THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197011, January 28, 2015

ESSENCIA Q. MANARPIIS, Petitioner, v. TEXAN PHILIPPINES, INC.,
RICHARD TAN AND CATHERINE P. RIALUBIN-TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the
Decision1 dated March 24, 2010, and Resolution2 dated May 19, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106661. The CA reversed and set
aside the Decision3 dated January 25, 2008 and Resolution4 dated September
22, 2008 of the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 029806-01, which affirmed the Decision 5 dated June
28, 2001 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC Case No. 00-08-04110-2000.
Texan Philippines, Inc. (TPI), which is owned and managed by Catherine
Rialubin-Tan and her Singaporean husband Richard Tan (respondents), is a
domestic corporation engaged in the importation, distribution and marketing
of imported fragrances and aroma and other specialized products and
services. In July 1999, respondents hired Essencia Q. Manarpiis (petitioner)
as Sales and Marketing Manager of the companys Aroma Division with a
monthly salary of P33,800.00.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Claiming insurmountable losses, respondents served a written notice (July
27, 2000) addressed to all their employees that TPI will cease operations by
August 31, 2000.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On August 7, 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
unexpired vacation leave and 13th month pay and with prayer for moral and
actual damages. Subsequently, petitioner amended her complaint to state
the true date of her dismissal which is July 27, 2000 and not August 31,
2000. She averred that on the same day she was served with notice of
company closure, respondents barred her from reporting for work and paid
her last salary up to the end of July 2000.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On September 18, 2000, petitioner received the following memorandum 9:
MEMO TO : MS. ESSENCIA MANARPIIS
Sales and Marketing Manager
Aroma Division

SUBJECT : Notice Of Investigation And Grounding

Dear Ms. Manarpiis,
You are hereby notified that an investigation will be conducted on 20 September 2000 at 2:00 p.m. in our office
regarding your alleged violation of company rules and regulations, specifically:
I (par. B) - - Fraudulent Expense/Disbursement expenses
I (par. G) - - Collusion/Connivance with Intent to Defraud
II (Section 6) - - Sabotage
II (Section 12) - - Loss of Confidence
III (Section 2) - - Libel/Slander
III (Section 8 par. e) - - Other acts of Insubordination
V (par. C & D) - - AWOL/Abandonment
V (par. I) - - Committing other acts of gross inefficiency or incompetence
said acts constitutive of gross misconduct, gross insubordination and dishonesty. You may bring
your witnesses and counsel if you so desire. In the meantime, you will not be allowed to perform
your usual functions, but will instead report to the undersigned.
Additionally, you are directed to submit to the undersigned your explanation in writing, within (72)
hours from receipt hereof (but in no case later than 20 September 2000), why no appropriate
disciplinary action and/or penalties may be imposed against you relative to the foregoing.
Failure to submit said written explanation within the prescribed period and/or attend the
investigation hearing on 20 September 2000 shall constitute an implied admission of the charges
and waiver on your part to due process.
For your information and compliance.
(SGD.) RICHARD TAN
(President)

Petitioner alleged that as sales and marketing manager, she received the
agreed commission based on actual sales collection on the first quarter of
2000 and was expecting to also receive such commission on the 2nd, 3rd and
4th quarters. However, on July 27, 2000, after receiving a text message from
respondent Richard Tan, she proceeded to her office and learned that her
table drawers were forcibly opened and her files confiscated. She protested
the company closure asserting that the alleged business losses were belied
by TPIs financial documents. But despite her pleas, she was asked to pack
up her things and by the end of the month her salary was discontinued. She
then received the memorandum regarding the company closure and was
required to turn over the company car, pager and cellphone. She was told
not to report for work anymore.
After receiving the September 15, 2000 memorandum, petitioners counsel
sent a reply stating that there was no point in the investigation because
respondents already dismissed petitioner purportedly on the ground of
cessation of business due to insurmountable losses, and also it was
impossible for petitioner to respond to the charges which are devoid of
particulars as to the alleged irregularities she committed. It was pointed out
that respondents should have investigated the supposed violations of

