UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1564

DONNA K. SOUTTER, For herself and on behalf of all similarly

situated individuals; TONY LEE WEBB,
Plaintiffs Appellees,
v.
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant Appellant.
-----------------------------------CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED
CONSUMER DATA INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,

STATES

OF

AMERICA;

Amici Supporting Appellant,

VIRGINIA
POVERTY
LAW
CENTER;
VIRGINIA
TRIAL
LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION; RAPPAHANNOCK LEGAL SERVICES, INC.; LEGAL AID
JUSTICE CENTER; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES,
Amici Supporting Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00107-REP)

Argued:

September 19, 2012

Decided:

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

December 3, 2012

Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Agee joined. Judge Gregory wrote a
dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Paul D. Clement, BANCROFT, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for

Appellant.
Deepak Gupta, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
ON
BRIEF: Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, KING & SPALDING LLP, Washington,
D.C.; Barry Goheen, Merritt E. McAlister, KING & SPALDING LLP,
Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant.
L. Steven Emmert, SYKES,
BOURDON, AHERN & LEVY, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Leonard A.
Bennett, CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, PC, Newport News,
Virginia; Stuart T. Rossman, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellees.
Robin S. Conrad, Kate
Comerford Todd, NATIONAL CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, INC.,
Washington, D.C.; John H. Beisner, Jessica Davidson Miller,
Geoffrey Wyatt, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America, Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Brad D. Weiss, Emily
D. Barnes, CHARAPP & WEISS, LLP, McLean, Virginia, for Consumer
Data Industry Association, Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Thomas
D. Domonoske, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Amici Supporting
Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

Equifax

Information

Services,

credit

reporting

agency

(CRA), appeals the district courts certification of a class of

Virginia residents

with

potentially

judgments on their credit reports.

inaccurate

does

not

satisfy

the

Virginia

court

Because the certified class

requirements

of

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure 23, we reverse.

I.
A.
On

June

22,

2007,

the

Virginia

Credit

Union

filed

suit

against Donna Soutter in the Richmond General District Court to

recover

$15,000

credit

card

debt.

After

Soutter

and

the

Credit Union agreed to a payment plan, the Credit Union agreed

to dismiss the suit.

Unfortunately, the Credit Unions attorney

failed to inform the District Court, and a default judgment was

entered against Soutter.

At Soutters request, the Credit Union

moved to set aside the judgment, and on March 20, 2008, the
District Court entered an order that noted Soutters case was
set aside and dismissed without prejudice.
After
requesting
report.

this
that
At

order,
Equifax

that

time,

Soutter
remove

the

Equifax

judgment was not yet on her file.

3

sent

(J.A. 430).

notice

judgment
informed

to

from
Soutter

Equifax,

her

credit

that

the

On December 20, 2008, Soutter

sent

an

additional

letter

to

Equifax,

claiming

denied credit because of the judgment.

that

she

was

She included a copy of

the District Court order dismissing the action against her with
this letter.

In response, Equifax removed the judgment from her

report.
Although it is not required to do so, Equifax chooses to
record court judgments on consumer credit reports.

Equifax has

never directly collected these judgments itself, instead relying

on vendors to provide the information.
LexisNexis

has

been

court records.

Equifaxs

vendor

Since February 2007,

for

collecting

Virginia

Virginias court system is comprised of more

than 250 individual circuit and general district courts.

Each

county and independent city has a general district court with

jurisdiction over small claimsthose less than $25,000.

There

are

court

120

circuit

courts

of

general

jurisdiction.

The

records are managed by the Office of Executive Secretary of the

Supreme

Court

of

Virginia,

which

operates

management system for the states courts.

shared

case

The clerk of each

local court uses a uniform system for recording judgments, and

the judgment sheet available in the case management system lists
only the most recent case disposition.

For example, if a case

is vacated and then later dismissed, the system would record the
case simply as dismissed.

LexisNexis

used

several

capturing the court records.

different

collection

methods

for

It used in-person review for all

circuit courts through independent contractors.

