United States v. Martinez, 4th Cir. (2002)
United States v. Martinez, 4th Cir. (2002)
United States v. Martinez, 4th Cir. (2002)
No. 00-4245
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Traxler joined. Judge Luttig wrote a concurring
opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Paul Craig Pooley, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney/Chief,
Criminal Division, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Juan Martinez challenges his convictions and sentence in
the Middle District of North Carolina on one count of conspiring to
distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, and
on four counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1956(a)(1). Martinez makes two basic contentions on appeal: first,
that the district court, in four separate contexts, committed reversible
error in accepting his guilty pleas, and, second, that the statute which
forms the object of his conspiracy conviction, 21 U.S.C. 841, is
unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000). We conclude that these contentions are without merit, and we
affirm.
I.
On May 25, 1999, Martinez, who was also known as Roberto Gonzalez and Jesus Garcia, was indicted, along with five others, on various charges relating to a drug distribution scheme in North Carolina
and elsewhere. The indictment contained sixteen counts, eight of
which (Count One plus Counts Eight through Fourteen) were against
Martinez. In Count One, Martinez and his co-defendants were
charged with conspiring, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, to commit
offenses involving controlled substances, that is, the distribution of
cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The
remaining seven charges against Martinez related to violations of the
money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1). The grand jury
issued a superseding indictment a month later, which changed Count
One only and named two additional co-conspirators. The superseding
indictment, which is the operative charge in this appeal (the "Indictment"), made no substantive changes to the eight charges levied
against Martinez.
On November 29, 1999, the Government and Martinez entered into
a plea agreement, which was filed with the court on that same day.
The plea agreement provided, inter alia: (1) that Martinez would
plead guilty to the conspiracy charge (Count One) and to four separate charges of money laundering (Counts Nine, Ten, Twelve, and
Fourteen); (2) that Martinez faced (a) on Count One, a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment, a maximum possible sentence of
life, and a maximum possible fine of $4 million; and (b) on each of
the money laundering charges, a maximum possible sentence of
twenty years imprisonment and a maximum possible fine of
$500,000; (3) that, upon acceptance by the court of the guilty pleas
tendered by Martinez, the Government would not oppose Martinezs
motion to dismiss the three other money laundering counts against
him (thereby reducing his exposure to prison by a total of sixty years
and his exposure to fines by the sum of $1.5 million); and (4) that the
Government would recommend to the district court a decrease in
Martinezs offense level by 1 additional level pursuant to
3E1.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines, if Martinez qualified for
a 2-point decrease in offense level under 3E1.1(a), and if his offense
level prior to the operation of 3E1.1(a) was 16 or greater.1
At the Rule 11 plea proceeding conducted on November 29, 1999,
Martinez acknowledged to the court that he had fully discussed with
his counsel both the various charges against him and the terms of his
plea agreement.2 Martinez also acknowledged to the court that he
understood the nature of the charges against him; he advised the court
that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs; and he
asserted that he was competent to plead.3
1
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11(c), the court informed Martinez that, on the conspiracy charge in Count One, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment, a potential
maximum sentence of life, and the imposition of a fine of up to $4
million. He was further informed by the court that the maximum possible sentence on each of the money laundering charges was twenty
years imprisonment plus a fine of $500,000. Martinez acknowledged
his understanding of the penalties he faced on the charges against him
by virtue of his guilty pleas. The court also advised Martinez that it
was not bound by the terms of his plea agreement with the Government, and that the final disposition of his case rested solely with the
court. The court informed Martinez that the Indictment did not, in
Count One, allege specific amounts of marijuana or cocaine, and it
advised Martinez that the quantity of controlled substances involved
in Count One would be determined at sentencing. Martinez acknowledged to the court, under oath, his understanding of all these matters.
Before concluding the Rule 11 proceeding, the court inquired
whether the Government intended to present a factual basis for the
guilty pleas. When the Government requested that the factual basis be
withheld until sentencing because it was lengthy, the court acceded
to its request.4
On March 3, 2000, the district court conducted Martinezs sentencing proceedings. In these proceedings, the Government made no
objection to the Presentence Report ("PSR") of the Probation Officer,
and Martinez did not contest the drug quantities determined in the
(1)
The court, after determining that Martinez lacked the ability to pay,
did not impose a fine on him.
6
As a notice of appeal, Martinezs motion of March 9, 2000, was premature because the district court did not enter its judgment until March
16, 2000. Under Rule 4(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court announces a
decision, sentence, or order but before the entry of the judgment or
order is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry." In any
event, a second notice of appeal was filed on Martinezs behalf on March
20, 2000.
governs, in particular the First and the Seventh Circuits, stress that
"Rule 11(h) was added by amendment for a narrow purpose," i.e., it
was to demonstrate that Rule 52 applied to Rule 11 errors. GandiaMaysonet, 227 F.3d at 6; see also Driver, 242 F.3d at 770. The courts
that see harmless error review as the proper standard, in particular the
Ninth Circuit, contend that the provisions of Rule 11(h) represent a
rejection of "McCarthys extreme sanction of automatic reversal
where technical violations occur." Odedo, 154 F.3d at 940. Both sides
to this debate buttress their positions with references to structural considerations.
The First and Seventh Circuits contend, for example, that employing the traditional "raise or waive principle, here as with other kinds
of error, serves obvious interests of fairness and judicial economy."
Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d at 5. They assert that a plain error standard, by inducing defendants to properly raise their contentions in district court, will enable "the district court to build the sort of record
that is essential to understanding the effect of any noncompliance
with Rule 11." Driver, 242 F.3d at 770. They also note that encouraging a defendant to move, in the first instance, to withdraw his plea in
district court will "dispel uncertainty about whether the defendant
really wants to withdraw his plea, give up the consideration received
for the plea bargain . . . and go to trial." Id. (emphasis in original).
