Adviser Dealer Services v. ICON Advisers, Inc., 10th Cir. (2014)
Adviser Dealer Services v. ICON Advisers, Inc., 10th Cir. (2014)
Adviser Dealer Services v. ICON Advisers, Inc., 10th Cir. (2014)
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
Respondents-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Although the
court generally disfavors the citation of an order and judgment, it may be cited for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
The arbitration panel awarded other damages to ICON that are not at issue
on appeal.
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Holmes from working with any of ICONs competitors for two years. The
non-compete agreement also prohibited Mr. Holmes from using any of ICONs
confidential information.
In light of a subsequent investigation into the conduct of one of Mr.
Holmes subordinates, Mr. Holmes left ICON in March 2010 under a separation
agreement that did not alter the terms of his non-compete agreement. Meeder, a
direct competitor of ICON, hired Mr. Holmes to act as its Senior Vice President
of Sales and Marketing in April 2010. After several attempts by ICON to make
Mr. Holmes comply with the non-compete agreement, the parties agreed to
arbitrate their dispute. All parties to the dispute, including ICON, Meeder, and
Mr. Holmes, signed FINRA Uniform Submission Agreements, stating that each
agreed to be bound by FINRAs rules, by-laws, and Code of Arbitration
Procedure.
ICON filed a Statement of Claim, alleging breach of contract against Mr.
Holmes, tortious interference with a contract against Meeder, and interference
with a prospective business relationship against both Mr. Holmes and Meeder.
ICON sought, among other things, damages and attorneys fees pursuant to the
Retirement Agreement and the Non-Compete Agreement . . . . Aplt. App. at 27.
Mr. Holmes and Meeder filed a Statement of Answer and Counterclaims,
requesting the panel award Respondents their reasonable attorneys fees, costs
and expenses, forum fees and such further relief as the Panel may deem just and
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judicially created reasons. 2 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co.
of Okla., 636 F.3d 562, 567 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269
F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001)). These judicially created reasons include
violations of public policy, manifest disregard of the law, and denial of a
fundamentally fair hearing. Sheldon, 269 F.3d at 1206. In reviewing a district
court order vacating an arbitration award, we review factual findings for clear
error and legal determinations de novo. Hollern, 458 F.3d at 1172. But we
give extreme deference to the determination of the arbitration panel for the
standard of review of arbitral awards is among the narrowest known to law. Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This narrow standard has been
interpreted to mean that as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.
Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 611, AFL-CIO v. Pub. Serv. Co. of
N.M., 980 F.2d 616, 618 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United Paperworkers Intl
Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). Once an arbitration
award is entered, the finality of arbitration weighs heavily in its favor and cannot
be upset except under exceptional circumstances. Burlington, 636 F.3d at 567
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
On appeal, Meeder again contends ICON never requested attorneys fees
from Meeder pursuant to the Retirement Agreement or otherwise, Aple. Br. at
17 (emphasis in original), and therefore the issue was never submitted to the
panel. Meeder also argues that because it was never a party to the Retirement
Agreement, it cannot be bound by the panels decision to award attorneys fees
based on that agreement. We disagree.
FINRA guidelines expressly allow a panel to award attorneys fees when
all of the parties request or agree to such fees. Aplt. App. at 55 (emphasis
added). A submission agreement is considered to be a contract between the
parties, which gives an arbitration panel authority to act. See Hollern v.
Wachovia Sec., Inc., 458 F.3d 1169, 1174 (10th Cir. 2006) ([I]ncorporating a
document by reference into a contract makes that document an express part of the
contract. (citing Plunkett v. Plunkett, 624 S.E.2d 39, 42 (Va. 2006))).
Arbitrators derive their authority from the parties arbitration agreement, and
parties may extend that authority . . . in their submissions to the arbitrators so
long as the submissions do not violate an express provision of the original
arbitration agreement. Id.
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All parties to the dispute filed Submission Agreements, in which they each
agreed to submit the matter in controversy, as set forth in the attached statement
of claim, answers, and all related cross claims, counterclaims and/or third-party
claims which may be asserted, to arbitration in accordance with the FINRA ByLaws, Rules, and Code of Arbitration Procedure. Aplt. App. at 45-53. The
agreements state that each party agree[s] to abide by and perform any award(s)
rendered pursuant to this Submission Agreement. Id. Both ICON and Meeder
specifically requested attorneys fees: ICON in its Statement of Claim and
Answer to Respondents Counterclaims, and Meeder in its Statement of Answer
and Counterclaims. Where, as here, parties incorporate by reference their
Statement of Claim and Answer, which both contain requests for attorneys fees,
into a Uniform Submission Agreement that states they agree to submit all issues
identified in those pleadings to arbitration, . . . the parties expressly empower[]
the arbitrators to award attorneys fees. Hollern, 458 F.3d at 1174.
Thus, the issue of attorneys fees was submitted to the panel by agreement
of the parties and the FINRA guidelines clearly gave the panel authority to rule
on and award such fees. Meeders argument that ICON never requested
attorneys fees is contradicted by the record. Moreover, [i]t is the arbitrators
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrators decision
concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him
because their interpretation of the contract is different from his. United
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Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
Even assuming the panel erred in awarding attorneys fees based
specifically on the Retirement Agreement, we are not at liberty to overturn that
decision. In line with the deferential standard of review, we have recognized that
[e]rrors in an arbitration panels factual findings, or its interpretation and
application of the law, do not justify vacating an award. Hollern, 458 F.3d at
1172. Because the arbitration panel had general authority pursuant to the
Submission Agreements to award attorneys fees, an erroneous reference to the
Retirement Agreement as a basis for its award was merely an error of fact, which
does not justify overturning the panels award of attorneys fees. We therefore
hold the district court erred in vacating the award of attorneys fees to ICON.
Meeder also appeals the district courts order upholding the panels award
of $250,000 in nominal damages to ICON. It contends that [a]warding damages
on a claim never submitted to the Panel clearly exceeded the authority of the
Panel as set forth in the Submission Agreement[s]. Aple. Br. at 28. The district
court held the nominal damages award was ambiguous, stating:
[O]ne possible interpretation is that the award is a general,
undifferentiated award on the claims for tortious interference with
existing and prospective business relationships, which general award
is then followed by specific awards on each of those claims. If so
construed, the award is within the purview of the authority granted
by the parties to the Panel.
Aplt. App. at 71.
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Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
ICON has also filed a Motion for Attorneys Fees. We deny ICONs
motion.
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