These in-person

reviews have some variety as well-some clerks provide a weekly

summary printout to the reviewer, some let the reviewer peruse
paper records, and some permit the reviewer use of the computer
and case management system.

For the general district courts,

the Supreme Court provided LexisNexis with bulk data feeds until
May

2009.

LexisNexis

then

used

verify the bulk feeds in person.

stopped

providing

these

independent

contractors

to

In May 2009, the Supreme Court

feeds.

LexisNexis

then

used

webscrape program to grab the data from the Courts website.

This practice ended in December 2009 when the Virginia Supreme
Court

enacted

new

security

measures,

including

challenge-

response test, that limited the ability of automated programs to

access

the

public

records.

LexisNexis

thus

had

to

switch

exclusively to in-person review from December 2009 to February

2010 for general district court records.

LexisNexis admittedly

had difficulty performing its task of collecting records from

time to time.
B.
On

February

17,

2010,

Soutter

filed

this

civil

action

against Equifax in the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging

that Equifax violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by
5

using unreasonable procedures in reporting judgments from the

Virginia court system.

In her initial class complaint, Soutter

sought to represent a class of [a]ll consumers for whom Equifax

furnished a consumer report which reported a judgment that was
either set aside, vacated or dismissed with prejudice.
14).

(J.A.

Nine days later, Soutter filed an amended class complaint

narrowing the proposed class to all consumers in Virginia about

whom Equifax furnished a consumer report to a third party that
showed a civil judgment in the General District Court for the
City of Richmond at any time on or after February 17, 2008
when, as of the date of the report, the judgment had been set
aside.

(J.A.

25).

During

proposed

class

for

the

judgments

from

all

Virginia

discovery,

second

time,

trial

Soutter

amending

courts.

changed

it

to

(J.A.

her

include

450).

In

moving to certify the class, she changed the class definition

for the third time, while also suggest[ing] that persons with
actual damages of more than $1,000 should be excluded.
216).
in

(J.A.

Soutter offered a fourth change to the class definition

her

reply

district

brief

court

to

to

the

begin

certification
the

subsequent

motion,

leading

hearing

on

the

class

certification by noting this giving me a dartboard to throw at

doesnt help me much.

I want to know what the class is now that

you

be

think

ought

to

certified.

(J.A.

624).

Soutter

confirmed that the class she sought to certify was the class
defined in her reply brief.
During this hearing, Equifax attacked Soutters ability to
ascertain the size and scope of the class.

In response, Soutter

explained that, by ordering judgment disposition data from the

Virginia Supreme Court, the class could be readily ascertained.
Unfortunately, Soutters efforts were counterproductive in that
the data she ordered did not even contain her own name.
Despite the ever-evolving class definition, on March 30,
2011, the district court granted Soutters motion and certified
the following class:
All natural persons, for whom Equifaxs records note
that a credit report was furnished to a third party
who requested the credit report in connection with an
application for credit on or after February 17, 2008
to February 17, 2010, other than for an employment
purpose, at a time when any Virginia General District
Court or Circuit Court judgment that had been
satisfied, appealed, or vacated in the court file more
than 30 days earlier was reported in Equifaxs file as
remaining
unpaid,
which
persons
suffered
actual
damages of less than $1,000 as a result of a report by
Equifax that did not accurately report that the
judgment had been satisfied, appealed, or vacated.
(J.A. 717-18).
Equifax filed a petition for permission to appeal under
Rule

23(f)

raising,

among

other

issues,

the

difficulty

with

ascertaining the class given the exclusion of individuals with

actual

damages

claims

of

greater

than

$1,000.

In

response,

during a status conference, Soutter requested that the class

7

definition be amended againmarking at least the fifth proposed

change to the class definition.
amended

the

class

definition

The district court agreed and

by

deleting

persons who suffered actual damages.

the

reference

to

The parties informed us of

this new class definition, and we granted Equifaxs petition for

permission to appeal.

II.
A.
On

appeal,

Equifax

contests

certification of the class.

the

district

courts

We review a class certification

order for abuse of discretion.

Gunnells v. Healthplan Services,

Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003).