company rules and fraudulent acts earlier and not when petitioner had filed
an illegal dismissal complaint.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Subsequently, petitioner received the following memorandum12:
September 25, 2000
TO : MS. ESSENCIA MANARPIIS
Sales and Marketing Manager
Aroma Division
SUBJECT : NOTICE OF TERMINATION
Ms. Manarpiis,
This is to inform you that your employment with the Company is terminated effective today, September 25, 2000,
due to Dishonesty, Loss of Confidence, and Abandonment of Work.
An internal audit of the Company shows that several obligations of the Company were paid twice to the same
supplier. Considering the level of your position, the inescapable conclusion is that you have colluded with the
Company supplier to defraud the Company of its finances.
Moreover, you have fraudulently caused to be reimbursed representation expenses and other expense statements
purporting to be that of your sales representatives while in truth and in fact they were yours, and you received the
corresponding payments therefor.
Also, your attendance record showed that you have been absent without official leave (AWOL) since August 3, 2000
up to date.
A notice of AWOL dated September 14, 2000 has been sent to you but you refused to accept the same, much less,
refused to act on it.
For your information and guidance
(SGD.) RICHARD TAN
President
Believing that her dismissal was without just cause, petitioner prayed for reinstatement if still viable, and if not,
award of separation pay with back wages from August 1, 2000, and payment of her monetary claims for sales
commissions, pro-rated 13th month pay, five days service incentive leave pay and sick leaves, as well as moral and
exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.

Respondents denied the charge of illegal dismissal and explained that TPIs
closure was averted by a new financing package obtained by respondent
Richard Tan. They asserted that the requisite notices of business closure to
government authorities and to their employees were complied with, and
notwithstanding that TPI has in fact continued its operations, petitioner was
found to have committed infractions resulting in loss of confidence which
was the ground for the termination of her employment. They likewise
averred that respondent Rialubin-Tan gave specific instructions to petitioner
for her to continue reporting for work even after August 31, 2000 but she
instead went AWOL and subsequently abandoned her job, to the utmost
prejudice of the company.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On June 28, 2001, LA Melquiades Sol D. Del Rosario rendered a Decision
declaring the dismissal of petitioner as illegal:

CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainants

dismissal to be illegal. Consequently, she should be paid in solidum by respondents the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)
SO ORDERED.15

P304,200.00 as backwages as of May 31, 2001[;]

P101,400.00 as separation pay for 3 years[;]
1% of the gross sales of complainant and .75% on other sales as determined
by the parties as complainants commissions;
10% for and as attorneys fees of the money awards.

Respondents appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the LAs decision. Their
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
In a petition for certiorari filed with the CA, respondents argued that the
subsequent termination of petitioner on the grounds of dishonesty, loss of
confidence and abandonment, after TPI was able to regain financial viability,
was made in view of the fact that commission of the said offenses surfaced
only during the audit investigation conducted after notice of cessation of
business operation was sent to the employees. Despite advice for her to
continue reporting for work after August 31, 2000, the effectivity date of the
intended closure, petitioner just stopped doing so and instead filed the
complaint for illegal dismissal and likewise failed to turn over all company
documents and records in her possession. They also discovered that
petitioner put up her own company Vita VSI Scents, enticing clients to buy
the same products they used to purchase from TPI.
By Decision dated March 24, 2010, the CA reversed the NLRC and ruled that
petitioner was validly dismissed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated January 25, 2008
and the Resolution dated September 22, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, Essencia Manarpiis complaint for illegal
dismissal against Texan Philippines, Inc., Richard Tan and Catherine Realubin-Tan is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.16

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition arguing that the CA committed patent reversible errors
when it: (1) granted the unverified/unsworn certification of non-forum
shopping accompanying respondents petition for certiorari; (2) granted
respondents petition for certiorari without finding any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of NLRC; (3) disturbed the consistent factual findings of
the LA and NLRC which were duly supported by substantial evidence and
devoid of any unfairness and arbitrariness; and (4) substituted its own
findings of facts to those of the LA and NLRC, the CAs findings being
unsupported by substantial evidence.17chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petition is meritorious.
We first address petitioners contention on the alleged formal infirmity of the
petition for certiorari filed before the CA. Petitioner argued that the same

