International Federation v. Karen Haas, 4th Cir. (2014)

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2123
INTERNATIONAL
FEDERATION
OF
PROFESSIONAL
&
ENGINEERS; TIMOTHY PERSONS; DENNIS ROTH; NINA
NANCY KINGSBURY,
TECHNICAL
SERAFINO;
Plaintiffs Appellees,
v.
KAREN
L.
HAAS,
Representatives,
Clerk,
United
States
House
of
Defendant Appellant,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; NANCY ERICKSON, Secretary, United
States Senate; TERRANCE W. GAINER, Sergeant at Arms, United
States Senate,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:12-cv-03448-AW)
Argued:
October 29, 2014
Decided:
December 24, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit

Judges.
Affirmed
opinion,
joined.
by
in
unpublished opinion.
Judge Duncan wrote the
which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Wilkinson
ARGUED: William Bullock Pittard, IV, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Arthur B.
Spitzer, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Washington, D.C., for
Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Kerry W. Kircher, General Counsel,
Christine Davenport, Sr. Assistant Counsel, Todd B. Tatelman,
Assistant Counsel, Mary Beth Walker, Assistant Counsel, Eleni M.
Roumel, Assistant Counsel, Thomas M. Sundlof, Staff Attorney,
Office
of
General
Counsel,
UNITED
STATES
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Jack McKay,
Kristen E. Baker, Benjamin J. Cote, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
PITTMAN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Karen L. Haas, Clerk of the U.S. House
of Representatives (the Clerk), appeals the district courts
order denying her motion to vacate the portions of the courts
memorandum opinion ruling that sovereign immunity did not bar
Plaintiffs-Appellees claims against her.
The Clerk argues that
the district court abused its discretion by finding that the

public interest favored denying her motion, and by denying her
motion on that basis.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012
(STOCK Act) became law in April 2012.
Clerk
to
various
publish
online
legislative
the
branch
The Act directed the
financial
disclosure
employees.
In
forms
November
of
2012,
Plaintiffs-Appellees--several legislative employees obligated to

make
financial
disclosures
and
union
representing
such
employees (collectively, the Employees)--sued the Clerk in her

official capacity. 1
required
the
Clerk
The Employees argued that the STOCK Act

to
violate
their
constitutional
right
to
The Employees also named as defendants the United States

of America, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Senate Sergeant
at Arms. None of these Defendants is a party to this appeal.
privacy;
they
sought,
among
other
forms
of
relief,
an
order
enjoining the Clerk from publishing their disclosure forms.

In February 2013, the Clerk moved to dismiss the Employees
claims
against
her.
She
argued
that
she
enjoyed
sovereign
immunity from those claims and that venue did not lie in the
District of Maryland.
entered
an
order
On March 20, 2013, the district court
granting
in
part
the
Clerks
motion
and
dismissing without prejudice the Employees claims against her.

The
district
court
explained
in
memorandum
opinion
accompanying its order that sovereign immunity did not shield

the Clerk from an action seeking to enjoin her from implementing
an
allegedly
unconstitutional
statute.
Nonetheless,
it
dismissed those claims without prejudice because venue [was]

not proper.
J.A. 210.
The Clerk then had 60 days, or until
May 20, 2013, to file a timely notice of appeal.
See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), 26(a)(1)(C).

On April 15, 2013--after the district court dismissed the
Employees claims but before the appeal window closed--Congress
mooted the Employees claims by striking the relevant provisions
from the STOCK Act.
Roughly a month later, the Clerk moved the
district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to

vacate [its opinion] insofar as [the opinion] discusses the
application of sovereign immunity to defendants other than the
United
States.
J.A.
321.
The
district
court
denied
that
motion, and the Clerk timely appealed. 2
II.
We review the district courts ruling on a [Rule] 60(b)
motion for abuse of discretion.
Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d
496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
A district court abuses
its discretion by resting its decision on a clearly erroneous

finding of a material fact, or by misapprehending the law with
respect to underlying issues in litigation.
In re Naranjo, 768
F.3d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Scott v. Family Dollar
Stores,
Inc.,
733
F.3d
105,
112
(4th
Cir.
2013))
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
III.
The
Clerk
argues
discretion
by
applying
affording
them
that
the
the
district
wrong
inappropriate
vacatur
weight,
court
abused
factors,
and
reaching
its
.
.
an
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.

