FILED

United States Court of

Appeals
Tenth Circuit

PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________

May 3, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court

TOOELE COUNTY; STATE OF

UTAH,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.

No. 15-4062

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant Appellee,
and
SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
ALLIANCE; THE WILDERNESS
SOCIETY; SIERRA CLUB,
Intervenor-Defendants.
________________________
MICHAEL ABDO; SOUTHERN
UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE,
Appellants.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00477-CW)
_________________________________
Jess M. Krannich, Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah,
(Stephen H.M. Bloch and Joseph J. Bushyhead, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Salt
Lake City, Utah; Brent V. Manning and Alan C. Bradshaw, Manning Curtis Bradshaw &
Bednar LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah with her on the briefs) for Appellants.

Anthony L. Rampton, Assistant Attorney General, Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake
City, Utah, (Kathy A. F. Davis, Assistant Attorney General and Sean D. Reyes, Utah
Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
This appeal concerns two suits in state and federal court and
statutory limitations on the power of the federal court to enjoin the statecourt case.
The first action to be filed was the one in federal court, where the
Utah Attorney General and the Board of Tooele County Commissioners
sued the federal government under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a.
In this suit, the Utah officials are attempting to quiet title in favor of Utah
for hundreds of rights of way in Tooele County, Utah. Five environmental
groups opposed this suit, and the federal district court permitted the groups
to intervene.
The second suit was the one in state court, where the Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Michael Abdo, a Tooele County resident,
claim that the Utah officials lack authority under state law to prosecute the
quiet-title action in federal court.
The Utah officials asked the federal court to enjoin the Wilderness
Alliance and Mr. Abdo from prosecuting the state-court action. The federal
2

district court granted the request and entered a temporary restraining order
enjoining the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo for an indefinite period of
time. The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appeal this ruling, presenting
us with two primary issues.
First, do we have appellate jurisdiction? We conclude that we do.
This issue arises because the federal district court called its order a
temporary restraining order, which is not ordinarily appealable. But
temporary restraining orders cannot exceed fourteen days. After fourteen
days, the order either lapses or becomes a preliminary injunction. The
district courts order had already lasted more than fourteen days by the
time the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed. Thus, the order is
treated as a preliminary injunction for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
Second, did the federal district court have the authority to enjoin the
state-court suit? We think not. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, grants
a district court expansive authority to issue all writs necessary. But the
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283 generally prohibits federal courts
from enjoining state-court suits. An exception exists when an injunction is
in aid of the federal courts exercise of its jurisdiction. This exception
applies when

the federal and state court exercise in rem or quasi in rem

jurisdiction over the same res and

the federal court is the first to take possession of the res.

3

These circumstances are absent because the state-court action is neither in

rem nor quasi in rem. Thus, the district courts order violates the AntiInjunction Act.
I.

Jurisdiction existed in district court and exists now in our court.

The parties do not dispute our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, but we

must independently examine our jurisdiction and the district courts. See
Lovell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 893, 897 (10th Cir.
2006). We conclude that jurisdiction existed in district court and exists
now in our court.
A.

The federal district court had jurisdiction.

The federal court had jurisdiction over the quiet-title suit under the
Quiet Title Acts grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
1346(f). Exercising this jurisdiction, the federal district court used its
authority under the All Writs Act to issue the temporary restraining order.
The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo challenge the district courts
jurisdiction, arguing that the district court tried to attach subject matter
jurisdiction over the state-court suit by entering the temporary restraining
order. Appellants Opening Br. at 17. We disagree. When a district court
enjoins another court from proceeding with a parallel suit, the district
court does not assert jurisdiction over the other suit; rather, the district
court exercises its own jurisdiction. See Commercial Sec. Bank v. Walker
Bank & Tr. Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that no
4

new grant of judicial power is contemplated by a statute empowering

federal courts to enjoin state-court proceedings). Thus, we reject the
challenge to the district courts jurisdiction.
B.

We have appellate jurisdiction.

