United States v. Dickey, 10th Cir. (2009)
United States v. Dickey, 10th Cir. (2009)
United States v. Dickey, 10th Cir. (2009)
Clerk of Court
v.
NATHAN DICKEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Procedural Background
In 2003, Mr. Dickey pled guilty to various offenses, including three counts
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C). In preparing the presentence report,
the probation officer applied the 2002 United States Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) and determined Mr. Dickeys possession with intent
to distribute 49.7 grams of crack cocaine warranted a base offense level of 30.
The probation officer then enhanced his base offense level two levels for his
managerial and leadership roles in those offenses and also reduced his base
offense level three levels for acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level
of 29. Mr. Dickeys total offense level of 29, combined with his criminal history
category of IV, resulted in a Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months
imprisonment. The district court sentenced Mr. Dickey at the low end of the
Guidelines range to 121 months on all counts, to run concurrently, which he did
not appeal.
On February 25, 2008, Mr. Dickey filed the instant motion to modify his
sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 706 to U.S.S.G.
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2D1.1(c) which modified the Drug Quantity Table downward two levels for
crack cocaine and became effective November 1, 2007, and retroactive as of
March 3, 2008. 1 In his motion, Mr. Dickey also argued for a downward variance
based on the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), asking for a reduced
sentence of sixty months imprisonment and asserting the Supreme Courts
decisions in Kimbrough v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007),
and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), supported such a reduction.
of 100 months was appropriate. It did not otherwise address that portion of Mr.
Dickeys 3582 motion requesting a downward variance based on the 3553(a)
sentencing factors, which we construe as a denial of his request for such a
variance.
II. Discussion
Mr. Dickey now appeals the district courts failure to grant that portion of
his 3582 motion requesting a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). In
so doing, he claims the district court erred in reducing Mr. Dickeys sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), by treating the amended guidelines sentencing
range as mandatory, contrary to United States v. Booker, without taking into
consideration the sentencing factors in 3553(a). In support, he asserts that when
the district court granted his 3582(a) motion he was placed in the same position
as if his sentence had been vacated following an appeal or the district court had
granted a 2255 motion, so that his original sentence was vacated and a new one
should have been imposed applying the 3553(a) factors. While Mr. Dickey
acknowledges we rejected the same argument in United States v. Rhodes, 549
F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 21, 2009) (No. 08-8318),
he advises he brings this appeal in order to preserve his right to contest any
adverse holding on the argument presented. He also argues that the United States
Sentencing Commissions recent 2008 revision to U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b) violates
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As Mr. Dickey acknowledges, his appeal must fail pursuant to our prior
precedent. In Rhodes, we explained Booker made the Guidelines advisory so
district courts, when conducting original sentencing proceedings, are no longer
bound by the sentencing ranges prescribed in the Guidelines. 549 F.3d at 839.
However, in considering whether the holding in Booker applied to a resentencing,
like here, we held 3582(c)(2) does not permit resentencing based on 18 U.S.C.
3553 factors and objectives, but is much more limited, authorizing a district
court to reduce the term of imprisonment only if such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. at
840 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)). Similarly, in United States v. Sharkey, this
court rejected the same argument Mr. Dickey presented to the district court that
3582(c)(2) authorizes a sentence reduction based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)
factors and the Supreme Courts decision in Kimbrough. See 543 F.3d 1236, 1239
(10th Cir. 2008). Even before Rhodes and Sharkey, this court held 3582(c)(2)
motions may not be employed to present Booker-type claims, as 3582(c)(2)
only expressly allows a reduction where the Sentencing Commission, not the
Supreme Court, has lowered the [sentencing] range. United States v. Price, 438
F.3d 1005, 1007 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2006).
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III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district courts order denying that
portion of Mr. Dickeys motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for a
downward variance under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).
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