Frias vs. Bautista-Lozada

EN BANC
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, A.C. No. 6656

Complainant, (formerly CBD-98-591)
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,*
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA and
VELASCO, JJ.
ATTY. CARMELITA S.
BAUTISTA-LOZADA,**
Respondent.
Promulgated:
May 4, 2006
x-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Respondent
Atty.
Carmelita
Bautista-Lozada seeks
reconsideration of our December 13, 2005 resolution finding her

guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
and
of
willfully
disobeying
final
and executory decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending her

from the practice of law for two years.
Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complaint against her
was already barred by prescription. She also asserts that her
December 7, 1990 loan agreement with complainant complied with
Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainant was fully protected.
Respondents contentions have no merit.
Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII,
Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides:
SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years
from the date of the professional misconduct.
However, as early as 1967, we have held that the defense of

prescription does not lie in administrative proceedings against
lawyers.[1] And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos,[2] we declared that
an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not

prescribe.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a
chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of
this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as
the administration of justice. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of
and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of
the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court.This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous
members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing
acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer.[3] (emphasis supplied)
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of

administrative
complaints
against
lawyers
from
this
Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and

control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise
of its delegated power to entertain administrative complaints against
lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and
principles laid down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of
the CBD-IBP which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of
administrative complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the settled
ruling of this Court. It should therefore be struck down as void and

of no legal effect for being ultra vires.
Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid defense,
respondent raised it only at this late stage. We presume she was
familiar with that rule yet she failed to invoke it at the earliest
opportunity. Instead she opted to insist on her innocence.
On the other ground raised by respondent, we have sufficiently
discussed the implications of her loan agreement with complainant
in relation to Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
in our December 13, 2005 resolution. Considering the fiduciary
character of respondents relationship with complainant, the nature
of their agreement and complainants lack of independent advice
when she entered into it, there is neither sufficient ground nor
compelling reason to reconsider our earlier resolution.
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is hereby declarednull and void.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

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EN BANC

BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, A.C. No. 6656

reconsideration of our December 13, 2005 resolution finding her

and executory decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending her

However, as early as 1967, we have held that the defense of

an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not

The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of

Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and

ruling of this Court. It should therefore be struck down as void and

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