Under Rule 23(a), a

party moving for class certification must meet the following

four prerequisites: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder is
impossible; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the class representative
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative

will

adequately

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

numerosity,

typicality,

class

interests.

and

adequacy

of

Rule 23(b) further requires that the class meet

one of three additional requirements.

23(b)(3)

the

These requirements are referred to as

commonality,

representation.

protect

provides

for

class

As relevant here, Rule

certification
8

if

the

court

determines that common questions of law or fact predominate over

any questions affecting only individuals and that a class action
is superior to other available litigation methods.
Importantly,

the

Supreme

Court

recently

reminded

courts

that [a] party seeking class certification must affirmatively

demonstrate his compliance with the Rule.
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).

Wal-Mart Stores,
In determining if a

party has met this burden, sometimes it may be necessary for

the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on
the certification question.
omitted).

The

analysis,

id.

district

(internal

Id.
court

(internal quotation marks

must

quotation

perform

marks

omitted),

rigorous
to

ensure

that a class certification is appropriate, because class actions

remain

an

conducted

exception

by

and

on

to

the

behalf

usual
of

the

rule

that

individual

litigation
named

is

parties

only, Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979).

B.
On appeal, Equifax contends that Soutter cannot satisfy the
typicality

or

adequacy

standards

in

Rule

23(a)

or

the

predominance and superiority standards in Rule 23(b)(3).

We

agree with Equifax that Soutter failed to show typicality under

Rule 23(a)(3) and, accordingly, that the district court abused
its discretion in certifying the proposed class.

Soutters

action

arises

under

the

FCRA.

That

statute

provides, in relevant part:

Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures
to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report
relates.
15 U.S.C. 1681e(b).

A CRA violates 1681e(b) if (1) the

credit report contains inaccurate information; and (2) the CRA

did not follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy.
415

(4th

Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., 257 F.3d 409,

Cir.

2001).

Soutter

has

claimed

only

statutory

damages, which are authorized by 15 U.S.C. 1681n(a)(1)(A) for

willful violations and range from $100 to $1,000.
Typicality

goes

to

the

heart

ability to represent a class.

of

representative[s]

Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436

F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2006).

Thus, Soutters interest in

prosecuting [her] own case must simultaneously tend to advance

the interests of the absent class members.

Id.

Typicality

tend[s] to merge with commonality, insofar as both serve as

guideposts

for

determining

whether

under

the

particular

circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and

whether the named plaintiffs claim and the class claims are so
interrelated that the interests of the class members will be
fairly

and

adequately

protected

in

their

absence.

General

Tele. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982).
10

Thus, [t]he essence of the typicality requirement is captured

by the notion that as goes the claim of the named plaintiff, so
go the claims of the class.

Deiter, 436 F.3d at 466 (quoting

Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331,

340

(4th

Cir.

1998)).

While

Soutters

claim

need

not

be

perfectly identical to the claims of the class she seeks to

represent, typicality is lacking where the variation in claims
strikes at the heart of the respective causes of action.

Id.

at 467.
To determine if Soutter has shown typicality, we compare
her claims and Equifaxs defenses to her claims with those of
purported class members by reviewing the elements of Soutters
prima

facie

case

and

the

fact

supporting

those

elements

and

examining the extent to which those facts would also prove

the claims of the absent class members.

Id.

In this case, Soutters claim under 1681e(b) requires her

to

prove

that

(1)

her

credit

report

was

inaccurate;

(2)

Equifaxs unreasonable procedures caused the inaccuracy; and (3)

Equifaxs
claim

behavior

include

was

that

her

willful.
report

Facts
was

supporting

inaccurate

Soutters

because

her

judgment had been dismissed and that she sent letters to Equifax
informing them of the possible inaccuracy before it occurred.
This

second

willful.

fact

bears

upon

whether

Equifaxs

behavior

was

Soutters facts would also include the manner in which

11

LexisNexis procured judgment data for general district courts in

2008.
This evidence, however, illustrates that Soutters claim is
not typical.

As in Deiter, Soutters claim is typical only on

an unacceptably general level.

Deiter, 436 F.3d at 467.