was defective as the jurat therein was based on the mere community tax
certificate of respondent Rialubin-Tan, instead of a government-issued
identification card required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Such
ground was never raised by herein petitioner in her comment on the CA
petition, thus, it cannot be validly raised by the petitioner at this stage.
Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a
formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance
that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court
may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied
with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the Rules of Court and settled doctrine, a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. As
a rule, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive, and this Court
will not review them on appeal.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
However, there are instances in which factual issues may be resolved by this
Court, to wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the CA
goes beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings of fact of the CA
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact of the
CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Considering that the findings of facts and the conclusions of the CA are
contrary to those of the LA and the NLRC, we find it necessary to evaluate
such findings.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, both the LA and NLRC found no just or
authorized cause for the termination of petitioners employment.
LA Del Rosario observed that respondents flip-flopped on the issue of
petitioners termination as when they claimed she was dismissed due to
insurmountable losses so that TPIs personnel were notified of the company
closure effective August 31, 2000, and at the same time they accused

petitioner of fraudulent acts and abandonment of work resulting in loss of

trust and confidence which caused her dismissal. He also found there was no
compliance with the legal requisites of the said grounds for dismissal under
Article 283 (business closure) such as the lack of termination report sent to
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), financial documents
which are audited and signed by an independent auditor, and the two-notice
requirement sent to the last known address of the employee alleged to have
abandoned work under Book V, Rule XIV, Section 2 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. It was noted that while TPIs financial
documents have BIR stampmark, they were not shown to have been
prepared by an independent auditor.
The NLRC upheld the LAs ruling that petitioners dismissal was not
valid, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As between the above, conflicting allegations, We find the version of the
complainant more credible. Record of the instant case would provide that
other than respondents bare allegations that complainant was instructed to
continue working even beyond 31 August 2000, no evidence was presented
to substantiate the same. If respondents could easily issue a notice of
business closure to all its employees, and at the same time, immediately
require the complainant to surrender all company properties assigned to her,
We could not understand why they could not easily issue another letter, this
time, intended only for the complainant informing her that her employment
was still necessary.
Relative to the companys closure due to business losses, prevailing
jurisprudence would dictate that the same should be substantiated by
competent evidence. Financial statements audited by independent external
auditors constitute the normal method of proof of the profit and loss
performance of the company. To exempt an employer [from] the payment of
separation pay, he or she must establish by sufficient and convincing
evidence that the losses were serious, substantial and actual x x x.
In the instant case, respondents may have presented before the Labor
Arbiter its Statement of Income for the year 1999. While its preparation may
be in compliance with the requirements of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
taxation purposes, based on the jurisprudence provided above, the same
would not suffice for purposes of respondents defense in the instant case. In
their appeal, respondents alleged that on the basis of the audited Statement
of Income and Retained Earnings For the Year Ending 31 December 2000, the
company incurred a net loss of almost half a million pesos. Assuming the
same to be true since we cannot find a copy of said statement attached to
[the] record, it would appear that the company had attained a better position
in year 2000 as compared to year 1999 when they incurred a net loss of
more than Two Million Pesos. Furthermore, said evidence is already
immaterial considering that the companys intended closure did not actually

