Freedom of Information Act Requests, Form #09.030
Freedom of Information Act Requests, Form #09.030
Freedom of Information Act Requests, Form #09.030
3. Duplication
a. Duplication copy for requesters.
b. Paper copy microfiche, audiovisual.
c. Magnetic tape or disc.
d. Not duplicating for internal use.
A. Requires that 5 USC (a) (2) records created after November 1, 1996 be
made available to the public by computer telecommunications or other
electronic means.
1. Establishes a new category of (a) (2) record (a) (2) (d). which are records
released under a FOIA request, and which may become the subject of fature FOIA
requests
2. Requires that an index of (a) (2) (D) records be made available to the public by
December 31, 1999
0. Advance payment.
1. Cannot collect, unless requester failed to pay in timely fashion (i.e. 30 calendar
days), or fee estimated to exceed $250.00.
2. If fee exceeds $250.00 notify and insure payment ifrequester has no prompt
payment history.
P. Fee Guidance
1. Aggregating Requesters:
a. Attempts to breakup requests below threshold.
b. Time frame and subject matter.
c. Determine if requester is attempting to avoid fees, may aggregate multiple
requests and charge.
2. Debt collection of 1982 (PL 97-365)
a. May charge interest for outstanding fees beyond 30 calendar days.
b. Rate prescribed by title 31 U.S.C. Section 3717.
c. Must send one demand letter and allow 30 calendar days to expire.
d. May submit to finance and accounting office for collection.
Q. Commercial Requesters
1. Commercial purpose, trade, profit interest.
2. Determine use to which requester will put the document.
3. Charges for search, review and duplication.
4. Not entitled to two hours and 100 pages free.
Please read the next three pages from the Department of Treasury Internal
Revenue Service.
Distnct
Director
P.er.son to..Contact:
Y a1ene
Mazur
Telephone Number:
(512) 499-5030
Refer Reply to:
E:DISC:FOIA # 1998-473
Date
~UL
o 6 1998
Dear Mr.
This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request dated June 18, 1998, and
received in our office on June 22, 1998. We are unable to respond to your request for
information.
While the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provides for access by the public to records
maintained by the Federal government, the Statement of Procedural Rules, copy enclosed, sets
forth certain requirements which must be met in order for a request to be processed. As
submitted, your request fails to meet several of these requirements.
A request under the Freedom of Information Act must:
-2-
-3-
If you have any questions, please contact the Disclosure Office at (512) 499-5030.
Disclosure Officer
Enclosures
A. Many of us have received this exact letter or a version of it. If you have
been sending out FOIA request then you may have received one of these
letters yourself.
B. The 3rd paragraph down gives you what a request must contain which
needs to be customized to your request.
C. In the first paragraph on page 8 : Important points to remember:
1. Do not ask for interrogatories or in other words you do not ask questions.
2. Do not ask them to do research.
3. You are only to ask for specific documents.
D. Third paragraph: here they are bringing up the 16th amendment, which is
of no concern to most average Americans. Like the Tax cases proclaim,
"The 16th amendment gave congress no new taxing powers."
E. In the FOIA request in question we only asked for certain specific
documents, which are not contained in the code. See first full paragraph
at the top of page 8.
F. This is just one of the many ways they try to side step your request.
G.
For more information order items #110 and #145 on our literature list and
read where they actually teach Disclosure Officers to lie and to send you
the wrong information.
10
C. When you read this section, make sure you have your yellow marker.
1. Be sure to read this section more than once.
2. Don't just skim through this. Mr. Wichmann III spent untold hours putting this
article together to enlighten and educate us. Take advantage of this.
The FOIA processs is not a flashy overnight "silver bullet" that is going
to cost you thousands of dollars for "hype" promoted by some ex-used
car salesmen. And there are a lot of them out there.
F.
11
1.\TRODCCTIO~
INTRODUCTION
On June 10, 1997, Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt, a former leader ofthe Black Panther Party \vho had been
convicted in 1972 of a 1968 murder-robbery, was freed on bail after a California state judge ordered a
new trial.:! The new trial order represented the culmination of more than t\vo decades of appeals and
denied writs.~ Pratt, who has always maintained his innocence, asserted that he was framed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as part of an attempt to destroy the Black Panthers. 6 The judge
granted Pratt a new trial because his conviction was "tainted by the prosecutor's failure to
reveal that a crucial witness was also a police and FBI informer."~ Critical to Pratt's receiving a new trial
I
'
\vere several requests made under the Freedom oflnforrhation Act (FOIA). :s Pratt's FOIA requests
revealed that Julius Butler, a key prosecution witness \vho had testified that Pratt had confessed to
committing the murder, had provided police and FBI agents with information on the Black Panthers for
9/18/2001
12
almost two and a half years preceding the Pratt trial.~ Since Butler had denied under oath that he had
ever been a police or FBI informant, this information would have enabled Pratt's defense attorneys to
impeach his credibility ..!.Q The effect that this information could have had on Pratt's 1972 trial is
demonstrated by the fact that several jurors in that original trial have since stated that they would not
have voted to convict Pratt if they had known that Butler was an informant..!..!.
Pratt's FOIA requests also turned up FBI documents that showed that FBI director J. Edgar Hoover had
ordered that Pratt and other prominent Panther members be "neutralized." 12 Pratt also discovered
documents that supported his contention that he was in Oakland on the night of the murder. 12 The
impact ofthe documents Pratt and his attorneys procured through FOIA is clear; without FOIA, Pratt
would still be in jail. 14
If Geronimo Pratt's story were the norm, FOIA's usefulness would be beyond debate. For
every one case like Geronimo Pratt's, however, there are many cases like that of Frank Jimenez.
Jimenez, a prisoner at the Oxford Federal Correctional Institution in Wisconsin, has submitted numerou,
FOIA requests which appear to have done nothing but waste the government's time and resources.
Jimenez sought all records held by eight separate executive agencies that were "in any way connected tc
related to or even remotely in reference to his name."~ For example, Jimenez requested the U.S. Postal
Service (USPS) to provide "all records concerning himself regarding mail he received in the states of
Wisconsin and Illinois." 16 Government agencies must undertake a serious search in response to each
FOIA request, and the burden is on the agencies to establish that materials have not been improperly
withheld ..!.?. The USPS, therefore, performed an "exhaustive but unfruitful" search of its records.~
Similarly, Jimenez's request to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF) turned up no
responsive records -- a result which was hardly surprising since the ATF had not been involved in the
investigation or prosecution of Jimenez. 19 The FBI, however, had more difficulty responding to
Jimenez's FOIA request. Citing extremely limited resources and a backlog of 3,080 requests ahead of
Jimenez's, the FBI moved to stay the proceedings to give it until March 2000 to process the request. 20
Unconvinced that Jimenez's request was necessary or urgent, the district court agreed with the FBI that
the
Agency's delay was justifiable and thereby granted the motion to stay the proceedings unti:
March 2000.~
The use ofFOIA by prisoners such as Frank Jimenez and Geronimo Pratt highlights the benefits and
problems of the statute. One ofFOIA's purposes is to enable people to expose government action to "the
light of public scrutiny. "22 In Pratt's case, the government had paid an informant and then improperly
withheld this information which, had it been disclosed at trial, may well have led to an acquittal.
Twenty-five years later, Pratt was able to use FOIA to depose that improper government action and to
use the previously withheld information to regain his freedom. In contrast, Jimenez's experience shows
how FOIA can be abused at enormous cost to American taxpayers and illustrates the delays that can
occur as understaffed federal agencies struggle to respond to requests for information that the agencies
may or may not possess.--'
.,~
This Note surveys recent FOIA cases which illustrate the delays that have come to plague FOIA
administration. In 1996, in an effort to cure these delays and update FOIA for the computer age,
Congress passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 (E-FOIA). ~ 4 This
of E-FOIA and concludes that congressional attempts to
Note analyzes the major provisions
use administrative changes to reduce delays in FOIA administration are destined to fail as long as
agency FOIA-processing units remain under-staffed and underfunded. Part I begins by briefly sketching
13
the beginnings and intended purposes ofFOIA. It then examines the early amendments to the statute and
discusses how these amendments led to many unanticipated consequences, including enormous
increases in the administrative cost ofFOIA and in the time delays in processing requests. Part I
concludes by discussing the 1986 FOL\ amendments which included changes to FOIA's fee provisions.
Part II evaluates judicial attempts to balance FOIA's requirement of open government with present fiscal
constraints and agency staffing problems. Part III outlines the major provisions ofE-FOIA and explores
how it may affect a typical FOIA case and whether it will help reduce the administrative and financial
burdens of FOIA. Part IV surveys alternative measures that have been suggested by scholars and
legislators for reducing FOIA's cost and agency backlogs. It concludes that none of these measures
would effectively address FOIA's problems while preserving the benefits of a policy of open
government.
The Freedom of Information Act was born out of concerns about a growing federal bureaucracy that was
not accountable to the electorate 25 and about the "mushrooming growth of Government secrecy."2 6
Early champions of a freedom of information bill recognized the importance of an informed populace in
a democracy, believing that "[f]ree people are, of necessity, informed; uninformed people can never be
free. "27 They saw FOIA as an essential way to ensure
that the government would be open. In
the vanguard of the freedom of information movement was the press, a group that had historically
encountered administrative roadblocks in its quest to inform the public about questionable governmental
practices. 28 Despite the press's traditional role as the public's watchdog, legal complications were
depriving the press of its "most vital raw material" -- public records and proceedings. 29 Frustrated by the
lack of an enforceable legal right to examine public records, reporters had to rely upon "the favorable
exercise of official grace or indulgence or 'discretion."' 3.Q
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 31 fundamentally changed the way that requests for information
were handled by creating a presumption in favor of disclosure and by requiring agencies to justify any
nondisclosure. 32 Prior to FOIA, the release of governmental records was governed largely by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 33 which required only that public records be made available to
"persons properly and directly concerned," and exempted the nebulous category "information held
confidential for
good cause found." 34 The introduction to FOIA explicitly stated that its
purpose was "to clarify and protect the right of the public to information."~" It required that records be
made available to "any person,"~~ and an agency seeking to withhold a record after 1966 had to show
that the information contained in the record fell within one of nine limited statutory exemptions.-~-:B. The 197-1 Amendments: The Source of Fnanticipated Consequences
Despite the powerful rhetoric employed by proponents of a freedom of information statute, FOIA as
originally enacted was relatively ineffective. 38 Administrative agepcies routinely "delayed responses to requests for documents, replied with arbitrary denials, and overclassified documents to take
advantage of the 'national security' exemption." 39 FOIA began to develop into its present fom1 in 1974,
\vhen Congress amended it in an effort to remedy the perceived deficiencies in the statute's
administration. -t~ The amendments significantly reduced agencies' discretion over whether to release
14
information~_!_ and eliminated inefficiencies in the processing of requests "in order to contribute to the
fuller and faster release of information, which is the basic objective ofthe Act."~ 2 Unfortunately,
Congress did not anticipate a major effect of its alterations: after the 1974 amendments, the number of
FOIA requests skyrocketed. ~ 3 Prior to the changes, Congress had estimated that the new amendments
would cost the government about $50,000 for the first year, and $100,000 for each of the following five
years. 44 The actual costs ofFOIA quickly and dramatically surpassed these conservative estimates. 45 By
1991, FOIA's annual expense totaled $91 million, 46 and in 1992, the figure had increased to $108
million. 47
These dramatic increases came about because of a change in FOIA's fee provisions.~~ Prior to
1974, an agency could charge requesters for the costs of searching for responsive documents, reviewing
documents for exempted information that the agency could then delete, and duplicating the documents
that were to be released. 49 The 1974 amendments limited fees to "reasonable standard charges for
document search and duplication and provide[d] for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and
duplication. n50 The change forced agencies to bear the cost of reviewing documents for exempted
material. This review process is the most expensive part of processing FOIA requests because it often
requires the use of highly trained agency personnel.~ For example, documents requested by prisoners
are typically investigative files that may contain referen~es to a confidential source, 52 or material that, if
released, could reasonably result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 53 In processing such a
request, someone familiar with the investigation must go through the documents "line by line to delete
those portions, and only those portions, that would disclose a confidential source or come within one of
the other specific exceptions to the requirement of disclosure.'' 54
C. The 1986 Amendments: Amending FOIA 's Fee Structure Again
In an attempt to address FOIA's rapidly escalating costs, Congress passed the Freedom of Information
Reform Act of 1986 (1986 Reform Act), 55 which significantly increased agencies' ability to charge
Hatch, one of the Act's
requesters for the costs ofprocessing requests. 56 Senator Orrin
sponsors, estimated that if agencies could charge commercial requesters for the cost of document
review, the agencies would be able to collect up to $60 million per year in additional fees. 5? The
amendments established a three-tiered fee system, dividing requests into ( 1) requests for commercial
use; (2) non-commercial requests by the news media or by educational or scientific institutions whose
purpose is scholarly or scientific; and (3) all other non-commercial requests. 58 For category ( 1) requests,
agencies may assess charges for document search, duplication, and review.~~ For category (2) requests,
agencies may only assess document duplication charges. 6 For category (3) requests, agencies may
assess search and document duplication charges but not-charges for review. 6 .1 In addition, category (2)
and (3) requesters may not be charged for the first two hours of search time or the first I 00 pages of
duplication. 62 Regardless of which category the request falls into, no fee may be charged if the costs of
collecting or processing the fee would likely exceed the amount ofthe fee.~~ Finally, if a reguester has
previously failed to pay fees in a timely manner or if the agency determines that the fee will' exceed
$250, t1"\e agency may require advance payment ofthe expected fee.~
The 1986 Reform Act also clarified the circumstances under \vhich a fee waiver is appropriate. The
1974 FOIA amendments required documents to be furnished at a reduced rate or at no charge \vhen the
agency determined that doing so was "in the public interest because furnishing the information can be
considered as primarily benefiting the general R'3blic." 65 In interpreting this section, courts had given
The first case in which a court intervened to permit understaffed federal agencies to take more time to
process FOIA requests was Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force. 70 In Open America,
a public interest group, a law professor, aiJd severallaw._,students sought documents relating to a former
Acting Director of the FBI's role in the Watergate scandal.2.!. After the FBI received the request, it
notified the plaintiffs that there were 5,137 FOIA requests in front oftheirs.72 The district court granted
the plaintiffs' motion to require detailed justification, itemization, and indexing of documents within
thirty days.7 3 The government appealed, arguing that the FBI had exercised "due diligence" in
processing the FOIA requests, but that "exceptional circumstances" existed that prevented it from
processing them within the statutory time limits.?~ In such circumstances, the 1974 FOIA amendments
state, "the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its revie\v of
the records."~
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, citing the language and legislative history of the 1974
FOIA amendments, vacated the district court's order. 76 According to FOIA at that time, an agency that
received a request for information had to determine whether it would grant or deny that request within
ten days. 77 In "unusual circumstances," however, the agency was permitted an additional tep \vorking ,
days. 78 After that period, the requester was deemed to have
exhausted his administrative
remedies2? and could bring an action in district court to compel production of the documents.S 0 The
agency could obtain a stay in the proceedings, ho\vever, and thus gain additional time to revie\v the
records, if it could "show [that] exceptional circumstances exist[ ed] and that the agency [was] exercising
:
due diligence in responding to the request."SI
16
In Open America, the D.C. Circuit examined the legisla~ve history of the 1974 FOIA amendments and
determined that Congress inserted the "exceptional circumstances" language of section 552(a)(6)(C) "as
a safety valve after the protests of the [Ford] administration that the rigid limits of [sections 552(a)(6)]
(A) and (B) might prove unworkable." 82 The court stated that "exceptional circumstances" exist when
an agency "is deluged with a volume of requests for information vastly in excess of that anticipated by
Congress, [and] the existing resources are inadequate to deal with the volume of such requests within the
time limits of subsection (6)(A). " 83 Applied to the facts, the court found that the FBI's expenditure of
$2,675,000 in processing FOIA requests in 1976, a year in which Congress had anticipated that FOIA
would cost the entire government only $100,000, constituted "exceptional circumstances.":).+ It further
found that the agency's use of a two-track system to handle simple and complex requests on separate
"first-in, first-out" bases satisfied the "due diligence" requirement. 85 Since the plaintiffs alleged no urgency or exceptional need for the information they had requested, the court reasoned that a
stay was appropriate. 8 6
More than twenty years later, courts are still struggling with the same problems. In Edmond v. United
States Attomey, 87 a prisoner sued the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) to force the agency to
disclose information responsive to a FOIA request that he had made on August 14, 1992. 88 The
prisoner, Rayful Edmond, Jr., sent a request to the USAO seeking all documents in the possession of the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the FBI, the United States Attorney, and the United States
Bureau ofPrisons (USBP) which "pertain[ed] to him, mention[ed] his name, or refer[red] to him." 89
Five days later, the USAO notified Edmond that his request would be handled in the order in which it
was received. 90 When Edmond had received no documents by December 1994, he wrote a letter to the
USAO asking about the status ofhis request.2.!. The USAO's response explained that his request would
be handled in its turn but noted that the agency was unable to give a specific date for completion of its
processing of the request. 92 Edmond and the USAO exchanged similar letters in 1995 and 1996. 93
Having received no documents and still in prison, Edmond finally resorted to filing suit in district court
on October 15, 1996.94
The USAO, estimating that the records responsive to Edmond's request consisted of 2,000
pages, and noting that there were thirty-one requests in front of Edmond's, asked the district court for an
additional two years to process his request. 95 The district court held that, based on the record before it,
the USAO had satisfied the "exceptional circumstances" test as defined in Open America.')(, It further
held that the USAO's use of a "first-in, first-out" system satisfied the due diligence requirement. 9 -:The court noted that a stay would not be appropriate if Edmond could make a showing of"exceptional
need or urgency," which the court defined as "potential jeopardy to ... life or personal safety. or to
substantial due process rights." 98 Edmond asserted that the requested documents contained exculpatory
material that would aid him in overturning his criminal Gonviction. 99 The court held, howeYer. that
unless Edmond could "provide an adequate showing" that it \vas likely that the requested documents
contained "materially exculpatory information," he was not entitled to priority'processing of his FOIA
request. !Y-.9 Since Edmond had not made such a showing, he was not entitled to priority processing. 1U. 1
The court was not satisfied, howe"ler, that it would take the government t\vo years to process the thirtyone requests in front of Edmond's. 102 The court therefore granted the government only one additional
year to complete the processing of Edmond's request, "with an opportunity to seek a further extension if
necessary at a later date." I 03
17
Edmond raises several troubling issues concerning the state ofFOIA law. First, Edmond had already
been waiting four and a half years for the information when the district court granted the agency
additional time to respond to the request. 104 While it is true that the
court chose only to grant
the agency a one-year extension, instead of the requested two-year extension, it is troublesome that a
prisoner will be forced to wait over five years to obtain any exculpatory material that the government
might possess. Second, the court's requirement that Edmond make a showing that the requested material
likely contains exculpatory material in order to obtain priority review is nearly impossible to satisfy. It is
absurd to think that a person in Edmond's position would be able to know what possible exculpatory
material might be contained in documents that the government has made an effort to keep secret.
