Malabang Vs Benito (What Is A de Facto Corp)

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Malabang vs Benito (what is a de facto corp)

FACTS: Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of Malabang


before it was created into a separate municipality thru an executive order. The
Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality of Balabagan for having
been created under an invalid EO 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal
officials from performing the functions of their respective offices. Petitioner relied on
the ruling of the Pelaez case that Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is
unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
and (b)because it offends against Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Constitution,
which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must
be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which
is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. The
Respondents on the other hand argue that the Mun. of Balabagan is at least a de
facto corporation for having been organized under color of a statute before this was
declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and
the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five
years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto
corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be
inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and
not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.
The method of challenging the existence of a municipal corporation is reserved to
the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding. But the rule
disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at
least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de
facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or
directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are
affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are
estopped by their conduct from doing so.
ISSUE:W/O the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.
RULING: No, because there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its
creation when EO 386 was subsequently declared as unconstitutional. The color of
authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be:1.
A valid law enacted by the legislature.2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face,
which has either (a)been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been
declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other
valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or
constitution of the state. In the case at bar, there is no other law that could give
color of authority to the validity of the existence of the municpality of Balabagan
when EO 386 was later on invalidated. Hence, such municipality is not a de facto
corporation.
Padilla vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 7155, creating the Municipality of Tulay na Lupa in the province of
Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-naLupa, Lugui, San Antonio,
Mabilo I, Napaod, Bayan-bayn, Mataulang, Pag-asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the
Municipalty of Labo, same province, COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite was
conducted throughout the municipality of Labo and majority voted against the
creation of the Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa. Petitioner prayed that the plebiscite
conducted to set aside with the contention that such plebiscite was a complete
failure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the
proposed Municipality of Tulay na Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo is valid.
RULING: COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion and the result of the
plebiscite rejecting the creation of the new municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa is valid.
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted
in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of the political entity
who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a
right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase
political units directly affected is the plurality of the political units which would
participate in the plebiscite.

Grio vs. COMELEC (Sec 462- conversion of sub province into Province)
G.R. No. 105120 September 2, 1992

FACTS: Grio and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in
relation to the May 11, 1992 election. Grio is a candidate for Governor of Iloilo
where the sub-province of Guimaras is located. LGC of 1991 took effect requiring
the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is one
such sub-provinces, upon approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The
plebiscite favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but petitioner
questioned the COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting
for Gov, Vice Gov and members of the Sanggunian of Iloilo.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.
HELD: The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under
the LGC of 1991, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province
is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will appoint provincial officials.
However, the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province
so there was need to undo what COMELEC has done in plebiscite. There ballots in
Guimaras should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now

considered the case moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for
the conversion of Guimaras.
Alvarez v. Guingona
G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996
Hermosisima, Jr., J.

Facts:

HB 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an


Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the
House of Representatives, subsequently passed by the House of Representatives,
and transmitted to the Senate. A counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the
Senate, and was passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by
the Chief Executive as RA 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13,
1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the
conversion of Santiago into a city.

Issue:

whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB
8817, RA 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives

Held:

Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the


House of Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import
was passed in the Senate, it cannot be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives.

Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr
1993). The SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and
was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of

local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House of Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives
the House bill.

In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court said that what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at
large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective.
Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the
people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended
RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of
Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act
merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,
therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law
passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was
the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga,
together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of
Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.
8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.

Navarro v. Ermita
2011 April 12 URGENT MOTION TO RECALL Entry of Judgment dated October 20,
2010.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of
local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents, and the criteria prescribed
by the Local Government Code (LGC), i.e., income, population and land area, are all
designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective
wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing
emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt,
the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
Petitioner: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA

Taxpayers and Residents of Surigao del Norte (Vice Gov, and Members of Provincial
Board)
Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
representing the President of the Philippines
Senate of the Philippines
represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT
House of Representatives
represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS
representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands
Movants-Intervenors: CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T.
MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and
HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL
Elected officials of Surigao de Norte province in the May 2010 elections
Facts:
1. Brief Recap a.
2 Oct 1996: President approves RA 9355 creating Province of Dinagat Islands into
law i.
Income : 82.69M/year ii.
Population : 106,951 iii.
Land Area : 802.12 sq. km b.
3 Dec 1996: COMELEC conducts mandatory plebiscite for ratification of creation of
province.
1People from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Dinagat Islands
voted. Affirmative Votes: 69,943
1LGC, SECTION. 10.
Plebiscite Requirement
No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly

affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections


(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the
law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date.

