United States v. George Sultani, 704 F.2d 132, 4th Cir. (1983)

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704 F.

2d 132

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,


v.
George SULTANI, Appellant.
No. 82-5182.

United States Court of Appeals,


Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 8, 1983.
Decided March 31, 1983.

Allen M. Lenchek, Upper Marlboro, Md., for appellant.


William Otis, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Alexandria, Va. (Elsie L. Munsell, U.S.
Atty., Dennis E. Szybala, Asst. U.S. Atty., Alexandria, Va., Sanford
Saunders, third year law student on brief), for appellee.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, ERVIN, Circuit Judge, and ALDRICH,*
Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:

In a trial by a magistrate, defendant was found guilty of violating a traffic


regulation applicable to Washington National Airport. He was not represented
by counsel. His request for the appointment of counsel, supported by his
assertion of indigency, was denied on the ground that it was unlikely that a jail
sentence would be imposed in the event that defendant was found guilty. Upon
finding him guilty, the magistrate sentenced the defendant to five days in jail
with execution of the jail term suspended and with defendant placed on
unsupervised probation for twelve months on condition that he not violate any
federal motor vehicle laws during the probation period. Defendant appealed to
the district court, and from its judgment adverse to him, he appeals to us.

Before us, defendant contends that he had a right to counsel because a jail
sentence, the service of which was suspended, was imposed on him, that he did
not waive his right to counsel, that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support his conviction and that the charging documents failed to allege a

violation of law on his part.


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The sentence was imposed on January 6, 1982, and was fully served by the date
on which this appeal was reached for argument. Defendant successfully
completed the period of probation without further infraction of federal motor
vehicle regulations, and so he is beyond the time that the jail sentence can be
made active. We therefore dismiss his appeal as moot, because we perceive no
subsequent collateral prejudice which defendant is suffering or will suffer and
because he disclaims that the issue of his right to counsel is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.

While we expressly decline to decide if the right to counsel attaches when a


suspended jail sentence is imposed, it is certainly clear that upon a violation of
probation the jail sentence could not be made an active one when an indigent
defendant had requested counsel and that claim was denied. It follows that the
magistrates in this circuit should not impose even a suspended jail sentence in
any case in which an unrepresented defendant has declined to waive his right to
counsel.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Honorable Bailey Aldrich, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the First
Circuit, sitting by designation

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