FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 100633. August 28, 2001.]

SOCORRO ABELLA SORIANO AND SABINO PADILLA, JR.,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DAVID C.
NAVAL AND DEOGRACIAS REYES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 101550. August 28, 2001.]
SPOUSES DEOGRACIAS R. REYES AND ROSALINA N. REYES,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SOCORRO ABELLA
SORIANO, respondents.

Sabino Padilla, Jr. for S.A. Soriano.

Dennis B. Recon & Associates for D. Reyes, et al.
Z.P. Reyes Law Office for respondent in G.R. No. 101550.
SYNOPSIS
On October 27, 1988, Deogracias R. Reyes and Rosalina N. Reyes led with the
Regional Trial Court, Naga City a complaint against Socorro Abella-Soriano for
"Declaration and Recognition of Real Right under an Implied Contract of Services,
Reformation of Instrument and Damages" which alleged two causes of action. The
trial court granted Socorro's motion to dismiss with respect to the rst cause of
action because of the pendency of an ejectment case between the same parties, but
denied the same insofar as the second cause of action was concerned. It denied the
motion to inhibit led by Atty. Padilla. It granted the "Motion to Admit
Supplemental Complaint" led by Deogracias and Rosalina. It denied the Motion to
Dismiss the Supplemental Complaint led by Socorro. The trial court then ordered
Deogracias and Rosalina to pay the deficiency in the docket fees and it was faithfully
complied by Deogracias and Rosalina. Atty. Padilla led an "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration for Various Orders of the Trial Court," but it was denied by the trial
court. During the pre-trial conference, Socorro and Atty. Padilla did not appear
during the scheduled hearings. Later, Socorro was declared in default and Atty.
Padilla was adjudged guilty of direct contempt. Thus, Socorro and Atty. Padilla led
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari an d mandamus. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition except the Orders pertaining to the supplemental
complaint. Hence, both parties filed the instant petition.
The Court ruled that Deogracias and Rosalina merely paid the amount of the docket
fees computed by the Clerk of Court. They were in good faith and relied on the
assessment of the Clerk of Court. In Sun Insurance Oce, Ltd. v. Asuncion , private
respondent, like Deogracias and Rosalina in the case at bar, demonstrated

willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Thus, that the trial court was vested with jurisdiction. However, the Court found
that Deogracias and Rosalina's supplemental complaint" contained matters entirely
dierent from and even contrary to the cause of action stated in the original
complaint. Hence, the Court agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
should not admit the same.
The Court further ruled that a litigant may not demand that a judge inhibit himself.
Specially so in this case where there is a nding of fact that "respondent judge has
not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality from impartiality". Besides, the test
for determining the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the
movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. In this case, there was no such
deprivation. On the other hand, we nd that Atty. Padilla's innuendoes are not
necessarily disrespectful to the court as to be considered contumacious. A lawyer's
remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily
assume the level of contempt. The decision of the Court of Appeals with
modication that the order nding Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt
of court and imposing five (5) days imprisonment was set aside.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PAYMENT OF FILING FEES, COURT
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE EVEN IF THE DOCKET FEE PAID WAS
NOT SUFFICIENT AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO DEFRAUD THE
GOVERNMENT. We agree with the Court of Appeals that when insucient ling
fees were initially paid by Deogracias and Rosalina, there was no intention to
defraud the government, hence, the ruling in Manchester Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals does not apply. Deogracias and Rosalina merely paid the amount
of the docket fees computed by the Clerk of Court. They were in good faith and
relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court. This is a nding of fact which the
Court of Appeals carefully made. In the absence of abuse of discretion, we shall not
disturb the same. In Sun Insurance Oce, Ltd. v. Asuncion, the issue was whether
or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was
not sucient. This Court ruled that since the petitioners did not intend to defraud
the government by paying insucient docket fees, a more liberal interpretation of
the rules should apply. In Sun Insurance Oce, Ltd., v. Asuncion, private
respondent, like Deogracias and Rosalina in the case at bar, demonstrated
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Thus, the Court concluded that the trial court was vested with jurisdiction.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IF WHAT IS PROVED IS LESS THAN WHAT IS CLAIMED, A
REFUND MAY BE MADE, BUT IF MORE, ADDITIONAL FEES WILL BE EXACTED. In
Ng Soon v. Alday , this Court stated that the initial payment of the ling fees
corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim is allowed subject to the
adjustment of what may be proved later. If what is proved (amount of claims for
damages) is less than what is claimed, then a refund may be made; if more,
additional fees will be exacted. The rule comes into play when the situation found in

Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (i.e., intention to defraud

the government) is absent.
IAcTaC

3.
ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; FILED AFTER AN ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WHICH STATES
A TOTALLY DIFFERENT CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT PERMITTED. A pleading
subsequently led after an original one which states a totally dierent cause of
action is not a "supplemental pleading" and is not permitted. The rule allowing
amendments to a pleading is subject to the general limitation that the cause of
action shall not be substantially changed or that the theory of the case shall not be
altered.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. We nd that Deogracias and Rosalina's
"supplemental complaint" contains matters entirely dierent from and even
contrary to the cause of action stated in the original complaint. Hence, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the trial court should not admit the same. In the
original complaint, Deogracias and Rosalina assailed as " void ab initio" the
memorandum agreement of June 23, 1986, while in the so-called "supplemental
complaint," they used as basis the very same memorandum agreement they
initially assailed in order to exercise an "option to repurchase" provided for therein.
A supplemental complaint is one that: ". . . set(s) forth transactions, occurrences of
events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented."
5.
ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; WILL NOT LIE IF
THE ACTS SOUGHT TO BE ENJOINED HAD BECOME A CONSUMMATED ACT. A
perusal of the records shows that Socorro's motion for an ex-parte restraining order
prayed that the court prohibit Deogracias and Rosalina from entering the vacant
apartments of the building subject of the litigation. The issue of whether Judge
Naval acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied the motion has become
moot and academic. The parties stipulated that Deogracias and Rosalina already
entered the premises in question. Injunction would not lie, anymore, as the acts
sought to be enjoined had become a fait accompli or an accomplished or
consummated act. It is useless to indulge in an academic discussion of a moot
question.
6.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; A LITIGANT
MAY NOT DEMAND THAT A JUDGE WILL INHIBIT HIMSELF FOR OTHER REASONS
NOT STATED IN THE RULES OF COURT. For any other reason, a litigant may not
demand that a judge inhibit himself. Specially so in this case where there is a
nding of fact that "respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides
partiality from impartiality. Besides, the test for determining the propriety of the
denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a fair and
impartial trial. In this case, there was no such deprivation.
7.
ID.; ID.; BARE ALLEGATIONS OF PARTIALITY AND PREJUDGMENT WILL NOT
SUFFICE. In a string of cases, this Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be
considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with
clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment with