Nonetheless, the court in Edmond reasoned that allowing prisoners to obtain priority processing without
some additional showing would require courts to grant a large number of such requests filed by federal
prisoners, 105 thus negating the "exceptional" nature of the circumstances. 106
Edmond is not unique; other cases have involved even longer delays. In Fox v. United States
Department ofJustice, 107 for example, the plaintiff had requested that the FBI furnish him with all
documents in its possession relating to him. 108 The FBI had located over 300 pages of documents
pertaining to Fox but, citing a backlog of 11,828 requests and Congress's failure to delegate money to
expand the FBI's small staff ofFOIA processors, said that it did not expect to be able to process those
documents until 1999. 109 The court granted the government's motion to stay the case, requiring only that
the FBI
file a status report within a year informing the court of any progress it makes in the
processing of Fox's request. 110
There are strong policy arguments on both sides of the debate over expedited processing for prisoner
FOIA requests. On the one hand, prisoners are among the most litigious classes of citizens in the
country,.!...!...!. and granting their requests priority review without requiring some additional showing that
the requests are likely to uncover exculpatory information could have a crippling effect on the efficient
functioning ofFOIA. On the other hand, uncovering exculpatory material that was improperly withheld
by the government is, perhaps, the quintessential example of why FOIA is needed in a supposedly just
society.~
Long delays in processing FOIA requests have been one of the statute's most serious problems since its
enactment,~ and the delays have continued in the 1990s.~ While courts have routinely granted
extensions -- even though such extensions were intended only for "exceptional circumstances" 115 -their action is an understandable response to agencies that are faced with inadequate resources for
processing FOIA requests. But unfortunately, these long delays increase
public cynicism
towards the government,~ and can occasionally result in serious harm to the disappointed requester. I I'
B. The "Central Purpose" Doctrine: Application to the Pri~acy Exemptions
By granting agencies additional time to process FOIA requests, courts have helped agencies cope with
extensive FOIA backlogs. Courts have also helped agencies by giving them a way to quickly dispose of
certain requests. They have accomplished this latter end through the "central purpose" doctrine, a
judicially created tool designed to alle~iate the problem inherent in balancing the competing concerns of
disclosure under FOIA and personal privacy interests in preventing disclosure. 1~ The cornerstone of the
doctrine was laid by the Supreme Court in 1989, in United States Department ofJustice v.
,
Reporters Committee for Freedom ofthe Press.!J.2. In that case, a CBS news correspondent had sought
the criminal records of organized crime figure Charles Medico and three members of his family. 120
Medico's family business had been investigated by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission for allegedly
18
obtaining several defense contracts through improper ties with a corrupt congressman. 121 The CBS
reporter asserted that information concerning past crimes by Medico would potentially be "a matter of
special public interest." 122 The issue was whether Medico's criminal rap sheet was exempt from
disclosure under FOIA Exemption 7(C), 123 which permits an agency to withhold a document when
disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."12~
To determine whether the invasion of privacy that would result from disclosure was warranted, the
Supreme Court used a balancing test, weighing Medico's privacy interest against the public interest in
disclosure. 125 The Court refused, however, to give the alleged public interest much weight in the
balance, stating instead that:
[A]lthough there is undoubtedly some public interest in anyone's criminal history,
especially if the history is in some way related to the subject's dealing with a public official
or agency, the FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's activities be
opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that
happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed. 126
'
The Court concluded that the public interest in the information sought by the reporter simply fell
"outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve." 127 In the context of the
privacy-public interest balancing test, this requirement that requested information open governmental
activities "to the sharp eye of public scrutiny" has subsequently been referred to as the "central purpose"
doctrine. 128
.
The Court's decision in Reporters Committee, which was not based on any language found in
fundamentally "changed the FOIA calculus." 130 The central purpose doctrine has been
subsequently reaffirmed and expanded. In 1991, the Supreme Court, in United States Department of
State v. Ray,~ extended the central purpose doctrine to FOIA Exemption 6, 132 the other privacy
exemption, which covers "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 133 The Court reaffmned and
strengthened the central purpose doctrine in 1994, in United States Department ofDefense v. Federal
Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), 134 another Exemption 6 case. The Court in FLRA explicitly stated
that when balancing the public interest in disclosure against the potential invasion of privacy, "the only
relevant public interest in disclosure to be weighed in this balance is the extent to which disclosure
would serve the core purpose of the FOIA, which is contributing significantly to public understanding of
the operations or activities ofthe govemment." 135
FOIA, 129
In 1997, the Court, in a per curiam decision, reversed a Ninth Circuit panel and reaffirmed its FLRA
decision.!.:~ Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA.) involved a FOIA request to the
Oregon Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for the names and addresses of recipients ofthe BLM's
newsletter._l_.-~2 The Ninth Circuit panel found a "substantial public interest in knO\ving to whom the
government is directing information, or as ONDA characterizes it, 'propaganda,' so that those persons
may receive information from other sources that do not share the BLM's self-interest in presenting
government activities in the most favorable light." 138 The Supreme Court viewed the Ninth Circuit
decision as resting on "a perceived public interest in providing persons on the BLM's mailing list with
additional information," 139 a foundation that was "inconsistent" with FLRA.. 1 ~
Soon after Reporters Committee was decided, the United States Department of Justice Office of
Information and Privacy issued a report concerning the ramifications of that decision on FOIA
19
processing.!..:..!. The Justice Department advised agency FOIA offices that the Court's "new 'core purpose'
public interest standard ... should govern the process ofbalancing interests under Exemptions 6 and 7
(C)." 142 The Supreme Court's terse decision in ONDA reaffirmed the strong signal it sent to lower courts
and government agencies in its earlier decisions, confirming the Court's intention to continue to strictly
enforce the central purpose doctrine. Thus, at least when the privacy exemptions are involved, agencies
may continue to rely on the central purpose doctrine and deny requests that fail the balancing test with
little fear of reversal by the judiciary.l 4 3
1. Electronic Reading Rooms: Placing Government Information On-Line. Section 4 ofE-FOIA requires
agencies to make certain records created on or after November 1, 1996, available for public inspection
"by computer telecommunications or ... by other electronic means" within one year of their creation. 150
This provision,
designed to promote access to government information via the Internet} 5 1
creates what Attorney General Janet Reno termed "electronic reading rooms." 152 Ofthe documents
subject to this provision, the type that will be ofmost interest to the general public and that has the
greatest potential for reducing the total number ofFOIA requests are copies of previously released
records that are likely to be the subject of subsequent requests. 153 In the FBI's electronic reading
room, 15 4 for example, documents posted in compliance~:with this provision include information of
popular interest on such topics as Elvis Presley, 155 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, 156 and various UFO
sightings. 157
Some FOIA observers have argued that this provision will lead to extensive litigation since "a requester
who disagrees with an agency's assessment of the likelihood of future requests may be able to sue to
challenge that assessment." 158 The merits ofthis argument are questionable for two reasons. First, it is
difficult to imagine how an individual would have standing to challenge the agency's assessment, since
the individual would not have suffered any concrete harm as a result of an agency decision not to make a
particular document or set of documents available in electronic reading rooms. 159 Second,
EFOIA leaves to agency discretion the determination ofwhich records are likely to become the subject of
repeated requests. 160 Since courts have historically shown great deference to the exercise of agency
discretion in the context of FOIA}~.!. any challenge to an agency determination likely \vill be
unsuccessful.
Critics also argue that agencies may divert resources to publishing older, preYiously released documents
20
at the expense of processing current requests. 162 This argument cynically assumes that agencies will act
in bad faith and will actively attempt to delay FOIA processing. The merits of this viev. are questionable
given the Clinton administration's efforts to encourage open government. In 1993, after the dismal FOIA
performance record of the Reagan and Bush administrations, 163 President Clinton signaled a desire to
reverse the trend. In a memorandum to department and agency heads, he made it clear that "[t]he
existence of unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles has no place in [FOIA's] implementation." 16 ~ In 1997,
following the passage ofE-FOIA, Attorney General Janet Reno 'Wrote another memorandum to
department and agency heads, reaffirming the administration's position on FOIA. 165 \vnile the Clinton
administration has not earned a perfect FOIA report card,I 66 agencies appear to be moving away from
actively impeding FOIA administration. 16 7
The creation of these electronic reading rooms has a tremendous potential for making
important information readily available to the general public.I 6 S The electronic reading rooms will also
save time and money for agencies, as they will be able to unburden themselves of requests by multiple
persons for similar information. 169 This provision creates a relatively inexpensive and efficient method
of "open[ing] agency action to the light of public scrutiny." 170
2. Specifying the Format of Requested Information. Prior to the passage ofE-FOIA, an agency was
under no obligation to accommodate a requester's preference for a particular format for requested
information. In Dismukes v. Department of the Interior,}}J_ the requester sought to obtain from the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a computer tape which listed the names and addresses of
the participants in six 1982 BLM Simultaneous Oil and .Gas Leasing lotteries. 1 72 The Agency was
willing to make the information available on microfiche, but the requester argued that
the
173
computer tape version would be more convenient for his purposes.
The district court held that release
174
on microfiche was sufficient.
The court stated that the Agency was only required to provide
"responsive, nonexempt information in a reasonably accessible form." 175 The district court's decision
seriously undermined the effectiveness of FOIA in the electronic age. By not releasing information in
the requested format, an agency can substantially decrease the usefulness of the information to the
requester, sometimes effectively denying access to the information. I76 For information-seekers looking
for "trends, abuses and outrages," electronic searching of government material can reduce search times
from days or weeks to hours or minutes. I77
An illustration of how important format can be is the Environmental Working Group's (EWG) request to
the FDA for pesticide monitoring results.~ The EWG, a nonprofit organization, wanted certain data to
enable it to "analyze the variance between levels of toxins that are inherent in imported foods consumed
by infants and children, as compared to adults." I79 The FDA refused to release the data in electronic
form, instead releasing the data in the "umvieldy physical form of [6,000 pages of] paper documents," a
form that was "cumbersome, confusing, and unorganized [sic] for the efficient statistical analysis
necessary for quality scientific research." ISO The EWG was able to complete its project, but only at an
unnecessarily high cost:
The FDA's decision left the EWG with no choice other than to bear the financial
burden of paying a commercial scanning firm to input the pesticide data. Then, the E\VG
had to go through the labor intensive chore of converting the data into suitable electronic
format -- the very format that the FDA maintained all along. IS 1
21
E-FOIA will prevent such inefficiencies from occurring in the future by requiring agencies to provide a
requested record "in any form or format requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by
the agency in that form or format." 182 This provision was intended to override the holding in
Dismukes, 183 and the new language should increase the usefulness and efficiency ofFOIA.
3. First In/First Out and }yfulti-Track Processing. Courts have permitted agencies to process FOIA
requests on a first in/first out (FIFO) basis. 18-t FIFO processing standing alone is problematic, however,
because simple requests that could be processed rapidly are delayed while earlier, more complex
requests are handled. 185 In the interest of efficiency and speed, some agencies, such as the FBI, have set
up two-track systems -- dividing requests into simple and complex requests -- which are processed on
separate FIFO bases. 186 E-FOIA gives agencies statutory authority to establish such multi-track
systems, but it does not require the establishment of such systems. 187 Since some agencies had already
established multi-track systems, this development is not very momentous; the multi-tracking option in
the statute will, at most, give agencies that do not currently use multi-tracking a reason to consider
whether they might benefit from such a system. While the lack of explicit guidelines has drawn some
criticism, 188 it would be unwise to require all agencies to set up a uniform multi-tracking system since
lengthy delays do not plague every agency. 189 By permitting individual agencies to design their own
systems, E-FOIA allows each agency to tailor a processing system to its distinct needs. For example, an
agency with a severe backlog might want to create three tracks and assign its most experienced
personnel to the track containing the most complex requests. Other agencies with only minor backlogs
might prefer a two-track system, or even a single-track system. Encouraging agencies to set their own
. rules regarding multi-track systems will likely encourage experimentation. Through this
process, agencies will learn which procedures work best, and will be able to borrow from other agencies'
experiences with various systems.
4. Expedited Review. Occasionally, a FOIA requester will have an urgent need for the requested
information, and delays in processing the request can have serious consequences. 190 In response, EFOIA requires agencies to set up a system of expedited processing for cases where the requester
demonstrates a "compelling need." 191 This requirement can be met in one oftwo ways. First, a
compelling need is present when "a failure to obtain requested records on an expedited basis ... could
reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual." 192
This provision will help minimize the most severe kinds of adverse effects which delays in FOIA can
have on requesters. Furthermore, since it is doubtful tha! many people will be able to meet the
provision's high standard, 193 it is unlikely that the provision will result in serious delays to the
processing of non-expedited requests. Since an agency's denial of a request for expedited review is
subject to judicial review, 194 requesters will likely challenge denials of expedited revie\v in the courts.
But courts should have little trouble absorbing any increased litigation. After all, prior to E-FOIA. courts
were already making
such determinations, albeit at a later stage, when determining whether to
stay proceedings and grant an agency additional time to process a request. 195
Second, for requesters that are "primarily engaged in disseminating information," the compelling need
requirement may be satisfied by a showing of "urgency to inform the public concerning actu_al or alleged
Federal Government activity." 196 The media will be the primary beneficiary ofthis provisioh, and it is
reasonable to expect that reporters will attempt to invoke it frequently. FOL-\ critics have found fault
1
with the statute precisely because it is no longer used primarily by the media to inquire into the activities
of the govemment. 197 While this provision will not prevent non-media requesters from using FOI.-\, and
thus does not directly respond to these critics' concerns, it will give certain media requests preferential
22
procc:ssmg, thereby making FOI.A. work more effectively for the media. Accelerating media access to
information on government activities is a positive development for FOIA. Since one of FOIA's original
reasonable
objectives was to "open agency action to the light ofpublic scrutiny," 198 it is both
and desirable to give preferential treatment to requests that are intended to publicize governmental
activities.
