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    United States v. Castellon, 10th Cir. (1999)

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    This document is an appeals court order regarding a defendant, Raul Castellon, appealing his conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, the appeals court found that while the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle he was in directly, he could challenge his initial traffic stop and subsequent detention. However, the court concluded the initial traffic stop was lawful based on the vehicle speeding. The court also found the defendant's subsequent detention was not an unlawful exploitation of the initial stop. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

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    United States v. Castellon, 10th Cir. (1999)

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    Scribd Government Docs
    25 views8 pages
    This document is an appeals court order regarding a defendant, Raul Castellon, appealing his conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, the appeals court found that while the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle he was in directly, he could challenge his initial traffic stop and subsequent detention. However, the court concluded the initial traffic stop was lawful based on the vehicle speeding. The court also found the defendant's subsequent detention was not an unlawful exploitation of the initial stop. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

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    Filed: 1999-09-03 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Docket: 98-1258

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    This document is an appeals court order regarding a defendant, Raul Castellon, appealing his conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, the appeals court found that while the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle he was in directly, he could challenge his initial traffic stop and subsequent detention. However, the court concluded the initial traffic stop was lawful based on the vehicle speeding. The court also found the defendant's subsequent detention was not an unlawful exploitation of the initial stop. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    25 views8 pages

    United States v. Castellon, 10th Cir. (1999)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    This document is an appeals court order regarding a defendant, Raul Castellon, appealing his conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, the appeals court found that while the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle he was in directly, he could challenge his initial traffic stop and subsequent detention. However, the court concluded the initial traffic stop was lawful based on the vehicle speeding. The court also found the defendant's subsequent detention was not an unlawful exploitation of the initial stop. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

    Copyright:

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    of 8

    F I L E D

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

    United States Court of Appeals


    Tenth Circuit

    SEP 3 1999

    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk

    UNITED STATES,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,

    Case No. 98-1258

    v.

    (D.C. No. 92-CR-113)


    (District of Colorado)

    RAUL CASTELLON,
    Defendant-Appellant.

    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*


    Before BRORBY, HOLLOWAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

    Raul Castellon appeals his conviction following a jury trial on one count of
    conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
    841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. He argues the court erred in failing to grant his motion to
    suppress evidence. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On February 11, 1992, acting at the request of the FBI, the Denver police stopped

    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
    orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
    conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    *

    a car in which Mr. Castellon was riding with Rafael Iribe-Perez. Based on conversations
    that it had intercepted between Mr. Iribe-Perez and his brother, Martin, the FBI suspected
    that Martin was collecting money for the head of a drug ring and that the car contained
    cocaine that he had recently purchased
    Denver police officer Gary Salazar testified that he ordered a fellow officer, Ron
    Neiber, to make the stop. According to Officer Salazar, he also told Officer Neiber to
    identify the men inside the car and determine whether they were illegal aliens. Officer
    Salazar added that when the car passed the spot at which he was conducting surveillance,
    it was traveling at a high rate of speed, reason enough to [make the] stop. Rec. supp.
    vol. I at 111.
    Because they did not want to immediately compromise the ongoing drug
    investigation, the law enforcement agents decided in advance to use a ruse of one sort
    or another on the cars occupants. Accordingly, after Rafael Iribe-Perez produced no
    form of identification other than a Mexican birth certificate and Mr. Castellon produced a
    green card, the Denver police officers called agents of the Immigration and Naturalization
    Service (INS) to the scene. The INS agents questioned the two men and informed them
    that they would be taken to an INS detention center twelve miles from the location of the
    stop. The agents explained that they needed to take him into custody in order to verify his
    green card because it looked too new and was of a new series. They also told him that he
    might be suspected of alien smuggling because he was traveling with an illegal alien.
    2

    When Mr. Castellon arrived at the INS detention center, the agents fingerprinted and
    photographed him. One and one-half hours later, after verifying his identification, the
    agents released Mr. Castellon.
    Meanwhile, the police towed the car to the FBI garage. After obtaining a warrant,
    law enforcement agents conducted a search and discovered eight kilograms of cocaine in
    a hidden compartment in the chassis of the car. The agents then decided that, in order to
    continue their investigation, they would continue the ruse. Thus, before releasing Mr.
    Castellon, they informed him that the car had been detained not because they suspected
    that it contained drugs but because it had been driven by an illegal immigrant. As a
    result, they said, the car could be claimed by the proper owner.
    Pursuant to a court authorized wiretap, FBI agents intercepted several telephone
    calls between Mr. Castellon and Mr. Almeida after Mr. Castellons release. Records of
    the calls were introduced at trial to connect Mr. Castellon with the alleged conspiracy.
    Mr. Castellon was charged with violations of 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1) and
    (b)(1)(A) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine on February 28, 1992. At
    trial, he moved to suppress the evidence against him, including evidence found in the
    searched car and his subsequent phone statements. The district court held a hearing and
    denied the motion. Mr. Castellon was subsequently found guilty, and sentenced to 50
    months imprisonment and five years of supervised release.

