United States v. Lopez-Guzman, 10th Cir. (2006)

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F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals


Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

July 18, 2006


Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court

U N TIED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JO SE LOPEZ-G U ZM A N ,

No. 06-3031
(D.C. Nos. 05-CV-3412-SA C and
02-CR-40133-SAC)
(D. Kansas)

Defendant - Appellant.

OR D ER D EN YING LEAVE TO PROCEED


ON APPEAL IN FORM A PAUPERIS,
D EN Y IN G C ER TIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
A ND DISM ISSIN G A PPLIC ATIO N

Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and OBRIEN, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Jose Lopez-Guzman, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 filed a 28
U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. The district

We construe pro se pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318


F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).

court dismissed the motion on January 5, 2006. Lopez-Guzman then petitioned


the district court for a certificate of appealability (COA) and for permission to
proceed in form a pauperis (ifp) on appeal. The court denied both requests. The
application for a COA was denied because Lopez-Guzman failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The court denied his
request to proceed ifp because he failed to show the existence of a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues he raised on
appeal. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3). He renewed his petition for a COA and
leave to proceed ifp in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(B); F ED . R. A PP . P.
22(b)(1), 24(a)(5). W e, too, deny his requests.
Background
On April 20, 2004, Lopez-Guzman w as sentenced to 120 months
imprisonment after pleading guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of
possession with intent to distribute 5.9 kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Pursuant to a reservation in the plea agreement, he filed a
direct appeal alleging the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
W e affirmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 3, 2005. United
States v. Lopez-Guzman, 145 Fed. Appx. 627 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
304 (2005).
On October 26, 2005, Lopez-Guzman filed a motion to vacate, set aside or
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. He claimed the district court
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was w ithout jurisdiction to try or sentence him because his indictment failed to
identify an element of his offense. Specifically, he asserted the indictment failed
to contain subsection (b) of 21 U.S.C. 841, the section which sets forth the
penalty for a violation of 841(a)(1). Lopez-Guzman also claimed his attorney
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in allowing him to plead to a faulty
indictment.
The district court dismissed his motion, concluding it fell within the scope
of his plea agreement waiver, his waiver was knowing and voluntary, and there
would be no miscarriage of justice if the waiver were enforced. As stated above,
the district court also denied Lopez-Guzmans application for a COA and for
leave to proceed ifp on appeal (certifying the appeal was not taken in good faith).
Certificate of Appealability
A COA is a jurisdictional pre-requisite to our review. M iller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). W e will issue a CO A only if Lopez-Guzman
makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C.
2253(c)(2). To make this showing, he must establish that reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved [by the district
court] in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(quotations omitted). Insofar as the district court dismissed his habeas petition on
procedural grounds, Lopez-Guzman must demonstrate both that jurists of reason
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would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id. W here a plain procedural
bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a
reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in
dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed
further. Id. W e review the district courts factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. English v. Cody, 241 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir.
2001).
Lopez-G uzman argues, inter alia, the district court erred in concluding he
had waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence via his plea
agreement. He contends his indictments defect is jurisdictional and he could not
voluntarily plead guilty to an defective indictment. After carefully considering
the record and Lopez-Guzmans arguments, we conclude he has failed to make a
sufficient showing that he is entitled to a COA on any of his claims.
Contrary to his assertions, the indictment states the type of controlled
substance, its weight, and references the penalty section he claims is missing. 2

The indictment stated:

On or about the 13th day of September, 2002, . . . Jose Lopez-Guzman, did


knowingly and intentionally possess, with intent to distribute, approximately
5.9 kilograms of cocaine . . . in violation of Title 21, United States Code,
Section 841(a)(1), with reference to Title 21, United States Code, Sections
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Thus, his counsel was not ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty. In addition,
he admitted to each element of the crime prior to the district courts acceptance of
his plea. Finally, even if the indictment was defective, Lopez-Guzman waived all
non-jurisdictional defenses when he entered his voluntary plea of guilty. United
States v. Flynn, 309 F.3d 736, 739 (10th Cir. 2002). His claimed omission does
not raise jurisdictional implications. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631
(2002) ([T]his Court some time ago departed from [the] view that indictment
defects are jurisdictional.); see also United States v. Pettigrew, 346 F.3d 1139,
1146 (D .C. Cir. 2003) ([T]he omission of drug quantity from jury instructions is
not a jurisdictional error.). Therefore, his objection to the indictment was
waived when he voluntarily entered his guilty plea and fell within the scope of the
plea agreement waiver of his right to collaterally attack his conviction. The
district courts order of dismissal is not reasonably debatable. Slack, 529 U.S. at
484. A ccordingly, w e D EN Y Lopez-Guzmans application for a COA.
Request to Proceed IFP
In addition, we reject Lopez-Guzmans request to proceed ifp on appeal.
W e have previously concluded that 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus and 28
U.S.C. 2255 proceedings, and appeals of those proceedings, are not civil

841(b)(1)(A) and 812, and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.
(R. Vol. I, Doc. 3.)
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actions for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(2) and (b). M cIntosh v. United


States Parole Commn., 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997). However, LopezGuzman remains obligated to comply with, and is subject to, all of the other
provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1915. Id. at 812. This includes a requirement that he
present a reasoned, non-frivolous argument on appeal. DeBardeleben v. Quinlan,
937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991); see 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). Because he has
not satisfied this requirement, his pending request to proceed ifp is DENIED.
Lopez-G uzman is ordered to immediately pay the full filing fee. Kinnell v.
Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001) (dismissal of an appeal does not
relieve appellant of the obligation to pay the appellate filing fee in full).

Entered by the C ourt:


Terrence L. O Brien
United States Circuit Judge

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