Sanchez v. Daniels, 10th Cir. (2006)

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
July 7, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ALEJAN DR O A RT SAN CH EZ,

Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 05-6337
(D.C. No. CIV-04-1040-L)
(W .D. Okla.)
vs.
R .C . D A N IELS; LA RR Y D A MRON;
W ILLIA M R ON PU TM A N ; M IKE
BURGESS; TERESA M ULICAN; J.M .
K ELLY ; V ER N WILSO N ; JA SON
H U STED,
Defendants - Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant Alejandro A rt Sanchez, a state prisoner appearing pro

se, appeals the dismissal of his action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. According to M r.
Sanchez, his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
by Oklahoma law enforcement officers during the course of a traffic stop. The
district court dismissed the action as time-barred by the applicable two-year
statute of limitations. The district court held, on alternative grounds, that M r.
Sanchez claim was also barred by the rule enunciated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we affirm.
Background
M r. Sanchez was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by Oklahoma State
Troopers Vern W ilson and Chance Husted on June 20, 2002. In the course of the
stop, Trooper W ilson determined that M r. Sanchez was wanted on an outstanding
federal warrant, and he arrested M r. Sanchez. Upon the officers request, the
driver granted his consent to search the vehicle. The officers discovered five
bundles of what was later determined to be methamphetamine. Agents D aniels
and Damron, both of the District II M ulti-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force in Elk
City, Oklahoma, arrived at the scene sometime later and participated in the
questioning of M r. Sanchez and the others. M r. Sanchez pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and was sentenced to ten
years imprisonment.
On August 19, 2004, M r. Sanchez filed this 1983 action seeking damages
for violations of his civil rights. The magistrate judges report and
recommendation concluded that his racial profiling claim was time-barred and
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recommended that the motions to dismiss on those grounds be granted. The

magistrate determined that the statute of limitations had not expired with regard
to M r. Sanchezs other claims. The magistrate also recommended that M r.
Sanchezs motion for entry of a default against Officer W ilson and Husted be
denied. 1 As noted above, the district court dismissed all of M r. Sanchez claims
as barred by limitations. The district court also denied M r. Sanchezs m otions to
alter or amend, which sought relief from the judgment of dismissal and to file an
amended complaint.
M r. Sanchez contended that the search and seizure was violative of the
Fourth Amendment on the following grounds: (1) he was subjected to racial
profiling by Troopers W ilson and Husted; (2) Officers D aniel and Damron were
acting outside the scope of their jurisdiction; and (3) the Chief of Police and the
M ayor of Elk City, acting in concert with the Custer County Sheriff and a Custer
County Commissioner, conspired to violate his constitutional rights by permitting
Elk City law enforcement officers to perform arrests outside the citys
jurisdictional limits. On appeal, he challenges the district courts decisions that
the action was barred by limitations and by Heck. He maintains that he should
have been allowed to amend his complaint to overcome H eck by alleging that the
drug evidence against him would have been admissible, regardless of any
constitutional violation. Finally, he contends that the district courts judgment
1
M r. Sanchez has not raised this issue before us on appeal.

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was wrong because he was denied the opportunity for discovery and was not
appointed counsel.
Discussion
W e review a district courts dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo.
See Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 415 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). W e accept all of the plaintiffs
well-pleaded facts as true and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Yanaki, 415 F.3d at 1207. Lastly, such a motion should not be granted unless no
set of facts exist from which the plaintiff would be entitled to relief. Id.
It is well settled that 1983 claims are properly characterized as personal
injury actions for purposes of determining the relevant limitation period. See
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239-41 (1989); M eade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512,
1522-23 (10th Cir. 1988). W e look to the relevant state statute of limitations
applicable to such actions. Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir.
2005). Accordingly, Oklahomas two-year statute of limitations, found in Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 12, 95(3), applies to these claims. Id.
Upon thorough review of the record, we conclude that all of M r. Sanchezs
claims against all of the defendants involve allegations of conduct occurring on
June 20, 2002, more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint. See Beck
v. City of M uskogee Police Dept, 195 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding
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that a plaintiffs claim that the police acted outside their jurisdiction accrued at
the time of the incident). M r. Sanchezs argument that he only learned of the
factual background supporting the claims from a fellow inmate months later is
unavailing. See Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the continuing violation exception is inapplicable in the absence of
governmental action subsequent to the initial interaction). Accordingly, as M r.
Sanchez failed to file his complaint until August 19, 2004, his claims are barred
by the two year statute of limitations. Price, 420 F.3d at 1162 (10th Cir. 2005).
As we uphold the district courts dismissal of the complaint on limitation
grounds, we decline to address its additional and alternative ground that M r.
Sanchezs claim is barred under Heck. As such, we find no error based on the
district courts denial of leave to amend, not allowing discovery or nonappointment of counsel.
AFFIRM ED. M r. Sanchez remains obligated to continue making partial
payments of the filing fee until it is paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.

Circuit Judge
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F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

ALEJAN DR O A RT SAN CH EZ,

OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *

Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. **

Plaintiff-Appellant Alejandro A rt Sanchez, a state prisoner appearing pro

recommended that the motions to dismiss on those grounds be granted. The

M r. Sanchez has not raised this issue before us on appeal.

Paul J. Kelly, Jr.

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