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit stresses that the provisions of Rule 11
place obligations on the judge, not the defendant; it is the judges duty
to "comply with the requirements of the rule in order to assure that
the plea is knowing and voluntary." Odedo, 154 F.3d at 940. The
Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that Rule 11 does not require "the
defendant to request the judge to make the inquiry or specify its
form." Id. As such, the Ninth Circuit sees little reason for the proper
standard of review to turn on whether a defendant made a motion to
withdraw his plea.
After evaluating these competing positions, we see the plain error
approach as most compelling. Significantly, the Advisory Committee
Notes on Rule 11(h) suggest that Rule 11(h) should not be viewed as
establishing a unique standard of review for Rule 11 errors. Indeed,
the Advisory Committee began its discussion by observing that
"[s]ubdivision (h) makes clear that the harmless error rule of Rule
52(a) is applicable to Rule 11." Advisory Comm. Notes to Fed. R.
10
11
that plain error analysis applied if the defendant failed to object at trial.9
Id. at 737. Thus, the Olano Court indicated that if a legal rule is violated and the defendant fails to object at trial, the violation is subject
to plain error review under Rule 52(b), regardless of its type. To the
extent, therefore, the Ninth Circuit contends that Rule 11 errors are
subject to a unique standard of review because Rule 11 places obligations on the judge, the Olano decision renders such a distinction
untenable.
The considerations relied upon by the First and Seventh Circuits
weigh heavily in favor of the plain error approach. As those courts
observed, the interests of judicial economy are far better served by a
plain error standard of review. United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767,
770 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2000). The Government bears the burden under a harmless
error approach of showing that the error was not prejudicial, and in
the context of plea proceedings, showing prejudice usually means
demonstrating that a defendant would not have pleaded guilty absent
the error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Therefore, applying a harmless
error standard to all Rule 11 errors would mean that the Government,
in such cases, must demonstrate that a defendant would still have
pleaded guilty absent the Rule 11 error. As the Seventh Circuit
observed in Driver, the record will likely be sparse with respect to a
defendants knowledge and intentions if the defendant does not move
to withdraw the plea, and the Government therefore would have substantial difficulty sustaining that burden, even when the error is truly
harmless. Driver, 242 F.3d at 769. As such, if we mandate application
of a harmless error standard for all Rule 11 errors, guilty pleas would
be set aside more easily on appeal; thus, employing the harmless error
approach would frustrate one of the central purposes of plea agreements the increased efficiency of the judicial process.10
9
The error at issue in Olano was the district courts failure to comply
with the pre-1999 version of Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which mandated that "[a]n alternate juror who does not
replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict."
10
Perhaps the best argument in favor of the harmless error approach is
that the title to Rule 11(h), "Harmless Error", implies that assertions of
12
13
A.
In its Apprendi decision in June of 2000, the Supreme Court concluded that Charles Apprendis due process rights had been violated
when, because the state trial court found by a preponderance of evidence that Apprendi had committed criminal activity with a racially
biased purpose, he received a penalty exceeding the statutory maximum for the crime for which he had been convicted.11 Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 497. The Court then held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. The Court also concluded that
"facts that expose a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed [are] by definition elements of a separate
legal offense." Id. at 483 n.10.
In our en banc Promise decision earlier this year, we had occasion
to apply Apprendi to charges under 21 U.S.C. 841. We observed
that 841(a) specifically "prohibits, inter alia, possession of controlled substances with the intent to distribute them," while
841(b)(1) "sets forth various penalties that vary according to, inter
alia, the quantity of the particular controlled substance at issue."
Promise, 255 F.3d at 156 (Wilkins, J., joined by Widener, Williams,
Michael, Motz, Traxler, and King, JJ.) (emphasis omitted). We further noted that "an individual who possesses with the intent to distribute an identifiable but unspecified quantity of [controlled substances]"
faces a maximum sentence of twenty years, and that "[a] sentence
11
Apprendi had pleaded guilty, in New Jersey state court, to two counts
of second degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and
to one count of third degree possession of an antipersonnel bomb.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70. Under New Jersey law, second degree
offenses have a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment. Id. at 468.
Prior to Apprendi, however, the court could sentence a defendant to an
extended term ranging from ten to twenty years if, under New Jerseys
hate crimes law, it found by a preponderance of the evidence, that "[t]he
defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:443(e). The court, having made such a finding, sentenced Apprendi to
twelve years on one of the two firearms counts, a term which exceeded
the statutory maximum. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
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spiracy to violate 841(b)(1)(C), it could only conduct plea proceedings and sentence Martinez for that offense.12
B.
We now review Martinezs contentions to determine whether error
occurred as required by United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
We therefore must determine (1) whether there was error; (2) whether
it was plain; (3) whether it affected Martinezs substantial rights; and
(4) whether, if the first three criteria are met, we should exercise our
discretion to notice the error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
We first examine whether Martinezs contentions of error are valid.
Martinez alleges four separate errors occurred in his Rule 11 proceedings: (1) that the court incorrectly informed him of his potential sentence; (2) that the court failed to properly inform him of the elements
of the conspiracy charge; (3) that the court failed to inform him that,
if it rejected the Governments sentencing recommendation, he could
not withdraw his guilty pleas; and (4) that the court did not determine
the existence of a factual basis for his guilty pleas. We review each
of these allegations in turn.
1.
Martinezs first contention, that the court incorrectly informed him
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