5. Twenty-Day Time Limit. Prior to the passage ofE-FOIA, an agency was required to determine
whether it would comply with a request for information within ten days of its receipt of the request. 199
Agency disregard for the time limits prompted strident criticism from observers such as Senator Patrick
Leahy, author of the Senate version ofE-FOIA. When testifying before the House Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, Leahy complained:
The current time limits in the FOIA are a joke. Few agencies actually respond to FOIA
requests within the 10-day limit required in the law. Such routine failure to comply with the
statutory time limits is bad for morale in the agencies and breeds contempt by citizens who
expect government officials to abide by, not routinely break, the law. 200
In an attempt to remedy the problem, Congress doubled the statutory time limit from ten days to twenty
days. 201 The expansion ofthe time limit was intended to "help Federal agencies in reducing their
backlog of FOIA requests. "202 Congress's recognition of the need for expanded time limits is
commendable, and the new provision likely will enable agencies with only minor backlogs to process
requests within the statutory limits. 203 Unfortunately, a twenty-day limit is barely more realistic than a
ten-day limit for agencies such as the FBI or the CIA, whose enormous backlogs draw the most
criticism. While these agencies may be able to process some of their smaller, simpler FOIA requests
_ izing a multi-track system, 204 their backlogs are several
within the twenty-day limit by utilmonths long. 205 The FBI receives requests for law enforcement information that may fall within
Exemption 7, 206 and the CIA receives requests for information that may be covered under the National
Security Act and may thus be exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3. 207 The FBI 2.2~ and the CIA
can actively invoke these exemptions to ensure effective law enforcement or to protect national security,
thus necessitating close and extensive review of requested documents. 209 In view of these
circumstances, it is unlikely that the expanded time limits will result in a substantial reduction of these
agencies' backlogs. 210
Furthermore, the new twenty-day limit, like its ten-day predecessor, is rife with exceptions. E-FOIA
maintains the provision for a ten-day extension in "unusual circumstances." 211 If it is unlikely that the
agency will complete processing of the request within that time, the agency must only notify the
requester and give that person the opportunity to limit the scope of the request so that it may be
processed within the time limit. 212 lfthe agency fails to conform to the time limits, irrespective of
v.-hether the requester chose to limit the scope of his request, the requester is deemed to have exhausted
his administrative remedies and may bring suit in federal district court.~ 13 The district court has the
power to allow the agency additional time to process the request, however, if the agency can show that
diligence in responding
"exceptional circumstances exist dnd that the agency is ~xercising due
214
to the request."
Prior to the passage ofE-FOIA, no statutory definition of"exceptional
circumstances" existed, and the term was thus left tb unbridled judicial construction. In an attempt to
constrain what was seen as liberal judicial allowance of significant time extensions for agencies faced
with request backlogs, 215 and to encourage agencies to reduce those backlogs. Congress explicitly stated
23
in E-FOIA that "the term 'exceptional circumstances' does not include a delay that results from a
predictable agency workload of requests under this section, unless the agency demonstrates reasonable
progress in reducing its backlog of pending requests. rrl1 6
The new statutory language was intended to limit ajudge's ability to give an agency additional time to
respond to a request absent truly extraordinary circumstances, and thereby to coerce agencies into
reducing their backlogs of requests. 217 The new statutory language is loose enough, however, to enable
judges to continue to grant time extensions to beleaguered agencies.~ While this reality is contrary to
congressional intent, it is both unavoidable and desirable in view of the currently inadequate levels of
agency funding for FOIA request processing. It would be problematic if a judge were forced by statute
to compel disclosure of requested documents without giving the agency adequate time to review the
documents to ensure that they do not contain exempted material. 219 The risks involved are particularly
severe in regard to material that may contain information that must be kept secret for national security
reasons, 220 or information whose disclosure would result in an invasion ofprivacy.22 1
An application of the new statutory language to the facts of Edmond v. United States
illustrates the ease with which judges could continue to grant time extensions to
underfunded agencies. First, while the statute explicitly states that "the term 'exceptional circumstances'
does not include a delay that results from a predictable agency workload ofrequests," 223 Congress did
not define "predictable agency workload." The district court in Edmond noted that the USAO had
received "a volume of requests for information vastly in excess of that anticipated by Congress." 224 The
judge could easily determine that such an unanticipated volume was not "predictable" under E-FOIA's
language. Second, delays from a predictable agency workload can constitute exceptional circumstances
if the agency "demonstrates reasonable progress in reducing its backlog of pending requests. " 225 The
statute leaves to the courts the job of determining what constitutes "reasonable progress." Courts could
liberally construe this language to give agencies a fair opportunity to process requests. The Edmond
court noted that the USAO had increased its FOIA staff from one to four people. 226 The court could
consider this action to be "reasonable progress" toward reducing the agency's FOIA backlog under the
new language. Tbird, if a FOIA requester had earlier refused to narrow the scope of his request or to
arrange for an alternative timetable, 227 the judge must consider this refusal as a factor in determining
whether "exceptional circumstances" exist. 228 Therefore, unless a requester was willing to narrow the
scope of his request before the suit was filed, E-FOIA gives judges an additional means of granting
liberal time extensions to agencies faced with understaffing and too many FOIA requests.
While it is unfortunate that people will have to be satisfied with less information if they want to receive
it in a timely manner, such a result is unavoidable given-Congress's refusal to allocate sufficient
resources to agencies for FOIA processing.
AttomeT-22
Congress passed E-FOIA to accomplish two goals. The first goal, which it largely achieved, was to
"encourage electronic access to Government information." 229 The requirement that agencies release as
much information as possible in the format requested, including on CD-ROM or diskette, was a longoverd~e step. 230 The provisions relating to on-line publication of government information promise to
make information maintained and collected by the government more accessible to a larger segment of
the American public. 231, The second goal, to encourage and assist reduction of agency backlogs of FOIA
requests, will likely prove more elusive. Although increased funding for FOIA processing is the action
most likely to reduce backlogs significantly, 232 such an increase \Vas noticeably absent from the
24
7''
reforms._.).)
The changes the amendments did accomplish will likely have a mixed effect on the backlogs. As
agencies publish more information on the Internet, people will need to turn to FOIA less frequently to
obtain desired information and multiple requests for the same information will certainly be reduced. 234
But FOIA will still continue to be widely used; agency FOIA processing teams will continue to be underfunded and understaffed; and the time requjred to process requests will continue to result in
backlogs. The provisions authorizing multi-tracking will probably speed up the processing of simpler
requests, but the fact that the FBI had a system of multi-tracking in place prior to E-FOIA, 23_.:' yet had
one ofthe worst backlogs, 236 demonstrates that multi-tracking is not a panacea. It remains to be seen
how expedited review will work in practice, because the amendments leave the details to agency
regulations. 237 While the expedited processing provisions may lead to more litigation 23 and may
increase overall delay and costs, 239 their benefits outweigh these drawbacks. Expedited review will
secure rapid access to information for those requesters with the most urgent need for information, and it
will accelerate the media's efforts to provide the public with important information about governmental
activities. Finally, the twenty-day time limit may help agencies with minor backlogs, but it will have
only a minor effect on agencies with the largest backlogs, and congressional attempts to limit the
judiciary's ability to grant these agencies time extensions likely will be ineffective. Thus, since it is
doubtful that E-FOIA will substantially improve the speed at which FOIA requests are processed, more
invasive surgery is required.
Anyone may use FOIA to procure non-exempt information for any reason.;~:~ Some critics have
attacked the absence of a purpose requirement because public dollars are not unlimited and other public
~ I
causes may be more deserving. 244 The absence of such a requirement invites abuse, -_4_:- "bring[ ing] into
the system requests that are not
really important enough to be there, [and] crowding out the
genuinely desirable ones to the ~nd of the line. " 246 One possible solution to these problems is to expand
the central purpose doctrine 247 beyond the realm of the privacy exemptions, empo\vering agencies to
apply the doctrine directly to all FOIA requests received. 248 Advocates of a universal central purpose
25
standard argue that it would dramatically reduce the costs and delays currently associated with FOIA. 2-+9
Agencies could use the doctrine to decide quickly whether to deny a request as being outside the scope
of FOIA, or whether to process the request more fully. Supporters argue that the doctrine would help
eliminate FOIA abuses and would help return FOIA to its original purpose of enabling citizens to learn
about the activities of government. 250 Such a proposal is theoretically feasible, given the apparent
willingness within some federal courts to expand the central purpose doctrine beyond the privacy
exemptions. 251 There are, however, several problems with such a proposal.
At a practical level, the current Congress appears to be moving away from limiting the scope of FOIA
and has, in fact, reaffll1I1ed its commitment to universal access to FOIA for any purpose. The findings
accompanying E-FOIA explicitly state that "the purpose of [FOIA] is to ... establish and enable
enforcement ofthe right ofany person to obtain access to the records of[agencies of the Federal
Government], subject to statutory exemptions, for any public or private purpose. " 2 ~ 2 Senator
Leahy explained the fmding as follows:
This finding is intended to address concerns that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Department ofJustice v. Reporters Committee and the U.S. Department ofDefense v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority analyzed the purpose of the FOIA too narrowly ....
Efforts by the courts to articulate a 'core purpose' for which information should be released
imposes a limitation on the FOIA which Congress did not intend and which cannot be found
in its language, and distorts the broader import of the Act in effectuating Government
openness. 253
Senator Leahy's comments illustrate his dissatisfaction with the central purpose doctrine. Nonetheless,
the central purpose doctrine will likely survive within its present boundaries because nothing in the
statute expressly prohibits courts from employing the doctrine as part of the privacy exemptions'
balancing tests. 254 The legislative findings, however, may prevent courts from expanding the central
purpose doctrine to other areas ofFOIA, and they send a strong signal that Congress is not likely to limit
the scope of FOIA in the near future.
A second practical problem with the proposed expansion of the central purpose doctrine is that agencies
might exercise a broader power too expansively. Agency determinations would have to be reviewable by
the courts, and this increased litigation would dramatically increase the costs and delays associated with
FOIA -- the very problems such a solution was intended to fix. 255
A final practical problem is that requesters often do not know in advance what their requests
will reveal. Thus, while it is true that FOIA is being use9 by corporate lawyers to conduct industrial
espionage, 256 the information they obtain occasionally reveals hidden governmental abuses: 2::;corporate requesters cannot anticipate these contents until after the agencies have disclosed the material
and the requesters have had the opportunity to examine it. Thus, while such requesters may have selfish
motives for making their requests, the public may benefit from the information as well. \Vhile such
occasional indirect benefits may be difficult to justify given that government resources are limited, 25 S
the proper response to this problem is not to limit the scope ofFOIA; the proper response was made in
1986 when FOIA's fee provisidns were amended to shift the cost of processing primarily commercial
requests to the requester. 259 It is unwise to place limits on who can use FOIA and for what purposes
they can use it, because limiting a basic freedom can end up having the unintended consequence of
hurting those who need it most.~~o Any initial limitation of a freedom facilitates subsequent limitations
of that freedom; it is preferable not to start down that road.
26
Expans10n ot the central purpose doctrine would perform the undesired service of further tipping the
scales toward government secrecy and away from disclosure. 161 The central purpose doctrine
was ostensibly intended to return FOIA to its original purposes. In deciding the central purpose doctrine
cases, however, the Supreme Court ignored one ofFOIA's important original purposes. Section 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act had required agencies to disclose information only "to persons properly
and directly concerned. " 162 The passage of FOIA in 1966 was specifically intended to eliminate "the
test of who shall have the right to different information. "263 That change was essential to the new
scheme that FOIA established. 264 FOIA represents the basic idea that information in the government's
possession should be made available to anyone for any purpose, unless the information is explicitly
exempted. 165 It is too simplistic to suggest that FOIA has one single, central purpose that should
override this equally important ideal. Limiting the scope ofFOIA also ignores the collateral benefits of
having a broad public disclosure law, such as "ensur[ing] for the individual citizen a sense of
empowerment and control over a government that can at times appear monolithic and imperious." 166 It
ignores the idea that if "information is power, then to deny public ownership of government information
is to deny public control over the government. "267 Limiting the amount of information available through
FOIA does limit, in a sense, the amount of power we have over our government. Since government
resources are not infinite, however, it is proper, in some cases, to place a price on access to certain types
of information. FOIA's current fee provisions appropriately balance the philosophy of open government
with fiscal realities, however, and it would be unwise to expand the central purpose doctrine. 26 8
In passing E-FOIA, Congress recognized that inadequate agency resources are one of the primary causes
of delay in FOIA ad.ministration. 269 This is not a novel insight; previous legislators, as well as scholars
and agency heads, have all highlighted the need for more FOIA funding to ensure the effective operation
ofthe statute. 27 Congress attempted to recoup some ofthe costs ofFOIA by amending the statute's fee
structure in 1986. 271 In 1992, agencies spent about $1 OS million processing FOIA requests, and charged
$8 million in fees. 272 Under the current scheme, however, agencies do not keep those fees; the money is
deposited in the Treasury. 273 This fee collection structure does nothing to help agencies process FOIA
requests more rapidly.
In 1996, Senator Leahy introduced a bill that would have permitted agencies to collect a portion of
FOIA fees directly if, looking at all of their requests, they were in "substantial compliance" with FOIA's
time limits. 274 The purpose of the Senate bill was to give agencies an incentive to comply with the
These fee-sharing provisions, however, failed to make it into the final
statutory time limits. 275
draft of E-FOIA. While Senator Leahy had good intentions, his bill would not have been the most
effective solution. First, it would have helped the agencies that needed the least assistance, while the
agencies with the biggest backlogs would not have received the additional money needed to reduce their
backlogs. 276 Second, an agency can be in "substantial compliance" by either providing responsive
documents or by denying requests. 1T Since the stated purpose of the proposed requirement was to
provide agencies with a financial incentive to reduce backlogs, it is possible that agencies would have
denied requests in order to attain "substantial compliance." This would have threatened to shift FOIA's
delicate balance towards initial non-disclosure, an undesirable result. Finally. the administrative costs to
the GAO would tlave outweighed the benefits of the procedure. 278 Under the provision, the GAO might
have been required to conduct a substantial number ofF.OIA audits annually. 2 ~ Since the GAO's
budget, like that of many agencies, has recently been cut, some critics argued that "meeting demands for
27
FOIA audits would diminish the agency's ability to carry out other functions. " 2_S_Q
One positive feature ofthe Leahy proposal is that it required that agencies use the fees collected to
improve their FOIA processing capabilities. 281 That aspect of the Leahy bill could be integrated into a
provision that would allow agencies to keep all the FOIA fees that they collect, irrespective of their level
of compliance with the time limits. 282 This solution would eliminate the expense of agency performance
audits, and, "rather than simply rewarding agencies that already are in compliance with FOIA time
limits, funds [would] become available to those agencies that experience backlogs to assist them in
overcoming their timing problems. n283
CONCLUSION
FOIA is not perfect. It is often used by the "wrong" people for the "wrong" reasons. 284 But the basic
principle underlying FOIA should not be abandoned. In the context of a $1.63 trillion federal budget,~~
the $100 to $200 million that FOIA costs each year is minuscule. When one considers that FOIA
spending is roughly equivalent to federal spending on military bands, 286 FOIA suddenly does not seem
so extravagant and wasteful. Spending $200 million or more on open government is worth the price
even after "the era of big government is over." 287 FOIA..today is very different than its creators could
have imagined; it is indeed "a far cry from John Q. Public finding out how his government works." 288
Still, FOIA serves many valuable purposes, 289 and the lofty rhetoric used by early supporters of open
_
. cretive federal government,
government 290 continues to have merit. The specter of a seespecially one as large and impersonal as the current one, is reasv1i" enough to continue efforts to perfect
the statute. FOIA has many obvious benefits, but there are hidden benefits as well. Simply having a
public disclosure statute in the United States Code "serves as an effective deterrent to government waste,
abuse, and mismanagement." 291 With all of the benefits-- tangible and intangible-- FOIA is worth the
cost. As Judge Patricia Wald observed: "It takes constant vigilance, commitment, and common sense to
make any law work. I hope we as citizens have all these qualities -- in large measure -- to keep the FOIA
around for a long time and to make it work. n292
E-FOIA is illustrative of Congress's adherence to this goal. In passing E-FOIA, Congress demonstrated
both a willingness to adapt FOIA to changing times and a desire to continue searching for ways to make
FOIA more effective. Internet publication of government information will facilitate broad public access
to information without requiring people to bear the added time and expense of making a FOIA request.
