Alicia Stranzl v. Delaware County, 3rd Cir. (2015)
Alicia Stranzl v. Delaware County, 3rd Cir. (2015)
Alicia Stranzl v. Delaware County, 3rd Cir. (2015)
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 5-13-cv-01393)
District Judge: Honorable Henry S. Perkin
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 20, 2015
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 10, 2015)
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OPINION
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
absence on account of work-related stress and anxiety. Consistent with the Family and
Medical Leave Act, she received leave from March 2012 until September 2012. By the
time of her return in September 2012, she was no longer a regular employee, but now a fulltime student assigned to a Delaware County office for fieldwork. She was placed in a
different office within the county for her fieldwork than the one she had worked in as a fulltime employee, and her request to transfer her previous case files was denied. She also
alleges irregularities in her first paycheck following her return from leave.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, a plaintiff must show (1) that she is disabled within the meaning of the
Act, (2) that she is otherwise qualified for the job, with or without reasonable
accommodations, and (3) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action as a
result of discrimination. Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir.
2010).
The District Court correctly concluded that Stranzl cannot show an adverse
employment action. Stranzl contends that Delaware County created a hostile work
environment by calling Project Reach, assigning her to a new office upon her return,
denying transfer of her files, and failing to properly process her first paycheck. As we have
explained, isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) are not sufficient to sustain a
hostile work environment claim. Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir.
2005). This is because, for harassment to constitute an adverse employment action, the
conduct must be [sufficiently] extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
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employment. Id. Stranzls allegations do not come close to meeting this standard.1 Her
Americans With Disabilities Act and parallel Pennsylvania state law claims fail accordingly.
See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996) (Pennsylvania courts generally
interpret the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act in accord with its federal counterparts).
To recover for retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) she took leave under the Act; (2) she suffered a materially adverse
action; and (3) the adverse action was causally connected to her taking of protected leave.
Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2004); see also
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (in Title VII context,
clarifying that employer's retaliatory act need not relate to employment to state a claim for
retaliation). An alleged retaliatory action is materially adverse if it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from exercising a right under the Act. Moore v. City of
Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67-68).
The District Court determined that no adversity can be found in Stranzls relocation
and lack of access to her old files. We agree. The record shows these perceived slights
were incident to Stranzls transition to full-time graduate student, and, as such, we do not
see how they might have dissuaded a reasonable person in her position from taking leave.
See id. Stranzls claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act consequently fails as well.
Far from constituting a severe act of discrimination, Delaware County acted commendably
when it contacted the mental health experts at Project Reach. The assertion that it gives rise
to a discrimination claim is troubling. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
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