HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 114046; 237 SCRA 685, October 24, 1994
FACTS:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts
of frustrated homicide fot has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the
amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the
charge. Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and were subsequently released from
detention.
On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer
Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to enable him "to review the evidence on record and
determine once more the proper crimes chargeable against the accused," which was granted by Judge
Villajuan.
Respondent Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the aforesaid criminal cases filed against
herein petitioners.
By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated November 23, 1993 filed by respondent
prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered suspended by Judge Villajuan until after the
prosecution's request for change of venue shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court, and the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the former shall have been terminated. It appears that on
December 2, 1993, private complainants, through their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III, had filed
with the Supreme Court a Petition for Change of Venue purportedly to safeguard the lives of the
victims and their witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to
3644-M-93, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said
cases. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan and the cases were considered withdrawn from the
docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against
herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms and were docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93
to 4007-M-93. No bail having been recommended for the crime of murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the
arrest of herein petitioners. On December 23, 1993, said presiding judge issued an order setting the
arraignment of the accused for December 27, 1993.
On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment before Judge Pornillos were reset due to the
absence of respondent prosecutor. On even date, petitioners filed before Judge Villajuan a Motion for
Reconsideration of his order of December 15, 1993 which granted the motion to withdraw the original
informations.
Thereafter,
a
Motion
to
Quash
the
new
informations
for
lack
of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session

set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the
motion to quash and, at the same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners when
the latter refused to enter their plea.
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was
issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, and setting
the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994.
On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the
order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners' motion to quash filed
in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 and 4007-M-93. As earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the
petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to
4007-M-93 was valid.
RULING:
YES.
Petitioners similarly dispute the legality of their arraignment on January 24, 1994, when Judge
Pornillos entered a plea of not guilty for them after they refused to plead, without furnishing them
copies of the information with the list of witnesses, after merely reading the informations against them
and asking whether they understood the same, which were allegedly in palpable violation of Section 1,
Rule 116. Petitioners aver that they were requesting for the suspension of the arraignment as they
wanted to have a final copy of the order of January 24, 1994 which was merely read in open court, and
to take the necessary steps to question the same by way of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.
In criminal cases, it is the duty of the accused, in addition to the other pleas authorized by law, to plead
whether he is guilty or not of the crime charged. In that way and in that way only can an issue be
created upon which the trial shall proceed.

Section 1 (c) of Rule 116 is quite explicit that where the accused refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty
shall be entered for him. Hence, under such mandatory language, if the accused refuses to plead, the
court must enter a plea of not guilty. The words are so plain and unambiguous that no construction is
necessary. It actually calls for a literal application thereof. Any explanation or defense which
petitioners would want to invoke can be properly raised during the trial, but they cannot refuse to enter

their plea. Nonetheless, the alleged defect in their arraignment on January 24, 1994 is deemed to have
been cured when they were again arraigned on February 18, 1994 with the assistance of counsel de
oficio, and the information was read to them in the vernacular.

In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial court handling Criminal Cases Nos. 4004M-93 to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction over the new informations which we have likewise
declared valid, petitioners may be prosecuted thereunder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @
ROBERT TIU, G.R. No. 137348. June 21, 2004
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998 accused William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were charged with
violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 2, Article I, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Upon arraignment, the two (2) accused, who are Chinese nationals, pled not guilty. The records do not
show whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English language. Their trial proceeded. In the
course of the trial, the two (2) accused were given the services of a Chinese interpreter.
The prosecution, through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, sought to establish that on July
23, 1998 at around 5:00 P.M., a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD),
PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug
activities of a certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese male partner. After an evaluation of the
confidential information, Chief Inspector Ferro decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. He
constituted a team of eight (8) with Police Inspector Medel N. Poe as team leader, SPO1 Gonzales as
poseur-buyer and the rest as back-up support.
According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged pusher, placed an order for one (1) kilo of
shabu and agreed to a P600,000.00 consideration. The CI likewise agreed to meet with his contact
on July 24, 1998at 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between 4:00 and 5:00
A.M. The boodle money was prepared consisting of six (6) bundles of cut bond paper with a
marked P1,000.00 peso bill on top of each bundle.
On July 24, 2004 at 3:00 A.M., the CI received a call from the drug dealer changing the meeting time
between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. on the same day. The team, together with the CI, proceeded to the meeting
place and arrived there at around 1:30 P.M. The CI rode with SPO1 Gonzales. They parked their car
along 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue. The rest of the team posted themselves at their back and their
right side.