E-FOIA's administrative improvements are a small step toward increased efficiency in FOIA processing.
Nevertheless, E-FOIA should not be the final effort to perfect FOIA. Future efforts should be directed at
funding agency FOIA-processing divisions. Only adequate funding will enable agencies to eliminate
backlogs and delay and allow FOIA to reach its full potential.
FOOTNOTES
l.
3.
Antonin Scalia, The Freedom ofInformation Act Has No Clothes, REGULATIO~. ~hr.-Apr.
1982, at 15, 15 (criticizing the Act as "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated
Consequences, the, Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored").
110 CONG. REC. 17,087 (1964) (statement ofSen. Long).
Scalia, supra note l at 17.
28
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
See William Booth, Ex-Black Panther Freed; After 25 Years. "The Struggle Continues," WASH.
POST, June 11, 1997, at AL
See Edward l Boyer, Larvyer Presses 23-Year Battle on Behalfof"Geronimo" Pratt, LA.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter Boyer, Larvyer Presses 23-Year Battle].
See Edward J. Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom, LA. TIMES, June 11, 1997, at A1 [hereinafter
Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom] ("Pratt said he understood that former FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover and former President Richard Nixon 'launched a program to kill us all. [The Black Panther
Party was) at the center ofthe bull's-eye."'); see also Clarence Page, Commentary, Time for a New
Peek at Old FBI Fifes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1997, at 21 ("Pratt always had maintained that the
FBI knew he was innocent because it allegedly haq him under surveillance in Oakland when the
murder occurred in Santa Monica."). M. Wesley Swearingen, a 25-year FBI veteran, supports
Pratt's view, contending that wiretap logs placed Pratt in Oakland at the time of the murder but that
"someone had destroyed these logs." M. WESLEY SWEARINGEN, FBI SECRETS: AN
AGENT'S EXPOS ... 86 (1995).
Booth, supra note~. at Al.
5 U.S.C. 552 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
See Boyer, Lawyer Presses 23-Year Battle, supra note~. at B 1.
See id.
See Booth, supra note 4, at A 1. The judge who reversed Pratt's conviction noted that the
information about Butler would have enabled Pratt's lawyers to "put the whole case in a different
light." Edward J. Boyer, D.A. Appeals Decision to Release Ex-Black Panther, LA. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1998, at B 1 [hereinafter Boyer, D.A. Appeals].
See Tony Jones, Cochran: Past, Present Future, TRI-STATE DEFENDER, May 10, 1995, at 1A.
A retired FBI agent has corroborated these documents, stating that Pratt was "framed as part of the
FBI's now-defunct counter intelligence program-covert efforts to 'neutralize' what they called
'black hate groups."' Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom, supra note~' at AI.
See Booth, supra note~. at Al.
On January 30, 1998, Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti appealed Pratt's release,
arguing that "nothing points to Pratt's innocence; everything points to his guilt." Boyer, D.A.
Appeals, supra note 11, at BL The Los Angeles Times characterized Garcetti's decision to appeal
as "unwise" and "a fool's errand." Editorial, Misguided Move Against Pratt, LA. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1998, at B6. Ifthe appeal fails, most legal observers believe that the prosecution will be unable to
win a new trial since Butler has been discredited and the only eye-witness is now dead. See Boyer,
Pratt Strides into Freedom, supra note~. at AI.
Jimenez v. FBI, 938 F. Supp. 21,25 (D.D.C. 1996). Jimenez made FOIA requests to the FBI, the
Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Postal Service, the Bureau of Prisons, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms, the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorney, the U.S. Marshals Service, and
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. See id. at 24-25.
!d. at 26.
See United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 ( 1989) (citing FOIA's
legislative history to support the Court's holding that the burden is on the government agency); see
also Safecard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that a search is
adequate if it is "reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents"); ~1eeropol v. Meese,
790 F.2d 942, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[A] search need not be perfect, only adequate, and adequacy
is measured by the reasonableness of the effort in light of the specific request."); Weisberg v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("\Vhat the agency must
show beyond material doubt is that it has conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all
relevant documents.").
29
30
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
decisions, denials which had covered up the mistakes or irregularities of the time").
CROSS, supra note 27, at 4.
!d. at 197.
Pub. L No. 89-487,80 Stat. 250 [hereinafter FOIA] (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 552 (1994
& Supp. ll 1996)).
See id. at 251 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 552 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) ("[E]very agency
shall, upon request for identifiable records ... make such records promptly available to any
person." (emphasis added)). Upon complaint of nondisclosure made to a district court, "the court
shall determine the matter de novo and the burden shall be upon the agency to sustain its action."
!d. From an administrative law perspective, FOIA is unique because of its de novo review ofmany
agency determinations, including the determination that a particular document is exempted under
the statute. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) (1994 & Stipp. II 1996). Outside ofFOIA, a reviewing
court can normally set aside agency findings and conclusions only if they are "arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (1994).
Pub. L No. 79-404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) [hereinafter APA]. The original APA no longer
exists in recognizable form. After being modified by FOIA, it was replaced when Congress
enacted Title 5 ofthe United States Code. See Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat.
378.
APA, supra note 33, 3(c), 60 Stat. at 238.
FOIA, supra note~. 80 Stat. at 250.
!d. at 251.
See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)-(9) {1994). The exemptions covered documents:
{1) Classified as secret for national defense or foreign policy reasons;
(2) Related solely to internal agency personnel rules and practices;
(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute;
(4) Containing trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information;
(5) Containing legally privileged information;
(6) Containing personnel, medical or "similar" files that, if disclosed, would result in an invasion
of privacy;
(7) Involving law enforcement investigations, but only to the extent that disclosure
(A) Would interfere with law enforcement proceedings;
(B) Would deprive a person of a fair trial;
(C) Could result in an invasion of privacy;
(D) Could disclose the identity of a confidential source;
(E) Would disclose law enforcement techniques; or
(F) Could endanger the life or safety of any person;
(8) Involving financial regulatory activities; or
(9) Involving geological information about oil or natural gas wells.
See id.
Six of the nine exemptions have survived to this day with little or no change to their original
language. The exemptions that have undergone siWtificant changes are Exemption 1, which was
amended in 1974 to limit the exemption to classified documents, see Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L
No. 93-502, 2(a), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 [hereinafter 1974 Amendments] (codified at 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(1) (1994)); Exemption 3, which was amended in 1976 to add a set of criteria intended to
limit the situations where the exemption could be invoked, see Government in the Sunshine Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-409, 5(b), 90 Stat. 1241, 1247 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3) (1994));
31
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
5-l.
55.
and Exemption 7, which was expanded in 1986 to further limit public access to certain
investigatory files, see Freedom oflnformation Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 1802
(a), 100 Stat. 3207-48,3207-48 to 3207-49 [herein~fter 1986 Reform Act] (codified at 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(7) (1994)).
.
See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT A1"'D
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7 (1981) ("Initial administrative compliance with the Freedom of
Information Act was not particularly impressive."); Scalia, supra note 1, at 15 ("The 1966 version
[ofFOIA] was a relatively toothless beast .... ").
Scalia, supra note 1, at 15; see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-1419, at 8-9 (1972) ("The efficient
operation of the Freedom of Information Act has been hindered by five years of foot-dragging by
the Federal bureaucracy.").
See 1974 Amendments, supra note 37, 88 Stat. at 1561.
See O'BRIEN, supra note 38, at 8.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6267.
For example, the FBI received 447 FOIA requests in 1974, and 13,875 requests in 1975. See Open
America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 617 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Leventhal, J., concurring).
See H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6275. Congress believed
that agencies' operating budgets would be able to absorb most of the costs, including the cost of
searching for the requested information. See id.; see also Eric J. Sinrod, Freedom ofInformation
Act Response Deadlines: Bridging the Gap Between Legislative Intent and Economic Reality, 43
AM. U. L. REV. 325, 334 (1994) (noting that, based on the beliefthat administration ofFOIA
would not entail significant costs, Congress did not appropriate additional resources to fund the
1974 amendments).
In fact, the cost of implementing FOIA in fiscal year 1974 for the FBI alone was $160,000. See
Open America, 547 F.2d at 612. By fiscal year 1976, the actual costs for the FBI totaled
$2,675,000. See id. The FBI was not alone. A single request by a former CIA agent cost the CIA
an estimated $400,000. See Agee v. CIA, 517 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 n.5 (D.D.C. 1981). These sums
had been amassed at individual agencies despite projections that the cost ofFOIA to the entire
government for the period 1976-80 would amount to no more than $500,000. See supra text
accompanying note 44.
See Sinrod, supra note 44, at 334.
SeeS. REP. NO. 104-272, at 21 (1996).
See Scalia, supra note ! at 16.
See id.
1974 Amendments, supra note 37, 1(b)(2), 88 Stat. at 1561 (amended 1986) (emphasis added).
See Onin G. Hatch, Balancing Freedom of Information with Confidentiality for Law Enforcement,
9 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 8 ( 1983 ); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16.
Such material would be exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(D).
Such material would be exempt under 5 U.S.C. ~.52(b)(7)(C).
Scalia, supra note !, at 16.
1986 Reform Act, supra note 37, 1803, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(A)
(1994)). The 1986 FOIA amendments were attached to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act as part of a lastminute addition.1 See Susan L. Beesley & Theresa A. Newman Glover, ~ote, Delelopments Under
the Freedom of Information Acr-1986, 1987 DUKE LJ. 521, 524 (1987). Congress had been
considering a more substantial overhaul ofFOIA, but additional measures died in the Senate after
passing the House. See id. at 523-24.
32
See id.
See id. at 610.
1974 Amendments, supra note 37, 1, 88 Stat. at 1563 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)
(6)(C) {1994 & Supp. II 1996)).76. See Open America, 547 F.2d at 610-13, 616.
~
77. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994). FOIA's time limits were doubled in 1996. See E-FOIA,
supra note 24, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996)). These
changes are discussed infra Part III.A.5.
(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed,
\Vith another agttncy having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or
among two or more components of the agency having substantial subject-matter
interest therein.
33
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
!d. 552(a)(6)(B)(i)-(iii).
See id. 552(a)(6)(C).
See id. 552(a)(4)(B).
!d. 552(a)(6)(C).
.
Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
!d. at 616.
See id. at 612.
See id. at 616. But see Mayock v. INS, 714 F. Supp. 1558, 1566 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that a
first-in, first-out processing policy did not constitute "due diligence" because the INS did not
accord priority to requests for information needed for immigration proceedings), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Mayock v. Nelson, 938 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1991). A-fayock v. INS was initiall:
decided on summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for the resolution of
outstanding issues of fact. See Nelson, 938 F.2d at 1008. After the case was remanded, the parties
entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in changes to FOIA processing practices at the
INS. See infra note 117 (discussing elements of the settlement agreement).
See Open America, 547 F.2d at 614-16. The court recognized that, given the FBI's finite resources,
priority processing of the plaintiffs' request would have necessitated taking personnel away from
other prior requests. See id. at 614. The court was unwilling to order such a reallocation of
resources when the plaintiffs "have alleged no urgency, have alleged no exceptional need, for the
information they seek." !d.
959 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997).
See id. at 2.
!d. Edmond is serving an 18-year sentence in fedeFal prison after pleading guilty to distributing a
kilogram of crack cocaine. See Like Son, Like Father; Edmond Gets 18 Years, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 1991, at C5. Edmond is the father ofRayful Edmond ill, who is currently serving three
life terms after being convicted in 1989 of running the District of Columbia's largest crack
distribution ring. See id.
See Edmond, 959 F. Supp. at 2.
See id.
See id. The USAO refused to give a specific date was given despite explicit statutory instructions
that required it to do so:
The time limits ... may be extended by written notice to the person making such
request setting forth the reasons for such extension and the date on which a
determination is expected to be dispatched. No such notice shall specify a date that
would result in an extension for more than ten working days.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
34
35
115. See Edmond v. United States Attorney, 959 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Courts have uniforrn1v
--granted the government reasonable periods of time in which to review FOIA requests when ther~
is a backlog."); Sinrod, supra note 44, at 342 (noting the irony that "the condition of 'exceptional
circumstances' has become the norm").
116. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,894 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement ofSen. Leahy) ("[R]outine
- - failure to comply with the statutory time limits ... breeds contempt by citizens who expect
government officials to abide by, not routinely bre~, the law.").
117. Timely FOIA responses are particularly important to aliens facing deportation proceedings. See
- - Sinrod, supra note 44, at 350. Since discovery is not permitted in deportation proceedings, see
Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987), aliens often must rely on FOIA to obtain
information from the INS. See Mayock v. INS, 714 F. Supp. 1558, 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("FOIA
is essentially the only procedure which aliens can use to obtain from the INS information relevant
to their cases."); see also Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1252 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming
the denial of a subpoena sought against the INS because the plaintiff "failed to meet her burden of
proving that the materials she sought were essential to her case and otherwise unavailable" (since
FOIA was available to obtain the requested information) (emphasis added)).
An example of the serious consequences that can result from FOIA delays is the case of Hassan
Tehranijam, an Iranian alien who had petitioned for political asylum, fearing persecution if
returned to Iran. See Sinrod, supra note 44, at 351. The immigration judge doubted the
authenticity ofTehranijam's political asylum claim and ordered him deported. See id. Prior to the
deportation order, Tehranijam's attorney had made a FOIA request to the INS for documentation
to support the claim of political persecution, but a large backlog of requests at the INS delayed
processing of his request. See id. Without this needed documentation to support his claim,
Tehranijam was deported. See id. Tehranijam's attorney eventually sued the INS in order to change
its procedures. See Maycock, 714 F. Supp. at 1559-60. That case ended with a settlement
agreement under which the INS instituted some cnanges in its processing of FOIA requests. See
Sinrod, supra note 44, at 353-54. The Mayock settlement agreement included arrangements for
expedited processingof certain time-sensitive requests and a two-track processing system to
separately handle simple and complex requests. See id. at 354-55. These features were included in
E-FOIA, to the effect that certain FOIA requests may receive expedited processing, see infra Part
ill.A.4, and all agencies are authorized to create a multi-track processing system. See infra Parts
m.A.3.
118. See generally Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: The
-"Central Purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 67-69 (1994)
(defining and discussing the central purpose doctrine); Beall, supra note 23, at 1253-61 (same).
119.489 u.s. 749 (1989).
120. See id. at 757.
121. See id.
122. !d.
123. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(C) (1994).
124. !d.
125. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762.
126. !d. at 774.
.
127. !d. at 775.
1_28. See Cate et al., supra note 11 S, at 67; Beall, supra note 23, at 1258.
129. See United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 507 ( 1994)
36
37
would be able to satisfy the requirements of this section by making the records available on CDROM or diskette. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3448, 3463. The records that are to be made available for public inspection by electronic means
are:
(A) fmal opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders,
made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpret~tions which have been adopted by the
agency and are not published in the Federal Register;
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staffthat affect a member of the
public;
(D) copies of all records, regardless of form or format, which have been released to
any person ... and which, because of the nature of their subject matter, the agency
detennines have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests
for substantially the same records; and
(E) a general index of the records referred to under subparagraph (D).
E-FOIA, supra note 24, 4, 110 Stat. at 3049 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)).
One commentator has erroneously stated that 552(a)(2) requires all records created after
November 1, 1996, to be made available electronically within one year of their creation. See David
MacDonald, Note, The Electronic Freedom ofInformation Act Amendments: A Minor Upgrade to
Public Access Law, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357,375 (1997). Such a
requirement would be nearly impossible for agenc!.es to fulfill and would be an incredible waste of
agency resources.
151. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 11, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3454.
152. Attorney General Reiterates FOIA Policy, FOIA UPDATE (Office of Info. and Privacy, U.S.
Dep't of Justice), Spring 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Reno Memo].
153. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, 4, 110 Stat. at 3049 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2)(D) (Supp. II
-1996)).