Negative Votes: 63,502 c.


President appoints interim set of provincial officials d.
1 Jun 2007: New set of provincial officials elected and assume office e.
10 Feb 2010: RA 9355 declared unconstitutional. (failed to meet min land area
requirements) 2.
Decision on 2010 case declared Final and Executory on 18 May 2010 3.
This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment of
movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original
parties. 4.

COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was
declared final and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status
as a non-province. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would have
to be nullified, and a special election would have to be conducted for various
positions (Governor, Vice-Governor, etc) for Surigao del Norte. Hence the
intervenors became real parties in interest with the declaration finality of the 2010
case decision. (Cong Matugas etal had petitioned to intervene before, but were
declared to have no standing since at that time, they were still candidates in the
May 2010 elections.)
Other Pertinent laws: LGC. Sec 386. Barangay - no min land area requirement LCG.
Sec 442. Municipality - 50 sq km BUT
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13.
Municipalities.
(a) Requisites for Creation

A municipality shall not be created unless the following requisites are present: (iii)
Land area- which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is
composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
LCG. Sec 450. City: 100 sq km BUT
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created
is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities
(a) Requisites for creation
A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either
population or land area are present:
" The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed
of one (1) or more
islands. "
LGC. Sec 461 Province 2000sq km BUT
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9.
Provinces.
(a) Requisites for creation
A province shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either
population or land area are present:
" The land area requirement shall not apply where the propose
d province is composed of one (1) or more islands. "
Petitioners
1.

Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (did not meet requirements)


Respondents
1.Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (met requirements)
Movants-Intervenors
1.The passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section
461 of the LGC 2.

The exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of
two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum
land area requirement 3.

The Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case - matter of equity and
fair play, undue burden on those who have relied on the inoperative law.
Issue:
WON a territory composed of more than 1 island is exempt from the minimum land
area requirement?
Held: Yes

SC:
1.Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island
Province of Dinagat. The acts of Congress, in passing RA 9355, definitively show the
clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land
area requirement
2.Please see pertinent laws With respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the
three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e.,
income, population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that
when the LGU to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from
the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of
the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component
city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the
genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities)
and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC but was inadvertently omitted in

Section 461 (for provinces).Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent.
3.Operative Fact Doctrine not really discussed. It does not apply in this case.
General Rule: An unconstitutional law produces no rights, imposes no duties and
affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative
as if it has not been passed
Dispositive:
Petition granted. RA 9355 and LGC-IRR Art 9 is constitutional. Excerpt: Debates in
congress regarding plebiscite and land area requirements

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. ". The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers.
So if we hard fast on
requirements of, we set a minimum for every province,
palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear
that in case we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite.
Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata
mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government
Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea
how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas. So, in every geographical
condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a generalization."

CITY OF PASIG VS COMELEC


G.R. No. 125646
September 10, 1999 (suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending boundary
disputes)

FACTS
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
separated from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to
be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay
Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of
1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said
barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March
15, 1997.Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta
moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions
with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both
Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a
pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case. Hence,
the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case
shall have been finally decided by the court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan
and Napico should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of
territory.

RULING
The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial
questions and that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A
case involving a boundary dispute between Local Government Units presents a
prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of
the proposed barangays may be held.While it may be the general rule that a
prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into
play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well
suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely
interrelated/linked to the first.

A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be


properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries. Primarily becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending
civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility.

BARANGAY SANGALANG VS. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN


G.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009

The case is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45, seeking to set aside the
decision and resolution of the CA.

The root of the controversy is about a barangay jurisdiction dispute between


petitioner Barangay Sangalang and respondent Barangay Maguihan, both situated
in Lemery, Batangas. Petitioner claims the lots to be within their territorial
jurisdiction, whereas respondent maintains that they are within their territorial
boundary.

