Brown v. Eardley, 10th Cir. (2006)
Brown v. Eardley, 10th Cir. (2006)
Brown v. Eardley, 10th Cir. (2006)
B RIA N L. B RO WN ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M . EARDLEY, Senior Correctional
O fficer, U SP-Leavenw orth; (FNU)
SEM ICK, Facility Lieutenant,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U ) G A LLY,
Correctional Officer,
USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) M ULLINS,
Correctional Officer,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U ) A SHM AN,
Unit M anager, UPS-Leavenworth;
(FN U) HOW ARD, Correctional
Counselor, U SP-Leavenworth; G. ,
Case M anager, USP-Leavenworth;
(FN U) CAVAJAL, Facility Captain,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U )
NITCHELS, Former Associate
W arden, USP-Leavenworth; HELEN
M ARBERRY, Former Associate
W arden, U SP-Leavenw orth; (FNU)
M ELDNER, Unit M anager,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U ) G O ODIN,
Special Investigator,
USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) RO SALU S,
Special Investigator,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U ) LA CY,
Disciplinary Judge, USP-Leavenworth,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 05-3174
(D.C. No. 04-CV -3216-JW L)
(D . Kan.)
Plaintiff Brian L. Brown, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district courts order dismissing his claims of cruel and unusual punishment
against federal prison personnel, brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unkown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district
court ruled that dismissal was required because M r. Brown had not exhausted his
administrative remedies by completing the prison grievance procedures.
M r. Brown then filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. W e
affirm.
Appellate Jurisdiction
W e have appellate jurisdiction only over the district courts order
dismissing M r. Browns claims. W hile his motion for reconsideration was
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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The district court also ruled on various other motions, none of w hich are
before us in this appeal.
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pleadings will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972). Although we construe liberally M r. Browns pro se pleadings and hold
them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, [he]
must nonetheless set forth sufficient facts to support [his] claims. Diaz v. Paul
J. Kennedy Law Firm, 289 F.3d 671, 674 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110-12 (10th Cir. 1991)). M oreover, this court generally does
not address issues that were not presented to the district court. Wilburn v.
M id-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003).
Discussion
M r. Brown first asserts that his prison grievances w ere exhausted fully
under 28 C.F.R. 542.18. He argues that because his grievances were
emergencies, the wardens response was required within three days, rather than
twenty calendar days. He relies on the following language of 542.18: If the
[A dministrative Remedy] Request is determined to be of an emergency nature
which threatens the inmates immediate health or welfare, the W arden shall
respond not later than the third calendar day after filing. The warden did not
respond within three days of the date he filed any of his six grievances.
Therefore, according to M r. Brown, he is excused from complying with the
grievance procedure time limits.
W e need not address how 542.18s provision for treatment of an emergency
grievance should be applied because even if it should have been applied to
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to process grievances in a timely manner, (2) did not clearly instruct him on how
to meet the filing deadlines, and (3) refused to prepare the necessary letters to
explain that the filing delays were not his fault. W e do not address the merits of
these arguments because they were not presented to the district court or they were
raised for the first time in the post-judgment motion to reconsider. As noted
above, w e decline to consider issues not presented to the district court, and we
have no jurisdiction to review the order denying reconsideration. In making this
determination, we have carefully review ed the record on appeal, particularly
documents 91 and 92, which are M r. Browns response and brief in opposition to
defendants motion to dismiss.
The district court granted M r. Browns motion to proceed without
prepayment of costs and fees. He is reminded that he is obligated to continue
making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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