154. FBI FOIA Electronic Reading Room (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://v.ww.tbi.gov 'foipa:
document.htm>.
- -155. See Index oflfoipalelvis (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://w,nv.tbi.gov/foip~~-~~is>.
156. See Index oflfoipalrosen (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://\nvw.fbi.gov/foipa. ros~~ ?
157. See Index of/foipalufo (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http:/1\V\\'W.fbi.gov/foipa/ufo/>.
158. Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement: Hearing on S. 1090 Before the Subcomm. on
Gov't Management, Info. and Tech. ofthe House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 104th
Cong. 74 (1996) (testimony of Robert Gellman) [hereinafter Gellman Testimony]; see also
MacDonald, supra notejl50, at 382 (arguing that the provision will likely result in an "explosion
of litigation").
159. An agency's assessment would not be aimed at anyone in particular, and an indi\idual would still
-have access to the document through traditional FOIA channels. Cf Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575-76 ( 1992) ("[T)he alle-ged violation of a right to have the Government
act in accordance with law [is] notjudicially cognizable because 'assertion of a right to a particular
38
kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot
alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III .... "' (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754
(1984))).
160. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, 4, 110 Stat. at 3049 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2)(D) (Supp. II
-1996)).
161. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing agency discretion in the context of granting
--fee waivers). 162. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 383 n.164 (arguing that "(a)gencies may find less political risk
--in processing antiquated documents than current and controversial ones"); Gellman Testimony,
supra note 158, at 74.
163. See Jane Kirtley, Public Access to Records Always Under Attack, EDITOR & PUBLISHER
l\1AG., July 7, 1997, at 48 (noting that the Clinton administration "inherited a legacy of entrenched
bureaucratic resistance to openness promulgated during the Reagan and Bush administrations").
164. Memorandum from President Clinton on FOIA to Heads ofDepartments and Agencies (Oct. 4,
1993), reprinted in FOIA UPDATE (Office ofinfo. and Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice),
Sununer!Fall 1993, at 3 [hereinafter 1993 Clinton Memo].
165. See Reno Memo, supra note 152, at 1 ("As your department or agency implements the Electronic
- - FOIA amendments, I urge you to be sure to continue our strong commitment to the openness-ingovernment principles that President Clinton and f [have] established .... ").
166. See Open Records Ensure Freedoms, WIS. ST. J., July 4, 1997, at 13A (noting that the Clinton
--administration's record is "mixed," but emphasizing that it is "an improvement upon the policies of
the Reagan and Bush administrations").
167. See Federal Information Policy Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Management,
--Info., and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 51 (1996)
(statement of J. Kevin O'Brien, Chief, Freedom of Info. and Privacy Acts Section, FBD
[hereinafter O'Brien Testimony] (asserting that the FBI would continue its "best efforts" to reduce
its backlog of unprocessed FOIA requests); Letter from John C. Dwyer, Acting Associate
Attorney General, to The Speaker ofthe United States House of Representatives (July 1, 1997)
(expressing the Clinton administration's "firm commitment" to FOIA and to "its faithful
implementation in [a] strong spirit of government openness"), reprinted in OFFICE OF INFO.
AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, DOJ ANNUAL FOIA REPORT TO CONGRESS
1996, available at DOJ Annual FOIA Report to Congress- 1996 (visited Apr. 1, 1998)
<http://W\\-w.usdoj.gov/oip/annual report/1996/96-sp.htm>. There is a risk, of course, that future
administrations will revert to a more restrictive FOIA policy. If that scenario becomes a reality,
the courts could intervene and set reasonable limitations on agency discretion. Agencies would
still be subject to FOIA's time limits, and if, as a result of diverting resources to post previously
released material, an agency took too long responding to newer requests, the courts could compel
disclosure and require the agency to shift resources back to processing current requests.
168. The system is by no means perfect, however. For example, when I examined some FBI
- - information on UFOs, the documents on the screen were barely legible due to the condition of the
original documents. See FBI FOIA Electronic Reading Room. UFO: Section l (visited Apr. 1,
1998) <http://v.--..nv.fbi.gov/foipa/ufo/ufo 1.pdf>.
169. SeeS. REP. NO. 104-272, at 9 (1996) ("Government dissemination of more varieties and greater
- - amounts of its information holdings via [the information] 'superhighway' may reduce the volume
of FOIA requests .... ").
170. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 3 72 ( 1976).
171. 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984).
172. See id. at 760-61.
39
40
"Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps Both," 44 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1184 (1995)
(lamenting the fact that "FOL\ has rarely if ever been used as a powerful external check on
governmental affairs," and noting that "the typical FOIA request is made by a wily civil litigant
circumventing traditional discovery rules, a corporate counsel in search of competitor's financial
information, or a conspiracy theorist demanding operational files of the [CIA] on himself or other
players in covert intelligence maneuvers in Cuba"); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16 ("[FOIA was]
promoted as a boon to the press, the public interest group, the little guy; [it has] been used most
frequently by corporate lawyers .... [The current situation] is a far cry from John Q. Public
finding out how his government works."). Perhaps the most scathing and extensive critique of
FOIA was delivered by Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman, in 1988:
Today, a typical FOIA scenario is not, as envisioned by the Congress, the journalist
who seeks information about the development of public policy which he will shortly
publish for the edification of the electorate. Rather, it is the corporate lawyer seeking
business secrets of a client's competitors; the felon attempting to learn who it was who
informed against him; the drug trafficker trying to evade the law; the foreign requester
seeking a benefit that our citizens cannot obtain from his country; or the private
litigant who, constrained by discovery limitations, turns to the FOIA to give him what
a trial court will not.
The Freedom ofInformation Act: Hearings Before)he Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law ofthe
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1OOth Cong. 37 (1988) (footnote omitted).
198. Department ofthe Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,361 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994).
200. 142 CONG. REC. S10,894 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also Sinrod,
--supra note 44, at 342 (noting that "compliance with FOIA's ten-day rule has become the exception
rather than the norm"); Beall, supra note 23, at 1254 n.14 ("[T]he 10-day time limits imposed by
[the 1974] Congress no longer have any significance.").
201. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, 8, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (Supp. II
-1996)).
202. H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 26 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3469.
203. There is a risk, however, that the new time limits will slow down some FOIA processing since
--agencies that currently respond within ten days will no longer have the pressure to comply within
ten days. See Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 75.
204. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
205. See Congress Brings Information Act into Electronic Age, supra note!~
206. See Sarah Henderson Hutt, In Praise of Public Access: Why the Government Should Disclose the
-Identities of Alleged Crime Victims, 41 DUKE L.J. 368,383 n.88 (1991).
207. See Michael H. Hughes, CIA v. Sims: Supreme Cqurt Deference to Agency Interpretation of FOIA
-Exemption 3, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 279,281 (1985).
208. See Hutt, supra note 206, at 383 n.88.
209. See Hughes, supra note 207, at 281.
' 210. See Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 75 (noting that no matter whether the time limits are
- - ten or twenty days, agencies with very large backlogs "will never be in compliance" because "they
will not have any more resources").
211. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, 7(b), 110 Stat. at 3050-51 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(B)
(Supp. II 1996)). One supporter of a twenty-day time limit argues that the expanded limit should
41
replace the "unusual circumstances" provision, contending that the added administrative burden of
sending out notices of extensions to requesters is unnecessary. See Sinrod, supra note~~. at 357.
212. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, 7(b), 110 Stat. at 3050-51 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(B)(i)(ii) (Supp. II 1996)).
213. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (Supp. II 1996).
214.Id.
215. See supra Part II.A.
216. E-FOIA, supra note 24, 7, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(C)(ii) (Supp. II
1996)).
21 7. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 24 ( 1996) (explaining that the language does not cover "routine
-backlogs" because permitting such backlogs to "give agencies an automatic excuse to ignore the
time limits ... provides a disincentive for agencies to clear up those backlogs"), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3467.
218. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
220. Information that is classified by executive order in the interest of national defense or foreign
-policy is exempted from disclosure by 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(l).
221. Such information is exempted from disclosure by 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). President
--Ford, when he initially vetoed the 1974 FOIA amendments, voiced such a concern:
I believe that confidentiality would not be maintained if many millions of pages of
FBI and other investigatory law enforcement files would be subject to compulsory
disclosure .... Our law enforcement agencies do not have, and could not obtain, the
large number of trained and knowledgeable personnel that would be needed to make
such a line-by-line examination of information requests that sometimes involve
hundreds of thousands of documents, within the time constraints added to current law
by this bill.
Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amendments, 1974 PUB. PAPERS 374,375 (Oct. 17, 1974).
222. 959 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997), discussed in detail supra at pages 1228-29.
223. E-FOIA, supra note 24, 7, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S. C. 552(a)(6)(C)(ii) (Supp. II
-1996)).
224. Edmond, 959 F. Supp. at 2.
225. E-FOIA, supra note 24, 7, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(C)(ii) (Supp. II
1996)).
226. See Edmond, 959 F. Supp. at 3 n.2.
227. See supra text accompanying note 212 (discussing opportunity to narrow scope of requests).
228. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, 7, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(C)(ii) (Supp. II
-1996)).
229. S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 5 (1996); see also E-FOIA, supra note 24, 2(a)(6), 110 Stat. at 3048
("Government agencies should use new technology to enhance public access to agency records
1
and information.").
230. See Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement: Hearing on S. 1090 Before the Subcomm.
- o n Gov't Management. Info., and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight,
104th Cong. 98 (1996) (testimony of James P. Lucier, Jr.) (categorizing E-FOIA's technological
provisions as not "particularly astonishing" and "Iinle more fundamental than requiring agencies to
42
publish their telephone numbers now that telephones have been invented").
231. See E-FOIA Signing Statement, supra note 145, at 1949.
232. See O'Brien Testimony, supra note 167, at 51 ("It fs clear, however, that only more analysts,
- - trained to process requests, can sigru!iCantly diminish the backlogs .... ").
233. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 384 (calling the failure to fund "[t]he first and primary failure"
- - ofE-FOIA). For a discussion of the Senate proposal to fund the amendments that was not passed,
as well as other proposed ways to fund FOIA, see infra Part IV.B.
234. SeeS. REP. NO. 104-272, at 9 (1996) ("Government dissemination of more varieties and greater
--amounts of its information holdings via a 'superhighway' may reduce the volume ofFOIA
requests.").
235. See Gellman, E-FOIA Will Slow Down Agency Responses, supra note 1-lS, at 27.
236. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,894 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that
- - FOIA requests to the FBI can take up to four years to be processed).
237. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, 8, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(E)(i) (Supp. II
- - 1996)). For example, it is unknown how expedited review will function in combination with multitrack processing. One commentator suggests that an agency might put all other requests on hold so
it can devote all of its FOIA resources to processing the expedited cases. See Gellman, E-FOIA
Will Slow Down Agency Responses, supra note 148, at 27. One of the only finn requirements that
the amendments place on agency regulations is that they ensure "expeditious consideration of
administrative appeals of [the] determinations of whether to provide expedited processing." EFOIA, supra note 24, 8, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(E)(ii)(II) (Supp. n
1996)).
:>
238. Cf Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 74 (noting that "virtually every word in the FOIA has
--been the subject of intense litigation~
239. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 383 (arguing that the expedited review provisions "will add
- - significant costs to administrative overhead" and will "further drain agency resources and slow
down FOIA compliance overall").
240. See, e.g., Cate et al., supra note 118, at 67-69.
241. See id. at 45.
242. S. 1090, 104th Cong. (1996).
243. The statute itself places no limitations on who may request records or for what reason. As long as
--the records do not fall within one of the statutory exemptions, an agency, "upon any request for
records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the
records promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3) (1994) (emphases added). Courts
have reaffirmed this basic principle ofFOIA, noting that Congress "clearly intended the FOIA to
give any member of the public as much right to disclosure as one with a special interest in a
particular document." United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at
6 (1996) ("Requesters do not have to show a need or reason for seeking information."), reprinted
._.
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3449.
244. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 17 (criticizing FOIA and its costs because requests that "may be
motivated by no mo~ than idle curiosity" take "money from the Treasury that could be better
spent elsewhere").
245. See Scott Shane:Panningfor Gold in Government Files: Businesses Mc.1ke Afost of Public Right to
-Know, BAL TIM:ORE SUN, July 28, 1997, at 1A (noting that some people have become "FOIA
hobbyists"). One such FOL-\. hobbyist, Michael J. Ravnitsky of St. Paul, Minnesota, "has flooded a
43
dozen agencies with 2,200 FOIA requests." !d. Ravnitsky, who recently got a bill from the FBI for
$18,000 in costs, stated: "'I think FOIA is great fun. It's a national treasure."' !d. He says that he is
not planning on paying the bill. See id.
2-+6. Scalia, supra note ~ at 17.
2-+ 7. See discussion supra Part II. B. (discussing the central purpose doctrine, which has been used to
--uphold the denial, based on the privacy exemptions, ofFOIA requests that do not serve FOIA's
"central purpose," which is to ensure access to information concerning the activities of
government, not those of private citizens).
2-+8. See Cate et al., supra note 118, at 67 ("The test for whether a request seeks 'official information'
- - should be the touchstone for disclosure under FOIA .... [O]nly information that will serve the
purpose of ensuring that 'the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny'
should ever be subject to disclosure under the FOIA." (quoting Reporters Conzm., 489 U.S. at
774)). But see Beall, supra note 23, at 1279-80, 13.00 (criticizing the central purpose doctrine as
"contrary to the original spirit ofFOIA," and expressing dismay over the doctrine's "exaltation of
privacy doctrines" that erode "one of the central bulwarks to a free democracy," access to
information).
249. See Cate et al., supra note 118, at 69, 72.
250. See id. at 67-68.
251. See Beall, supra note 23, at 1273-80 (reviewing cases in which lower courts incorporated the
--central purpose doctrine's language in non-privacy exemption cases).
252. E-FOIA, supra note 24, 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 3048 (emphases added).
253. S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 24 (1996) (additional views of Senator Leahy) (citations omitted).
254. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the use of a balancing test. For example, under Exemption 7(C),
- - material may be withheld if disclosure would result in an "unwarranted invasion" of privacy. See 5
U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(C) (1994). In order to determine whether an invasion of privacy would be
unwarranted, a court is forced to weigh the relative merits of the interest in disclosure and the
privacy interest involved. See Dickinson, supra note 130, at 209-10 ("[B]y casting the personal
privacy exemptions as balancing tests, Congress reintroduced into disclosure disputes the issue of
merit."). Senator Leahy appears to have recognized this necessity. His attachment to the Senate
report accompanying E-FOIA states that the requester's intended use can properly be considered
when balancing the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interest. SeeS. REP. NO. 104272, at 27 (additional views of Senator Leahy). Most likely, any congressional attempt to fully
overturn Reporters Committee and its progeny and to eliminate the central purpose doctrine would
need to be more explicit.
255. One way to avoid such a problem would be to require FOIA requesters to state how the
information they are requesting is likely to shed light on the activities and operations of the
government. This type of initial purpose statement would assist agencies in making the initial
determination. But see Cate et al., supra note 118, at 68 n.229 (arguing that a congressional
attempt to limit the use ofFOIA for purely private purposes by requiring that requesters
demonstrate a "public purpose use" for the requested information would be ineffective and
ultimately "umvorkable").
256. SeeWald, supra note 25, at 666.
257. See id. at 670 (noting the risk of "increas[ing] the cozy, closed door government-business dealings
-which were the very sort of practices the Act was designed to root out") (internal quotation marks
omitted). Public interest groups argue that moving too quickly to cut off public di3closure of
business data would be unwise, claiming that such a move would shield such embarrassing
information as "drug company tests on humans [that are performed] before completing animal
tests, toxic chemicals dumped into streams and rivers, inspection reports of the Department of
44
Agriculture concerning unwholesome meat, [and] misleading reports by a utility to its ratepayers
about the costs of a new nuclear plant." !d. at 669-70 (footnotes omitted).
258. See Scalia, supra note l, at 17-18 ("[FOIA's] defects ... might not be defects in the best of all
--possible worlds. They ire foolish extravagances only because we do not have an unlimited amoun 1
of federal money to spend, [or] an unlimited numb-er of agency employees to assign .... ").
259. See 1986 Reform Act, supra note 37, 1803, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)
(4)(A)(iii) (1994)). For a discussionof the 1986 amendments, see supra Part I.C.