A little while, accused Ong approached their car. The CI introduced him to SPO1 Gonzales who told
accused Ong in broken Tagalog to get in the car. When Ong inquired about the money in payment of
the shabu, SPO1 Gonzales showed him the slightly opened plastic bag containing the boodle money.
SPO1 Gonzales then demanded to see the shabu. Accused Ong excused himself, went out of the car,
walked a few steps and then waved his right hand to somebody. While accused Ong was walking back
to the car, SPO1 Gonzales and the CI saw a green Toyota Corolla coming. The Corolla parked in front
of their car and a Chinese-looking male, later identified as accused Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu
alighted, approached accused Ong and handed to him a gift-wrapped package. SPO1 Gonzales opened
it and inside was one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance. After its inspection,
accused Ong demanded for its payment. SPO1 Gonzales gave to accused Ong the boodle money
placed in a W. Brown plastic bag. Thereafter, SPO1 Gonzales signaled his back-up team by turning on
the hazard lights of the car. SPO1 Gonzales himself arrested accused Ong while the CI and the back-up
agents arrested accused De Ming.
The officers brought the two (2) accused to their office where the corresponding booking sheets and
arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was referred to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The two (2) accused were subjected to a physical and
mental examination as required. They were found to be free from any external signs of trauma.
Appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the
Peoples Republic of China, claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Upon the
recommendation of a friend, he was able to work in a pancit canton factory in Quezon City. In June
1998, he stopped working at the factory and hunted for another job. Two (2) weeks prior to his arrest,
accused Ong was introduced by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as technician in a
bihon factory owned by Ong Sin.
On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW
business. He claimed that he gets his products from Baclaran and sells them to customers in the cities
of Naga and Daet in Bicol.
On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the
penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos.The case is with us
on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arraignment of appellants violates Rule 116, Section (a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure?
RULING:
YES.
Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.a.accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned
for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused
with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him,
and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses
other than those named in the complaint or information. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.)
The arraignment of appellants violates the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their
Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does not,
however, indicate whether the Information was read in the language or dialect known to them. It
merely states:

Neither does the August 4, 1998 Order of Judge Diosdado M. Peralta of RTC-Br. 95, Quezon City,
disclose compliance with the rule on arraignment. It merely stated in part that [w]hen both accused
William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, both
accused entered a plea of not guilty. What leaps from the records of the case is the inability of
appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend any other language than Chinese and any of its
dialect. Despite this inability, however, the appellants were arraigned on an Information written in the
English language. We again emphasize that the requirement that the information should be read in a
language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is
intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules
necessarily nullifies the arraignment.

This 4th day of Aug., 1998, the undersigns (sic) states:

That, in open court, and in the presence of Trial Prosecutor Ruben Catubay, the following accused
William Ong and Ching De Ming AKA Robert Tiu was/were called and, having been informed of the
nature of the accusation filed against him/her/them, furnishing him/her/them a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses, the said accused in answer to the question of the
Court, pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.

EDWARD T. MARCELO, DIONILO D. MARFIL, CELIA C. CABURNAY, and DANIEL T.

PASCUAL vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. PEDRO T.
SANTIAGO, in his capacity as The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, and THE QUEZON CITY PROSECUTOR, G.R. No. 106695; 235 SCRA 39, August
4, 1994

TO WHICH I CERTIFY.

FACTS:
Sgd. Mary Ruth Milo-Ferrer

Jose T. Marcelo charged the petitioners with falsification of public documents committed by forging
the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements (VTA's

Branch Clerk of Court

Sgd. William Ong

The VTA's were purportedly executed in Quezon City and acknowledged before petitioner Dionilo
Marfil, a notary public.

ACCUSED WILLIAM ONG

Sgd. Ching de Ming

ACCUSED CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU

After conducting a preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Domingo Israel found "more
than sufficient evidence" of the forgery of the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as "found and
concluded by two (2) national police agencies, the NBI and PCCL," and recommended the filing of the
case in court.
On 30 May 1991, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285.

There is no showing that this motion was acted upon.