not suffice.
8.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DIRECT CONTEMPT; PROPER
REMEDY FOR PERSON ADJUDGED GUILTY THEREOF IS CERTIORARI OR
PROHIBITION. The Court of Appeals erred when it stated that a certiorari
proceeding assailing the judgment of direct contempt was not proper as Atty. Padilla
may have appealed therefrom. Rule 71, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court provides:
"A person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom , but
may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition." This is exactly, what
petitioners did.
9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE EXERCISED ON PRESERVATIVE, NOT VINDICTIVE
PRINCIPLE. [W]e nd that Atty. Padilla's innuendoes are not necessarily,
disrespectful to the court as to be considered contumacious. A lawyer's remarks
explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily assume the
level of contempt that justies the court to exercise the power of contempt. Courts
must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used
sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious behavior in facie curiae. The salutary rule
is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.
The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
persons but for the functions that they exercise.

10.
ID.; ID.; ID.; SNIDE REMARKS OR EVEN SARCASTIC INNUENDOES DO NOT
NECESSARILY ASSUME THAT LEVEL OF CONTUMELY. Snide remarks or even
sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely actionable
under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judges generally and wisely pass
unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it
with simply a reproof. In the natural order of things, when a case is decided, one
party wins and another loses, and oftentimes, both sides are equally condent and
sanguine. Thus, disappointment is great for the party whose action or view fails. It is
human nature that there be bitter feelings which often reach to the judge as the
source of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate
everything which appears as but a momentary outbreak of disappointment.
11.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY;
LAWYERS MUST NOT OBSERVE TEMPERATE LANGUAGE. Lawyers may not be
held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of
chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language. While judges must exercise patience, lawyers must also
observe temperate language as well. At this juncture, we admonish all lawyers to
observe the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
"Canon 8. Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, oensive or otherwise improper. "Canon 11 A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial ocers and

should insist on similar conduct by others." A lawyer is an ocer of the Court, bound
by the law. It is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
12.
ID.; ID.; LAWYER MUST MAINTAIN RESPECTFUL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE
COURTS. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial oce, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance. It is peculiarly incumbent for lawyers
to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor. This is not to say that
courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an ocer of the court, a lawyer may
criticize the court. He must do so in a bona de manner, uberrima des. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism on the one hand, and abuse and slander of the
courts and of the judges thereof on the other. Unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration is proscribed.
13.
ID.; ID.; DISCIPLINE AND SELF-RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE BAR EVEN
UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE ORDERLY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. It may happen that counsel possesses a greater
knowledge of the law than the judge who presides over the court. It may also
happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their
decision. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under
adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice. Malicious
attacks on courts have in some cases been treated as libel, in other cases as
contempt of court, and as a sucient ground for disbarment. However, mere
criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of
the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated.
DECISION
PARDO, J :
p

The Cases
We decide the two petitions jointly.
G.R. No. 100633 is an appeal 1 via certiorari interposed by Socorro A. Soriano and
her counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. (hereafter, Atty. Padilla) from the decision of
the Court of Appeals 2 that armed the following orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Naga City 3 :
"(a)
Order dated December 16, 1988, denying petitioner's urgent exparte motion for restraining order;
"(b)

Order dated January 23, 1989 denying petitioner's motion to inhibit;

"(c)
Order dated July 12, 1989 ordering the respondents to pay the
deficiency in the docket fees paid by them;
"(d)
Orders dated September 13 and 15, 1989 denying petitioner's
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration.
"(e)
Order dated September 25, 1989 directing petitioner Atty. Sabino
Padilla, Jr. to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt; and
"(f)
Order dated February 9, 1990 denying petitioner's ex-parte motion
to rest; declaring petitioner in default; and resetting the scheduled
promulgation of judgment on the charge of direct contempt against Atty.
Padilla, Jr. with a warning that should he fail to appear he would be ordered
arrested pursuant to the provisions of the rules." 4

and which decision annulled the orders of the Regional Trial Court 5 admitting
respondents' (Deogracias and Rosalina Reyes) supplemental complaint.
G.R. No. 101550 is a petition for review on certiorari initiated by Deogracias and
Rosalina Reyes assailing the same decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
annulled the order of the Regional Trial Court 6 admitting their supplemental
complaint on the ground that the trial court should not have admitted the same as
it did not merely "supplement" but entirely substituted the original pleading. 7

The Facts
On October 27, 1988, Deogracias R. Reyes and Rosalina N. Reyes (hereafter,
"Deogracias" and "Rosalina") led with the Regional Trial Court, Naga City 8 a
complaint against Socorro Abella-Soriano (hereafter "Socorro") 9 for "declaration
and recognition of real right under an implied contract of services, reformation of
instrument and damages."
The complaint alleged two causes of action. 10

