Filed: Patrick Fisher

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 14 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk
TERRY J. GRIGSBY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 01-7129
v.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, *
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 00-CV-736-S)
Submitted on the briefs:
Gregory L. Johnson, Ardmore, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Sheldon J. Sperling, United States Attorney; Tina M. Waddell, Regional Chief
Counsel, Region VI; Mark J. Kingsolver, Deputy Regional Chief Counsel; and
Una McGeehan, Assistant Regional Counsel, of the SSA-Office of the General
Counsel, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee.
On November 9, 2001, Jo Anne B. Barnhart became the Commissioner of

Social Security. In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Ms. Barnhart is substituted for Larry G. Massanari as the
appellee in this action.
Before EBEL , HOLLOWAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

EBEL , Circuit Judge.
Terry J. Grigsby appeals from the district courts decision affirming the
Commissioners denial of his application for Social Security disability insurance
and supplemental security income benefits. We affirm,
based on our
determination that the 1996 amendments to the Social Security Act, concerning
disability benefits based on alcoholism or drug addiction, apply to Mr. Grigsbys
pending claims.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Grigsby first sought benefits in July 1994, when he filed an application
claiming disability due to scoliosis and collapsed vertebrae. The application was
denied on initial review, on reconsideration, and, following a hearing, on
consideration by an administrative law judge (ALJ). On judicial review, however,
the district court determined that the record contained indications of alcoholism
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-
which the Commissioner had failed to develop.
The court therefore determined
that the case should be remanded to the ALJ for a supplemental hearing so that
Plaintiff can testify as to his current situation with alcohol and to submit
additional medical evidence concerning current status, treatment, etc. for this
alleged alcohol problem. Appellants App. at 264.
The district court also noted that, in 1996, Congress amended the statutory
standards applicable to persons whose condition is affected by alcoholism or drug
addiction. Id. Under the amended provisions, [a]n individual shall not be
considered to be disabled . . . if alcoholism or drug addiction would . . . be a
contributing factor material to the Commissioners determination that the
individual is disabled. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-121, 105(a)(1)(C), 105(b)(1)(I), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(110 Stat.) 847, 852-53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(C),
1382c(a)(3)(I)).
At the time of the district court decision, the amendments were effective
to preclude an award of benefits to individuals whose claims were finally
adjudicated by the Commissioner of Social Security on or after March 29, 1996.
Id. , 105(a)(5)(A), 105(b)(5)(A), at 853-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
Mr. Grigsbys district court case was referred to a magistrate judge, who
issued findings and a recommendation adopted by the district court.
-3-
405 (note), 1382 (note) (1997). Individuals whose claims had been favorably
and finally adjudicated before that date were given a grace period until January 1,
1997, at which time their benefits would cease.
Id.
Based on its interpretation of the amendments effective-date provision, the

district court stated that Mr. Grigsbys possible alcoholism must be categorized
as being disabling on or before 3-2[9]-96 which is the date this condition will no
longer warrant the finding of disability. Appellants App. at 265-66. The
district courts statement was consistent with other cases holding that a claim was
finally adjudicated when a claimant had exhausted administrative remedies, but
had not completed the judicial review process.
688, 695 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996);
See Newton v. Chater , 92 F.3d
Santos v. Chater , 942 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (D. Mass.
1996); but see Torres v. Chater , 125 F.3d 166, 171-72 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding,
with no difficulty, that a case that had been remanded by the district court to
the Commissioner for further adjudication was not finally adjudicated).
By the time the case came before the ALJ on remand, however, Congress
had clarified the effective-date provision. In Technical Amendments Relating to
Drug Addicts and Alcoholics, Congress provided that a claim is not finally
adjudicated if there is pending a request for either administrative
or judicial
review with respect to such claim. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-33, 5525(a)(2)(D)(i), 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 251, 624-25
-4-
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1382 (note) (emphasis added)). The

clarification was to take effect as if included in the 1996 amendments.
5528(c)(i).
Id. ,
On remand to the ALJ, Mr. Grigsby sought benefits from his alleged onset
date of May 15, 1991, through January 1, 1997, the termination date for persons
already receiving disability insurance benefits based on alcoholism. After
receiving additional evidence and conducting another hearing, the ALJ issued
his decision. The ALJ found that Mr. Grigsbys alcoholism was severe enough to
amount to a substance addiction disorder under 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App.
1, 12.09. He determined, however, that Mr. Grigsby was not entitled to benefits
for any period of time because (1) alcoholism was a contributing factor material
to the disability finding, and (2) Mr. Grigsbys claim was not finally adjudicated
before March 29, 1996.
Mr. Grigsby then filed a complaint for judicial review. He conceded that
his disability was attributable to alcoholism and attacked only the applicability of
The initial set of technical amendments specified applicability only to