The case was lodged before the Sangguniang Bayan of Lemery, Batangas, which
referred it to a hearing committee that rendered a report to the effect that the
properties belonged to petitioner. Such recommendation was affirmed by the
Sangguniang Bayan. Respondent appealed to the RTC, who ruled in favor of
respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, and later on an Amended Notice of Appeal.
The CA dismissed the appeal, ruling that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong
remedy in filing a notice of appeal instead of filing a petition for review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court. To wit:

"Given the procedural mandates, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lemery,
Batangas, dated April 27, 2000, was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Appropriately, under Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, decisions of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of
petitions for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."

The CA also ruled that if said appeal were to be considered as an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41, it still should be dismissed, because the submitted appellants brief
failed to contain a subject index and page references to the records requirement in
its Statement of Facts and Case and Argument, as provided for in Section 13 of Rule
44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court committed GADLEJ in dismissing the appeal solely based in
the rigid and strict application of technicalities, overriding the merit of the appeal or
substantial justice.
2. Whether the decision and order of the RTC of Lemery, Batangas, which set aside
the appealed resolution of the Sangguiniang Bayan, are null and void because
respondent Maguihan has not perfected its appeal and by reason thereof, the RTC
has not acquired appellate jurisdiction

HELD:
As to his first assigned error, petitioner faults the CA for having strictly applied the
rules of court notwithstanding his choice of the wrong remedy; yet, on the other
hand, as to his second assigned error, petitioner faults the RTC for not having
strictly applied the rules of court to respondents alleged failure to pay the
corresponding docket fees.

A reading of the records of the case shows that it was only in his Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration to the RTC Decision that petitioner first raised the issue
of non-payment of docket fees. Respondent, for his part, filed with the RTC an
Opposition and Comment explaining his failure to file the corresponding docket fees,
that the non-payment of docket fees is correct, but that the appellant who appealed
the case by himself and being a layman was not aware that a docket fee should be
paid in case perfection of an appeal and no one from the courts personnel reminds
him of this requirement. In order not to sacrifice the ends of justice, the appellant
was willing to pay the docket fee and other lawful charges necessary for the
perfection of an appeal.

The Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration was silent as to the issue
of the non-payment of docket fees. The Supreme Court deems that the RTC must
have accepted the explanation given by respondent, otherwise, said court would
have dismissed the appeal and reconsidered its decision.

The failure to pay docket fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of an
appeal, it being discretionary on the part of the appellate court to give it due course
or not. The Supreme Court will then not interfere with matters addressed to the
sound discretion of the RTC in the absence of proof that the exercise of such
discretion was tainted with bias or prejudice, or made without due circumspection of
the attendant circumstances of the case.

In any case, the more pressing issue is whether or not the Supreme Court should
even entertain petitioners appeal.

By filing a Notice of Appeal assailing the RTC Decision, petitioner has availed itself of
the remedy provided for under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the
ordinary mode of appeal. The CA, however, considered petitioners choice to be the
wrong remedy and, forthwith, dismissed the petition.

After an examination of relevant laws pertinent to herein petition, the Supreme


Court finds that the CA was correct in holding that petitioner had availed itself of the
wrong remedy. As correctly observed by the CA, under Section 118 of the Local
Government Code, the jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of boundary
disputes between and among local government units is to be lodged before the
proper Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, if it involves two
or more barangays in the same city or municipality. Under Section 118(e) of the
same Code, if there is a failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally
tried by the sanggunian concerned and shall decide the same within (60) days from
the date of the certification referred to.

Section 119 of the Local Government Code also provides that the decision of the
sanggunian concerned may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area
in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.

In the case at bar, it is clear that when the case was appealed to the RTC, the latter
took cognizance of the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, not its
original jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from the RTC Decision must conform
to the provisions of the Rules of Court dealing with said matter. On this score,
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.


(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing
a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition
for review in accordance with Rule 42.

Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that petitioner has availed itself of the wrong
remedy. Since the RTC tried the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The law is clear in this respect.

In any case, as in the past, the Supreme Court has recognized the emerging trend
towards a liberal construction of the Rules of Court. Courts have the prerogative to

relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to
due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the
rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.
Thus, notwithstanding petitioners wrong mode of appeal, the CA should not have so
easily dismissed the petition, considering that the parties involved are local
government units and that what is involved is the determination of their respective
territorial jurisdictions.

