50 SCRA 30 Jovellana vs.

Executive
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino
and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the
said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by
the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people
of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election
there being intimidation and fraud.
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED
BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
"WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention
is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;
"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in
chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all
persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or
over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by
the barrio, district or ward secretary;
"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen
participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their
views on important national issues;
"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated
January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do
you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution?
"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561)
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution,
as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its
rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to
ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen
(14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members
of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga
Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the
Filipino people;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the
nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an
overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
"President of the Philippines
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the
view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the
exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and
intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the
1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was
left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.

Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183
FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the
military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order
No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize
political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2
was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081
placing the entire country under martial law.
ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject
to judicial inquiry?; and
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of martial law?
HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices
held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and
academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation,
which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent
danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of
martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.

PVTA vs CIR
G.R. No. L-32052
65 SCRA 416
July 25, 1975
Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of
their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8)
hours daily.
Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental
functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA.
Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from
CA No. 444.
HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and
promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government
necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief
Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered
obsolete.
The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED.

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino

G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
Issue: whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate
Held: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that:
the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government

Holy See vs Rosario

G.R. No. 101949
238 SCRA 524
December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.
FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy
See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The
land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who
exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were
unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales
Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent
corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.
The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages
against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See
and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from
suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by
entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this
special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As
expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are
adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of
our admission in the society of nations.
It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy
shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real
action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the
Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and
is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or
embassy in this Court.
Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature.
The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose,
but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The
transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (nonproprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict
the squatters living in said property.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation
proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of
the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the
government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of
ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give
its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a
suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have
done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the
time of the taking.

United States of America vs. Ruiz

136 SCRA 487
Facts: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it
won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly
awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the
US.
Issue: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. The
result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to
be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

PNR v. IAC

GR No. 70547; January 22, 1993

FACTS:
The passenger express train of Philippine National Railways (PNR) and a passenger bus of Baliwag
Transit Inc. collided at the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit Bulacan at 1:30 in the afternoon
of August 10, 1947 causing damage to the bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53 suffered
physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that the collision was due to the negligence and imprudence of PNR and
its engineer Honorio Cirbado in operating in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal
lights, flagman or switchman.
ISSUE:
1) Who between the petitioner and respondent was negligent?
2) Is PNR immune from suit?
HELD:
There is no admissible evidence to show that the bus driver did not take necessary precaution in
traversing the track. Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver for he had taken
necessary precautions before passing over the railway track. The failure of PNR, on the other hand, to put
a cross bar, or signal light, flagman, or switchman or semaphores is evidence of negligence on their part.
By the doctrine of implied powers, the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to transact
private business. PNR is not exercising governmental powers, as such it is not immune from suit.

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures,
a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When
he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He
then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and
quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT

scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with
leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,
containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order
invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been
deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in
all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also
been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in
the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process
of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and
medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely
known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such
admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to
treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her
reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-called
"three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised
in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the
admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any
less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the
medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the
longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and
to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied
in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be
a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be
forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token,
a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in
nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also
provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where
even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools,
there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does
not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other
students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly
affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more
vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession,
does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly
treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others
who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality
among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private

respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is
certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does
not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only
inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and
may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full
harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant
future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm
and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

G.R. No. L-47178

May 16, 1980

ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner,

vs.
VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING ENTERPRISES
and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or THE COMPENSATION APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF,
Department of Labor, respondents.
Fernardo R. Moreno for petitioner.
Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.
E. V. Espanol for public respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.:t.hqw
The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation filed by petitioner, the
mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was drowned while in the employ of private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio.
Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so, it is admitted that there was no controversion. Such
omission, fatal in character, was sought to be minimized by the filing of a motion to dismissed based on
the alleged absence of an employment relationship. What cannot be ignored, however, is that
subsequently, in the hearing of such claim private respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief
engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a
member of the working force, but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and
thereafter was found dead. The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent
employer to the effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the
actual performance of his work with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22,
1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty." 1 The hearing officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack
of merit. 2 A motion for reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order dated August 29, 1977, the then
Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas F. Ople, denied such motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 3
Hence this petition for review.

