doctrine:
The lessee may prove an independent verbal agreement on the part of
the landlord to put the leased premises in a safe condition.
The appraised value of the property may be used to determine the price.
Facts:
A parcel of land was originally owned by the parents of the present plaintiff,
Zacarias Robles. Upon the death of his father, plaintiff leased the parcel of
land from the administrator with the stipulation that any permanent
improvements necessary to the cultivation and exploitation of the hacienda
should be made at the expense of the lessee without right to indemnity at
the end of the term. As the place was in a run-down state, and it was
foreseen that the lessee would be put to much expense in bringing the
property to its productive capacity, the annual rent was fixed at the
moderate amount of P2,000 per annum.
The plaintiff made various improvements and additions to the plant. The

firm of Lizarraga Hermanos was well aware of the nature and extent of
these improvements.
When the plaintiffs mother died, defendant came forward with a proposal
to buy the heirs portion of the property. In consideration that the plaintiff
should shorten the term of his lease to the extent stated, the defendant
agreed to pay him the value of all betterments that he had made on the
land and furthermore to purchase from him all that belonged to him
personally on the land. The plaintiff agreed to this.
On the ensuing instrument made, no reference was made to the surrender
of the plaintiffs rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease
should end; nor is anything said concerning the improvements which the
plaintiff had placed. At the same time the promise of the defendant to
compensate for him for the improvements was wanting. Accordingly, the
representative of the defendant explained that this was unnecessary in
view of the confidence existing between the parties.
On the part of the defendant it was claimed that the agreement with respect
to compensating the plaintiff for improvements and other things was never
in fact made.
TC: gave judgment for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of
P14,194.42, with costs.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the lessee may contest the validity of a written contract
with oral evidence
2. Whether or not the appreciation value can be used to determine the
price
Held:
1. Yes. In case of a written contract of lease, the lessee may prove an
independent verbal agreement on the part of the landlord to put the leased
premises in a safe condition. The verbal contract which the plaintiff has
established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main
contract of conveyance, and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible
under the doctrine above stated. In the case before us the written contract
is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a
collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with
related matters.
2. Yes. The stipulation with respect to the appraisal of the property did not
create a suspensive condition. The true sense of the contract evidently was
that the defendant would take over the movables and the improvements at

an appraised valuation, and the defendant obligated itself to promote the

appraisal in good faith. As the defendant partially frustrated the appraisal, it
violated a term of the contract and made itself liable for the true value of
the things contracted about, as such value may be established in the usual
course of proof. Furthermore, an unjust enrichment of the defendant would
result from allowing it to appropriate the movables without compensating
the plaintiff thereof.
***
It will be seen from the clauses quoted that the plaintiff received some
thousands of pesos of the purchase money more than his brother and
sister. This is explained by the fact that the plaintiff was a creditor of his
mother's estate while the other two were debtors to it; and the difference in
the amounts paid to each resulted from the adjustments of their respective
rights. Furthermore, it will be noted that the three grantors in the deed
conveyed only their deceased mother; and precisely the same words are
used in defining what was conveyed by Zacarias Robles as in defining
what was conveyed by the other two. These words are noteworthy, and in
the original Spanish they run as follows: "Sus derechos, interes y
participacion en la testamentaria de la difunta Da. Anastacia de la Rama,
como uno de los herederos forzosos de la misma." What was conveyed by
the plaintiff is not defined as being, in part, the hacienda "Nahalinan," nor
as including any of his rights in or to the property conveyed other than
those which he possessed in the character of heir.
No reference is made in this conveyance to the surrender of the plaintiff's
rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease should end; nor is
anything said concerning the improvements or the property of a personal
nature which the plaintiff had placed on the hacienda. The plaintiff says
that, when the instrument was presented to him, he saw that in the sixth
paragraph it was declared that the plaintiff's lease should subsist only until
June 30, 1918, instead of in May, 1920, which was the original term, while
at the same time the promise of the defendant to compensate for him for
the improvements and to purchase the existing crop, together with the
cattle and other things, was wanting; and he says that upon his calling
attention to this, the representative of the defendant explained that this was
unnecessary in view of the confidence existing between the parties, at the
same time calling the attention of the plaintiff to the fact that the plaintiff
was already debtor to the house of Lizarraga Hermanos in the amount of
P49,000, for which the firm had no security. Upon this manifestation the
plaintiff subsided; and, believing that the agreement with respect to
compensation would be carried out in good faith, he did not further insist
upon the incorporation of said agreement into this document. Nor was the
supposed agreement otherwise reduced to writing.