On 6 June 1991, the petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City a Motion
for Review seeking the deferment of the filing of the information or if one had been filed, the
suspension of the criminal proceedings and the reversal of the Israel resolution.

On 10 June 1991, warrants for the arrest of the petitioners were issued, and all of them except Edward
Marcelo posted bail. Marcelo surrendered to the court and posted bail on 29 July 1991.

On 13 June 1991, the petitioners, in a Manifestation and Motion, informed the Bersamin court of the
filing of their Motion for Review and prayed that further proceedings in the case be suspended until the
resolution of the Motion for Review.

The records of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 were thereafter destroyed by a fire on 16 October 1991
but were subsequently reconstituted on 9 December 1991.

On 15 November 1991, the Review Committee handed down a resolution, recommending the reversal
of the Israel resolution and the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285. Then
on 5 December 1991, the petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the Bersamin court of
the reversal and praying for the dismissal of the case.

This was followed on 10 December 1991 by the motion of Assistant City Prosecutor Conrado M.
Jamolin which prayed for the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because
of the resolution of the review committee. The private prosecutor opposed this motion.
On 14 June 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico Bringas, the prosecutor assigned to the case, filed a
motion to defer the arraignment until the resolution of the Motion for Review, which the Bersamin
court granted in its Order of 10 July 1991. The Bersamin court, however, reset the arraignment to 28
August 1991.

On 27 August 1991, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to defer the arraignment on 28 August 1991
until the resolution of their Motion for Review.

On 10 December 1991, the private complainant filed with the Secretary of Justice an appeal from the
15 November 1991 resolution of the Review Committee.

On 13 December 1991, Judge Bersamin, issued an order the dispositive portion of which reads:

Judge Bersamin issued an order on 28 August 1991 resetting the arraignment to 8 October 1991 and
directing the City Prosecutor of Quezon City "to conclude the pending review of the resolution of the
filing Prosecutor Domingo Israel and to render a report of the results of the review on or before" 8
October 1991.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Dismiss of the accused and the Motion to

Withdraw Information of the public prosecutor are hereby granted and this
case is hereby dismissed without costs.

Believing that no resolution on the Motion for Review would be released before 8 October 1991 and
considering that petitioner Marcelo was abroad, the petitioners filed on 3 October 1991 a motion for
the cancellation of the arraignment on 8 October 1991 and for its resetting to "early November 1991.

On 27 January 1992, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre R. Bello III handed down a resolution granting
the complainant's appeal, reversing the 15 November 1991 Resolution of the Review Committee, and
ordering the filing of a new information.

The new information, signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ralph Lee, was filed on 5 February 1992
pursuant to the resolution of Secretary Bello, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104. The
petitioners posted bail.

Thereafter, the following incidents took place in the said case:

1. On 3 March 1992, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 was already final and that the appeal subsequently taken
by the private prosecutor to and the resolution thereon by the Secretary of Justice are null and void and
cannot be a valid basis for any authority to file the new information or for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.

The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition. The Santiago court, not having been enjoined
by the Court of Appeals, continued with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104. On 7 April
1992, it arraigned petitioners Caburnay, Pascual, and Marfil, entered a plea of not guilty for them, and
reset the arraignment of petitioner Edward T. Marcelo, who was then abroad, to 28 April
1992. Marcelo was arraigned and a plea of not guilty was entered for him. Subsequently, the court
received the testimonies of the following witnesses for the prosecution: Jose Marcelo, Jr., who testified
on direct examination and cross-examination on 9 June 1992, 16 June 1992, and 14 July 1992;
Emmanuel Guzman, who testified on 23 July 1992, 10 August 1992, and 20 August 1992; Aida Gaetos,
who testified on 10 August 1992; and Francisco Cruz, Lita Wells, Evelyn M. Eugenio, and Helier
Penaranda, who testified on 13 August 1992.

The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' motion to reconsider the decision of 11 June 1992.
Hence, the instant petition which reiterates the grounds and the arguments raised before the Court of
Appeals.

2. On 20 March 1992, Judge Santiago issued an order denying the motion to quash on the principal
ground that it was not based on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:

3. On 1 April 1992, the petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the 20 March 1992 Order alleging
therein that their motion to quash was based on the ground that the officer who filed the information
had no authority to do so and had acted pursuant to an order of the Secretary of Justice which is void
for having been given without or in excess of jurisdiction under the doctrine laid down in Crespo vs.
Mogul that the Secretary of Justice cannot interfere with the trial court's disposition of a criminal case
after it had taken cognizance thereof.