First, Deogracias and Rosalina pleaded that they were employed by Socorro as
manager and administrative assistant of her property and real estate in 1968. 11 As
"payment for their services," in 1973, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina one
apartment unit 12 to use as their dwelling for the duration of their lifetime. A token
monthly rental of one hundred fty pesos (P150.00) was imposed on them to
enable them to supposedly keep their self-respect. 13 In the same building, there
existed a unit which Deogracias and Rosalina improved and converted into a pub
and restaurant 14 at a cost of four hundred fty thousand pesos (P450,000.00). For
the use of the premises, Socorro collected rent from Deogracias and Rosalina in the
token amount of one thousand ve hundred pesos (P1,500.00) a month supposedly
for the main purpose of enabling them "to keep their self respect." 15 From 1968 to
1987, Deogracias and Rosalina were able to sell and dispose of all the lots in the
three residential subdivisions 16 owned by Socorro, amounting to about ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00). As real estate manager and administrative assistant, they
were also able in the course of twenty years to nd qualied tenants for Socorro's
commercial buildings. They supervised the construction and maintenance of

Socorro's property and collected rent on behalf of and for the interest of Socorro.
Despite all these efforts, on October 17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina
notice to vacate the two units at No. 67 Elias Angeles St., Naga City. 17
Deogracias and Rosalina averred that Socorro agreed to allow them to use the two
units for the duration of their lifetime as compensation for their services. 18 By now
ejecting them from the premises, Socorro reneged on her obligation. 19

Second, Deogracias and Rosalina were the owners of two (2) commercial lots with
improvements. 20 On May 28, 1986, Deogracias and Rosalina became indebted to
Socorro in the amount of six hundred thirty eight thousand six hundred thirty ve
pesos and thirty six centavos (P638,635.36). The parties agreed that to pay for the
debt, Deogracias and Rosalina were to sell the two (2) commercial lots for two
million and ve hundred thousand pesos (P2.5M) and deliver part of the proceeds of
the sale to Socorro. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina conveyed
the property to Socorro by way of rst mortgage. Instead of a real estate mortgage,
Socorro prepared two (2) documents, a "deed of absolute sale" 21 covering
Deogracias and Rosalina's property and a "memorandum of agreement." 22 Due to
the ascendancy of Soccorro over them and also because of Socorro's repeated
assurance that the documents had the same eect as a real estate mortgage,
Deogracias and Rosalina signed the same. Socorro presented the "deed of absolute
sale" to the register of deeds of Naga City and as a consequence TCT Nos. 9388 and
9424 were released in her favor. It was only in September 1988, that Deogracias
and Rosalina discovered that they were deprived of the ownership of their property.
23 Thus, Deogracias and Rosalina pray that their true intention of entering into a
real estate mortgage and not an absolute sale be given eect, that the "deed of
absolute sale" and "memorandum of agreement" be declared void and that the
T.C.T.s issued in Socorro's name be canceled and new T.C.T.s be issued in favor of
Deogracias and Rosalina. 24
CIaASH

On October 28, 1988, Deogracias and Rosalina paid the ling fee of four hundred
forty pesos (P440.00) 25 and legal research fee of ten pesos (P10.00). 26 The
computation of the filing fee was based on the following amounts: 27
"1.
P100,000.00 representing the income of the property under litigation
received by the defendants from its tenants and which the plaintis prayed
to be returned and refunded to them;
"2.

P50,000.00 moral damages;

"3.

P10,000.00 exemplary damages;

"4.

P50,000.00 attorney's fees.

"The total of which amounted to P210,000.00."

On November 29, 1988, Socorro led a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the rst cause of action was barred by the pendency of an ejectment

case between the same parties over the same premises and that the second cause
of action was premature. 28
On December 8, 1998, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress,
Socorro, led with the trial court an urgent ex-parte motion for restraining order. 29
The motion prayed that the trial court immediately issue an ex-parte restraining
order commanding private respondents to "desist from entering the vacant
apartments of the building subject of the case or from urging the tenants thereof to
stop paying their rentals to the defendant (Socorro)."
The Carmelite Sisters talked to respondent Judge Naval in his chambers and
requested him to immediately act on Socorro's urgent ex-parte motion for a
restraining order. Judge Naval told the Carmelite Sisters that he could not issue the
ex-parte restraining order because a Supreme Court administrative circular required
a hearing with notice to the adverse party. To this statement, Sister Margaret Mary
retorted, "Why would Atty. Padilla (Socorro's counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.) ask
for an ex-parte restraining order when according to you that is prohibited by an
order or circular of the Supreme Court? Do you mean Atty. Padilla does not even
know that there is such an order or circular, when he has a brother in the Supreme
Court (Associate Justice Teodoro Padilla)." 30
On December 16, 1988, the trial court denied Socorro's urgent ex-parte motion for a
restraining order. The trial court ruled that the issue was whether or not petitioner
Socorro may be restored to the possession of the property, which she claimed she
was deprived of by means of force, threat and intimidation. According to the trial
court, this is a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court,
31 not the Regional Trial Court. 32
On January 16, 1989, the trial court granted Socorro's motion to dismiss with
respect to Deogracias and Rosalina's rst cause of action but denied the same
insofar as the second cause of action was concerned. 33
On the same day, January 16, 1989, Socorro, through counsel, Atty. Padilla, led a
motion to inhibit Judge Naval praying that the ends of justice would best be served
if the case was re-raed to another judge. Basically, the grounds cited were: First,
while still a law practitioner and politician, Judge Naval was a frequent customer of
the restaurant owned by Deogracias and was a good friend of his. Second, Judge
Naval was also a close friend of Rosalina and Deogracias' attorney, Atty. Dennis B.
Recon. 34
On January 23, 1989, the trial court denied Socorro's motion to inhibit. We quote
the trial court's order: 35
"The factual bases of Defendant's motion to inhibit are not true.
"This Presiding Judge while still a law practitioner and politician, was NOT a
frequent customer of the Rey-Ves Pub and Restaurant. To the best of his
recollection, this Presiding Judge has eaten and drunk (sic) in said Pub and
Restaurant for not more than ve (5) times since then until the present and