supplemental security income benefits. Congress did not simultaneously amend
the parallel provisions applicable to disability insurance benefits. Later, it
corrected this omission.
See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 401(a), (c), 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.)
1860, 1906-07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 405 (note)).
3
-5-
the amendments to his request for benefits through January 1, 1997. The district
court affirmed the Commissioners decision and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In challenging the Commissioners decision in this court, Mr. Grigsby
argues that the application of the amended provisions to his claim: (1) violates
the law of the case doctrine and the mandate rule; (2) amounts to an
impermissible retroactive application of the amended statutory provisions; and
(3) infringes upon his equal protection rights. We review the record to determine
whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence and to verify
that the law was correctly applied.
See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 388
(10th Cir. 1995). Applying this standard, we conclude that Mr. Grigsbys
contentions are without merit.
Law of the case and mandate rule
Mr. Grigsby maintains that, under the doctrine of the law of the case and
the mandate rule, the Commissioner was required to award him benefits. The
district courts initial order implied that an award would be forthcoming if the
Commissioner found Mr. Grigsbys possible alcoholism disabling before
March 29, 1996. Generally, once a court decides an issue, the same issue may
not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings in the same case and there must be
compliance with the reviewing courts mandate.
-6-
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah &
Ouray Reservation v. Utah , 114 F.3d 1513, 1520 (10th Cir. 1997). Although
primarily applicable between courts of different levels, the doctrine and the
mandate rule apply to judicial review of administrative decisions, and require[]
the administrative agency, on remand from a court, to conform its further
proceedings in the case to the principles set forth in the judicial decision, unless
there is a compelling reason to depart.
Wilder v. Apfel , 153 F.3d 799, 803
(7th Cir. 1998); see also Brachtel v. Apfel , 132 F.3d 417, 419-20 (8th Cir. 1997).
This court has routinely recognized, however, that application of these
principles is discretionary, not mandatory.
1293, 1299 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Kennedy v. Lubar , 273 F.3d
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Woolsey & Co.
81 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1996) (further quotation omitted)). There are
well-recognized exceptions to both the law of the case doctrine and the mandate
rule. 4 One of these exceptions is triggered by a subsequent, contrary decision of
This court has recently summarized the grounds for departure from both the
law of the case and the mandate rule. There are three exceptionally narrow
reasons to depart from the law of the case: (1) when the evidence in a
subsequent trial is substantially different; (2) when controlling authority has
subsequently made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues; or
(3) when the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice. Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. Pship , 262 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir.
2001) (quoting McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp. , 204 F.3d 1031, 1035
(10th Cir. 2000)). With regard to the mandate rule, a deviation requires
exceptional circumstances, including (1) a dramatic change in controlling
legal authority; (2) significant new evidence that was not earlier obtainable
through due diligence but has since come to light; or (3) if blatant error from
(continued...)
-7-
applicable law by a controlling authority.
Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. Pship
262 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 2001).

Here, Congress enacted clarifying legislation to provide guidance on the
applicability of the amended alcoholism and drug addiction provisions. With the
technical amendments, Congress signaled its plain intent to bar alcoholism-based
benefits for claims in which a request for judicial review was pending after
March 29, 1996.
See OKane v. Apfel , 224 F.3d 686, 691 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating
that Congress explicitly defin[ed] finally adjudicated to exclude claims for

which there is a pending request for judicial review). Thus, intervening
legislation justified the Commissioners reconsideration of the district courts
instructions on the appropriate treatment of Mr. Grigsbys claim for benefits.
The ALJs determination that the 1996 changes in the law preclude an award
of benefits to Mr. Grigsby is not barred by either the law of the case or the
mandate rule.
Retroactivity
The second argument raised by Mr. Grigsby is that application of the 1996
amendments has an impermissible retroactive effect. [T]he general rule is that
courts will not apply [a new] statute in ways that would create new legal
(...continued)
the prior . . . decision would result in serious injustice if uncorrected.
(quoting United States v. Webb , 98 F.3d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1996)).
4
-8-
Id.
consequences for events completed before the statute was enacted.

United States , 254 F.3d 1180, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
Daniels v.
Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods ., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994)). As long as it do[es] so explicitly, however,
Congress has the power to override this traditional presumption and direct the
statutes retroactive application.
Id.
As explained above, the technical amendments make it clear that Congress

deliberately precluded benefits to pending claims.
OKane , 224 F.3d at 692.
We join a number of other circuits and hold there is no impermissible retroactivity

in the application of the amended provisions to claims which were pending in
either the administrative process or on judicial review on March 29, 1996.
Massanari , 254 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2001);
Apfel , 149 F.3d 844, 846 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998);
Ball v.
OKane , 224 F.3d at 691; Adams v.