take effect.
Upon a finding that complainant was not instructed to continue working even
beyond 31 August 2000 but was told not to report to work upon receipt of
the notice of companys closure, it certainly follows that respondents would
no longer inform complainant of the companys continued operation after
respondent Tan had allegedly succeeded in searching for funds. In fact, We
are not even persuaded that the companys closure was prevented by the
new funds sought by respondent Tan when in the first place, there was no
intended closure at all but only a decision to dismiss complainant in a
manner that would enable respondents evade liabilities under the Labor
Code.
With regard to the alleged violation of company rules and regulations, We
agree with the finding that respondent[s] acts of issuing the two notices
setting the case [for] investigation were mere afterthoughts. As highlighted
in the assailed Decision, the first notice was issued after respondents had
already received the summons in the instant case. More importantly, the
above discussion would provide that prior to issuance of said first notice,
complainant was already illegally dismissed. Furthermore, assuming for the
sake of argument that complainant was not yet terminated, a reading of the
said first notice would show that it does not conform with the requirements
of due process. The same had failed to discuss the circumstances under
which each of the charges therein was committed by the complainant. As
can be noted from the letter dated 19 September 2000 sent by
complainants counsel to respondent Tan, it was impossible for his client to
submit a written explanation thereto since the notice to explain is devoid of
particulars regarding the alleged irregularities.
As a consequence of complainant[s] double termination, initially through the
purported cessation of business operations, and thereafter, by imputing
offenses violative of company rules and regulations, we agree with the
finding [that] she was illegally dismissed, and as such, entitled to
backwages. She would have been entitled to reinstatement but we believe
that the charges lodged by the respondents against the complainant had
rendered reinstatement non-viable. Thus, she should be granted separation
pay instead.22 (Citations omitted)
The CA, however, considered the evidence of respondents sufficient to prove
the alleged business losses and their good faith in resorting to closure of the
company. It cited the 1999 Annual Income Tax Return showing a net loss of
P2,290,580.48 and financial statement indicating a net loss of P2,301,228.61
for the year ended December 31, 1999; respondents claim that it was forced
to sell six company cars; and the DOLE termination report.
On the other grounds invoked by respondents to justify petitioners

termination, the CA cited the following infractions: (a) several company

obligations towards a supplier which were paid twice during her term as
Marketing and Sales Manager; (b) company funds procured by petitioner,
represented to be under the table expenditures for the Bureau of Customs
which she cannot explain when queried; (c) divulging confidential company
matters to the customers; and (d) establishing her own company while still
employed with TPI.
We reverse the CA and reinstate the LAs decision as affirmed by the NLRC.
Closure or cessation of business is the complete or partial cessation of the
operations and/or shut-down of the establishment of the employer. It is
carried out to either stave off the financial ruin or promote the business
interest of the employer. Closure of business as an authorized cause for
termination of employment is governed by Article 28323 of the Labor Code,
as amended.
If the business closure is due to serious losses or financial reverses, the
employer must present sufficient proof of its actual or imminent losses; it
must show proof that the cessation of or withdrawal from business
operations was bona fide in character.24 A written notice to the DOLE thirty
days before the intended date of closure is also required, the purpose of
which is to inform the employees of the specific date of termination or
closure of business operations, and which must be served upon each and
every employee of the company one month before the date of effectivity to
give them sufficient time to make the necessary
arrangement.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The ultimate test of the validity of closure or cessation of establishment or
undertaking is that it must be bona fide in character. And the burden of
proving such falls upon the employer.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After evaluating the evidence on record, we uphold the factual findings and
conclusions of the labor tribunals that petitioner was dismissed without just
or authorized cause, and that the announced cessation of business
operations was a subterfuge for getting rid of petitioner. While the
introduction of additional evidence before the NLRC is not proscribed, the
said tribunal was still not persuaded by the company closure purportedly
averted only by the alleged fresh funding procured by respondent Tan, for
the latter claim remained unsubstantiated. The CAs finding of serious
business losses is not borne by the evidence on record. The financial
statements supposedly bearing the stamp mark of BIR were not signed by an
independent auditor. Besides, the non-compliance with the requirements
under Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended, gains relevance in this
case not for the purpose of proving the illegality of the company closure or
cessation of business, which did not materialize, but as an indication of bad