Because the district courts order took the form of a temporary

restraining order, we must address our own jurisdiction. Temporary
restraining orders are not ordinarily appealable, but preliminary
injunctions are appealable. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d
501, 511 (10th Cir. 1968) (temporary restraining order); Crowe & Dunlevy,
P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2011) (preliminary
injunction). Thus, we must consider whether the order, when appealed, was
truly a temporary restraining order. If it was, it would not be appealable.
But in our view, the order should be treated as a preliminary injunction for
purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions differ in
how long they can last. Temporary restraining orders can last no more than
fourteen days 1; preliminary injunctions can last longer. When a temporary
restraining order lasts longer than fourteen days, it becomes appealable as
a preliminary injunction. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86 n.58, 87-88
(1974). This is true even if the district court labels its order a temporary

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).

5

restraining order. See Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir.
2007) (explaining that appellate jurisdiction is not controlled by . . . the
name that a district court attaches to an order).
Appellate jurisdiction turns on what kind of order was appealed. The
Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed an order labeled as a
temporary restraining order. But the federal district court said that the
order would remain in effect until the court decided whether to grant an
injunction. That period of time was indefinite. For fourteen days, the order
functioned as a temporary restraining order. But on the fifteenth day, that
order could be treated as a preliminary injunction, for purposes of
appealability, because a temporary restraining order cannot last longer than
fourteen days.
The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed on the eighteenth
day. Thus, they appealed an order that we view as a preliminary
injunction. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 87-88. And as a preliminary injunction,
the order was appealable. 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1).
II.

The federal district court violated the Anti-Injunction Act by

enjoining the state-court suit.
In the temporary restraining order, the district court enjoined the

Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo from prosecuting the state-court action
until the district court decided whether to issue an injunction. This order
implicated the Anti-Injunction Act, which ordinarily prohibits injunctions
6

against state-court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. 2283; see Phelps v. Hamilton,

122 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1997) ([T]he statute imposes an
absolute ban on federal injunctions against pending state court proceeding,
in the absence of one of the recognized exceptions in the law.).
The district court thought that one of the statutory exceptions
applied, reasoning that an injunction against the state-court proceeding was
necessary for the federal court to aid its jurisdiction over the federal quiettitle action. We respectfully disagree.
A.

We review de novo the district courts application of the

Anti-Injunction Act.

We would ordinarily review the district courts order for an abuse of

discretion. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 269
F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2001). But the applicability of the AntiInjunction Act calls for a legal conclusion. Ambort v. United States, 392
F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, we conduct de novo review of the
district courts application of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id.
B.

The Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the federal district

court from enjoining the state-court suit.

The Anti-Injunction Act ordinarily precludes injunctions against

state-court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. 2283. But three exceptions exist:
1.

Congress expressly authorized an injunction.

2.

The injunction is necessary in aid of [the federal district

courts] jurisdiction.

3.

The injunction is necessary to protect or effectuate a

previous judgment in federal district court.

Id. Applying the second exception, the district court concluded that an
injunction would aid the court in exercising its own jurisdiction. The Utah
officials defend this conclusion, arguing in the alternative that the first
exception applies because the Quiet Title Act constitutes an expressly
authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
The federal district court erred. An injunction would not fall within
the second exception, which encompasses injunctions in aid of the federal
courts jurisdiction. And we decline to address the first exception
whether the Quiet Title Act is an expressly authorized exception to the
Anti-Injunction Actbecause this issue was not presented to the federal
district court.
1.

The exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act are narrow.

The Anti-Injunction Acts exceptions are narrow and are not to be

loosely construed. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 131 S. Ct. 2368,
2375 (2011). As a result, courts should resolve doubts about the
applicability of an exception in favor of allowing the state-court
proceeding to continue. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2382.
2.

The second statutory exception does not apply.

The second statutory exception is limited. The Supreme Court has

applied it only when

both the federal and state suits constitute in rem or quasi in rem
proceedings and

the federal court was the first to take possession of the res (the
property under dispute in the federal and state actions).

See Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1943) (per curiam). 2
To apply the second exception, the court must decide whether the two
suits are either in rem or quasi in rem. An action in rem is one founded
upon the rights in or to property. Housley v. Anaconda Co., 427 P.2d 390,
392 (Utah 1967). Thus, in rem proceedings affect the interests of all
persons in the property. Archer v. United States, 268 F.2d 687, 690 (10th
Cir. 1959). An action is quasi in rem when it affects the interests of only
some persons in the property. Id.; see Restatement (Second) of Judgments
6 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1982).
The federal quiet-title suit fits the definition of an in rem or quasi in
rem proceeding. See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Natl Tr. Co., 302 P.3d
1103, 1106-07 (Nev. 2013) (stating that an action to quiet title is an in rem
or quasi in rem proceeding); see also Enhancing the Marketability of Land:
The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 Yale L.J. 1245, 1265 (1959) (stating that for a
quiet-title suit, the court obtains jurisdiction to adjudicate all interests in
the land at issue through its control of that land).

The Utah parties acknowledge that the second exception is generally

limited to state and federal proceedings that control the same res.
Appellees Resp. Br. at 11-12.
9

But the state-court suit was neither in rem nor quasi in rem because
there, the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo were not seeking adjudication
of anyones interest in property. Thus, jurisdiction in state court was based
on the courts authority over the Utah officials, not over anyones
property. By definition, that suit involved in personam jurisdiction rather
than in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 199 (1977) (If a courts jurisdiction is based on its authority over the
defendants person, the action and judgment are denominated in
personam.). Thus, the state-court suit would not ordinarily trigger the
Anti-Injunction Acts exception for injunctions involving two in rem or
quasi in rem proceedings.
The Utah officials downplay the fact that the state-court suit was
neither in rem nor quasi in rem, arguing that the gravamen of the statecourt suit involves the same res involved in the federal suit. We reject this
argument because the second statutory exception requires more than a
relationship between the suits and the property; both suits must also be in
rem or quasi in rem proceedings. See Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users
Assn v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67, 71 (10th Cir. 1942) (The mere fact that . . .
two suits relate to the same physical property does not justify a restraint of
the second suit by the court first acquiring jurisdiction.). The state-court
suit does not concern title to the contested rights of way at issue in the
federal-court suit, and we cannot uphold the injunction based solely on a
10

close relationship between the subject matter of the federal and state
suits. Id.; see Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 523 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th
Cir. 2008) ([T]he mere fact that the actions of a state court might have
some effect on the federal proceedings does not justify interference.).
The federal district court relied on an expanded version of the second
exception. Unlike our court, some other circuits have applied the second
exception more expansively in certain cases addressing multi-district
litigation, 3 school desegregation, 4 water rights, 5 congressional
redistricting, 6 and class actions. 7 In expansively applying the second
exception, these courts treat the underlying federal litigation as
functionally equivalent to a res. See Bryan J. Schillinger, Preventing
Duplicative Mass Litigation Through the Limited Resources Doctrine, 14
Rev. Litig. 465, 467-68 (1995) (explaining that the expansive approach is
based on broadening of the definition of in rem).

In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355,
364-65 (3d Cir. 2001).

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 501 F.2d 383, 384 (4th

Cir. 1974).

United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 101415 (9th Cir. 1999).
6

Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (11th Cir. 1993).

In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 235 (3d Cir. 2002).

11

In the state-court action, we have nothing that can be treated as the

functional equivalent of a res. Thus, even if we were to adopt the expanded
exception, it would not apply here.
The Utah officials point out that

this case is one of 22 quiet-title suits involving rights of way in

various Utah counties, which are pending in the same federal
district court, and

all of these suits pit Utah against the federal government.

Because of the number of suits, the Utah officials compare this case to
cases in which courts have upheld injunctions of state-court suits to
facilitate multi-district or class-action litigation. In our view, however, the
circumstances differ.
In cases involving multi-district litigation, some courts have broadly
applied the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act because
1.

a multi-district litigation panel, created by federal statute, has

reviewed many different pending cases in different district
courts and decided to consolidate the cases pretrial
proceedings,

2.

a judge overseeing the multi-district litigation has put forth

considerable effort coordinating discovery or settlement
discussions, and

3.

a state-court suit could affect the consolidated class of cases

and impede settlement.

In re Life Invrs Ins. Co. of Am., 589 F.3d 319, 331 n.11 (3d Cir. 2009).
None of these concerns apply here.