has not had any personal talk with either or both plaintis-spouses. This
Presiding Judge has never become a 'good friend' or even a friend of said
spouses.
"Atty. Dennis B. Recon is considered by this Presiding Judge as a friend, just
like any other lawyer known to him and appearing before him, and just like
counsel for Defendant, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. This Presiding Judge did not
notice any one of the three Regional Trial Judges assigned in Pili, Camarines
Sur to be present in the court room during the last hearing herein on
December 16, 1988, although after the hearing, this Presiding Judge met
Hon. Nilo Malanyaon, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur,
at the lobby of the Naga City Hall of Justice conferring with Hon. Gregorio A.
Manio, Presiding Judge, Branch 19, Naga City about the Christmas Party of
the entire Court personnel which would be held at 5:30 o'clock that
afternoon of December 16.
"The inhibition of this Presiding Judge would not have been a problem had
Defendant's counsel led his motion before this Court had refused to issue
ex parte a restraining order despite strong representations therefor by
three (3) Sisters of Charity and their Mother Superior, allegedly upon
instructions of Counsel for the Defendant. To grant the 'motion to inhibit' at
this stage of the proceedings when this Court, after hearing, has already
denied defendant's motion for issuance of a restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction, and has already partially denied defendant's motion to
dismiss, may create a bad precedent, and may even adversely aect the
integrity of the bar and of the bench because the said Sisters of Charity
impressed upon this Presiding Judge not to be apprehensive in issuing the
restraining order ex parte as the Supreme Court will sustain it, their counsel
being a brother of a Justice of the Supreme Court.
"This Presiding Judge believes that he is competent to hear this case and to
render judgment which is fair and just to both parties.
"WHEREFORE, defendant's motion 'to inhibit' is hereby DENIED.
"SO ORDERED.
"Given in Chambers, this 23rd day of January 1989, at the City of Naga,
Philippines."

On April 17, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina led a "motion to admit attached
supplemental complaint." 36 The supplemental complaint pleaded 37 :
"2.
That on March 30, 1989, subsequent to the ling of the aboveentitled case and conformably with the true agreement of the parties herein
in their Memorandum of Agreement which they acknowledged before Notary
Public Manuel M. Rosales on 23 June 1986 (Annex 'C', Complaint) and within
the 'three (3) years' period provided therein, the herein plaintis tendered to
the defendant the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND, SIX
HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE PESOS and THIRTY SIX CENTAVOS, (P638,635.36)
Philippine Currency, as payment to the latter of their (Plaintis') obligation to

herein defendant;
xxx xxx xxx
"5.
That the failure and/or refusal of the defendant to accept said tender
of payment to her by the plaintis is absolutely without just cause, and
which is clearly a move on her part to let the 3-year period provided in their
Memorandum of Agreement (which will expire on May 28, 1989) elapse and
to invoke it to stonewall the recovery by the plaintis from her of the
former's 9-door commercial building at Concepcion Grande, Naga City."

On April 28, 1989, the trial court admitted Deogracias' and Rosalina's supplemental
complaint. 38
On May 22, 1989, Socorro moved to dismiss the supplemental complaint. 39
On July 6, 1989, the trial court denied Socorro's motion to dismiss the supplemental
complaint. 40
On July 12, 1989, the trial court ordered Deogracias and Rosalina to pay a deciency
in the docket fees in the amount of one thousand seven hundred twelve pesos
(P1,712.00). 41
On August 3, 1989, Socorro moved for an extension to le a responsive pleading to
the supplemental complaint and to reset pre-trial.
On August 7, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina complied with the order of July 12,
1989, and paid the additional filing fee. 42
On August 11, 1989, the trial court granted Socorro's motion for an extension of
time to le a responsive pleading and also granted the same with respect to the
motion to reset pre-trial.
On August 18, 1989, Socorro again moved for another extension of time to le a
responsive-pleading and for the resetting of the pre-trial.
The trial court granted the second motion and gave Socorro an extension of ve (5)
days.
On August 23, 1989, Socorro again moved for another extension of time to le
responsive pleading and to reset pre-trial. The trial court has not acted on the
motion.
On August 26, 1989, Socorro's counsel, Atty. Padilla led an "omnibus motion for
reconsideration of various orders of the respondent court." 43
cCTaSH

On September 3, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina led an opposition to Socorro's

omnibus motion, moved to strike out the motion and moved to declare Socorro in
default with respect to the supplemental complaint. 44
On September 13

45

and 15, 1989, 46 the trial court denied Socorro's "omnibus

motion for reconsideration."

On September 25, 1989, the trial court directed Socorro's counsel, Atty. Padilla to
show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court. 47
Forthwith, on October 9, 1989, Socorro led with the trial court an opposition to
Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion to declare her in default as to the supplemental
complaint 48 and an answer to the supplemental complaint. 49
On October 23, 1989, the trial court denied Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion to
declare petitioner in default and admitted Socorro's answer to the supplemental
complaint. 50 Pre-trial was reset to December 15, 1989. The court instructed the
parties to file their pre-trial briefs three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial.
On December 15, 1989, only Deogracias, Rosalina and their counsel appeared
during the pre-trial conference. The trial court postponed the pre-trial since there
was no showing that Socorro and Atty. Padilla were notied thereof. Subsequently,
Atty. Padilla admitted receipt of notice but reasoned that he received such only on
the very same date of the pre-trial. 51
On January 5, 1990, the same incident occurred and pre-trial was re-set. Atty.
Padilla claimed that they did not appear during the scheduled pre-trial since they
received notice thereof five (5) days after. 52
On January 17, 1990, Socorro and Atty. Padilla were served with notice that pretrial and promulgation of judgment on the contempt charge against Atty. Padilla
was set on February 9, 1990. 53

