Edmonson v. Potter, 4th Cir. (2004)

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1427
DELOIS EDMONSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JACK POTTER, Postmaster General,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Williams D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-02-2803-1-WDQ)
Submitted:
September 24, 2004
Decided:
December 22, 2004
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael J. Snider, Morris E. Fischer, SNIDER & FISCHER, L.L.P.,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Thomas M. DiBiagio, United
States Attorney, John W. Sippel, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Delois
Edmonson
appeals
the
district
courts
order
granting summary judgment to John E. Potter, Postmaster General,

United
States
Postal
Service
(USPS
or
Postmaster)
and
dismissing her employment discrimination suit alleging violations

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
On appeal, Edmonson alleges
error by the district court in dismissing her claims that the USPS
failed to accommodate her carpel tunnel syndrome and subjected her
to a hostile work environment.
We have reviewed the record and
find no reversible error.

This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo.
Higgins v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1988).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact, given the parties respective

burdens of proof at trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986).
In determining
whether the moving party has shown there is no genuine issue of

material fact, a court must assess the factual evidence and all
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.
Id. at 255; Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth
Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1996).
- 2 -
Edmonson first claims error in the district courts

dismissal of her failure to accommodate claim.1
To prevail under
the ADA, Edmonson must prove that she was a qualified individual
with a disability and that the USPS discriminated against her
because of the disability.
Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 268.
Absent
direct evidence of discrimination, Edmonson may make her showing

using the burden shifting approach first enunciated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Halperin v. Abacus
Technology Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on
other grounds by Baird ex rel Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir.
1999).
To
establish
prima
facie
case
for
failure
to
accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must show:

(1) she was an individual with a disability within the meaning of
the ADA;2
(2) the employer had notice of her disability; (3) with
reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions
As a preliminary matter, the district court properly applied

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards to Edmonsons
Rehabilitation Act claim because she is a federal employee. See
Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir. 2001).
2
The ADA defines a disability as (A) a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.
12102(2), 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). The Postmaster asserts that
Edmonson has failed to establish that she is disabled under the
applicable law, because she has not provided any evidence that her
carpel tunnel syndrome has substantially limited a major life
activity. We do not address this assertion given the disposition
of this appeal.
- 3 -
of
the
position;
accommodations.
2001).
and
(4)
the
employer
refused
to
make
such
Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir.
To establish discrimination based on her disability under
the Rehabilitation Act, Edmonson must demonstrate that she: (1) is

an individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2)
is otherwise qualified for the job in question; and (3) suffered an
adverse
employment
action
Halperin, 128 F.3d at 197.
solely
because
of
the
disability.
An absolute precondition to [any
discrimination] suit [is] that some adverse employment action [has]

occurred.
Cir. 1985).
Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th

An adverse employment action is a discriminatory act
that adversely affect[s] the terms, conditions, or benefits of

[a plaintiffs] employment.
Von Guten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858,
864 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc.,
126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)).
We find without difficulty that the record is replete
with facts demonstrating the reasonable accommodations made by the
USPS to Edmonson.
From the time Edmonson presented her medical
documentation to the USPS relating to her carpel tunnel syndrome in

1986, the USPS provided her with light-duty work.
She worked, and
continues to work, as a mail processing clerk in the 030 Manual

Operation at the Baltimore Processing and Distribution Center.
At
no time did Edmonson sustain any loss of pay, benefits, or rank.

The USPS approved thirteen schedule changes requested by Edmonson
- 4 -
over a twelve month period of time.
While she asserts the refusal
to grant her two additional schedule changes demonstrates a refusal

to accommodate, she admitted that her requests for schedule change
were for personal convenience and not to accommodate her alleged
disability.
In addition, her request for a twelve-month schedule
change was not completed on the proper form, and she did not first
receive authorization from her manager or union representative in
compliance with USPS policies and procedures.
that
Edmonson
demonstrated
that
she
was
Assuming, arguendo,
disabled
under
the
Rehabilitation Act, we find this evidence amply supports the

Postmasters reasonable accommodation of her disability.
Moreover,
we
agree
with
the
district
courts
determination that Edmonson failed to demonstrate that she suffered

an adverse employment action such that she established her prima
facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.
USPSs
denials
of
Edmonsons
requests
for
temporary
The
schedule
changes did not affect a term, condition, or benefit of her

employment.
Nor did the denials cause Edmonson to be demoted or
receive less pay or benefits.
She admitted also that the requests
were for her personal convenience, i.e., to accommodate her babysitter and care for her brother, and not to accommodate an alleged
disability.
Such requests for accommodation based on personal
convenience are not actionable under Title VII.
See, e.g., Grube
v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001).
- 5 -
Edmonson further asserts on appeal that she was subjected

to adverse employment action because she was transferred from the
re-wrap section, and her duties and skills thereafter became very
limited.
She attested that she had lack of instruction and
assignment and sat with no work to do for long periods of time

. . ..
Edmonsons self-serving assertions, unsupported by any
other evidence, are insufficient to successfully counter summary

judgment.
Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 134-35 (4th
Cir. 2002).
Despite Edmonsons assertions, she admitted that she
was not demoted, nor did she receive less pay as a result of her
transfer out of the re-wrap section.
A transfer in duties or
reassignment that does not result in any decrease in salary,

benefits, or rank cannot constitute an adverse employment action
necessary to state a prima facie case of discrimination.
Munday,
126 F.3d at 243; Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256-57 (4th Cir.
1999).
Nor is there any evidence that the changes to her work
schedule or duties damaged her future career prospects.
Brown v.
Cox Med. Ctrs., 286 F.3d 1040, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 2001).3
Her
dissatisfaction with the assignments she received without the

scheduling modification is not actionable, nor is her claim that
the
reassignment
caused
supervisors and workers.
her
to
lose
her
status
with
other
See, e.g., Brown, 286 F.3d at 1046;
The district court properly held that the adverse impact on

Edmonsons leave was insufficient to establish an adverse
employment action. See Von Guten, 243 F.3d at 869.
- 6 -
Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.