12

First, the district courts case management is not governed by federal

statute, and the 22 quiet-title suits are pending in a single district rather
than spread across districts. The cases have not been consolidated; the
district court simply issued a case-management order before trial to
collectively address procedural issues.
Second, when the federal district court issued the temporary
restraining order, the court had entered only a single case-management
order. See Appellants Appx at 9, 15 (district court docket sheet showing
entry of a case-management order). The case-management order would not
be disturbed even without an injunction against the state-court
proceedings. See note 10, below.
Third, the state-court suit might affect the ability of the parties to
settle the federal-court suit, but only because the state courts could resolve
a related question under Utah law. As the federal district court apparently
recognized, however, the state-law issue would not affect title to the
property underlying the federal-court suit. Thus, the concerns animating
expansion of the second exception in multi-district cases are not present
here.
The Utah officials also rely on cases involving class actions. For
these cases, some courts have expanded the second statutory exception by
analogizing an impending settlement in a class action to a res. See, e.g.,
Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1339 (11th Cir. 2012); Lorillard
13

Tobacco Co. v. Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, 589 F.3d 835, 844 (6th Cir.
2009); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1985).
No one has suggested that the federal suit is likely to settle soon.
Thus, the federal-court suit has not progressed to the point that an
injunction of the state-court suit would be necessary to protect the
equivalent of a res. In these circumstances, the injunction would be invalid
even in those courts that have broadened the second exception to apply
beyond in rem and quasi in rem proceedings. See Negrete v. Allianz Life
Ins. Co., 523 F.3d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to apply the
expanded exception in class-action litigation because the case did not
involve multi-district litigation, discovery was incomplete, and settlement
was not imminent).
The Utah officials urge an even broader expansion, one that would
authorize injunctions of state-court proceedings to prevent state courts
from undoing years of work in federal court to resolve complex cases.
Appellees Resp. Br. at 25. 8 For this argument, the Utah officials rely on

In state court, the environmental groups asked for not only a

declaratory judgment but also an injunction against the Utah officials
implementation and funding of the suit in federal court. Appellants
Appx at 19, 30. Because the environmental groups are seeking to enjoin
the prosecution of a federal-court suit, one could argue that the second
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act allowed the federal court to enjoin the
state court. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964). But
the Utah officials have not made that argument. Thus, we leave open the
possibility that the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act might
14

Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1996). In Winkler, the
Seventh Circuit declined to enjoin state-court proceedings. 101 F.3d at
1205-06. But the Seventh Circuit suggested that a federal court could
enjoin state proceedings when

the federal case involves multi-district litigation and

the injunction is necessary to protect a previous discovery

order.

Id. at 1202. These circumstances are not present here: the federal quiettitle suit does not involve multi-district litigation, and the federal district
court need not act to protect a previous discovery order. 9 See Zurich Am.
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 326 F.3d 816, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining
to apply Winkler in a case that did not involve multi-district litigation or
the need to protect a previously entered order). 10

allow a federal court to enjoin a state court from issuing an injunction that
would prohibit prosecution of the federal-court suit.
9

The Utah officials also cite other opinions in which the courts relied
partly on Winkler to enjoin state-court proceedings that threatened to
undermine prior orders. Appellees Resp. Br. at 25 (citing Newby v. Enron
Corp., 338 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2003); In re Ocwen v. Fed. Bank FSB Mortg.
Servicing Litig., 397 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2005)). But here, the
federal district court had no need to prevent interference with any prior
orders.
10

The Utah officials argue that the state-court litigation could undo the
federal courts case-management order. We disagree. The case-management
order would remain in place; the state-court litigation would simply make
further litigation in federal court unnecessary.
15

* * *
The second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply here.
The federal suit was in rem or quasi in rem, but the state-court suit was
neither. And the state-court suit did not involve the functional equivalent
of a res. So even if we were to adopt the expanded exception, it would not
apply here. Thus, the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act does not
allow an injunction against the state-court proceedings.
3.

We decline to consider the Utah officials newly presented

argument that the Quiet Title Act is an expressly authorized
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.

For the first time on appeal, the Utah officials contend that the Quiet
Title Act is an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
We decline to reach this argument.
We have discretion to affirm the district court on any ground
adequately supported by the record. See Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159,
1162 (10th Cir. 2004). But in deciding whether to exercise this discretion,
we may consider whether an argument was fully briefed in our court and
the district court. Id.