On February 2, 1990, Socorro, through Atty. Padilla, mailed her ex-parte motion to
reset the scheduled hearing. 54 The trial court received the motion on February 7,
1990. 55
On February 9, 1990, only Deogracias and Rosalina and their counsel appeared
before the court. The court declared Socorro in default. The court granted the
motion to reset the hearing for the promulgation of judgment on the charge of
direct contempt on February 27, 1990, with a warning that should Atty. Padilla fail
to appear during the scheduled hearing, he would be ordered arrested. 56
On February 19, 1990, Atty. Padilla was served with notice of the scheduled
promulgation of judgment on the charge of direct contempt.
On February 27, 1990, Atty. Padilla did not appear before the court. The court
appointed a counsel-de-oficio for Atty. Padilla, promulgated judgment against him,
found him guilty of direct contempt and sentenced him to suer the penalty of
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (P100.00). 57
On March 12, 1990, Socorro and Atty. Padilla led with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with temporary restraining order. Socorro

assailed the following orders of Judge Naval:

58

First, his insistence on exercising jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding

Deogracias' and Rosalina's failure to pay the correct ling fee on their amended
complaint. Second, his admission of Deogracias' and Rosalina's amended complaint
which they termed as a "supplemental complaint", despite the fact that it pleaded a
cause of action directly contrary to that stated in the original complaint. 59 Third, his
refusal to issue an ex-parte restraining order to restrain Deogracias and Rosalina
from seizing possession of the property subject of the case on the ground that he
was prohibited from doing so by a certain Supreme Court Circular and on the
ground that the court a quo did not have authority to decide whether Deogracias
and Rosalina forcibly entered and seized occupation of the property in litigation as
such issue fell under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court, it being a question
of "forcible entry and unlawful detainer." Fourth, his refusal to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. Fifth, his unreasonable and violent reaction towards a motion for
reconsideration led by Socorro and Atty. Padilla, which motion for reconsideration
pointed out that:
(1)
the insulting accusation Judge Naval hurled at Atty. Padilla was not
supported by the facts;
(2)
it was Judge Naval's version of the facts that was obviously false and
untrue;
(3)
that Judge Naval has an "unusual interest" in holding on the case
despite the court's lack of jurisdiction over it.

Sixth, his citing of Atty. Padilla for contempt of court. Seventh, his order for the
arrest and incarceration of Atty. Padilla for direct contempt of court.
On June 26, 1991, the Court of Appeals decided:

60

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED except the Orders dated April 28, 1989 and July 6, 1989 which
are granted. The Writ of Injunction dated June 18, 1990 is hereby
DISSOLVED. Costs against petitioners.
"SO ORDERED."

On August 17, 1991, Socorro and Atty. Padilla led with the Supreme Court a
petition assailing the aforequoted decision. 61
On July 25, 1991, Deogracias and Rosalina led with the Court of Appeals a motion
for partial reconsideration 62 of its decision of June 26, 1991, assailing the Court of
Appeals annulment of the order of the trial court admitting their supplemental
complaint.
On August 21, 1991 the Court of Appeals denied Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion
for partial reconsideration. 63

On October 16, 1991, Deogracias and Rosalina likewise led with the Supreme
Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the aforequoted decision of the
Court of Appeals insofar as it annulled the order of the Regional Trial Court
admitting their supplemental complaint. 64
On November 6, 1991, the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions. 65

The Issues
1.

Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing

to restrain or to remedy the forcible seizure by the plaintis of
the property subject of the litigation.

2.

Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing

to order the payment of the correct ling fee and upon failure to
pay the same, to dismiss the case.

3.

Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing

to inhibit.

4.

Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in admitting

the "supplemental complaint," with a theory directly contrary to
the original complaint and in not dismissing it upon motion of
defendant.

5.

Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion and acted in
excess of jurisdiction in nding Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. guilty of
"direct contempt."

6.

Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of

discretion in sanctioning the foregoing orders of the trial court
(except the Order admitting the supplemental complaint). 66

The Court's Ruling

We nd the petitions without merit except as hereafter stated. We shall discuss the
issues in seriatim .

Effect of Non-Payment of Filing Fees in Full

We agree with the Court of Appeals that when insucient ling fees were initially
paid by Deogracias and Rosalina, there was no intention to defraud the government,
hence, the ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals 67
does not apply. Deogracias and Rosalina merely paid the amount of the docket fees
computed by the Clerk of Court. They were in good faith and relied on the
assessment of the Clerk of Court. This is a nding of fact which the Court of Appeals
carefully made. In the absence of abuse of discretion, we shall not disturb the same.
In Sun Insurance Oce, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 68 the issue was whether or not the court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was not sucient.

This Court ruled that since the petitioners did not intend to defraud the government
by paying insucient docket fees, a more liberal interpretation of the rules should
apply. In Sun Insurance Oce, Ltds., v. Asuncion, private respondent, like
Deogracias and Rosalina in the case at bar, demonstrated willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. Thus, the Court concluded
that the trial court was vested with jurisdiction and consequently stated the
following rules: 69
SDECAI

"1.
It is not simply the ling of the complaint of appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where
the ling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
xxx xxx xxx
"3.
Where the trial court acquired jurisdiction over a claim by the ling of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed ling fee, but
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specied in the pleading, or
if specied the same has been left for the determination of the court, the
additional ling fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional filing fee (italics ours)."