See United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 525 n.4 (4th Cir.
2000) ([T]he denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable as a
separate final order.). Our review is limited to the denial of
the Rule 60(b)(6) motion; an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b)
relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.
Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(quoting Browder v. Dir., Dept of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257,
263 n.7 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
objectively
unreasonable
interest.
conclusion
Appellants Br. at 11.
as
to
the
public
The Employees respond that
the district court considered the proper factors and its wellreasoned
opinion
denying
Courts deference.
[the
Clerk]s
motion
deserves
Appellees Br. at 39. 3
We address the Clerks arguments in three steps.

by
summarizing
the
this
relevant
law,
then
recount
We begin
the
district
courts analysis, and finally explain why the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the Clerks motion.
A.
Rule
60(b)
authorizes
court,
[o]n
motion
and
just
terms, to relieve a party or its legal representative from a

final judgment, order, or proceeding, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b),
for five enumerated reasons or any other reason that justifies
relief,
courts
id.
with
judgments
justice.
at
60(b)(6).
authority
whenever
such
The
catchall
adequate
action
to
is
provision
enable
them
appropriate
to
provides
to
vacate
accomplish
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
The Employees also argue that the Clerks Rule 60(b)(6)

motion was improper because it asked the district court to
vacate only the statements in the opinion that displeased
[the Clerk].
Appellees Br. at 21.
We do not address this
argument because we affirm the district courts denial of that
motion on other grounds.
U.S. 847, 86364 (1988) (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335

U.S. 601, 615 (1949)).
In Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112 (4th
Cir. 2000), we set forth a two-step process that is largely
determinative of a district courts decision whether to vacate
its own judgment due to mootness under . . . Rule 60(b)(6).
Id. at 118.
the
party
First, the district court must determine whether
seeking
action.
Id.
at
relief
117
caused
(quoting
the
U.S.
mootness
Bancorp
by
voluntary
Mortgage
Co.
v.
Bonner Mall Pship, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994) (discussing appellate

vacatur
of
omitted).
appellate
decisions))
(internal
quotation
mark
A movant who caused her case to become moot is at
fault for that mootness and therefore entitled to vacatur only

in exceptional circumstances.
See id. at 118.
Second, if the movant is not at fault for the mootness, the

district court must consider whether vacatur would be in the
public
interest.
See
id.
([When]
appellate
review
of
the
adverse ruling was prevented by the vagaries of circumstance

or the unilateral action of the party who prevailed below,
. . .
vacatur
remains
available,
subject,
as
always,
to
considerations of the public interest. (quoting Bancorp, 513

U.S.
at
25)).
We
explained
in
Valero
that
there
is
substantial public interest in judicial judgments, id., because

those
judgments
are
not
merely
7
the
property
of
private
litigant
whole.
but
rather
valuable
to
the
legal
community
Id. (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 26).
as
Applying this
principle to the facts then before us, we s[aw] the public

interest
as
no
bar
judgment
declaring
to
vacatur
invalid
because
several
the
district
provisions
of
courts
the
West
Virginia Code addressed statutory provisions that . . . either

no longer exist[ed] or ha[d] been substantially revised.
Id.
Thus, Valero establishes that the publics interest in judicial

judgments is diminished where the district courts holding is
unlikely to have prospective application.
B.
The district court adopted our analytical framework from
Valero.
J.A.
359.
It
considered
whether
the
twin
considerations of fault and public interest favor[ed] granting

the
Clerks
Motion
exceptional
justified.
The
cause
Vacate,
circumstances
or
exist[ed]
alternatively
such
that
whether
vacatur
[was]
J.A. 361 (quoting Valero, 211 F.3d at 118, 121).
district
[the]
explained
to
court
first
controversy
that
the
case
to
found
become
became
moot
that
the
moot.
due
Clerk
J.A.
to
the
did
361.
actions
not
It
of
Congress and the President, whose behavior is not attributable

to
the
Clerk
functions
because
within
she
the
is
responsible
Legislative
for
Branch
administrative
and
has
no
constitutional role in the enactment of legislation.
J.A. 361
n.5.
Turning to the public interest, the district court found
that,
on
motion.
balance,
this
interest
favored
denying
the
Clerks
It quoted Valero for the proposition that [j]udicial
precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal

community as a whole.
J.A. 362 (quoting Valero, 211 F.3d at
118) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court
then found that the publics interest in maintaining access to

the
courts
sovereign
immunity
ruling,
which
addressed
broader question of law than the holding at issue in Valero,

outweighed
the
precedent.
exceptional
Clerks
J.A.
362.
circumstances
the Clerks motion.
interest
Finally,
justified
in
vacating
after
adverse
concluding
vacatur,
the
legal
that
court
no
denied
Id.
C.
Upon consideration of the Clerks arguments and the record

before us, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Clerks motion to vacate.
Rather, the
district court faithfully applied our holding in Valero to the

facts before it.
Valero teaches that, where the movant is not at fault for
the
mootness,
the
district
court
must
consider
public interest operates as a bar to vacatur.