260. Cf The Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement Act: Hearings on S. 1940 Before rhe
- - Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 96 (1992)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[A]ll of us would look at some requests as frivolous, but that is part of
the price of democracy.").
261. See Beall, supra note 23, at 1262 (arguing that the use of the central purpose doctrine as a
--gatekeeper "would work a dramatic volteface from the principles ofFOIA, improperly shifting the
Act from one that favors disclosure to one that favors secrecy").
262. Pub. L. No. 79-404, ch. 324, 3, 60 Stat. 237,238 (1946).
263. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 40 (1965).
264. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 7 ( 1986) ("The inclusion of any type of purpose test ~vould have
--made the FOIA as useless as the disclosure statute it replaced.").
265. SeeS. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3. This 1965 Senate Report states that the primary purposes of the law
- - were "to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted
under clearly delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and
the press may obtain information wrongfully withheld." !d.
266. Beall, supra note 23, at 1299.
267. !d.
268. See discussion supra Part I.C (arguing that the 1986 Amendments strike the proper balance
--between keeping government activities open to the light of public scrutiny and fiscal realities).
269. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 13 (1996) ("A principal constraint to the full effectiveness of the
- - FOIA has been the lack of adequate agency resources."), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,
3456; S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 16 (1996) ("The reasons for [the backlogs] may vary, but
principally it appears to be a problem oftoo few resources in the face of too heavy a workload.").
270. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 11 (1986) (citing inadequate resources as a reason for delay in
- - FOIA processing); Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno on FOIA to Heads and
Departments of Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993) (noting that the principal reason for backlogs appears to
be "too few resources in the face oftoo heavy a workload"), reprinted in FOIA UPDATE (Office
of Info. and Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice), Summer/Fall 1993, at 5; Sinrod, supra note -t..t, at 33-t
("Congress' failure to fund FOIA adequately led to backlogs and delays in many agencies: ... ").
271. See discussion supra Part I.C (noting that the 1986 Amendments significantly increased agencies'
-ability to charge requesters for the costs of processing requests).
272. SeeS. REP. NO. 104-272, at 21.
273. See id.
27-t.
S. 1090, 104th Cong. 6(a) (1996). The bill's lang~age
provided:
-I
.
If at an agency's request, the Comptroller General determines that the agency annually
has either provided responsive documents or denied requests in substantial
compliance with the [time limit] requirements of[5 U.S.C. 552(a)] (6)(A), one-half
of the fees collected under this section shall be credited to the collecting agency and
expended to offset the costs of complying with this section through staff development
45
If it were possible to trace all of the disclostifes made under the FOIA, the identifiable
dollar savings to the taxpayer resulting from those disclosures would almost certainly
exceed the cost of the FOIA. In fact, the savings from a single FOIA disclosure can
pay the cost of the entire FOIA for an entire year or even longer. \\-'hen [one
considers] the non-monetary benefits that result from FOIA disclosures-such as fairer
and more responsive government, better agency policy, health and safety
improvements, and a better informed citizenry-the total benefits ofthe FOIA far
exceed the costs.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 10-11 (1986) (internal citations omitted). This House Report recounts
several instances where use ofFOIA led to recovery of misspent tax dollars. See id. at 9-10.
Sometimes the amount recovered is relatively small. For example, the Better Government
Association used FOIA "to document that a [government official] illeg:1lly used :1n :1gency
chauffeur for non-official transportation." /d. at 10. The official eventu:11ly reimbursed the
government $6,411. See id. The savings can be substantial, however, such as when the Better
Government Association used FOIA during an investigation of a Navy shipbuilding contractor.
46
See id. at 9. The investigation uncovered waste and false billing by the contractor. and " [ u]
ltimately a settlement was reached with the contractor that resulted in potential savings to the
government of$170 million." !d.
290. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
291. H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 9; accord H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 7 (1996) (noting that FOIA "mav
--have a certain degree of preventive effect, prompting a higher degree of probity and
conscientiousness in the performance of government operations"), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.~.
3448, 3450; William Safire, Essay, Free Speech v. Scalia, N.Y. Tlv1ES, Apr. 29, 1985, at A17
(asserting that FOIA "has done more to inhibit the abuse of Government po\ver ... than any
legislation in our lifetime"). This deterrent value exists because "[a]gency managers knO\v that
many oftheir actions are subject to public oversight through documents obtained by the press and
by citizens through the FOIA." H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 9.
292. Wald, supra note 25, at 683 (emphasis added).
47
Unanticipated Consequences
A. We hope you found the preceding report enlightening as to why
you should be using the FOIA process to your benefit.
B. We have read many ofthese type of reports. We have read every
appellate and Supreme Court case cited in the previous report plus
hundreds more. We read everything we can find on FOIA. Our
goal is to help everyone who needs help and is willing to listen to
us.
C. Some people are doing FOIA requests on their own, but seem to
48
49
J.
Mr. Pratt stayed with the FOIA program and saw it through.
So can you!
K. Just as Mr. Pratt exposed the FBI lies, you can expose the lies of
the IRS.
L. We have people call us who want to argue against doing FOIA
requests. Usually in the first minute, we know that they don't
have a clue of what they are talking about.
M. Read and learn for yourself like thousands of others are doing.
50
Learn more and use our Specialized Services and better protect yourself.
51
A joint publication of
U.S. Genera1 Services Administration
Washington, DC 20405
Table of Contents
The Freedom of Information Act
What the Freedom of Information Act is and how to use i t . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Privacy Act
What the Privacy Act is and how to use i t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~- Compari_son of the Freedom o= In=ormation Ac~ and ~h~_ _l'r:.vacy__::>.:::::
Relationship between the two acts and deciding which to use . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Sources of
Informat~on
Introduction
52
-
in exercising their rights.
It uses a question-and-answer format to
present information about these laws in a clear, simple manner.
The
brochure is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of the complex
issues associated with the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
It also does not
discuss the availability of federal agency information electronically,
although many federal agencies maintain Internet World Wide Web sites at
which a wide range of information is readily available.
The questions answered in this brochure are those frequently asked by
persons who contact the Federal Information Center (FIC) for information
on the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
The answers were compiled by the FIC
and the Consumer Information Center (CIC) of the U.S. General Services
Administration. They were reviewed by the Department of Justice, the
agency responsible for coordinating the administration of the FOIA and
encouraging agency compliance with it.
The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), which has a similar responsibility for the Privacy Act,
reviewed the answers to questions on that act.
The FOIA, enacted in 1966, provides that any person has the right to
request access to federal agency records or information. Federal
agencies are required to disclose records upon receiving a written
request for them, except for those records that are protected from
disclosure by the nine exemptions and three ~~elusions of the FOIA.
This right of access is enforceable in court:
The Privacy Act is another federal law regarding federal government
records or information about individuals.
The Privacy Act establishes
certain controls over how the executive branch agencies of the federal
government gather, maintain, and disseminate personal information.
The
Privacy Act also can be used to obtain access to information, but it
pertains only to records that the federal government keeps about
individual U.S. citizens and lawfully admitted permanent resident
aliens.
The FOIA, on the other hand, covers all records in the
possession and control of federal executive branch agencies.
This brochure contains information about the most significant provisions
of the FOIA and the Privacy Act. We hope you find it helpful.
The FOIA provides access to all federal agency records (or portions of
those records), except for those records tha~ are protected from
disclosure by nine exemptions and three exclusions (reasons for which a~
agency may withhold records from a requester).
The exemptions cover (1) classified national defense and foreign
relations information, (2) internal agency rules and practices, (3)
information that is prohibited from disclosure by another law, (4) trade
secrets and other confidential business information, (~) inter-agency or
intra-agency communications that are protected by legal privileges, ( 6)
information involving matters of personal privacy, (7) certain
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, (8) information
relating to the supervision of financial institutions, and (9)
geological information on wells.
The three exclusions, which are rare~y
used, pertain to especially sensitive law enforcement and national
53
security matters.
Even if information is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, the agency
still may disclose it as a matter of administrative discretion when that
is not prohibited by any law and would not cause any foreseeable harm.
The full text of the FOIA is printed beginning on page 15 of this
brochure.
The FOIA does not apply to Congress, the courts, or the immediate office
of the White House, nor does it apply to records of state or local
governments.
However, nearly all state governments have their own
FOIA-type statutes. You may request informat~on about a state's records
access law by writing to the office of the attorney general of that
state.
The FOIA does not require a private organization or business to release
any information directly to the public, whether it has been submitted to
the federal government or not.
However, information submitted to the
federal government by such organizations or companies can be available
through a FOIA request if it is not protected by a FOIA exemption, such
as the one covering trade secrets and confidential business information.
Under the FOIA, you may request and receive by mail a copy of any record
that is in an agency's files and is not covered by one of the exemptions
or exclusions.
For example, suppose you have heard that a certain toy
has been recalled as a safety hazard and you want to know the details.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission could help you by providing
copies of the recall documents.
Perhaps you want to read the latest
inspection report on conditions at a nursing home certified for
Medicare.
Your local Social Security office keeps such records on file.
Or you might want to know whether the Department of Veterans Affairs has
a file that mentions you.
In all of these examples, you could use the
FOIA to request information from the appropriate federal agency.
(See
the discussion below on how to find the right agency office and
address.)
When you make a FOIA request, you must describe the records that you
want as clearly and specifically as possible. If the agency cannot
identify and locate records that you have requested with a reasonable
amount of effort, it will not be able to assist you. While agencies
strive to handle all FOIA requests in a customer-friendly fashion, with
no unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles, the FOIA does not require them to
do research for you, to analyze data, to answer written questions, or in
any other way to create records in order to respond to a request.
How do I
54
find~he
handle your FOIA request, but you will save t_.i.me in the long run if yo:..:
send your request directly to the most appropriate office.
For
assistance, you can contact the Federal Information Center (FIC) .
The
FIC is specially prepared to help you find the right agency, the right
office, and the right address.
The FIC is administered by the U.S.
General Services Administration.
Information on how to contact the FIC
begins on page 14.
The U.S. Government Manual, the official handbook of the federal
government, may also be useful.
It describes the programs within each
federal agency and lists the names of top personnel and agency
addresses.
The Manual is available at most public libraries and can be
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents.
(Ordering instructions
are on page
.)
Additionally, each agency publishes FOIA regulations
in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) that contain the mailing
addresses of its FOIA offices.
(For example, the Department of
Justice's FOIA regulations can be found in Volume 28 of the CFR, Par~
16.) The CFR is available at most public libraries.
You may
Date
Freedom of Information Act Request Agency Head or FOIA Officer Name of
agency or agency component Address (see discussion above on whom to
contact)
Dear
Under the Freedom of Information Act,
55
I am
Name Address
Under the FOIA, federal agencies are required to respond to your reques~
within 10 working days of receipt (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and
federal holidays).
If you have not received a response by the end of
that time (allowing for mailing time), you may telephone the agency or
write a follow-up letter to ask about the status of your request.
Sometimes an agency may need more than 10 working days to find the
records, examine them, possibly consult other persons or agehcies,
decide whether to disclose all of the information requested, and prepare
the records for disclosure. Agencies may extend this 10-day period ~p
to 10 more working days, with written notice to you.
Some agencies,
particularly law enforcement agencies, receive large numbers o:
requests, many of which involve voluminous records or require
exceptional care to process.
If an agency has a backlog of reques~s
56
that were received before yours and has assigned a reasonable portion of
its staff to work on the backlog, the agency ordinarily will handle
requests on a first- come, first-served basis and may not respond to all
requests within the statutory time period.
If the agency denies your appeal, or does not respond within the
statutory time period, you may take the matter to court.
The agency's
denial letter should tell you that you can file a FOIA lawsuit in the
U.S. District Court where you live, where you have your principal place
of business, where the documents are kept, or in the District of
Columbia.
In court, the agency will have to prove that any withheld
information is covered by one of the exemptions listed in the act.
If
you win a substantial portion of your case and your lawsuit is found to
be a matter of public interest, the court rna~ require the government to
pay court costs and reasonable attorney's fees for you.
57
58
How do I
As with the FOIA, no one office handles all Privacy Act requests. To
locate the proper agency to handle your request, follow the same
guidelines as for the Freedom of Information Act.
If you think a particular agency has a file pertaining to you, you may
write to the Privacy Act Officer or head of the agency. Agencies are
generally required to inform you, upon request, whether or not they have
files on you.
In addition, agencies are required to report publicly the
existence of all systems of records they keep on individuals.
The
Office of the Federal Register publishes a listing of each agency's
systems of records notices, including exemptions, as well as its Privacy
Act regulations.
The multi-volume work, Privacy Act Issuance's
Compilation, is updated every two years and can be found in most large
reference and university libraries.
Write a letter to the agency that you believ~ may have a file pertaining
to you. Address your request to the Privacy Act Officer or head of the
agency, such as "Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services." Be
sure to write "Privacy Act Request" clearly on both the letter and the
envelope.
Most agencies require some proof of identity before they will give you
your records.
Therefore, it is a good idea to enclose proof of identity
(such as a copy of your driver's license) with your full name and
address.
Do not send the original documents.
Remember to sign your
request for information, since your signature is a form of
identification.
If an agency needs more proof of identity before
releasing your files, it will let you know.
Give as much information as possible as to why you believe the agency
has records about you. The agency should process your request or contact
you for additional information.
A sample request is shown below.
Keep a copy of your request.
need to refer to it in further correspondence with the agency.
You may
Date
59
Dear
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. subsection 552, and the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. subsection 552a, I am requesting access to
[identify the records as clearly and specifically as possible].
If there are any fees for searching for or copying the records, please
let me know before you fill my request.
[Or, please supply the records
without informing me of the cost if the fees do not exceed $ -----which I agree to pay.]
If you deny all or any part of this request, please cite each specific
exemption you think justifies your refusal to release the information
and notify me of appeal procedures available under the law.
Optional:
If you have any questions about handling this request, you
may telephone me at
(horne phone) ~or at
(office
phone).
Sincerely,
Name Address
What about costs for getting records under the Privacy Act?
Under the Privacy Act, an agency can charge only for the cost of copying
records for you, not for time spent locating them.
Under the terms of the Privacy Act, the agency is not required to reply
to a request within a given period of time.
However, most agencies have
adopted the 10-day period in their regulations.
If you do not receive
any response within 4 weeks or so, you might wish to write again,
enclosing a copy of your original request.
60
Although the two laws were enacted for different purposes, there is some
similarity in their provisions. Both the FOIA and the Privacy Act give
people the right to request access to records held by agencies of the
federal government.
The FOIA's access rights are given to "any person,"
but the Privacy Act's access rights are given only to the individual who
is the subject of the records sought (if that individual is a U.S.
citizen or a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien).
The FOIA applies to all records of federal agencies. The Privacy Act,
however, applies to only those federal agency records that are in
"systems of records" containing information about individuals that is
retrieved by the use of a name or personal identifier. Each law has a
somewhat different set of fees, time limits, ~nd exemptions from its
right of access.
If the information you want pertains to the activities of a federal
agency, an organization, or some person other than yourself, you should
make your request under the FOIA, which covers all agency records.
If
the information you want is about yourself, you should make the request
also under the Privacy Act, which covers most records of agencies that
pertain to individuals.
Sometimes you can use the FOIA to get records
about yourself that are not in a Privacy Act "system of records."
If
you are in doubt about which law applies or would better suit your
needs, you may refer to both in your request letter.
If you request
records about yourself and the Privacy Act applies, the agency should
process the request under both the FOIA and the Privacy Act and withhold
requested information from you only if it is exempt under both laws.
552
a~d
63
No fee may be charged by any agency under this section-(I) if the cost of routine collection and processing of the fee are
likely to equal or exceed the amount of the fee; or
(II) for any request described in clause (ii) (II) or (III) of this
subparagraph for the first two hours of search time or for the first one
hundred pages of duplication.
(v) No agency may require advance payment of any fee unless the
requester has previously failed to pay fees in a timely fashion,
agency has determined that the fee will exceed $250.
or the
64
i~
(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all
practicable speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in
the determination of the request or among two or more components of the
agency having substantial subject-matter interest therein.
(C) Any person making a request to any agency for records ~nder
paragraph (1), (2), or (3) o this subsection shall be deemed to have
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect: to sc:ch request i
the agency fails to comply with the applicabfe time limit provisions o
this paragraph.