On the part of the defendant it is claimed that the agreement with respect
to compensating the plaintiff for improvements and other things was never
in fact made. What really happened, accordingly to the defendant's answer,
is that, after the sale of the hacienda had been effected, the plaintiff offered
to sell the defendant firm the crop of cane then existing uncut on the
hacienda, together with the carabao then in use on the place. This
propositon was favorably received by the defendant; and it is admitted that
an agreement was arrived at with respect to the value of the carabao,
which were taken over for the agreed price, but it is claimed with respect to
the crop that the parties did not come into accord.
Upon the issue of fact thus made we are of the opinion that the
preponderance of the evidence supports the contention of the plaintiff
and the finding of the trial court to the effect that, in consideration of the
shortening of the period of the lease by nearly two years, the defendant
undertook to pay for the improvements which the plaintiff had placed on the
hacienda and take over at a fair valuation, to be made by appraisers, the
personal property, such as carabao, tools and farming impliments, which
the plaintiff had placed upon the hacienda at his own personal expense.
The plaintiff introduced in evidence a letter (Exhibit D), written on March 1,
1917, by Severiano Lizarraga to the plaintiff, in which reference is made to
an appraisal and liquidation. This letter is relied upon by the plaintiff as
constituting written evidence of the agreement; but it seems to us so vague
that, if it stood alone, and a written contract were really necessary, it could
not be taken as sufficient proof of the agreement in question. But we
believe that the contract is otherwise proved by oral testimony.
When testifying as a witness of the defense Carmelo Lizarraga himself
admitted contrary to the statement of defendant's answer that a few
days before the conveyance was executed the plaintiff proposed that the
defendant should buy all the things that the plaintiff then had on the
hacienda, whereupon the Lizarragas informed him that they would buy
those things if an agreement should be arrived at as to the price. We note
that as regards the improvements the position of the defendant is that they
pertained to the hacienda at the time the purchase was effected and
necessarily passed with it to the defendant.
As against the denials of the Lizarraga we have the direct testimony of the
plaintiff and his brother Jose to the effect that the agreement was as
claimed by the plaintiff; and this is supported by the natural probabilities of
the case in connection with a subsequent appraisal of the property, which
was rendered futile by the course pursued by the defendants. It is,
however, unnecessary to enter into details with respect to this, because,
upon examining the assignments of error of the appellant in this court, it will
be found that no exception has been taken to the finding of the trial court to

the effect that a verbal contract was made in the sense claimed by the
plaintiff.
We now proceed to discuss seriatim the errors assigned by the appellant.
Under the first, exception is taken to the action of the trial court in admitting
oral evidence of a contract different from that expressed in the contract of
sale (Exhibit B); and it is insisted that the written contract must be taken as
expressing all of the pacts, agreements and stipulations entered into
between the parties with respect to the acquisition of the hacienda. In this
connection stress is placed upon the fact that there is no allegation in the
complaint that the written contract fails to express the agreement of the
parties. This criticism is in our opinion not well directed. The case is not one
for the reformation of a document on the ground of mistake or fraud in its
execution, as is permitted under section 285 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The purpose is to enforce an independent or collateral
agreement which constituted an inducement to the making of the sale, or
part of the consideration therefor. There is no rule of evidence of wider
application than that which declares extrinsic evidence inadmissible either
to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract. The execution of a
contract in writing is deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or
stipulations concerning its terms and the subject-matter which preceded
the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or
mistake of fact (10 R. C. L., p. 1016). But it is recognized that this rule is to
be taken with proper qualifications; and all the authorities are agreed that
proof is admissible of any collateral, parol agreement that is not
inconsistent with the terms of the written contract, though it may relate to
the same subject-matter (10 R. C. L., p. 1036). As expressed in a standard
legal encyclopedia, the doctrine here referred to is as follows: "The rule
excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so
far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but
such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written
agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and
whether the action is at law or in equity." (22 C. J., p. 1245.) It has
accordingly been held that, in case of a written contract of lease, the lessee
may prove an independent verbal agreement on the part of the landlord to
put the leased premises in a safe condition; and a vendor of realty may
show by parol evidence that crops growing on the land were reserved,
though no such reservation was made in the deed of conveyance (10 R. C.
L., p. 1037). In the case before us the deed of conveyance purports to
transfer to the defendant only such interests in certain properties as had
come to the conveyors by inheritance. Nothing is said concerning the rights
in the hacienda which the plaintiff had acquired by lease or concerning the
things that he had placed thereon by way of improvement or had acquired
by purchase. The verbal contract which the plaintiff has established in this