faith on the part of respondents in hastily terminating petitioners

employment. Under the circumstances, the subsequent investigation and
termination of petitioner on grounds of dishonesty, loss of confidence and
abandonment of work, clearly appears as an afterthought as it was done only
after petitioner had filed an illegal dismissal case and respondents have been
summoned for hearing before the LA.
We have laid down the two elements which must concur for a valid
abandonment, viz: (1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor being manifested by some overt acts.27 Abandonment as a just ground
for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
perform his employment responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to work,
even after notice to return, is not tantamount to
abandonment.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Furthermore, it is well-settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint
for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of his
desire to return to work, thus, negating the employers charge of
abandonment.29 An employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot
logically be said to have abandoned his work.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Abandonment in this case was a trumped up charge, apparently to make it
appear that petitioner was not yet terminated when she filed the illegal
dismissal complaint and to give a semblance of truth to the belated
investigation against the petitioner. Petitioner did not abandon her work but
was told not to report for work anymore after being served a written notice
of termination of company closure on July 27, 2000 and turning over
company properties to respondent Rialubin-Tan.
On the issue of loss of confidence, we have held that proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not needed to justify the loss as long as the employer
has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded of his position.31 Nonetheless, the right of an
employer to dismiss employees on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence, however, must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just
cause. Unsupported by sufficient proof, loss of confidence is without basis
and may not be successfully invoked as a ground for dismissal. Loss of
confidence as a ground for dismissal has never been intended to afford an
occasion for abuse by the employer of its prerogative, as it can easily be
subject to abuse because of its subjective nature, as in the case at bar, and
the loss must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant
the employees separation from work.32chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Here, loss of confidence was belatedly raised by the respondents who

initiated an investigation on the alleged irregularities committed by
petitioner only after the latter had questioned the legality of her earlier
dismissal due to the purported company closure. As correctly observed by
the NLRC, assuming to be true that respondents had not yet actually
dismissed the petitioner, the notice of cessation of operations (memo dated
July 27, 2000) addressed to all employees never mentioned the supposed
charges against the petitioner who was also never issued a separate
memorandum to that effect. Moreover, the turn over of company properties
by petitioner on the same date as demanded by respondent Rialubin-Tan
belies the latters claim that she verbally instructed the former to continue
reporting for work in view of the audit of the companys finances. Indeed,
considering the gravity of the accusations of fraud against the petitioner, it is
strange that respondents have not at least issued her a separate
memorandum on her accountability for the alleged business losses.
To prove the dishonesty imputed to petitioner, respondents submitted before
the NLRC a letter dated August 4, 2000 from one of TPIs suppliers advising
the company of a supposed double payment made in February and March
2000. However, there is no showing that such payment was made or ordered
by petitioner, and neither was it shown that this overpayment was reflected
in the account books of TPI. Respondents likewise failed to prove their
accusation that petitioner put up a competing business while she was still
employed with TPI, and their bare allegation that petitioner divulged
confidential company matters to customers. As to the supposed failure of
petitioner to account for funds intended for under the table transactions at
the Bureau of Customs, the same was never raised before the labor tribunals
and not a shred of evidence was presented by respondent to prove this
allegation.
Apropos we recall our pronouncement in Lima Land, Inc., et al. v.
Cuevas33:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a final note, the Court is wont to reiterate that while an employer has its
own interest to protect, and pursuant thereto, it may terminate a managerial
employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay off an employee
must be exercised without abuse of discretion. Its implementation should be
tempered with compassion and understanding. The employer should bear in
mind that, in the execution of the said prerogative, what is at stake is not
only the employees position, but his very livelihood, his very breadbasket.
Indeed, the consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally
adequate evidence that the dismissal was for justifiable cause. Thus, when
the breach of trust or loss of confidence alleged is not borne by
clearly established facts, as in this case, such dismissal on the cited
grounds cannot be allowed.34 (Emphasis supplied)

The normal consequences of petitioners illegal dismissal are reinstatement

without loss of seniority rights, and payment of back wages computed from
the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement.
Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service should be awarded
as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of
back wages.35 Given the strained relations between the parties, the award of
separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.
Finally, on the solidary liability of respondents Richard Tan and Catherine
Rialubin-Tan for the monetary awards. It is basic that a corporation being a
juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and employees.
Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporate agents are not theirs
but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. However, in
certain exceptional situations, solidary liability may be incurred by corporate
officers. In labor cases for instance, this Court has held corporate directors
and officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of
employment of employees done with malice or bad
faith.36chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We sustain the NLRCs conclusion that the schemes implemented by the
respondents to justify petitioners baseless dismissal, and the manner by
which such schemes were effected showed malice and bad faith on their
part. Consequently, its affirmance of the order of the LA that the amounts
awarded to petitioner are payable in solidum by respondents is proper. The
NLRC likewise correctly upheld the award of attorneys fees considering that
petitioner was assisted by a private counsel to prosecute her illegal dismissal
complaint and enforce her rights under our labor laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 24, 2010
and Resolution dated May 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
106661 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated June 28, 2001 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 0008-04110-2000, as affirmed by the Decision dated January 25, 2008 of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. 029806-01, is
hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

Rollo, pp. 82-106. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and

concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Mario V. Lopez.
2

Id. at 48-51.