I n Ng Soon v. Alday, 70 this Court stated that the initial payment of the ling fees
corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim is allowed subject to the
adjustment of what may be proved later. If what is proved (amount of claims for
damages) is less than what is claimed, then a refund may be made; if more,
additional fees will be exacted. The rule comes into play when the situation found in
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (i.e., intention to defraud
the government) is absent. 71

Non-Admission of the Supplemental Complaint

We nd that Deogracias and Rosalina's "supplemental complaint" contains matters
entirely dierent from and even contrary to the cause of action stated in the
original complaint. Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
should not admit the same.
In the original complaint, Deogracias and Rosalina assailed as "void ab initio" the
memorandum agreement of June 23, 1986, while in the so-called "supplemental
complaint", they used as basis the very same memorandum agreement they
initially assailed in order to exercise an "option to repurchase" provided for therein.
A supplemental complaint is one that: 72
". . . set(s) forth transactions, occurrences of events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented."

A pleading subsequently led after an original one which states a totally dierent

cause of
allowing
cause of
shall not

action is not a "supplemental pleading" and is not permitted. The rule

amendments to a pleading is subject to the general limitation that the
action shall not be substantially changed or that the theory of the case
be altered. 73

Non-Issuance of the Ex-Parte Restraining Order

A perusal of the records shows that Socorro's motion for an ex-parte
restraining order prayed that the court prohibit Deogracias and Rosalina from
entering the vacant apartments of the building subject of the litigation. The issue
of whether Judge Naval acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied the
motion has become moot and academic. The parties stipulated that Deogracias
and Rosalina already entered the premises in question. Injunction would not lie
anymore, as the acts sought to be enjoined had become a fait accompli or an
accomplished or consummated act. 74 It is useless to indulge in an academic
discussion of a moot question. 75
Refusal of Judge Naval to Inhibit Himself
Rule 137, Section 1, Revised Rules of Court provides the grounds for the
disqualification of judges, to wit:
"SECTION 1.
Disqualification of judges . No judge or judicial ocer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or anity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above."

For any other reason, a litigant may not demand that a judge inhibit himself.
Specically so in this case where there is a nding of fact that "respondent judge
has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality from impartiality." 76 Besides,
the test for determining the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether
the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. 77 In this case, there was no
such deprivation.
In a string of cases, this Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and
convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suce.
78

Charge of Direct Contempt of Court

The Court of Appeals erred when it stated 79 that a certiorari proceeding assailing
the judgment of direct contempt was not proper as Atty. Padilla may have appealed
therefrom. 80 Rule 71, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court provides: "A person
adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom , but may avail
himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition (italics ours)." This is exactly
what petitioners did.
The Court of Appeals also erred when it armed the trial court's nding of direct
contempt of court against Atty. Padilla. Rule 71, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
"SECTION 1.
Direct contempt punished summarily A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court. . .
."

The Court of Appeals armed the trial court's judgment on direct contempt on two
grounds. 81 We quote 82 :
". . . 2.
Pursuing relentlessly his design to embarrass this Presiding Judge
by claiming in his "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration" dated August 26,
1989 that this Presiding Judge could not correctly understand the clearly
worded Administrative Circular No. 1 of the Supreme Court.
"3.
Alleging in disrespectful and insulting manner in his "Omnibus Motion
for Recommendation" dated August 26, 1989 the following:
"a.
It is respectfully submitted that even a rst year law student will
readily see that the last sentence of the par. 2-3 above quoted
"Restraining orders or preliminary injunction should not be issued without
prior notice and hearing and showing of a clear right thereto" must be
read and understood in the light of the heading and subject being discussed,
namely, "Prompt Action on Dilatory Petitions, to Delay Enforcement of
Executory Judgments." By no stretch of the imagination can it be interpreted
in isolation to mean that Courts had lost their inherent power to issue exparte restraining orders.
"And this Court certainly can read and understand just what par. 3-2 of
Administrative Circular No. 1 means. (par. 9);
"b.
One had a right to assume that this Court was suciently acquainted
with the principle in Rule 135 of the Rules of Court to the eect that: . . .
(par. 14; (b);
"c.
Given the foregoing conduct of this Court, undersigned counsel felt
that for reasons known only to the Court it could not really act freely on this
Case as it ordinarily would, and therefore a motion to inhibit was probably
the best way out of this situation. (par. 14 (b), sub-par. 4);
"d.
But the Court obviously took the motion to inhibit in a dierent light.
Not only did it deny the motion; in so doing, it vented its anger at

undersigned counsel and the Carmalite Sisters .(par. 15);

"e.
They were Carmelite (sic) Sisters, or if their ocial name is to be
used, they were Sisters belonging to the order of Discalced Carmilites. The
Sisters or Daughters of Charity, are an entirely dierent religious
congregation. It seems that the Court could not get correctly even this very
elementary fact. (par. 16);
"f.
Fourthly, even the Court's version is not at all attering to it. For if
that version were to be believed, the Court even went to the extent of
allowing the sisters to make representations with it, and improper
representations at that, instead of rmly telling the sisters that they were
out of bounds and should leave. It is bad enough that a Presiding Judge
should allow a lawyer to discuss the merits of a case out of court and
without the presence of opposing counsel; that he should allow non-lawyers
and non-parties, who have nothing to do with a case, to even discuss them
with him is the height of impropriety. (par. 16, sub-par. 4)
"g.
All the foregoing circumstances naturally cast serious doubts on the
accuracy and truthfulness of the Court's statements above quoted. . . (par.
17).
IEcaHS

"h.
What version then is to be believed? With all due respect, it is
submitted that the foregoing version of the Carmelite Sisters is to be
believed. (par. 18).
"i.
When defendant pointed this out in her motion to dismiss and other
pleadings, this Court instead of dismissing both the original and the
supplemental complaint sought to remedy the irremediable. It refrained from
passing on it in ruling on the motion to dismiss; but in a separate order of
July 12, 1989, it required the plaintis to pay the dierence between what
they had paid on the original complaint and what they should pay on the
"supplemental" complaint. In other words, instead of dismissing the
"supplemental" complaint for non-payment of the ling fee, which is all that it
could do, the Court went out of its way to save the day for the plaintis by
giving them an opportunity to pay the correct ling fee and thus retain
jurisdiction over the same.