case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance,

and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine
above stated. The rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous oral
agreement is not admissible to vary a written contract appears to have
more particular reference to the obligation expressed in the written
agreement, and the rule had never been interpreted as being applicable to
matters of consideration or inducement. In the case before us the written
contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in itself,
and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it
deals with related matters.
Under the second assignment of error the appellant directs attention to
subsection 4 of article 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein it is
declared that a contract for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at
a price of not less than P100, shall be unenforceable unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and subscribed by
the party charged, or by his agent; and it is insisted that the court erred in
admitting proof of a verbal contract over the objection of the defendant's
attorney. But it will be noted that the same subsection contains a
qualification, which is stated in these words, "unless the buyer accept and
receive part of such goods and chattels." In the case before us the trial
court found that the personal property, consisting of farming implements
and other movables placed on the farm by the plaintiff, have been utilized
by the defendant in the cultivation of the hacienda, and that the defendant
is benefiting by those things. No effort was made in the court below by the
defendant to controvert the proof submitted on this point in behalf of the
plaintiff, and no error is assigned in this court to the findings of fact with
reference thereto made by the trial judge. It is evident therefore that proof
of the oral agreement with respect to the movables was properly received
by the trial judge, even over the objection of the defendant's attorney. .
The appellant's third assignment of error has reference to the alleged
suspensive condition annexed to the oral agreement. In this connection it is
claimed that the true meaning of the proven verbal agreement is that, in
case the parties should fail to agree upon the price, after an appraisal of
the property, the agreement would not be binding; in other words, that the
stipulation for appraisal and agreement as to the price was a suspensive
condition in the contract: and since the parties have never arrived at any
agreement on the price (except as to the carabao), it is contended that the
obligation of the defendant has never become effective. We are of the
opinion that the stipulation with respect to the appraisal of the property did
not create a suspensive condition. The true sense of the contract evidently
was that the defendant would take over the movables and the
improvements at an appraised valuation, and the defendant obligated itself
to promote the appraisal in good faith. As the defendant partially frustrated

the appraisal, it violated a term of the contract and made itself liable for the
true value of the things contracted about, as such value may be
established in the usual course of proof. Furthermore, it must occur to any
one, as the trial judge pointed out, that an unjust enrichment of the
defendant would result from allowing it to appropriate the movables without
compensating the plaintiff thereof.
The fourth assignment of error is concerned with the improvements.
Attention is here directed to the fact that the improvements placed on the
hacienda by the plaintiff became a part of the realty and as such passed to
the defendant by virtue of the transfer effected by the three owner in the
deed of conveyance (Exhibit B.). It is therefore insisted that, the defendant
having thus acquired the improvements, the plaintiff should not be
permitted to recover their value again from the defendant. This criticism
misses the point. There can be no doubt that the defendant acquired the
fixed improvements when it acquired the land, but the question is whether
the defendant is obligated to indemnify the plaintiff for his outlay in making
the improvements. It was upon the consideration of the defendant's
promise so to indemnify the plaintiff that the latter agreed to surrender the
lease nearly two no doubt as to the validity of the promise made under
these circumstances to the plaintiff.
The fifth assignment of error is directed towards the action of the trial court
in awarding to the plaintiff the sum of P1,142 as compensation for the
damage caused by the failure of the defendant to take the existing crop of
cane from the hacienda at the proper time. In this connection it appears
that it was only in November, 1917, that the defendant finally notified the
plaintiff that he would not take the cane off the plaintiff's hands. Having
relied upon the promise of the defendant with respect to this matter, the
plaintiff had made no prior arrangements to have the cane ground himself,
and he had failed to contract ahead for the necessary laborers to harvest
the crop. Due to this lack of hands the milling of the cane was delayed, and
things that ought to have been done in December, 1917, were only
accomplished in February, 1918. It resulted also that the milling of the cane
was not completed until July, 1918. The trial court took judicial notice of the
fact that protracted delay in the milling of sugar-cane results in loss; and his
Honor estimated the damage to the plaintiff's crop upon this account in the
amount above stated. As fortifying his position on this point his Honor
quoted extensively in his opinion from scientific treatises on the subject of
the sugar industry in this and other countries. That there must have been
damage attributable to the cause above stated is manifest; and although
the estimate made by the court was based upon what may be considered
matter of judicial notice without any specific estimate from farmers, we see
no reason to conclude that any injustice was done to the plaintiff in said
estimate.

Upon the whole we find no reason to modify the conclusions of the trial
court upon any point, and the judgement appealed from must be affirmed.