Id. at 68-77. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go and concurred in by

Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B.
Velasco.
4

Id. at 78-79.

Records (Vol. 1), pp. 195-208. Penned by Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D.
Del Rosario.
6

Id. at 15, 52, 93-95.

Id. at 28.

Id. at 2, 8-10.

Id. at 31-32.

10

Id. at 15-16.

11

Id. at 33-34.

12

Id. at 35.

13

Id. at 21.

14

Id. at 51-66.

15

Id. at 207-208.

16

Rollo, p. 105.

17

Id. at 27-28.

18

Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing, G.R. No. 186720, February 8,
2012, 665 SCRA 534, 543.
19

Id. at 546, citing Bello v. Bonifacio Security Services, Inc., G.R. No. 188086,
August 3, 2011, 655 SCRA 143, 147-148.
20

Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) v. Pulgar, 637 Phil. 244,

251 (2010), citing Amigo v. Teves, 96 Phil. 252 (1954).

21

Macahilig v. National Labor Relations Commission, 563 Phil. 683, 690

(2007).
22

Rollo, pp. 73-75.

23

Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.

The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to
the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. x x x In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one-half (1/2) month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
(6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
24

Reahs Corporation v. NLRC, 337 Phil. 698, 705 (1997), citing Catatista v.
NLRC, 317 Phil. 54 (1995) and Maya Farms Employees Organization v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 106256, December 28, 1994, 239 SCRA 508.
25

Galaxie Steel Workers Union (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU) v. NLRC, 535 Phil. 675,

685 (2006), as cited in Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. v. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc.
Employees Union-Olalia, G.R. Nos. 173154 & 173229, December 9, 2013,
711 SCRA 618, 627-628.
26

Espina v. Court of Appeals, 548 Phil. 255, 275 (2007), citing Mac Adams
Metal Engineering Workers Union-Independent v. Mac Adams Metal
Engineering, 460 Phil. 583, 590 (2003) and J.A.T. General Services v. NLRC,
465 Phil. 785, 795 (2004).
27

Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor

(TEA-SPFL) v. NLRC, 338 Phil. 681, 686 (1997), citing Labor v. NLRC, 318 Phil.
219, 240 (1995).
28

GSP Manufacturing Corporation v. Cabanban, 527 Phil. 452, 454 (2006),

citing R.P. Dinglasan Construction, Inc. v. Atienza, 477 Phil. 305, 314
(2004); Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506, 516 (2003); Phil.
Industrial Security Agency Corp. v. Dapiton, 377 Phil. 951, 959 & 960 (1999);
and Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Bandolino v. NLRC, 341 Phil. 635, 646
(1997).

29

Concrete Solutions, Inc./Primary Structures Corporation v. Cabusas, G.R. No.

177812, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 44, 56-57, citing New Ever Marketing, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 575, 587 (2005).
30

GSP Manufacturing Corporation v. Cabanban, supra note 28, at 455.

31

P.J. Lhuillier Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 497 Phil. 298, 311
(2005), citing Reyes v. Zamora, 179 Phil. 71, 89 (1979).
32

Id. at 311-312, citing Hernandez v. NLRC (Fifth Division), 257 Phil. 275, 282
(1989), and Labor v. NLRC, supra note 27, at 242.
33

635 Phil. 36 (2010).

34

Id. at 53-54, citing Marival Trading, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 552 Phil. 762, 782 (2007), and Fujitsu Computer Products
Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 697, 728 (2005).
35

Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, 634 Phil. 364, 369-370 (2010),

citing Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines and/or Lindsay, 597
Phil. 494, 501 (2009).
36

Alba v. Yupangco, G.R. No. 188233, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 503, 507-508,
citingMAM Realty Development Corporation v. NLRC, 314 Phil. 838, 844-845
(1995).