That

is, Soutter is an Equifax customer whose report was inaccurate

because Equifax incorrectly reported a judgment that had later
been dismissed.
has

On a more directly relevant level, her claim

meaningful

represent.

Id.

differences

from

the

class

LexisNexis

used

in-person

she

seeks

to

review

for

the

circuit court records while employing at least three different

means of collecting general district court records during the
class period.

Proof that Equifaxs behavior was unreasonable

because of the manner in which LexisNexis collected data from

the Richmond General District Court in Soutters case does not
advance the claim of a class member whose judgment was from a
circuit court in 2010.

Soutters claim simply varies from any

potential class plaintiff with a circuit court judgment, and

from

many

potential

plaintiffs

with

general

district

court

judgments, depending on the date of the judgment.

In
show

addition,

willfulness.

to

recover

Proof

statutory

that

damages,

Equifaxs

conduct

Soutter
was

must

willful

toward Soutter because she sent letters in advance informing

Equifax that the case against her was dismissed will not advance
12

the

claims

of

other

class

members.

These

problems

are

exacerbated because Soutter is claiming only statutory damages,

which

typically

require

an

individualized

inquiry.

See

Stillmock v. Weis Markets, Inc., 385 Fed. Appx 267, 277 (4th
Cir.

2010),

(Wilkinson,

J.

concurring)

(noting

because

statutory damages are intended to address harms that are small

or

difficult

to

quantify,

evidence

about

particular

class

members is highly relevant to a jury charged with this task).

In certifying the class, the district court concluded that
Soutter was typical of the class she seeks to represent because
she

was

establish
This

challenging
or

analysis

rejected

in

to

Equifaxs

follow

is

reasonable

conducted

Deiter.

alleged

at

failure

procedures.

the

Wal-Mart

uniform

same

(J.A.

general

clarified,

in

to

698).

level

we

examining

commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), that the members of a proposed

class do not establish that their claims can productively be
litigated at once, merely by alleging a violation of the same
legal

provision

by

the

same

defendant.

M.D.

ex

rel.

Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551).
typicality

simply

by

Likewise, Soutter cannot satisfy

asserting

violation

of

1681e(b)

by

Equifax.
In sum, if the district court had performed the rigorous
analysis

Wal-Mart

dictates,

it
13

would

have

concluded

substantial gap exists between Soutters proof and that of

class members.

Deiter, 436 F.3d at 468.

III.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district courts
order

granting

class

certification

and

remand

for

further

proceedings. *
REVERSED AND REMANDED

Because we conclude that Soutter failed to satisfy Rule

23(a)(3)s
typicality
requirement,
we
have
not
addressed
Equifaxs additional arguments on appeal.
If, on remand, the
district court is presented with a renewed request for
certification, any proposed class is subject to the rigorous
analysis under all four Rule 23(a) factors.

14

GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I disagree with the majoritys holding that the district
court

abused

its

discretion

in

certifying

Soutters

class.

While the majority correctly recites the standard guiding this

Courts

typicality

analysis

under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure 23, its application impermissibly narrows the class

representatives claim and greatly impedes the future of class
actions

against

Credit

Reporting

Agencies

(CRAs)

under

the

pertinent provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), as underscored
by the majority, is not satisfied where the variation in claims
strikes

at

the

heart

of

the

respective

causes

of

action.

Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436 F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2006).
At the heart of 1681e(b) are two requirements:

(1) that the

credit report is inaccurate; and (2) that the CRA did not employ
reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy of the
credit

reports

it

furnished.

Dalton

v.

Indus., 257 F.3d 409, 415 (4th Cir. 2001).

Capital

Associated

For Soutter, so long

as proving these elements for her claim advances the claims of

other class members, she is a typical class representative.
Deiter,

436

F.3d

at

466

(The

essence

of

the

See

typicality

requirement is captured by the notion that as goes the claim of

the named plaintiff, so go the claims of the class.) (quoting
15

Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331,

340 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Inhibiting
requirement,

Soutters
the

ability

majority

to

narrows

satisfy
the

the

scope

second
of

the

reasonableness inquiry by creatively assessing the handful of

procedures

employed

majority

asserts:

by

Equifaxs

Proof

vendor,

that

LexisNexis.