If the Government can show exceptional circumstances
65
66
i~volves
access to records
(3) the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the
denial of records requested under this section, and the number of
instances of participation for each;
(4) the results of each proceeding conducted pursuant to subsection
(a) (4) (F), including a report of the disciplinary action taken against
the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for improperly
67
withholding records
taken;
OY
an explanation of
why~disciplinaYy
(5) a copy of every rule made by such agency regarding this section;
(6) a copy of the fee schedule and the total amount of fees collected by
the agency for making records available under this section; and
(7) such other information as indicates efforts to administer fully this
section.
The Attorney General shall submit an annual report on or before March l
of each calendar year which shall include for the prior calendar year a
listing of the number of cases arising under this section, the exemption
involved in each case, the disposition of such case, and the cost, fees,
and penalties assessed under subsections (a) (4) (E), (F), and (G).
Such
report shall also include a description of the efforts undertaken by the
Department of Justice to encourage agency compliance with this section.
(f) For purposes of this section, the term "agency" as defined in
section 551{1) of this title includes any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation,
or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent
regulatory agency.
.
68
69
F. Now read through the next four pages with your highlighter so you get a
feel of how to use the System of Records.
G. This Federal Register of Dec. 10, 2002 could just prove to be a valuable
tool for your use in the FOIA process.
H. Learn to use it to your advantage. It is Item # 195 on our literature list.
I. Tum off the electric toilet (TV) in your living room and spend some time
70
Monday,
December 10, 2001
Part
Department of the
Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
Privacy Act of 1974, as Amended; System
of Records; Notice
71
63784
72
(RCPJ
IRS 26.019-Taxpayer Delinquent Accounts
(TD .>,.) Files including subsystems: (a)
Adjustments and Payment Tracers Files,
(b) Collateral Files. (c) Seized Property
Records. (d) Tax SB/SE. W8d. LMSB
Waiver. Forms 900. Files, and (e)
Accounts on Child Support Obligations
IRS 26.02D-Taxpayer Delinquency
Investigation (TDIJ Files
IRS 26.021-Transferee Files
IRS 26.022-Delinquency Prevention
Programs
IRS 30.003-Requests for Printed Tax
Materials Including Lists
IRS 30.004-Securitv Violations
IRS 3.;.003-Assignment and Accountability
of Personal Property Files
IRS 34.007-Record of Government Books of
Transportation Requests
IRS 3.;.009-Safety Program Files
IRS 3.;.012-Emergency Preparedness Cadre
Assignments and Alerting Rosters Files
IRS 3.;.013-ldentification Media Files
System for Employees and Others Issued
IRS ID
63800
7602. 7801
PURPOSE(S):
None.
RETRIEVABIUTY:
c.s.c.
Disk storage.
5 u.s.c. 301; 26
and 7802.
TreasurynRS
STORAGE:
24.030
STORAGE:
SYSTEM NAME:
Magnetic media.
SYSTEM LOCAnON:
73
RETRIEV ABIUTY:
Federal Register I Vol. 66, No. 237 I Monday. December 10. 2001/ Notices
accordance with instructions appearing
at 31 CFR part 1. subpart C. appendix
B. Inquiries should be addressed as in
"Record access procedures" below.
RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES:
None.
TreasurynRS 24.046
SYSTEM NAME:
63801
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE:
None.
TreasurynRs 24.047
SYSTEM NAME:
STORAGE:
Magnetic media.
RETRIEVABIUTY:
74
PVRPOSE(S):
After going through this issue we want you to develop your own request
and send it in.
1. Form a FOIA study group and help each other with requests. Then compare the
results you get back.
C. Every once in awhile something slips through. You may get a two to six
page answer that can prove to be very interesting!
D. If you get something out of the norm, we would like to take a look at it.
You can fax it to 313-557-0708. That way we can all learn and help
others. Don't forget to use a cover letter so we know who is sending the
fax.
E.
F.
These FOIA requests come back in your name not somebody else's
name.
G.
If you are one ofthe millions who have stopped self-assessing yourself
then this process is critical for your overall protection.
75
B. We suggest you keep this request very simple by not mixing this IMF
request with any other request.
C. Try to keep your request limited to 3 or 4 years at a time.
D. Your Hv1F will generally run 1 %, to 2 years behind. If you ask for the
current year or last year's IMF they will probably not yet be in the IDRS
system.
E. We provide a complete decoding service of your IMF that goes into great
depth and detail. The decoding that we do will include another group of
FOIA requests for you to send in which are based upon what the IRS has
posted to your IMF and other documents.
F. The first 100 pages of a FOIA request are free. It is 1Ocents a page after
that. The first two hours of research are free.
G. The IRS has 20 days to respond to your request. But do not hold your
breath. Some people get responses within a couple of weeks. With others it
may take months.
H. When you send this or any other FOIA request it has to have a notarized
statement or you can use your driver's license copied onto the FOIA request
to verify that you are the correct requester.
I. If you no longer have a SSN you might want to put "former SSN" in front
76
2.
If some of this request is exempt from release, please furnish me with those
portions reasonable segregable. I am waiving personal inspection of the requested
records.
3.
4.
5.
Please certify all documents with the Form 2866, certificate of official record. If
there are no specific documents pertaining to this request, certify your response
with Form 3050, certificate oflack of records.
DATED:
Respectfully,
name, Requester
77
STATE O F - - - - - - -
)
)
ss
Signature ofNotary
I, Name, hereby swear and affirm that I have the authority to request information
pertaining to Entitv name.
Name
78
FOIA Section
A. FOIA, your key to relief.
B. You will notice the FOIA requests in this section are also in the past issues. This
issue is geared to giving you a background on the FOIA process with a little study.
1. Both BMF and IMF have the same items that you want to obtain through FOIA request.
2. If you want to teach a class on the IMF, the BMF, or the NMF you will have them in the past issues.
3. Some people will be buying a certain issue because someone they know has a problem in this area. Then,
if that individual wants a year subscription they can order it for themselves.
C. In the March VIP Dispatch concerning the NMF (Non-Master File) the FOIA
requests are the key and will continue to be. That is why this issue is so important.
D. Each "VIP Dispatch" is designed to be a self-contained unit based on one main topic.
E. We will introduce several new FOIA requests that can be used with the IMF or BMF
in the following issues.
F. After years of teaching about the FOIA process we want people to say; "that was
exactly the FOIA request that we were looking for," Or "look what I received back
from that FOIA request. I had no idea they were keeping this type of information on
me."
G. FOIA requests are a great tool to use to document actual IRS Procedural Due Process
abuse against you.
I. These documented procedural due process violations are the only real issue that the federal system
will sit up and take notice of in tax matters.
2.
If you get good at this and with some divine providence you can trace these procedural due
process violations to one or two specific agents. You can then file a complaint against them. First
you must gather the documented facts.
H. When you do a BMF request make sure you use the Entity name and not your
personal name.
l.Make sure you use the entities EIN and not your SSN.
I.
We have hundreds of entities who obtain their BMF's. They do exist and can be
acquired for its use as credible evidence to rebut the Prima Facia presumptions of the
IRS.
J. If the IRS is coming after an entity, the BMF will show how far along they are in the
process.
79
1.)
2. If you have an SSN you will not have a BMF. But the IRS will still input BMF codes
into your IMF file to make you liable for some kind of an excise tax.
B. If you have a trust with an EIN then you can send off for the BMF of that
trust.
C. We also offer decoding process for your BMF which can get somewhat
complicated and time consuming depending on the size of the BMF.
D. Remember: There must be an affidavit/declaration, notary statement
filled out and signed, and attached to each FOIA request.
1. Sometimes the disclosure officer will send back your original request in the case of a
trust asking to see a copy of the trust document making you the qualified individual to
receive the information asked for.
2. If you do not have this document, contact whoever sold you your last trust packet.
Ask for this page or create it yourself, if you are the qualified trustee, and make sure
there is a notary statement with it, or it will probably be returned again.
80
2.
If some of this request is exempt from release, please furnish me with those
portions reasonable segregable. I am waiving personal inspection of the requested
records.
3.
4.
Please send me a copy of all the documents maintained in the System of Records
k.no\Vn as Returns and Information Processing D:R:R - Treasury I IRS Business
Master File Specific (BMF): 24.046 which pertains to the above referenced EIN#
and entity.
5.
Please certify all documents with the Form 2866, certificate of official record. If
there are no specific documents pertaining to this request, certify your response
\Vith Form 3050, certificate of lack of records.
DATED:
Respectfully,
81
AFFIDAVIT I DECLARATION
COUNTY O F - - - - - -
)
)
STATE O F - - - - - - -
ss
Signature ofNotary
I, Name. hereby swear and affirm that I have the authority to request information
pertaining to Entity name.
Name
82
D. Ifyou or the entity has not had a CP-504 or a CP-518 then you probably
do not have a NMF.
E. If you should even have a FOIA request returned the Disclosure Officer
will send a form letter telling you why. Just correct it and send it back in
again. Do not let anything or anyone sidetrack you from doing your
FOIA request.
F. This FOIA process is your key to unlocking the IRS's "BIG DARK
CHEST OF SECRETS," that they are hiding from you.
83
2.
If some of this request is exempt from release, please furnish me with those
portions reasonable segregable. I am waiving personal inspection of the requested
records.
3.
4.
Please send me a copy of the Non Master file and Comments Field maintained in
a System of Records known as Integrated Data Retrieval System I IRS 34.018
which pertain to the above referenced SS# or EIN#.
5.
Please certify all documents with the Form 2866, certificate of official record. If
there are no specific documents pertaining to this request, certify your response
with Form 3050, certificate of lack of records.
Dated:
Respectfully,
84
AFFIDAVIT I DECLARATION
COUNTY OF _ _ _ _ __
STATE OF _ _ _ _ _ __
)
)
)
ss
Signature of Notary
I, Name, hereby swear and affirm that I have the authority to request information
pertaining to Entity name.
Name
85
CERTIFICATION OF IDENTITY
From the: U.S. Department of Justice
A. Every once in a while we will get a call from someone whose FOIA was
returned because lack of identity.
1. If it is for an IMF type of document you can use your Driver's License by
photocopying it right on the request. That will also save you a notary fee.
2. If it is for a BMF type of document then sometimes they will want to see your
corporate papers or a trust document that shows you are a qualified requester.
C. One thing we like about this Form is item 3, Social Security Number. If
you go to the bottom of the page at item 3, even the D.O.J. says
providing your SSN is "VOLUNTRY."
1. This Form makes a nice little exhibit to use when some entity wants that number
from you.
86
Certification of Identity
Privacy Act Statement. In accordance with 28 CFR Section 16.4l(d) personal data sufficient to identify the individuals submitting requests
by mail under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 u.S. C. Section 552a, is required. The purpose of this solicitation is to ensure that the records of
individuals who are the subject of U.S. Depanment of Justice systems of records are not wrongfully disclosed by the Department. Failure to
furnish this information \viii result in no action being taken on the request. False information on this form may subject the requester to criminal penalties under 18 t.J.S.C. Section 1001 and or 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(i)(3).
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 0.50 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources. gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection
of information. Suggestions for reducing this burden may be submitted to Director, Facilities and Administrative Services Staff, Justice
Management Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530 and the Office of Information and Regulatory Atfairs, Office
of \-lanagement and Budget, Public use Reports Project ( 1103-00 16), Washington, DC 20:503.
CurrentAdilless - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Date of B i r t h - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Place of B i r t h - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct, and that I am the
person named above, and I understand that any falsification of this statement is punishable under the provisions of 18 U.S. C. Section 1001
by a fine of not more than S 10,000 or by imprisonment of not more than five years or both, and that requesting or obtaining any record(s)
under false pretenses is punishable under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(i)(3) by a fine of not more than $5,000.
FOR~!
87
001361
APR.<! I
D. On the third and fourth page is a report by the Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration concerning FOIA appeals.
1. When you send in your appeal you can actually attach these two pages as an
exhibit.
E. The next level is the filing of a suit in Federal District Court, which can
be an educational experience, or pure pain in the rear depending on your
attitude and abilities.
1. Before you decide to go to this level research it and weigh your options.
F. We have found few people who wish to expend the time or money
necessary to do an appeal or file a suit.
G. If you get a request back and they have blacked out large portions of
what they send you or admitted to withholding documents, then you
might consider doing the appeal. Then follow up with a suit.
H. If they say, "we have no documents responsive to your request" we
usually accept that, and use it as an admission on their part that they have
failed to follow due process.
I.
We know of one individual who has filed over 10,000 FOIA requests.
Many have gone to appeal and suit.
88
Page 1 of 1
The documents that were withheld must be disclosed under the FOIA because ...
[Optionan
I appeal the decision to deny my request for a waiver of fees. I believe that I am entitled to a
waiver of fees. disclosure of the documents I requested in is in the public interest because the
information is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities
of government and is not primarily in my commercial interest. [provide details]
[Optiona~
I request that you release the withheld documents notwithstanding their exempt status. The public
interest in their release outweighs the public interest in withholding them because ... [provide
information on purpose for which the records would be used]
If you need to discuss this request, I can be reached at [daytime phone numberj. Thank you for
your consideration of this appeal.
Sincerely,
Name
Address
City, State, Zip
Telephone Number
90
113112002
Page 1 of2
Executive Summary
The Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) established an effective legal right of access to government
information by requiring agencies to make various information available to the public. Taxpayers who
file FOIA requests can administratively appeal to the Commissioner when the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) Disclosure Offices deny requests or when the IRS does not respond timely and asks for an
extension oftime to process the requests. Taxpayers who do not agree to voluntarily extend the time
frame can consider the delay a denial of their request for information and, therefore, may appeal.
The Assistant Chief Counsel (Disclosure Litigation) in the IRS Office of the Chief Counsel was
responsible for processing the administrative appeals; this Office closed almost 1,700 appeals cases in
Fiscal Year 1999. The IRS' Modernization Plan transfers responsibility for reviewing appeals to the
Chief, Appeals because it more appropriately falls within that Office's jurisdiction.
The objective of the audit was to evaluate the IRS' efforts to provide prompt and appropriate service to
taxpayers who appeal a denial of a FOIA request for information or a delay in providing information.
Results
The Assistant Chief Counsel (Disclosure Litigation) staff made appropriate determinations in the 50
cases we sampled. Attorneys and paralegals generally worked cases when taxpayers appealed because
the IRS denied their requests for information. Attorneys and paralegals properly determined whether the
IRS' decisions to not provide information were appropriate. Clerical employees generally worked cases
timely and appropriately when taxpayers appealed because of IRS delays in providing information.
Although the IRS correctly processed taxpayers' appeals, improvements to the service can be made by:
Responding timely when taxpayers appeal because the IRS denied their requests for information.
Analyzing FOIA appeals case information to identify potential trends in resource or case
resolution issues in Disclosure Offices.
App~als
of Denied Requests
At the end of Calendar Year 1999, the Office of the Chief Counsel inventory records indicated that 918
appeals had been open an average of 420 workdays. These appeals had been filed by taxpayers when the
IRS denied their requests for information. The 420 workdays extend significantly beyond the 20
workday requirement in the law. These cases were assigned, based on complexity, to attorneys or to
paralegals to make determinations as to the appropriateness ofthe IRS' initial denial of the requests.
91
1/31/2002
Page 2 of2
Although the Office of the Chief Counsel records indicated that, on average, attorneys expended 19
hours and paralegals expended 6 hours working an appeal, the appeals were often in inventory several
months and sometimes for years before decisions were made and provided to the taxpayers.
Management from the Assistant Chief Counsel (Disclosure Litigation) cited two main reasons for these
extensive time frames: the loss of paralegal staff who principally handled FOIA appeals, and the
subsequent distribution of appeals to attorneys who had higher priority work.
The Chief, Appeals has been implementing its Modernization Plan, including the transfer of
responsibility for FOIA appeals. That Office, however, has not set a specific target date for transferring
the FOIA appeals responsibilities or conducted an analysis to determine the staffing necessary to timely
process the appeals.
The Internal Revenue Service Should Analyze Freedom of Information Act Appeals
Case Information to Identify Potential Trends in Disclosure Offices
FOIA appeals information was not analyzed to identifY trends that Disclosure Offices could address. For
example, data may indicate an inordinate number of appeals due to delays in a few Disclosure Offices or
common characteristics among cases decided in favor of taxpayers. IdentifYing these characteristics and
resolving any associated problems could reduce the need for taxpayers to appeal.