    II. DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Mr. Castellon argues the district court erred in denying his motion to
    suppress evidence obtained from the search of the car in which he was riding and his
    subsequent phone statements. The government responds that Mr. Castellon lacks
    standing to challenge the search because he was merely a passenger without a property
    interest in the vehicle. Alternatively, the government argues that the law enforcement
    officers complied with the Fourth Amendment.
    When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the
    totality of the circumstances and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    government. See United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 1999). We
    accept the district court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Id.
    The defendant bears the burden of proving that the challenged search was illegal under
    the Fourth Amendment, but the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the
    Fourth Amendment is a question of law we review de novo. Id.
    We begin with the government's contention that Mr. Castellon lacks standing to
    challenge the search. Fourth Amendment protection is a personal right that must be
    invoked by an individual. Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469, 473 (1998). We have
    previously labeled the question of whether an individual is protected by the Fourth
    Amendment as a standing inquiry. See Gordon, 168 F.3d at 1226 n.2. However, as the
    Supreme Court has noted, [i]n order to determine whether a defendant is able to show
    4

    the violation of his (and not someone else's) Fourth Amendment rights, the 'definition of
    those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment
    law than within that of standing.' Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 472 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439
    U.S. 128, 140 (1998)).
    We agree with the government that Mr. Castellon does not have sufficient Fourth
    Amendment interests to challenge the search directly. He must show that he had an
    expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.
    Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472. Here, he has not met his burden of adducing facts at the
    suppression hearing indicating that his own rights were violated by the challenged
    search. Erwin, 875 F.2d at 270 (quoting United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414,
    1418 (10th Cir. 1987)). He claimed neither legitimate ownership nor possession of the
    car. See id. at 271. A passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
    chassis of a car. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49 (Like the trunk of an automobile, [the
    glove compartment and area under the seat] are areas in which a passenger qua passenger
    simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy.). Thus, Mr.
    Castellon may not challenge the search itself.
    Nevertheless, even as a passenger, Mr. Castellon has a sufficient Fourth
    Amendment interest (what we previously called standing) to challenge the initial traffic
    stop and his subsequent detention. It is beyond dispute that a vehicle's driver may
    challenge his traffic stop, and we see no reason why a person's Fourth Amendment
    5

    interests in challenging his own seizure should be diminished merely because he was a
    passenger, and not the driver, when the stop occurred. United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d
    268, 270 (10th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1164
    (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a passenger has standing to challenge a constitutionally
    improper traffic stop, detention, or arrest on Fourth Amendment grounds even though,
    when the seizure occurs, she has no possessory or ownership interest in either the vehicle
    in which she is riding or in its contents).
    Accordingly, we must consider whether the evidence obtained was the fruit of an
    unlawful stop or detention. Even if defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of
    the car, if the initial stop was illegal, the seized contraband is subject to exclusion under
    the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine. Erwin, 875 F.2d at 269 n.2; see also EylicioMontoya, 70 F.3d at 1164 (considering whether evidence was the fruit of a passenger's
    unlawful arrest). The fruit of the poisonous tree inquiry is not a matter of but for
    causation:
    We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because
    it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
    more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary
    illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
    exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
    purged of the primary taint.
    Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted). However, if not even the 'but for' test can be met, then clearly the
    evidence is not a fruit of the prior Fourth Amendment violation." United States v.
    6

    Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting 5 Wayne LaFave, Search and
    Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 11.4(a), at 236-37).
    Here, we conclude that there is no error in the district court's refusal to suppress
    evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In particular, the record supports
    the district court's conclusion that the initial stop of the vehicle was lawful. Officer
    Salazar testified that the vehicle was speeding. Moreover, the evidence submitted by the
    government regarding its investigation of the drug conspiracy established that the law
    enforcement agents had a reasonable suspicion that the car contained cocaine. Thus, the
    initial stop of the car comported with the Fourth Amendment.
    Further, while we have some question as to whether Mr. Castellon was properly
    detained after he produced a valid green card, he has not shown that the evidence he seeks
    to suppress the contents of the car and his subsequent statements was the but for
    result of his detention, regardless of whether the detention itself was legal. Both the car
    evidence and Mr. Castellon's subsequent statements regarding his involvement with the
    car resulted from the detention of the car, not of Mr. Castellon. The police would have
    obtained the very same evidence whether Mr. Castellon had been detained or whether he
    had been allowed to immediately walk away.
    Although Mr. Castellon argues that the police should have released the car to him,
    this argument is without merit. The officers were under no obligation to release the car to
    Mr. Castellon, particularly when it appears from the record that Mr. Castellon did not
    7

    produce any proof of legal entitlement to the car. See United States v. Long, 705 F.2d
    1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1983) (law enforcement officers may impound an automobile until
    the ownership of the vehicle can be ascertained). Finally, we note that the police
    subsequently obtained a search warrant to search the car based on probable cause to
    believe it contained contraband, and Mr. Castellon does not challenge the issuance of that
    warrant on appeal. For the above reasons, the evidence is not fruit of the poisonous tree
    under Wong Sun.

    III. CONCLUSION
    Although we have some concerns about the propriety of Mr. Castellon's detention,
    Mr. Castellon has failed to establish that law enforcement agents obtained the evidence in
    question as a result of that detention. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's denial
    of Mr. Castellon's motion to suppress.

    Entered for the Court,

    Robert H. Henry
    Circuit Judge

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