United States v. Chacon-Rascon, 10th Cir. (2009)

FILED
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
April 3, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSE LUIS CHACON-RASCON,
No. 08-2046
(District of New Mexico)
(D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00795-LH)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and

McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
On December 9, 2005, Jose Chacon-Rascon, the defendant, was convicted in

Curry County, New Mexico on his plea of guilty to a state charge of Criminal
Sexual Penetration in the Fourth Degree (a felony), and he was ultimately given a
deferred sentence. Shortly thereafter, on January 10, 2006, he was deported to
Mexico. On April 24, 2007, defendant was charged in a one-count indictment
filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico with
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
reentry into the United States, after having been deported from the United States,
in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b). On June 6, 2007, the defendant pled
guilty to the indictment.
The presentence report set defendants base offense level at 8, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(a) and then increased his base offense level by 16 levels,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because he previously had been convicted
of a crime of violence resulting in his deportation. He then received a three-level
reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, resulting in a total offense level of 21.
In connection with his criminal history category, defendant received one
point for his conviction of criminal sexual penetration of a child, which resulted in
his deportation, and received two additional criminal history points, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d), because he had reentered the United States while under a
criminal justice sentence. With a criminal history category of II and an offense
level of 21, his guideline range was imprisonment for 41 to 51 months. The
defendant asked for a downward variance, which the district court granted when it
sentenced defendant to imprisonment for 33 months. The defendant appeals the
sentence thus imposed.
On appeal, the defendant raised three issues:
(1) the district court erred in calculating defendants criminal history
category;
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(2) the district court erred in calculating defendants offense

level, and
(3) the district courts sentence of 33 months imprisonment was
unreasonable under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
I.
The defendant first argues that the district court committed plain error in
calculating defendants criminal history category by adding two points under
U.S.S.G. 4 A1.1(d) for committing the instant offense (re-entry) while under a
criminal justice sentence. In this Court, the defendant argues that a deferred
sentence is not a criminal justice sentence. Counsel in his reply brief concedes
that this particular issue was not raised in the district court, and that therefore the
issue cannot be raised on appeal unless it is an error that was plain, meaning
clear or obvious and affecting substantial rights. If these requirements are met,
we, in our discretion, may correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. A.B., 529
F.3d 1275, 1280 (10 th Cir. 2008). This Court has held that deferred sentences
under Oklahoma, Colorado and Utah State law constitute criminal justice
sentences under U.S.S.G. 4 A1.1(d). See United States v. Vela, 992 F.2d 1116
(10 th Cir. 1993); United States v. Norman, 129 F.3d 1393, 1401 (10 th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10 th Cir. 2002).
In sum, our
study of the present record leads us to conclude that the defendant has failed to
-3-
show the district court committed plain error.

II.
As stated, the district court followed the recommendation of the presentence
report that defendants base offense level of 8 be raised by 16 levels pursuant to
U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). In the district court, and in this Court, counsel
argues that defendants conviction in the New Mexico state court for criminal
sexual penetration of a child did not constitute a crime of violence, and that, in
fact, the sexual penetration was consensual and not forcible.
U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) states that statutory rape is a crime of
violence. Counsel concedes that the guideline so reads, but argues that such is
inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. 16 which reads as follows:
16. Crime of violence defined
The term crime of violence means
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense.
On appeal, counsel agree that U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 (b)(1)(A) is broader than
18 U.S.C. 16. In that connection, the United States on appeal cites, inter alia,
United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d 1127 (10 th Cir. 2006), where we
held that the defendants prior California conviction for unlawful sexual
-4-
intercourse with a minor constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the

Sentencing Guideline applicable to sentencing for illegal re-entry. Counsel also
cites United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 867 (3 rd Cir. 1992) where that Circuit
spoke as follows: We therefore hold that even if the definition of crime of
violence in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 is broader than that in 18 U.S.C. 16, the
Commissions definition is permissible under the authorizing statute. In short,
the district court did not err in adding 16 levels to defendants base offense level
pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 (b)(1)(A).
III.
Counsel also asserts on appeal that defendants sentence of imprisonment
for 33 months, which was below the guideline range of imprisonment of 41 to 51
months, was unreasonable. We disagree. The sentence imposed was in our view
most reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); United States v.
Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 2006).
Judgment affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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FILED

United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and

On December 9, 2005, Jose Chacon-Rascon, the defendant, was convicted in

(2) the district court erred in calculating defendants offense

show the district court committed plain error.

intercourse with a minor constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the

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