In the same vein, the CAs strict reliance on the requirements under Section 13 of
Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure relating to subject index and page
references in an appellants brief is, to stress, putting a premium on technicalities.
While the purpose of Section 13, Rule 44, is to present to the appellate court in the
most helpful light, the factual and legal antecedents of a case on appeal, said rule
should not be strictly applied considering that petitioners brief before the CA
contained only 9 pages, the records of the case consisted only of a few documents
and pleadings, and there was no testimonial evidence.

Other Issues:
Moving on to the substantive merits of the case, what it basically involves is
adjudication as to which barangay the lots in dispute belong. Ideally, herein petition
should be remanded to the CA, as the same inherently involves a question of fact.
However, since this case has been pending for almost 13 years now, the Supreme
Court deems it best to once and for all settle the controversy.

Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, outlines the procedures governing boundary disputes, including the
documents that should be attached to the petition.

The RTC observed that neither of the parties satisfied the requirement that all the
enumerated documents must be attached to the petition. Hence, like the RTC, the
Supreme Court is left with no other option but to select which between the
documents presented by the parties carries greater weight in proving its claim. The
documents presented by petitioner were sourced from the tax assessors office,
whereas the documents presented by respondent were sourced from the land
management bureau.

To the Supreme Courts mind, the presence of the cadastral map, which was
approved by the Director of Lands, should be given more weight than the
documents sourced by petitioner from the assessors office. Said map was approved

on March 17, 1986, which was approximately 10 years before the controversy in
hand developed. Hence, the same should be controlling in the absence of proof that
such document is invalid or inaccurate. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the
hearing committees recommendation to rule in favor of petitioner, the committee
itself stated in its report that the cadastral map submitted by respondent was
authentic.

Moreover, in ruling against petitioner, the RTC also gave greater weight to the
documents submitted by respondent, thus:
x x x This Court is mindful of the fact and takes judicial notice that the Land
Management Bureau is manned by geodetic engineers with sufficient expertise and
is the cognizant agency of government charged with the responsibility of matters
respecting surveys of land. This Court likewise takes into consideration that the duty
of the provincial and municipal assessors are primarily assessments of taxes.

It is undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal government


agency tasked with the survey of lands, and thus, more weight should be given to
the documents relating to its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the
ordinary course of business. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax assessor, the
conclusion is inevitable that it is the formers certification as to the location of
properties in dispute that is controlling, absent any finding of abuse of discretion. As
correctly observed by respondent and the RTC, the duty of provincial and municipal
assessors is primarily the assessment of taxes and not the survey of lands.

Lastly, petitioner alludes to a petition/resolution allegedly of persons residing in the


properties in dispute to the effect they are under the jurisdiction of petitioner. On
this note, the Supreme Court agrees with the observation of the RTC that the
determination as to whether the properties in dispute are within a certain
jurisdiction is not a decision to be made by the populace, to wit:
x x x In simple language, the population follows the territory and not vice versa. It is
the determination of the ambit and sphere of the land area as culled in the
approved barangay map that determines the jurisdiction of the barangay and not
the decision of the populace. To allow the latter will open endless litigation
concerning disputes of jurisdiction.
In sum, the Supreme Court does not belittle the documents presented by petitioner
or the duties of the provincial and municipal assessors; however, since the
documents presented by respondent are sourced from the very agency primarily
tasked with the survey of lands, more credence must be given to the same in the
absence of proof that would cast doubt on the contents thereof.

The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Lemery, Batangas, in Barangay Jurisdiction Dispute No. 1, are
AFFIRMED.

MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI


vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA (Municipality vs an Independent component city)
[G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003.]

FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and
the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable
settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the
boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section
118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because
both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In
fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It
also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and
agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.

POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE


FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR
MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED
CITY IN CASE AT BAR.
Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. To this end:

(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces
concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand
and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities,
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty
(60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification
to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian
concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the
certification referred to above.

Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other or between two or more highly urbanized cities
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local
government units involved. There is no question that Kananga is a municipality
constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it
continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized,
but an independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not
with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an
independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118
does not apply to them.

SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN


INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. Under Section 451 of the LGC,
a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an
independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for
provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is
considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election
Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is
neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the

parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion
to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO ADJUDICATE ALL
CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY
POWERS; CASE AT BAR. As previously stated, jurisdiction is vested by law and
cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. It must exist as a matter of law and
cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be
confused with venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to
the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The
applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since
there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over
the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to
adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary
powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all
other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.

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