Equifaxs

behavior

The
was

unreasonable because of the manner in which LexisNexis collected

data from the Richmond General District Court in Soutters case
does not advance the claim of a class member whose judgment
was from a circuit court in 2010.

This analysis, however,

misses the point; liability under 15 U.S.C. 1681e(b) is not

limited to the actions of a CRA vendor.
CRA itself.
reporting

Rather, it reaches the

In fact, 1681e(b) provides:

agency

prepares

consumer

Whenever a consumer

report

it

shall

follow

reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the

information
relates.

concerning

the

(Emphasis added).

individual

about

whom

the

report

The reasonableness of preparing a

consumer report extends beyond how a CRA vendor collects data;

included in the inquiry is the CRAs reliance on the information
it receives.
Consistent with this understanding, we have held that where
a CRA had no procedures governing the sources that a subvendor
could rely upon, a court could determine that the CRA did not
16

employ reasonable procedures under 1681e(b).

at 41617.

Dalton, 257 F.3d

Likewise, a court could determine that Equifaxs

procedures

were

unreasonable

because

they

fashioned

an

inefficient system that failed to monitor, review, and correct

the prevalent errors caused by its vendor.

Proving that these

procedures - or lack thereof -- were unreasonable would not

only advance Soutters claim, but would advance the claims of
the entire class.

Put differently, the district court would not

need to conduct mini-trials for each member of Soutters class.

This is the argument posited by Soutter in her Complaint
and argued in her brief.

Additionally, in light of the facts

presented before it, this is the position the district court

relied on in exercising its discretion to certify the class.
See Soutter v. Equifax Info. Services, LLC, 3:10CV107, 2011 WL
1226025 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011) (Equifaxs knowledge of the
allegedly

unreasonable

uniform

procedures

used

by

LexisNexis,

the actual vendor collecting the information, was the same for
Soutter, as for the class.) (emphasis added).

The majority,

however, evades this argument by misdirecting the inquiry into a

determination of what LexisNexis did.
In the same vein, the majority narrows its focus as to
whether

the

individual
demonstrating

class

can

prove

circumstances
that

Soutter

wilfullness

surrounding
sent
17

letters

by

looking

Soutter.
to

Equifax

at

the

While
would

certainly advance her individual claim, such specific proof is

not necessary to prove that Equifax acted willfuly to the entire
class.

Instead, to prove willfulness under the FCRA, the class

would need to establish that Equifax acted either knowingly or

recklessly.

See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47,

5960 (2007).

Thus, if Equifaxs procedures - or again, lack

thereof - entailed an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is

either

known

or

so

obvious

that

it

should

be

known,

finding would advance the claims of the entire class.

this

See id.

at 68 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).

Ultimately,

under

the

majoritys

constricted

analysis,

CRAs are encouraged to hide behind the inconsistencies of their

vendors and, in turn, are shielded from significant liability -even if they fail to assure maximum possible accuracy in their
credit reports.

This is because, so long as vendors use varying

procedures, no plaintiff will be a typical class representative,

and consequently, no class will be certified.

CRAs will remain

subject to only small individual claims, such as those covered

by

Soutters

class

(between

$100

and

$1,000).

Yet,

because

potential plaintiffs might not be aware of their claims or are

otherwise unwilling to pursue such small amounts, it is likely
that these claims will go without redress.

If we follow the

majoritys reasoning, little can be done to carry out the FCRAs

purpose

of

eliminating

CRA

reports
18

that

are

systematically

biased against the consumer.

(statement

of

Sen.

115 Cong. Rec. 2410, 2412 (1969)

Proxmire);

see

also

Saunders

v.

Branch

Banking & Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 2008)
(To

this

end,

FCRA

requires

CRAs

to

follow

procedures

in

reporting consumer credit information that . . . are fair and

equitable to the consumer.) (citing 15 U.S.C. 1681(b)).
these reasons, I dissent.

19

For