Torres , 125 F.3d at 170.
Equal Protection
Finally, Mr. Grigsby asserts that the amended provisions violate his equal
protection rights, in that they treat alcoholics with promptly-adjudicated claims
differently from alcoholics with claims still pending as of April 29, 1996. Under
the provisions, members of the first group received benefits from the date of their
application through January 1, 1997. Members of the second group received no
benefits.
-9-
In United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz
, 449 U.S. 166 (1980),
the Supreme Court set out the standard for evaluating equal protection claims
involving social and economic benefits. Where the distinctions drawn by statute
do not burden fundamental constitutional rights or create suspect
classifications, such as race or national origin,
id. at 174, the statute will not
be invalidated on equal protection grounds for being simply . . . unwise or

unartfully drawn, id. at 175. The Courts language in
Fritz indicate[s] the
Courts approval of the rational-basis standard as the appropriate test.

v. Califano , 656 F.2d 569, 573 (10th Cir. 1981);
Johnson
see also Spragens v. Shalala ,
36 F.3d 947, 950 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying the rational basis standard to social
security statutes and regulations permitting a blind recipient of benefits to earn
$600 per month while providing that other recipients lose eligibility if their
earnings exceed $300).
In the instant case, the challenged classification depends upon the timing of
adjudication. Congress has denied benefits to individuals with claims pending as
of March 29, 1996, but allowed a limited grace period for individuals whose
claims were favorably and finally adjudicated before that date. The distinction
involves no suspect class or quasi-suspect class, and it impinges upon no
fundamental right. Thus, the rational basis test applies. Under the rational basis
test, the challenged legislation is presumptively constitutional, and the appellant
-10-
bears the very difficult burden of establishing that the statute is irrational or
arbitrary and that it cannot conceivably further a legitimate governmental
interest. United States v. Phelps , 17 F.3d 1334, 1345 (10th Cir. 1994).
The legislation at issue here is clearly related to a legitimate governmental
goal. The government seeks . . . to discourage alcohol and drug abuse, or at
least not to encourage it with a permanent government subsidy.
Ball , 254 F.3d
at 824. Because social security benefits may be altered or even eliminated at any
time, Fritz , 449 U.S. at 174, it is not constitutionally impermissible for
Congress to have drawn lines between groups of [recipients] for the purpose of
phasing out those benefits,
id. at 177.
Here, Congresss line-drawing withstands rational basis scrutiny. There is

a reasonable basis for the distinction between the two categoriesthe people who
have never obtained payment do not have the need to adjust as do those who have
received benefits in the past.
Torres , 125 F.3d at 170. Mr. Grigsby has not
demonstrated an equal protection violation.

CONCLUSION
The ALJ properly applied the amended provisions when reviewing
Mr. Grigsbys claim on remand. AFFIRMED.
-11-

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F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

On November 9, 2001, Jo Anne B. Barnhart became the Commissioner of

Before EBEL , HOLLOWAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

which the Commissioner had failed to develop.

The court therefore determined

Based on its interpretation of the amendments effective-date provision, the

See Newton v. Chater , 92 F.3d

Santos v. Chater , 942 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (D. Mass.

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1382 (note) (emphasis added)). The

The initial set of technical amendments specified applicability only to

See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 388

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah &

Wilder v. Apfel , 153 F.3d 799, 803

Kennedy v. Lubar , 273 F.3d

Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Woolsey & Co.

applicable law by a controlling authority.

Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. Pship

262 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 2001).

that Congress explicitly defin[ed] finally adjudicated to exclude claims for

consequences for events completed before the statute was enacted.

Landgraf v. USI Film

As explained above, the technical amendments make it clear that Congress

OKane , 224 F.3d at 692.

We join a number of other circuits and hold there is no impermissible retroactivity

OKane , 224 F.3d at 691; Adams v.

In United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

, 449 U.S. 166 (1980),

id. at 174, the statute will not

be invalidated on equal protection grounds for being simply . . . unwise or

Fritz indicate[s] the

Courts approval of the rational-basis standard as the appropriate test.

see also Spragens v. Shalala ,

Ball , 254 F.3d

Here, Congresss line-drawing withstands rational basis scrutiny. There is

Torres , 125 F.3d at 170. Mr. Grigsby has not

demonstrated an equal protection violation.

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