United States v. Henry Halitzer, 455 F.2d 219, 2d Cir. (1972)
United States v. Henry Halitzer, 455 F.2d 219, 2d Cir. (1972)
United States v. Henry Halitzer, 455 F.2d 219, 2d Cir. (1972)
2d 219
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, John F. Dooling, Jr., Judge, entered August 23,
1971, denying appellant's petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 to set aside his
conviction, following a plea of guilty of a violation of the Federal Narcotics Act
and specifically 21 U.S.C. Sec. 174.
The plea of guilty was entered on December 29, 1969, which was after
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418
(1969) but before Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1970).
parole, but the trial court found after hearing "that the petitioner did know that
he would not be eligible for parole, that his plea was in no way founded on the
assumption that he would be entitled to parole and that he was not entering the
plea to any extent influenced by the belief or expectation that he would be
eligible for parole." This finding is not excepted to here. Petitioner argues that
the plea of guilty must be vacated because McCarthy held that when Rule 11 is
not complied with, per se, the plea is involuntary.
4
The judgment of the court below must be affirmed on the basis of Korenfeld v.
United States, 451 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1971) (at 773) (2-1 decision), which held
that Bye is not retroactive to McCarthy. While the author of this opinion
dissented in Korenfeld and still is of the view that Korenfeld was erroneously
decided, he nevertheless considers himself bound by it, especially in view of
the fact that a petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the court, with only
his dissent.
Appellant seeks to distinguish Korenfeld on the basis that there the defendant
"never even contended that his plea was involuntary because of his lack of
knowledge of his ineligibility for parole." As the dissent in Korenfeld shows,
however, this was not the case. See slip opinion at 646-47. As we pointed out
above, appellant here does not quarrel with Judge Dooling's finding that
appellant did in fact know that he would not be eligible for parole at the time of
the plea of guilty herein.