But that is not all. It even gave plaintis credit for the inadequate ling fee
they paid under their original complaint; (par. 22); and
"j.
Hence, if plaintis insist on their change of theory, the obvious
remedy is not by way of "supplemental" or even "amended" complaint, but
by dismissing the original complaint and ling an entirely new one. But of
course, that would mean a rae and plaintis apparently do not want to risk
having their case fall into another branch or sala.
"It is respectfully submitted, however, that plaintis' obvious desire to keep
their case in this particular branch of the court is no excuse for violating the
rules . (par. 27). (Italics ours )"

After a perusal of the charges of direct contempt of court, we nd that Atty. Padilla's
innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court as to be considered
contumacious. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case under
consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contempt that justies the
court to exercise the power of contempt. 83 Courts must be slow to punish for direct
contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly
contumacious behavior in facie curiae. 84 The salutary rule is that the power to
punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle,
85 and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. 86 The courts must
exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because
that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the
functions that they exercise. 87
Snide remarks or even sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of
contumely actionable under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judges generally
and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or
at least pass it with simply a reproof. In the natural order of things, when a case is
decided, one party wins and another loses, and oftentimes, both sides are equally
condent and sanguine. Thus, disappointment is great for the party whose action or
view fails. It is human nature that there be bitter feelings which often reach to the
judge as the source of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient,
and tolerate everything which appears as but a momentary outbreak of
disappointment. 88
Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the
moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to
condone even contemptuous language. 89 While judges must exercise patience,
lawyers must also observe temperate language as well. At this juncture, we
admonish all lawyers to observe the following canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
"Canon 8.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
"Canon 11.
A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial ocers and should insist on similar conduct by
others."

A lawyer is an ocer of the Court, 90 bound by the law. It is a lawyer's sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. 91
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial oce, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. 92 It is peculiarly incumbent for lawyers to
support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." 93

It may happen that counsel possesses a greater knowledge of the law than the
judge who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims
infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decision. Nevertheless, discipline and
self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for
the orderly administration of justice. 94 Malicious attacks on courts have some cases
been treated as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as a sucient ground
for disbarment. 95 However, mere criticism or comment on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case
made in good faith may be tolerated. 96
This is not to say that courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an ocer of the
court, a lawyer may criticize the court. He must do so in a bona de manner,
uberrima des. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of the courts and of the judges thereof on the other. 97
Unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration is proscribed. 98

The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 100633 is PARTLY GRANTED. The petition in
G.R. No. 101550 is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
20236, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the trial court's order nding Atty.
Sabino Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt of court and imposing on him
imprisonment for ve (5) days, and ordering him to pay a ne of one hundred pesos
(P100.00) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. With admonition to the trial court and
counsel to observe strictly the strictures of the ethics of the profession.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J ., Puno and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J ., took no part.
Footnotes
1.

Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners, however, state that the
petition may be considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in view of
what they submit as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals
(Petition for Review on Certiorari G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 6-45 at p. 6).

2.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 20236, promulgated on June 26, 1991, Torres, Jr., J., ponente,
Francisco and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurring.

3.

In Civil Case No. RTC 88-1587, Judge David C. Naval, presiding.

4.

Quoted from the Decision of the Court of Appeals G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp.
373-374.

5.

Dated April 28, 1989.

6.

Dated April 28, 1989.

7.

Petition for Review on Certiorari ad Cautelam, G.R. No. 101550, Rollo, pp. 6-20.

8.

Raed to Branch 21 thereof (Petition for Review on Certiorari, G.R. No. 100633,
Rollo, pp. 6-45, at p. 10).

9.

Docketed as Civil Case No. RTC 88-1587.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Petition, Annex "A", Complaint, CA Rollo, pp. 33-42.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex "A", Complaint, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 47-56,
at p. 48.
Identified as No. 67 Elias Angeles St., Naga City.
Petition for Certiorari, Annex "A", Complaint, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 47-56,
at p. 49.
"Rey-ves Pub and Restaurant."
Petition for Certiorari, Annex "A" Complaint, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 47-56, at
p. 49.
Peafrancia, Villa Sorabella and San Antonio Subdivisions.

17.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex "A", Complaint, Annex "A", G.R. No. 100633, Rollo,
p. 57.

18.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex "A" Complaint, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 47-56, at
p. 50.

19.
20.

21.

Ibid., p. 51.
Consisting of a two-storey six (6) door commercial building with a market value
of not less than two million ve hundred thousand pesos (P2.5M) situated at
Concepcion Grande, Naga City (Petition for Certiorari, Annex "A" Complaint, G.R.
No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 47-56, at p. 51).
G.R. No. 100633, Petition for Certiorari, Rollo, p. 58; CA Rollo, p. 44.

22.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex "A", Complaint, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 47-56,
at p. 52; Petition for Certiorari, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, p. 59; CA Rollo, p. 45.

23.

Petition for Certiorari Annex "A", Complaint, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 47-56, at
pp. 52-54.

24.

Ibid., p. 55.

25.

OR No. 105494 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Naga City.

26.

As per OR No. 200781 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Naga City.

27.

According to the certication issued by Rosario B. Torrecampo (RTC Clerk of

Court VI) upon the request of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr., dated
November 29, 1989 (Petition for Certiorari Annex "B", Certication, G.R. No.
100633, Rollo, p. 61); CA Rollo, p. 47.

28.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 376;
Petition, Annex "D", Motion to Dismiss, CA Rollo, p. 49.

29.

Petition Annex "H" Rollo, p. 53.

30.

Court of Appeals Decision G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 377.

31.

Citing Rule 70, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.

32.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, CA Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 378;
Petition, Annex "K", Order of December 16, 1988, Rollo, p. 56.

