Denney v. Roberts, 10th Cir. (2006)
Denney v. Roberts, 10th Cir. (2006)
Denney v. Roberts, 10th Cir. (2006)
D A LE M . D EN N EY ,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
v.
No. 06-3269
(D. Kansas)
Respondents - Appellees.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
rights were violated because (1) part of his sentence was not converted to a
determinate sentence, (2) the Kansas Sentencing Commission failed to obey a
court order requiring conversion of part of his sentence, (3) his sentence in one
case should be aggregated with his sentences in two unrelated cases, and (4)
Kansas failed to give him credit tow ard his sentence on one charge for excess
time served on an unrelated charge. In this court he also raises an equalprotection claim. The district court denied a COA. W e do likew ise and dismiss
the appeal.
BACKGROUND
In 1987 M r. Denney was convicted of aggravated burglary and rape, for
which he received indeterminate sentences (Case A). See State v. Denney, 101
P.3d 1257, 1259 (Kan. 2004). He served time from January 7, 1988, until his
parole on July 20, 1992. See id. On December 1, 1993, a jury found him guilty
of the commission in October 1992 of aggravated sexual battery, aggravated
criminal sodomy, and an aggravated weapons violation; he received indeterminate
sentences on the convictions (Case B). See id. The same jury also found him
guilty of aggravated criminal sodomy and aggravated sexual battery committed in
July 1993 (Case C); for these crimes he received a determinate sentence of 228
months, to run consecutively to his indeterminate sentences in Case B. See id. In
addition, M r. D enney's parole in Case A was revoked on April 15, 1994. See id.
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D ISC USSIO N
State prisoners seeking habeas relief under 2241 must obtain a COA to
appeal the denial of an application. See id. at 867. A COA will issue only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). This standard requires a demonstration that . . . includes
showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, the applicant must show that the district court's resolution of the
constitutional claim was either debatable or wrong. Id.
M r. Denney's first three claims challenge the interpretation of state law by
state courts. Such claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review , for it is
not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations
on state-law questions. Estelle v. M cGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 6768 (1991); see also
28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3); M ontez, 208 F.3d at 865. W e recognize that M r. Denney
asserts a violation of due process, and a pro se litigant's pleadings should be
construed liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Nevertheless, courts should not assume the role of advocate for the pro se
litigant. Id. It is not for this court to make M r. D enney's arguments for him.
M r. Denney's bare assertion that he has been denied due process, without any
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explanation of the legal basis for the claim, does not amount to a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2); see
Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, no
reasonable jurist could dispute the district court's denial of these claims.
M r. Denney similarly fails to support his claim that he was denied due
process when he was not given credit for excess time served on his Case A
sentence. He cites M eachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), but that case held
only that transfer to a less desirable prison does not violate a prisoner's dueprocess rights when state law does not condition such a transfer on proof of
specific conduct or events, see id. at 22627. To the extent that M eachum may be
relevant, we note that the Kansas Supreme Court explicitly held that M r. Denney
had no state-law right to jail-time credit for time spent in prison on unrelated
charges. See Denney, 101 P.3d at 1261. M oreover, we are aware of no authority
supporting his constitutional claim. Indeed, at least one circuit court has held to
the contrary. See Holscher v. Young, 440 F.2d 1283, 1290 (8th Cir. 1971) (Due
process does not require that [the applicant] be credited with the time spent in
prison under the prior illegal conviction of a crime unrelated to the present
case.). As a result, no reasonable jurist could dispute the district court's denial
of this claim.
Finally, M r. Denney appears to raise an equal-protection claim in his
application to this court. W e need not consider whether this claim was presented
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Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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