9
whether
the
211 F.3d at
121.
The district court was therefore right--indeed, compelled-
-to consider this factor.
But cf. Appellants Br. at 10 (Where
a party seeks vacatur of a moot district court decision, vacatur

is required so long as the requesting party did not cause the
mootness.). 4
And the district courts public interest finding
is neither inconsistent with Valero nor clearly erroneous.
The
trial court correctly noted that, unlike the holding at issue in

Valero, its ruling addressed a broad[] question of law that has
value to the legal community as a whole.
J.A. 362.
In Valero,
the
statutory
provisions
district
courts
judgment
addressed
that no longer existed; here, by contrast, the district courts

sovereign
immunity
ruling
could
be
implicated
whenever
plaintiff seeks to enjoin a legislative branch official from

implementing an allegedly unconstitutional law.
district
courts
courts
ruling
finding
outweighed
that
the
the
publics
Clerks
Finally, the
interest
interest
in
in
the
vacating
The Clerk cites Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit cases

that have dispense[d] entirely with consideration of the socalled public interest factor in the vacatur-for-mootness
context.
See Appellants Br. at 1416.
These cases are all
inapposite because none discusses a district courts authority
to vacate for mootness.
Cf. Valero, 211 F.3d at 117 (The
appellate vacatur power derives from 28 U.S.C. 2106, whereas
the district court power derives from Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b).).
Moreover, the fact that appellate courts
have vacated for mootness without explicitly considering the
public interest does not establish that a district court abuses
its discretion by considering that interest--particularly where
we have directed district courts to account for it.
10
adverse legal precedent, J.A. 362, does not leave us with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
United
States
v.
Perez,
752
F.3d
398,
407
(4th
Cir.
2014)
(quoting United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir.
2012)) (internal
quotation
mark
omitted).
The
public
has
substantial interest in the district courts judgment, Valero,

211 F.3d at 118, but the Clerk suffers little prejudice from the
continuing existence of non-binding precedent that, in her view,
is adverse to her interests.
At bottom, Rule 60(b)(6) vacatur is an equitable remedy,
Valero, 211 F.3d at 120, that a district court may employ on
just terms,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
766
554
F.3d
discretion
550,
in
(6th
deciding
Cir.
a
2014)
Rule
Cf. Henness v. Bagley,

([T]he
60(b)(6)
district
motion
is
courts
especially
broad due to the underlying equitable principles involved.);

Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. L.P. v. Beckman, 237
F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) ([V]acatur is an equitable remedy
rather than an automatic right.).
The district court did not
abuse
to
its
discretion
by
declining
grant
equitable
relief
that, under its findings, was contrary to the public interest.
11
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
12

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

October 29, 2014

December 24, 2014

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit

ARGUED: William Bullock Pittard, IV, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

The Clerk argues that

the district court abused its discretion by finding that the

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The Act directed the

Plaintiffs-Appellees--several legislative employees obligated to

employees (collectively, the Employees)--sued the Clerk in her

The Employees argued that the STOCK Act

The Employees also named as defendants the United States

enjoining the Clerk from publishing their disclosure forms.

On March 20, 2013, the district court

dismissing without prejudice the Employees claims against her.

accompanying its order that sovereign immunity did not shield

dismissed those claims without prejudice because venue [was]

The Clerk then had 60 days, or until

May 20, 2013, to file a timely notice of appeal.

App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), 26(a)(1)(C).

Roughly a month later, the Clerk moved the

district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to

motion, and the Clerk timely appealed. 2

Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d

496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

A district court abuses

its discretion by resting its decision on a clearly erroneous

quotation marks omitted).

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.

Appellants Br. at 11.

The Employees respond that

Appellees Br. at 39. 3

We address the Clerks arguments in three steps.

terms, to relieve a party or its legal representative from a

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486

The Employees also argue that the Clerks Rule 60(b)(6)

U.S. 847, 86364 (1988) (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335

First, the district court must determine whether

Bonner Mall Pship, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994) (discussing appellate

A movant who caused her case to become moot is at

fault for that mootness and therefore entitled to vacatur only

See id. at 118.

Second, if the movant is not at fault for the mootness, the

adverse ruling was prevented by the vagaries of circumstance

considerations of the public interest. (quoting Bancorp, 513

substantial public interest in judicial judgments, id., because

Id. (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 26).

principle to the facts then before us, we s[aw] the public

Virginia Code addressed statutory provisions that . . . either

Thus, Valero establishes that the publics interest in judicial

considerations of fault and public interest favor[ed] granting

J.A. 361 (quoting Valero, 211 F.3d at 118, 121).

Congress and the President, whose behavior is not attributable

constitutional role in the enactment of legislation.

It quoted Valero for the proposition that [j]udicial