Summary of Recommendations
The Office of the Chief Counsel should work with the Chief, Appeals to expedite the transfer of
responsibility for resolution ofFOIA appeals. The Chief, Appeals should determine the staffing
necessary to timely process FOIA appeals and should capture case information and periodically trend
FOIA appeals data.
Management's Response: IRS management agrees that expediting the transfer of responsibility for
processing FOIA appeals and ensuring an appropriate level of staffing necessary to process FOIA
appeals quickly are critical steps towards the IRS' renewed commitment to the FOIA. The Chief,
Appeals is considering staffing needs required to process FOIA appeals more quickly and effectively
and will work with the Office of the Chief Counsel to ensure that workload transition issues and training
needs are addressed.
Management's response did not address specific corrective actions for the report recommendation to
periodically trend FOIA appeals data. As a result, we could not determine whether adequate corrective
action was planned to capture case information and periodically trend the data. As part of our follow-up
activities, we are asking management to provide us more specific information on its planned corrective
action. Management's complete response to a draft of this report is included as Appendix IV.
92
1/3112002
93
Assistant Chief
Counsel
(Disclosure
Litigation)
Disclosure
Litigation
Reference
Book
Rev. 4-2000
IRS
94
April200b
To the Reader.
This refer~r~C?e boc>k ccivers the primary disclci$ure laws that affect the Internal Revenue
Service (t.R.C. 6103; the Freedom of lnfoi-mation Act (FOIA),and the Privacy Act. of
1$'74), arid(rel.ate~ statutes. Toget11er, these !alNS repre~nt efforts by the Congress to
Strlk~ bC!h!nce between a citizen's expectations of privacy and an open government.
Guidance teg~l matters concerning these .discl~ure:hiws:Js.provioed by thE;! ooce of
AssistantC))Je'f Counsel {Disclosure Litigation); This.offioe l.s also .responsiblf:dor
the Privacy .ArJr. of
defending r,iigatlqn filed pursuaMtto l;f\.C, 6103;: the FOIA.
on
and
1974:
This reference b,ook wiiLbeused.aphe June f,QOO course *Disclosure Training for Chief
Counse[ Attorneys"~ we hope thatthis material will also prove to be a useful reference
tool for your office. Wewelcome your comments and suggestions for improvement
I,
<-
{.
/Jh~ tt~
i .OHN B. CUMMI~S
/ AssistantChietCounsel
(Disclosure 'Litigation}
95
CHAPTER 1
PART 1: I.R.C. 6103-- HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
OBJECTIVES
A. Introduction
Except for a few periods in our history, tax information generally has not been
available to the public-its disclosure has been restricted. Congress has used
two basic approaches in determining whether, and under what circumstances,
tax information could be disclosed. Under the first approach, taken prior to 1977,
tax information was considered a "public record", but was only open to inspection
under Treasury regulations approved by the President or under presidential
order. Under this scheme, the rules regarding disclosure were essentially left to
the Executive branch.
By the mid-1970's, there was increased congressional and public concern about
the widespread use of tax information by government agencies for purposes
unrelated to tax administration. This concern culminated with the total revision of
section 6103, which was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. There,
Congress eliminated Executive discretion regarding what information could be
disclosed to which Federal and State agencies. Under this second approach,
Congress established a new statutory scheme in which tax information was
confidential and not subject to disclosure except to the extent explicitly provided
by the Internal Revenue Code. Although there have been many amendments to
1
Much of the information in this chapter was taken from "Report on Administrative
Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service to the Administrative Conference of the
United States," S. Document 266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 821-1028 (October 1975);
Zaritsky, "Legislative History of Tax Return Confidentiality: Section 6103 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 and Its Predecessors," U.S. Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, D.C.: 74-211A (1974); Janssen, "Income Tax Snooping Through
History," Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1970, at 18; and Rogovin, "Privacy and Income
Tax Returns," The Washington Post, October 13, 1974, at C4.
1-1
96
II! i I
the law since that time, the basic statutory scheme established in 1976 remains
in place today.
B. Publicity of Tax Returns
The history of tax information confidentiality may be traced to the Civil War
Income Tax Act of 1862, 2 when tax information was posted on courthouse doors
and sometime published in newspapers to promote taxpayer surveillance of
neighbors. For the next 70 years, there was debate in Congress as to the effect
of public disclosure on the tax system and to societal interests in general.
1. 1866-1913
Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 432. Ambiguities in that provision regarding public
inspection led Congress, in 1864, to explicitly permit public inspection of the
assessment list:
It shall be the duty of the assessor ... to submit the
proceedings of the assessors ... and the annual lists taken
and returned as aforesaid, to the inspection of any and all
persons who may apply for that purpose.
Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 218, 228.
3
Income Tax Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
1-2
97
98
were open to public inspection. 8 It was believed by many that public inspection
of corporate tax returns would be of great assistance in the supervision and
control of corporate entities (there was considerable fear of the power of
corporations at that time).
The contrary view, held by a minority, acknowledged that the 1909 legislation
made tax returns public documents. However, paragraph seven of the law made
it a criminal offense for any government officer or employee to release material
contained in these public documents without special instruction from the
President. If, the argument proceeded, the public access granted by paragraph
six had been entirely unfettered, paragraph seven would not have imposed
criminal sanctions for divulging information without the President's consent. This
illogical result was taken to mean that tax returns had not been opened to
indiscriminate public inspection but only to persons having a proper interest in
the returns. 9
While there was disagreement over what was intended by the 1909 legislation, it
was universally conceded that it altogether failed to open corporate returns to the
public. Some blame this result on inadequate draftsmanship. Others thought
the failure lay in lack of an appropriation to provide clerks to do the publicizing.
At any rate, a majority did conclude that another approach was necessary. An
amendment to the provision in the 1910 Appropriations Act resulted.
The 1910 legislation, which appropriated funds for the necessary classifying,
indexing, and processing of corporate returns, also stated: 10
any and all such returns shall be open to inspection only upon the
order of the President under rules and regulations to be prescribed
by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by the President.
The debate surrounding the 1910 Act plainly indicates that Congress intended by
the quoted provision to back away from the fully "public" treatment of corporate
"The truth is, however, that the intention was to provide complete publicity of the
returns made by these corporations." Comments of Mr. Fitzgerald, 45 Cong. Rec. 4137
(1910).
9
"It will be noted that the law does not provide the returns shall be subject to public
inspection, but that the returns shall become public records and open to inspection as
such ... the mere branding of these instruments as public records did not carry with it
the right of indiscriminate public inspection." Comments of Mr. Smith, 45 Cong. Rec.
4136 (1910).
10
99
11
1-5
100
12
Rogovin, Privacy and Income Tax Returns, The Washington Post (Oct. 13, 1974),
at C4.
13
69 1h
14
Hearings on Revenue Revision 1925 Before the House Ways and Means Comm.,
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1925).
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 293.
1-6
101
Although corporate returns were, in 1910, made available to the public, as well
as to other government agencies, individual returns were kept within Treasury
until 1920. In 1920, individual returns joined corporate returns as being generally
15
One news article reported that in 1924, within 24 hours after it was announced
that tax lists were ready for inspection, Internal Revenue officers throughout the country
were besieged by applications from promoters, salespeople, and advertisers.
16
17
18
19
102
This diverse history on disclosure reveals the existence of a statute which, in all
significant respects, went unchanged since 1910. Thus, the story is one of the
exercise of discretion granted by a Congress unwilling to define precisely the
policy to be followed. Having committed discretion to the President, and an
agency headed by his designee, it was not surprising that the power was
exercised toward expanding the use of information. Indeed, it would have been
unrealistic to assume that the President could have been expected to resist
agency arguments for more information on which to base important decisions,
even though such information might not be necessary and might well be used for
many purposes other than that apparently intended.
E. Developments in the 1970's
20
21
This concern led directly to the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
552a.
22
103
orders were prototypes of future orders opening other tax returns to inspection
by other agencies. Responding to the adverse sentiment expressed in these two
hearings, the President revoked both orders on March 21, 1974.
The concern over tax return confidentiality that remained after revocation of the
two orders was increased by disclosures made in hearings of both the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Watergate Committee)
and the House Judiciary Committee investigating the possible impeachment of
President Nixon. The Watergate Committee's hearings revealed that former
White House counsel John Dean had sought from the IRS political information
on so-called "enemies." Furthermore, it was disclosed to that committee that the
White House actually was supplied information on IRS investigations of Howard
Hughes and Charles Rebozo. The Committee noted that tax information and
income tax audits were commonly requested by White House staff and supplied
by IRS personnel.
The House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry also revealed apparently
unauthorized use of IRS tax data by the President. One of the Articles of
Impeachment proposed by the Judiciary Committee alleged that President Nixon
had: 23
endeavored to obtain from the Internal Revenue Service, in
violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, confidential
information contained in income tax returns for purposes not
authorized by law.
Congressional interest in tax return confidentiality also manifested itself in 1974
when, as part of the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress ordered the
newly-established Privacy Protection Study Commission to report to the
President and Congress on the proper restrictions which should be placed on the
disclosure of federal income tax information. This report was issued on June 9,
1976, and suggested major changes in the distribution of tax data to the
Department of Justice for both tax and nontax law enforcement, distribution of
tax data to the states and to local governments, and transfer of information to the
President and the executive agencies. It also recommended more severe
penalties for wrongful disclosure of tax data. The commission did not
recommend a general denial of tax data to nontax federal agencies.
On June 10, 1976, the Senate Finance Committee issued its report on H.R.
10612, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, in which it proposed substantial revisions in
23
104
Congress recognized that the IRS had more information about citizens than any
other federal agency, and that other agencies routinely sought access to that
information. Congress also recognized that citizens reasonably expected that
the tax information they were required to supply to the IRS would be kept private.
If the IRS abused that reasonable expectation of privacy, the loss of public
confidence could seriously impair the tax system.
Although Congress felt that the flow of tax information should be more tightly
regulated, not everyone agreed where the lines should be drawn. The debates
on accessibility were most heated in the area of nontax criminal law enforcement
purposes. One side, led by Senator Long, sought more liberal access rules in
order to fight white collar crime, organized crime, and other violations of the law.
This side felt "the Justice Department is part of this Federal Government. It is all
one Government." The other side, led by Senator Weicker, wanted very
restrictive rules. This side recognized that it was cheaper and easier for Justice
to come directly to the IRS. But they also felt that when citizens made out their
tax returns, they made them out for the IRS, and no one else.
Ultimately Congress amended section 6103 to provide that tax returns and return
information are confidential and are not subject to disclosure, except in limited
situations, as delineated by the Internal Revenue Code, where disclosure is
warranted. In each area of allowable disclosure, Congress attempted to balance
the particular office or agency's need for the information involved with the
citizen's right to privacy, as well as the impact of the disclosure upon the
continuation of compliance with the voluntary tax assessment system. 25 In short,
Congress undertook direct responsibility for determining the types and manner of
permissible disclosures.
24
25
Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, 94th Gong., General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 313-316 (Comm. Print 1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 325-328.
1-10
105
6103(c)-6103(o).
Technical, administrative, and physical safeguard provisions to prevent the recipients
of tax information from using or disclosing the information in an unauthorized manner,
and accounting, recordkeeping and reporting requirements that detail what disclosures
are made for what purposes to assist in Congressional oversight. I.R.C. 61 03(p).
Criminal penalties, including a felony for the willful unauthorized disclosure of tax
information, a misdemeanor for the unauthorized inspection of tax information, 26 and a
civil cause of action for the taxpayer whose information has been disclosed in a manner
not authorized by section 6103. I.R.C. 7213 (criminal penalty for unauthorized
disclosure), 7213A (criminal penalty for unauthorized inspection), 7431 (civil damages
provision).
C. Summary of Permissible Disclosures
26
106
1-12
107
Appendix 2
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108
o.. .
C. We read a report from the OMB and GAO that all federal agencies had
compiled and updated their System of Records- Except the IRS.
1. Finally on December 10, 2001 the IRS completed this task and released the
updated System of Records.
2. You can now obtain this updated version. Just go to our web site near the end of
our literature list and place your order. (Item 195) It is an essential tool for
defending your substantive rights.
109
Page 1 of3
(a) assure that their use of new information technologies sustain, and do not
erode, the protections provided in all statutes relating to agency use, collection,
and disclosure of personal information;
(b) assure that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of
records be handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out
in the Privacy Act of 1974;
(c) evaluate legislative proposals involving collection, use, and disclosure of
personal information by the Federal Government for consistency with the
Privacy Act of 1974; and
(d) evaluate legislative proposals involving the collection, use, and disclosure
of personal information by any entity, public or private, for consistency with
the Privacy Principles.
To carry out this memorandum, agency heads shall:
(a) within 30 days ofthe date ofthis memorandum, designate a senior official
within the agency to assume primary responsibility for privacy policy;
(b) within 1 year ofthe date ofthis memorandum, conduct a thorough review
oftheir Privacy Act systems of records in accordance with instructions to be
issued by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). Agencies should, in
particular:
(1) review systems of records notices for accuracy and
completeness, paying special attention to changes in technology,
function, and organization that may have made the notices out of
date, and review routine use disclosures under 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(3)
to ensure they continue to be necessary and compatible with the
purpose for which the information was collected;
(2) identify any systems of records that may not have been
described in a published notice, paying special attention to Internet
and other electronic communications activities that may involve
the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information;
(c) where appropriate, promptly publish notice in the Federal Register to add or
amend any systems of records, in accordance with the procedures in OMB
Circular A-130, Appendix I;
(d) conduct a review of agency practices regarding collection or disclosure of
personal information in systems of records between the agency and State, local,
and tribal governments in accordance with instructions to be issued by OMB;
and
(e) within 1 year ofthe date ofthis memorandum, report to the OMB on the
http://www.epic.org/privacy/laws/clinton-privacy1rh"lemo-598.html
Page 2 of3
Page 3 of 3
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
http://www.epic.org/privacy/laws/clinton-privacy-~mo-598.html
business that spend at least one hour every work night plus part of almost
every weekend trying to keep up with their "books and records."
G. How much are you being paid to do all of that plus save these records for
up to 10 years?
1. When we ask these questions the common answer we usually get is, "That is the
price you pay to live in a civilized society."
If there was such a law, then there wouldn't be a need for them to falsify our files
and lie to us so much.
113
other Federal agencies for the purposes of determining entitlement for benefits or the eJigibilitv
~
34
20
20
41
20
34
3-+
34
20
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
13 hr .. 27 min.
5 hr.. 37 min.
I hr .. 26 min.
10 hr .. 35 min.
I hr.. 43 min.
7 hr .. 36 min.
59 min.
5 hr .. 58 min.
34 min.
I hr .. 27 min.
I hr .. 25 min.
53 min.
I hr., 32 min.
30 min.
20
20
34
20
34
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
5
5
3
2
I
13 min.
35 min.
13 min.
20 min.
2 hr .. -+6 min.
3 hr .. 4 min.
33 min.
6 hr.. 4 min.
45 min.
1 hr .. 29 min.
13 min.
3 hr.
3 hr .. 30 min.
39 min.
8 min.
I hr .. 31 min.
3 min.
2 hr .. 59 min.
1 min.
1 hr.
I min.
6 hr .. 37
1 hr .. 34
25 min.
2 hr .. 19
35 min.
2 hr .. 34
II min.
1 hr .. 24
13 min.
3 hr.. 29 min.
3 hr.. 36 min.
I hr .. 38 min.
19 min.
19 min.
36
26
30
II
15
13 min.
26 min.
14 min.
20 min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
- 72-
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
hr ..
hr ..
hr..
hr ..
hr ..
52
47
35
22
38
min.
min.
min.
min.
min.
53 min.
1 hr .. 41 min.
'/C>
hi'.S,
know will bring them a win, or will quiet someone that they want to
quiet. They are limited by fiscal constraint and a strict quota system,
which limits the number of tax cases they can prosecute.
115
Two Ninth Circuit cases, United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991 ), and
United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992), have established the
requirement that upon request by a criminal defendant, the government has an
obligation to search its own files for exculpatory material including evidence affecting
the credibility of its proposed witnesses and to provide that material to the defense. For
witnesses who are government employees, this includes a review of their personnel
files. Jennings makes clear that this requirement is based upon the Constitutional
underpinnings of the Fifth Amendment as set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). This requirement overrides any Privacy Act considerations.
11-27
116