DANTE LIBAN, ET AL. V. RICHARD GORDON, G.R. NO.

175352, JANUARY 18,

2011

of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and
the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
II.

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled
as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the
Senate against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec.
13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited the case
of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held
that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position
of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held
thatthe office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed
by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is
NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths
of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as
Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as
amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation
since Section
7,
Article
XIV
of
the
1935
Constitution
states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned
or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The
Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create
the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its
own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part

THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of
the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
III.

THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive

portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the
constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC
is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties,
and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the
very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will
consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such
question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents
some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question
will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter,
especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based
its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this
declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times,
particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1,
1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence
notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of
private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of
a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like
it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in
PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui
generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from
the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and
its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional
grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva

Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty
obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to
negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just
like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the
PNRCs special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the
State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as
not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a
private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated
as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of
the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent,
under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso
facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the
provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary
of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised
by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of
the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court
should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would
not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster
and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in
the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void
must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to
now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.]

Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. (J. Abad)

The issue was whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. The BSP contends that it is not a governmentowned or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or subdivision
of the government. The Supreme Court, however, held that not all corporations, which
are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private
corporations as there exists another
distinct class of corporations
or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as public corporations. These
corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government
which are not subject to the tests of ownership orcontrol and economic viability but to a
different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its
departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a public corporation
created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture
and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a
private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and
be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic
viability test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic activity
or business function for the government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore,
being a public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.

PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS VS

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 169752 September 25, 2007
Facts:
PSPCA was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the Philippine
Commission in order to enforce laws relating to the cruelty inflicted upon animals and
for the protection of and to perform all things which may tend to alleviate the suffering
of animals and promote their welfare.
In order to enhance its powers, PSPCA was initially imbued with (1) power to
apprehend violators of animal welfare laws and (2) share 50% of the fines imposed
and collected through its efforts pursuant to the violations of related laws.
However, Commonwealth Act No. 148 recalled the said powers. President Quezon
then issued Executive Order No. 63 directing the Commission of Public Safety, Provost
Marshal General as head of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, Mayors
of chartered cities and every municipal president to detail and organize special officers
to watch, capture, and prosecute offenders of criminal-cruelty laws.
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from the Commission on Audit visited petitioners
office to conduct a survey. PSPCA demurred on the ground that it was a private entity
and not under the CoAs jurisdiction, citing Sec .2(1), Art. IX of the Constitution.

Issues: WON the PSPCA is subject to CoAs Audit Authority.

Held:
No.
The charter test cannot be applied. It is predicated on the legal regime established by
the 1935 Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII. Since the underpinnings of the charter test had
been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, the test cannot be applied to
PSPCA which was incorporated on January 19, 1905. Laws, generally, have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. There are a few exceptions: (1) when
expressly provided; (2) remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and (4) laws
interpreting others.
None of the exceptions apply in the instant case.
The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law doesnt necessarily
qualify it as a public corporation. At the time PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of
1902 was the applicable law and no proscription similar to the charter test can be
found therein. There was no restriction on the legislature to create private corporations
in 1903. The amendments introduced by CA 148 made it clear that PSPCA was a
private corporation, not a government agency.
PSPCAs charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of
the State. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined
voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and may exercise powers generally accorded to
private corporations.
PSPCAs employees are registered and covered by the SSS at the latters initiative and
not through the GSIS.
The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not make the
entity a public corporation. They may be considered quasi-public corporations which
areprivate corporations that render public service, supply public wants and pursue
other exemplary objectives. The true criterion to determine whether a corporation is
public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporate to the State. It is
public if it is created by the latters own agency or instrumentality, otherwise, it is
private.

G.R. No. 183591

October 14 2008
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of
the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of
public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state,
or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult
the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by
respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded
their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for
judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or
of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-inintervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the
liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the
laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under
RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same
self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates
steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence
finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the
agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national
and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek
relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners
and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state,
or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local
or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as
a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in
the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other
states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of
the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and
the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of
the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in
conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous
region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to
the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the
MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only
to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes
and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her
mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed
standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations
either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants
of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at
the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes
not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous
peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of
choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists
in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the
MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clearcut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails,
among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not
grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the
environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOAAD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a
vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated
by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process
by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and

despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is
on its way to independence.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation
as may be prescribed by law.
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

ARTICLE II SECTION 25 - Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
ARTICLE X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component
cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their
own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan
authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the
acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources
of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds
of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas,
in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way
of direct benefits.

Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials,
shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province,
whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote
for elective provincial officials.
Section 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate
their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in
accordance with law.
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other
similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments
and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental
organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to
strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and
social growth and development of the units in the region.
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with
the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen
months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
1.

Administrative organization;

2.

Creation of sources of revenues;

3.

Ancestral domain and natural resources;

4.

Personal, family, and property relations;

5.

Regional urban and rural planning development;

6.

Economic, social, and tourism development;

7.

Educational policies;

8.

Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

9.

Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.

Section 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security
of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.

GR 91649 197 SCRA 52, 65 May 14, 1991

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward crony
economy, waiving the Manila City governments right to impose taxes & license fees,
and violating the equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The
question of wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or
permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National
Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license fees is no longer
vested in the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a
GOCC,is therefore exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme
over local governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national
policies using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The power to tax cannot be
allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent
power to wield it. Thepower of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to
limitation provided by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it
simply means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal
protection clause doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling activities are legalized
under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable
laws unconstitutional.

LINA VS PANO G.R. No. 129093

BASCO VS PAGCOR GR 91649 (MAY 14, 1991)

FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the
operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for
a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a
letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.

1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial,
respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento
asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following
reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the
defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995;
(2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business
permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as
invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge,
Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid
HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto,
such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views
which may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the
assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure
or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power
of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a
delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should
not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is
obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp
LIMBONA VS MANGELIN GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November
as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However,
on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's
advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker
of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution
from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom.
Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against
some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within
the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition
had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous
governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the
autonomous governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base
of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the

sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power,
on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of
the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the
latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the
same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in
the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more
reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and
principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions
shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang
Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still
invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second
place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under
the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess"
called on the ground of good faith.

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR

FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210
granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in
Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to
charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, provided, however, that

any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to
P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening
to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction
alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the
subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205,
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate
the CATV operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE : may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
x x x The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No.

436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of
other bodies. x x x
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the
general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach
subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public
streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions
allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. x x x
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot
sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well
recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the
mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the
CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the
exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.