1996).4
The second cause of action on which Edmonson appeals is
the district courts dismissal of her hostile work environment
claim.
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, Edmonson must prove that she:

qualified
individual
unwelcome
harassment;
with
(3)
disability;
the
harassment
(2)
was
was
(1) is a
subject
based
on
to
her
disability; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5)
some factual basis for imputing liability to the employer.
GMC, 247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001).
Fox v.
Edmonson must demonstrate
that her employers conduct was objectively hostile, such that a

reasonable person would so perceive it as such.
Id. at 178.
Factors to be considered in analyzing the objective component

include the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct,
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating rather than
being a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employees work performance.
Fox, 247 F.3d at
Assuming, arguendo, that Edmonson demonstrated that she was
178.
Given our finding that the district court correctly

determined that Edmonson failed to meet her prima facie burden on
her accommodation claim by failing to demonstrate that she was
subjected to an adverse employment action, we decline to address
Edmonsons further assertions on appeal relative to her
accommodation claim.
- 7 -
disabled under the Rehabilitation Act, we find no evidence here

that could support a reasonable finding that any alleged harassment
Edmonson suffered by the USPS was based on her disability, or that
it was severe or pervasive such that it created an abusive work
environment.
See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993).
Edmonson specified the following acts in support of her
claim of a hostile work environment:
(1) her light duty work and
lack of a chair fostered an atmosphere of resentment and pity for

her among her co-workers; (2) the strict leave policies of the
USPS; (3) the work place was too cold; (4) one night she was asked
to work in a mail-handler position, and then was removed from that
job; (5) sometimes her badge was missing; (6) her skills were
under-utilized; and (7) she was denied a shift change and was given
no work for long periods of time.
While Edmonson attested that her
uncertainty about her work assignments made her feel sick on a

daily basis, and that the stress of her working conditions created
physical problems such as hair loss and joint aches, juxtaposed
against
this
testimony,
Edmonson
also
described
the
above-
enumerated occurrences as silly, stupid, little stuff.

agree
with
the
district
courts
determination
that,
We
while
Edmonsons evidence established that she subjectively perceived her

environment
as
hostile,
it
was
insufficient,
when
viewed
objectively, to support a hostile work environment claim.
- 8 -
See
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998) (isolated
or genuinely trivial acts constituting ordinary adversities in
workplace not actionable); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77
F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996) (working environment must be hostile
or deeply repugnant, not merely unpleasant, to be actionable).
There is no evidence that Edmonson was unable to perform her job
duties as a result of her working environment, and she attested
that she never felt threatened. She was unable to provide evidence
to show that her disability specifically was a factor in the
occurrences of which she complained.
She did not satisfy her
burden of demonstrating that she was subjected to a hostile work

environment because of her alleged disability.
Accordingly,
we
affirm
the
district
courts
order
granting the Postmasters motion for summary judgment. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 9 -

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

September 24, 2004

December 22, 2004

Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael J. Snider, Morris E. Fischer, SNIDER & FISCHER, L.L.P.,

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

granting summary judgment to John E. Potter, Postmaster General,

dismissing her employment discrimination suit alleging violations

On appeal, Edmonson alleges

We have reviewed the record and

find no reversible error.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no

genuine issue of material fact, given the parties respective

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986).

whether the moving party has shown there is no genuine issue of

Id. at 255; Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth

Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1996).

Edmonson first claims error in the district courts

Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 268.

direct evidence of discrimination, Edmonson may make her showing

accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must show:

(2) the employer had notice of her disability; (3) with

reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions

As a preliminary matter, the district court properly applied

The ADA defines a disability as (A) a physical or mental

Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir.

To establish discrimination based on her disability under

the Rehabilitation Act, Edmonson must demonstrate that she: (1) is

Halperin, 128 F.3d at 197.

An absolute precondition to [any

discrimination] suit [is] that some adverse employment action [has]

Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th

that adversely affect[s] the terms, conditions, or benefits of

Von Guten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858,

From the time Edmonson presented her medical

documentation to the USPS relating to her carpel tunnel syndrome in

She worked, and

continues to work, as a mail processing clerk in the 030 Manual

no time did Edmonson sustain any loss of pay, benefits, or rank.

over a twelve month period of time.

While she asserts the refusal

to grant her two additional schedule changes demonstrates a refusal

In addition, her request for a twelve-month schedule

Rehabilitation Act, we find this evidence amply supports the

determination that Edmonson failed to demonstrate that she suffered

changes did not affect a term, condition, or benefit of her

Nor did the denials cause Edmonson to be demoted or

receive less pay or benefits.

She admitted also that the requests

Such requests for accommodation based on personal

convenience are not actionable under Title VII.

See, e.g., Grube

Edmonson further asserts on appeal that she was subjected

She attested that she had lack of instruction and

assignment and sat with no work to do for long periods of time

Edmonsons self-serving assertions, unsupported by any

other evidence, are insufficient to successfully counter summary