United States v. Mendoza-Ramos, 10th Cir. (2001)
United States v. Mendoza-Ramos, 10th Cir. (2001)
United States v. Mendoza-Ramos, 10th Cir. (2001)
TENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 1 2001
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
v.
SALVADOR MENDOZA-RAMOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 00-1349
I.
The facts are set forth in the Plea Agreement and Stipulation of Facts. On
March 9, 2000, highway patrol officers stopped a vehicle near Richfield, Utah. The
occupants of the vehicle were Juan Gomez and Francisco Cortez. After consent was
obtained, a search of the vehicle revealed approximately five pounds of
methamphetamine. Gomez and Cortez told the officers they were transporting the
drugs to Denver, Colorado, for delivery to a person named Chava, and agreed to
cooperate in attempting a controlled delivery of the drugs. Cortez placed two calls to
one of two telephone numbers they had been instructed to call and requested money to
repair their vehicle. The officers verified that the listings for the telephone numbers
were in the name of Mendoza-Ramos. Both of the wire money transfers subsequently
received for vehicle repairs were identified as sent by Mendoza-Ramos. Cortez again
contacted Mendoza-Ramos by telephone on March 11. Mendoza-Ramos asked Cortez
if the things were still with him. Mendoza-Ramos requested that Cortez and Gomez
drive to his house, but Cortez stated he did not know how to get there. MendozaRamos met the occupants at a Burger King in Denver and they followed MendozaRamos to his house, which was under surveillance. The three men went into the house.
Shortly thereafter, Mendoza-Ramos and Gomez came out of the house and Gomez
retrieved the drugs from the vehicle. Mendoza-Ramos was arrested. The officers
Mirandized Mendoza-Ramos in Spanish and he signed a Spanish Miranda form.
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support of a warrantless arrest. Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 n.1 (10th Cir.
1995).
Mendoza-Ramos argues the claims of the cooperating witnesses should not
have been considered as reasonably trustworthy evidence, Br. at 14, and the officers
failed to independently corroborate basic claims by the occupants of the vehicle, Br.
at 17. However, in its oral ruling on the motion to suppress, the district court stated:
It appears that [a] reasonable man would, based on the trustworthy
information, and that's the information in the personal knowledge of the
officers, and I want to emphasize that, the Court has carefully omitted
from consideration matters which were dependent upon statements which
are strictly statements made by the individuals which were not supported
by trustworthy information in the personal knowledge of the officers in
question. . . . . [T]he officers by their own independent investigation and
observation had sufficient information in this Court's opinion to warrant a
prudent man believing that the defendant here . . . was committing or had
committed a criminal offense.
R. Vol. II at 100-01.
Mendoza-Ramos argues this case is similar to United States v. Eylicio-Montoya,
70 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 1995). From his statement that far less information was
provided by the occupants of the vehicle, and even less confirmed, Br. at 21, it
appears he believes Eylicio-Montoya was decided on the grounds of confirmation of an
informant's testimony. However, a reading of the case illustrates that was clearly not
the basis for the court's decision that defendant's arrest was not supported by probable
cause.
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