Whether or not a pre-arraignment dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, which relied on the
reversal by the Review Committee of the Office of the City Prosecutor of the investigating prosecutor's
resolution to file the information, bars the filing of a new information for the same offense after the
Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the review committee.

4. On 2 April 1992, Judge Santiago denied the motion to reconsider and reset the arraignment to 7
April 1992.
RULING:

Thus, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals on 3 April 1992 a special civil action
for certiorari to set aside the order of the Santiago court denying the motion to quash.

NO.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners' special civil action for certiorari not
necessarily for the reason it relied upon, i.e., "certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies
against an order denying a motion to quash," but because the Santiago court did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash. It is settled that
if a court, in denying the motion to quash (or a motion to dismiss), acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari or prohibition lies. The denial by the Santiago
court of the motion to quash suffers from no fatal infirmity. The petitioners' contention that the
prosecutor did not have the authority to file the information because he acted upon an order of the
Secretary of Justice which is void in the light of Crespo vs. Mogul is untenable. Nothing in the said
ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or
information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may
file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the
court.

Insofar as this case is concerned, the procedure on appeals from the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor as well as that from the resolution of the Review Committee was governed by Department
Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990, of the Department of Justice. This was superseded by
Department Order No. 223, dated 30 June 1993. Pursuant to Section 1 of Department Circular No. 7,
only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor, the Regional State Prosecutor, and the Provincial or City
Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice, except as
otherwise provided in Section 4 thereof. Under the latter, a resolution of the aforesaid prosecutors
finding probable cause may be appealed only upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion; however, even with such showing, the appeal shall not be entertained if the appellant had
already been arraigned, and if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal
shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.

report of the results of the review on or before" 8 October 1991. In thus recognizing and allowing the
Motion for Review, the Bersamin court deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the
government to resolve with finality the issue of whether or not the information should have been filed.

The Review Committee's resolution was of course not final because under Department Circular No. 7
both the offended party and the petitioners could still appeal therefrom to the Secretary of Justice under
Section 1 and Section 4 thereof. The Bersamin court knew or was expected to know, since it had to
take judicial notice of Department Circular No. 7, that the resolution of the Review Committee was not
final. The offended party had, in fact, appealed from the said resolution to the Secretary of Justice on
10 December 1991.

Consequently, the 5 December 1991 Manifestation and Motion of the petitioners praying for the
dismissal of the case and the 10 December 1991 motion of Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin asking
for the withdrawal of the information were prematurely filed, because as to the first, the period of the
offended party to appeal from the resolution to the Secretary of Justice had not yet lapsed or even
begun, there being no showing of the date the offended party received a copy thereof; and, as to the
second, an appeal had in fact been filed on 10 December 1991. Prudence, if not wisdom or at the very
least respect for the authority of the prosecution agency to which the Bersamin court deferred, dictated
against a favorable action on the Review Committee's resolution until the denial of the appeal or the
affirmance of the resolution by the Secretary of Justice. The Bersamin court acted then with precipitate
or undue haste in issuing the 13 December 1991 Order granting the petitioners' motion to dismiss and
Prosecutor Jamolin's motion to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285.

In this case, the petitioners did not at once appeal to the Secretary of Justice from the resolution of
Assistant Prosecutor Israel. Instead, they initially filed the Motion for Review.

Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's
motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the
arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating
prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is
already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice.

From the foregoing antecedents, it is clear that the Bersamin court knew and took cognizance of the
Motion for Review, deferred the arraignment of the accused until the resolution of the said motion, and
even directed the Office of the City Prosecutor "to conclude the pending review . . . and to render a

The withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91- 21285, or even the dismissal of the said
case as decreed by the Bersamin court, did not bar the filing of a new information as directed by the
Secretary of Justice in his Resolution of 27 January 1992. No jeopardy had attached as a result of the

earlier termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because the petitioners therein had not been
arraigned and had, in fact, asked for its dismissal for a cause other than that which would constitute
double jeopardy. On the contrary, the filing of the new information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104

straightened the course of criminal justice which had earlier gone awry due to the precipitate action of
the Bersamin court. Nor may it be said that the prosecutor who filed the information had no authority
to do so.