33.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 378; CA
Rollo, Petition, Annex "L", Order of January 16, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 57.

34.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 378;
Petition, citing Motion to Inhibit, CA Rollo, pp. 1-32, at pp. 15-16; Petition, Annex
"M", Motion to Inhibit, CA Rollo, p. 58.

35.

Petition, citing Order of the trial court dated January 23, 1989, CA Rollo, pp. 1-32,
at pp. 16-17; Petition, Annex "N", Order of January 23, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 59.

36.

Petition, Annex "P", Motion to Admit Attached Supplemental Complaint, CA Rollo,

p. 61.

37.

Petition, Annex "P-1", Supplemental Complaint, CA Rollo, p. 62.

38.

Petition, Annex "Q", Order of April 28, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 66.

39.

Petition, Annex "R", Motion to Dismiss Supplemental Complaint, CA Rollo, p. 67.

40.

Petition, Annex "V", Order of July 6, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 71.

41.

Petition, Annex "W", Order of July 12, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 72.

42.

43.
44.

According to the certication issued by Rosario B. Torrecampo (RTC Clerk of

Court VI) upon the request of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr., dated
November 29, 1989 (Petition for Certiorari, Annex "B", Certication, G.R. No.
100633, Rollo, p. 61).
Petition, Annex "X", Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, CA Rollo, p. 73.
Petition, Annex "Y", Opposition to Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, CA Rollo,
p. 74.

45.

Petition, Annex "BB", Order of September 13, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 80.

46.

Petition, Annex "CC", Order of September 15, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 83.

47.

Petition, Annex "DD", Order of September 25, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 84.

48.

Petition, Annex "EE", Opposition to Motion to Declare Defendant in Default in the

Supplemental Complaint, CA Rollo, p. 85.

49.

Dated October 9, 1989, Petition, Annex "FF", Answer to Supplemental Complaint,

CA Rollo, p. 86.

50.

Petition, Annex "GG-1" Order of October 23, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 87.

51.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 385.

52.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 385.

53.

Petition, Annex "HH" Notice of Hearing, Promulgation of Judgment, CA Rollo, p.

88.

54.

Petition, Annex "II", Ex Parte Motion to Reset, CA Rollo, p. 89.

55.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 385.

56.

Petition, Annex "JJ", Order of February 9, 1990, CA Rollo, p. 90.

57.

Order of February 27, 1990, CA Rollo, p. 96.

58.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at pp. 385-387.

59.

According to petitioners, the original complaint alleged that a certain

memorandum of agreement was null and void and should be declared as such,
while the supplemental complaint subsequently led by Deogracias and Rosalina
claimed that they exercised their rights under the memorandum of agreement
earlier assailed but Socorro refused to comply with her obligations thereunder.

60.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, at p. 395.

61.

Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 6-45.

62.

Partial Motion for Reconsideration, CA Rollo, pp. 179-184.

63.

G.R. No. 101550, Rollo, p. 48.

64.

Petition for Review on Certiorari ad Cautelam, G.R. No. 101550, Rollo, pp. 6-20.

65.

G.R. No. 101550, Rollo, p. 50. On May 18, 1992, the Court gave due course to
both petitions, Rollo, p. 93.

66.

G.R. No. 101550, Rollo, pp. 137-167, at pp. 151-152.

67.

159 SCRA 569 [1988].

68.

170 SCRA 274, 285 [1989].

69.

Supra, p. 285.

70.

178 SCRA 221 [1989].

71.

Supra, Note 66, p. 227.

72.

Rule 10, Section 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

73.

Superclean Services Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 327 Phil. 786, 795 [1996].

74.

Aznar Brothers Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 327 SCRA 359 [2000].

75.

Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc . v. Secretary of Labor, 312 SCRA 104, 114
[1999].

76.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395, p. 391.

77.

Arthur Te v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000.

78.

Joseph Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001.

79.

Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 100633, Rollo, pp. 373-395 at p. 393.

80.

Rule 71, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court provides: "The person adjudged in
direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of
the remedies of certiorari or prohibition." (italics ours).

81.

The Court of Appeals rejected the rst ground (i.e. "1. Causing the "Discalced
Carmelite Sisters" to unduly exert pressure on this Presiding Judge to issue exparte the restraining orders prayed for in his motion dated December 8, 1988") as
basis for direct contempt.

82.

Petition, Annex "DD", Order of September 25, 1989, CA Rollo, p. 84.

83.

Oclarit v. Paderanga, G.R. No. 139519, January 24, 2001.

84.
85.

Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, Sixth Revised Edition, 1997, p. 803;
de Guia v. Guarrero, 186 SCRA 339 [1990].

Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716 [1967].

86.

Nazareno v. Barnes , 220 Phil. 451, 463 [1985]; Pacuribut v . Lim, Jr., 341 Phil.
544, 548 [1997].

87.

Austria v. Masaquel, 127 Phil. 677, 690-691 [1967]; Nazareno v. Barnes, supra,
Note 86; Angeles v. Gernale, Jr., 340 Phil. 173 [1997].

88.

People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 994 [1995].

89.

In re: Gomez , 43 Phil. 376 [1922].

90.

City Sheriff, Iligan City v. Fortunado, 351 Phil. 430, 437 [1998].

91.

People v . Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580 [1946]; Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp .
v. Court of Appeals , 355 Phil. 369, 380 [1998]; Tiomico v. Court of Appeals , 304
SCRA 216 [1999]; Pepsi-Cola Products Phils ., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 359 Phil.
859 [1998].

92.

Malcolm's Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 161.

93.

Tiongco v. Aguilar, 310 Phil. 652, 660 [1995].

94.

Malcolm's, op. cit. p. 162.

95.

Malcolm's, op. cit. p. 170.

96.

In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 600 [1949].

97.

Tiongco v. Aguilar, supra, Note 93. citing the first canon of legal ethics.

98.

Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 445 [1967].