The concerns underlying the Seventh Circuit opinion in Winkler are

absent here. Indeed, after deciding Winkler, the Seventh Circuit
unambiguously stated that the prospect of a state court reaching [a]
decision first, making federal decision unnecessary . . . does not justify a
federal injunction against the state litigation. Adkins v. Nestle Purina Pet
Care Co., 779 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2015).
16

In district court, no one addressed whether the Quiet Title Act is an

expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The
proposition appears at least debatable, for the Quiet Title Act states: No
preliminary injunction shall issue in any action brought under this
section. 28 U.S.C. 2409a(c).
During oral argument, the Utah officials asserted that 2409a(c) of
the Quiet Title Act does not apply here. But no one has briefed the effect
of this provision, and no other federal appellate court has considered
whether the Quiet Title Act constitutes an expressly authorized exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act. In these circumstances, we decline to decide the
issue newly raised in our court.
III.

Conclusion
The second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply, and

the district court erred by concluding that it could enjoin the state-court
proceedings. This error requires reversal and remand for further
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.

17

15-4062 Tooele County v. United States

HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
The opening paragraph of the Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
filed in Utah state court by Michael Abdo and Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
(Appellants) states that they are seeking a judgment declaring Defendants federal court
quiet title action involving alleged R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in Tooele County illegal,
unconstitutional, and an ultra vires action brought outside the authority of the Office of
Attorney General, as well as an order enjoining the implementation and funding of this
litigation. Aplt. App. at 19. The injunction sought in this complaint would restrain
federal court proceedings; it does not matter that the prohibition . . . [would be]
addressed to the parties rather than to the federal court itself. Donovan v. City of Dallas,
377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964).
I do not think that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C 2283, forbids the issuance
of an injunction to prohibit a state court from restraining federal-court proceedings. To
restrain a federal-court proceeding is to impair to eviscerate that courts jurisdiction,
preventing it from even considering the dispute before it. As the district court said in this
case, the injunction sought by Appellants in state court would . . . effectively defeat the
jurisdiction of the federal court. Intervenors App. at 60. An injunction prohibiting
such a restraint could be necessary in aid of [the courts] jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C 2283.
In this light, it is easy to understand why the federal district court issued its
injunction in this case. Nevertheless, such an injunction was unnecessary. The law is
well-settled that a state court cannot grant the injunctive relief sought by Appellants.

Other than to protect its own jurisdiction over property in an in rem or quasi in rem
proceeding, a state court has no authority to restrain a federal-court proceeding. See
Donovan, 377 U.S. at 412-13; General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977); see
also Baker ex rel Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 n.9 (1998) (This
court has held it impermissible for a state court to enjoin a party from proceeding in a
federal court.) We should presume, a very safe presumption, that no Utah court would
issue the injunction sought by Appellants.
As for the declaratory relief sought by Appellants in state court, I agree with the
panel majority that the Anti-Injunction Act bars the issuance of an injunction to prevent
that portion of the state litigation. Even though the claim for declaratory relief raises
issues that would also be before the federal court, there is nothing wrong with parallel
claims being pursued in both state and federal court. To be sure, if the state proceeding
were the first to arrive at a judgment, that judgment could have preclusive effect in
federal court (although the federal court, applying state preclusion law, would be the
tribunal to determine the preclusive effect); but such a result is not improper under our
federal system. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 293 (2005) (In parallel litigation, a federal court may be bound to recognize the
claim- and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judgment . . . .); Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Loc. Eng., 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970) (the state and federal
courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this case, and neither court was free to prevent either
party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts). In fact, before the states
adopted statutes and rules permitting federal courts to certify questions of state law to
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state courts, the United States Supreme Court endorsed the practice of federal-court
parties seeking determinations of state-law issues in the federal litigation by commencing
actions in state courts. See, e.g., Government & Civic Employee Organizing Committee,
CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 365 (1957). Insofar as Appellants state-court action
seeks that courts interpretation of Utah law, it is not at all troubling, although it would be
surprising if the state court exercised its discretion to issue a declaration on whether state
law would be superseded by federal law in the present circumstance.

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