1.
In La Mallorca v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 this Court explicitly held that the
failure to controvert "is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a host of
decisions in compliance with the clear and express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Any
Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. 5 The opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Bachrach
Motor Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 6 to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission. 7 Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 8 such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted that nine more decisions had been
rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 9 to Abong v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission. 10 By the time respondent secretary of Labor denied the motion
for reconsideration, a host of decisions that speaks to the same effect had been promulgated. 11 It clearly,
appears, therefore, that the failure of the referee to grant the award ought to have been remedied and the
motion for reconsideration granted.
2.
The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation
v. Otadoy, 12 there was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was drowned while in the
performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was that he "was lost at sea while in the employ of
petitioner. 13 Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained. Likewise, the ruling in Caltex
(Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva 14 was cited with approval. Thus: "The fact that the employee was found missing
while on board the petitioner's vessel MV 'Caltex Mindanao' became known to the captain of the vessel
on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956 when the petitioner transmitted to the
respondent Compensation WCC For in No. 3 stating that the employee was 'Lost at sea and presumed
dead as of October 10, 1956,' and that it was controverting the respondent's claim. 15 In the present
case, there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was not controverted. Under the
circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law.
3.
It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased
was drowned while "in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private
respondent. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of
employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim. Time
and time again this Court has stressed such statutory provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from
January to April of this year. 16 An appraisal of the counter-affidavits submitted by two employees of
private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the vessel for a
drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate the force of the presumption of
compensability.
4.
Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because of the
doctrine that the findings of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded due weight and
consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 17 finds
pertinence: "The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is authorized to inquire into the facts when
the conclusions are not supported by substantial or credible evidence. 18
5.
This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation
uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. So it has been since
the first leading case of Francisco v. Conching 19 decided a year after the 1935 Constitution took effect.
What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 20 is not amiss:
"There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be
reminded of the high estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of
social justice and protection to labor. 21 Further: "No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of
a clearly expressed legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for
social justice and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to
doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national policy. 22 Lastly,
to quote from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social justice is in this
sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who

has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter
compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.' 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrelita B. Ondoy is awarded the sum of,
P6,000.00 as compensation for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for burial expenses; and
P600.00 as attorney's fees. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against private respondent
Virgilio Ignacio.

Daza v Singson G.R. No. 86344. December 21, 1989.

7/31/2010 0 Comments
Facts: On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly
reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original
members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Briefly stated, the contention of the
petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real
party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the
Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the
Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation
in the Commission on Appointments.
Issue: Whether petitioners removal is unconstitutional;
Whether the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional;
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13,
1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio: If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from
the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in
the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with
authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by
members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said
vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
In view of the Allied Majority of 1961
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista
Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in
the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from
the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the

House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied
Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber.
It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had
not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still
members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid
because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of
Representatives as required by the Constitution.
The Court held: The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION
OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress
to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto.
In view of Congress authority
Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire
in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and
do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or
formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
In view of the Courts intervention
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our
jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be
resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we
are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely
discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not
evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine
Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos
. . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the national treatment and
parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our
Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
II.

THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion
nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to
all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the
fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of
the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of
laissez faire.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino
labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles
while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action.
Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which

mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So
too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by
the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or
personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its
members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike
down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own
judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a
matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the
worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership,
should this be the political desire of a member.

G.R. No. L-23825

December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to
act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the
date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that
not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been
impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned
executive orders because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new
political subdivisions intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma
Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of
an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least twothirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be
created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the
recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated. Petitioner argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This
theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioners argument, which is that the statutory denial
of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too
obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except
by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent
to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are
based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or
boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be
required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created,
and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines
shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control
of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the
new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable
distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as
may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines.

Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not
amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case
involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing
municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to
said transfer (See Govt of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil.
518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common
boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is strictly a legislative function (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425,
January 2, 1959) or solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power (Udall vs. Severn, May 29,
1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs.
Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), municipal corporations are purely the creatures of
statutes.
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only
to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last
clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase as the public welfare may
require qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of
the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said
Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, whenever in the judgment of
the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order, effect the changes
enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government to such
place as the public interest requires. The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748
which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code governed the time at which,
or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of
the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was
to be transferred.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we
assumed that the phrase as the public welfare may require, in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses
thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this
Court had upheld public welfare and public interest, respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid
delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial
pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside
of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the
Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon
national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of
speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the
exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
character. The question of whether or not public interest demands the exercise of such power is not one
of fact. It is purely a legislative question (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike
Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, the question as to whether incorporation is
for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and
statecraft (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers,
state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be
annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the
right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be
exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute
(In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town
or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable
inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs.
Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population,
to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain
determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is
allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition ought justly to be included in the
village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge
and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village as justice may require (In re Villages of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether
or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the public interest and whether the
requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a
municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal
Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case of
Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter
case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the
President of the United States to approve codes of fair competition submitted to him by one or more
trade or industrial associations or corporations which impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to
membership therein and are truly representative, provided that such codes are not designed to promote
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them,
and will tend to effectuate the policy of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies
no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be
applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of
prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative

undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation,
correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing
codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually
unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
If the term unfair competition is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is virtually
unfettered. and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that public
welfare, which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the
delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to
a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by
public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of
Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system
established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for
the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the
fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can
hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices
of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope
of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to
pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set
aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial
board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a
new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies
no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of
discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority
even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In
other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments

than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which
he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section
68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed
by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent
with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondents claim (a) that not all the
proper parties referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities have been impleaded in
this case, and (b) that the present petition is premature.
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that
the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate,
the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized
by law to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official
investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer (Section 1661, Revised
Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which
involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives
of the national government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly
represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the executive
order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a
matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many
years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organized
and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental
thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials.
There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the
new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been
made by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio and the
respondent PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is
SO ORDERED.