Woodruff v. Wyoming Department, 10th Cir. (2002)

F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
MAR 26 2002
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID ANDREW WOODRUFF,

Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
No. 01-8013
(D.C. No. 00-CV-120-B)
(D. Wyoming)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Pro se petitioner David Andrew Woodruff, a Wyoming state prisoner, seeks

a certificate of appealability (COA) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253(c) to
challenge the district courts dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). We deny a COA and dismiss.
On March 12, 1997, Woodruff was convicted in Wyoming state court of
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument

pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The Court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
first degree sexual assault and attempted first degree sexual assault. He does not
appear to have appealed those convictions. On June 15, 2000, he filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus based on the premise that he is presently denied his
right to access the court, and that he has this right pursuant to Wyoming
Constitution Art. 158 and the 14th and 5th amendment due process clauses of the
US Constitution. (R. Doc. 1 at 1.) The district court dismissed the petition,
reasoning that it was untimely because it was filed more than a year after his
convictions became final.
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
prisoners challenging the validity of their convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2254
generally have one year from the date on which their convictions become final to
petition for federal habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). A
conviction becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review. Id. Nevertheless, prisoners may file a habeas
petition one year from the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence. 2244(d)(1)(D).
In dismissing the petition as time-barred, the district court applied the
period of limitation set forth in 2244(d)(1)(A), without giving consideration to
the alternate period set forth in 2244(d)(1)(D). It seems to us that the latter is a
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better fit. Woodruff seeks relief, not the on the basis of errors in his prosecution,
but on the ground that his indigent status prevents him from meaningful access to
the courts (e.g., he claims to be unable to pay filing fees and is prevented from
making photocopies and using a typewriter). In addition, he takes issue with the
actions of several courtsfrom the Wyoming district court to the United States
Supreme Courtin a civil case where Woodruff claimed he wishe[d] to
challenge his conviction on grounds he was refused counsel at trial and to
challenge the conditions of confinement. (R. Doc. 1 at 2.) In one of his
objections, Woodruff clarifies that his habeas corpus petition isnt challenging
trial or sentencing errors of the court who convicted him. (R. Doc. 7 at 2.)
Nevertheless, we decline to issue a COA because the substantive claims for
which Woodruff seeks habeas reliefi.e., early releaseare not cognizable under
the federal habeas corpus statutes. Under our precedent, condition of
confinement suits by state inmates are civil rights suits properly brought under
42 U.S.C. 1983. See McIntosh v. United States Parole Commn, 115 F.3d 809,
81112 (10th Cir. 1997). 1
We note that the relief sought by Woodruff is not available in a 1983
suit. See McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 812 (A habeas corpus proceeding attacks the
fact or duration of a prisoners confinement and seeks the remedy of immediate
release or a shortened period of confinement. In contrast, a civil rights action . . .
attacks the conditions of the prisoners confinement and requests monetary
compensation for such conditions. (quotation omitted)). Petitioner specifically
(continued...)
1
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Petitioners application for a COA is therefore DENIED, and this matter is

DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
(...continued)
claims that remedies such as monetary or injunctive [relief] will not remedy his
injury. (R. Doc. 1 at 2.)
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F I L E D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

United States Court of Appeals

DAVID ANDREW WOODRUFF,

Pro se petitioner David Andrew Woodruff, a Wyoming state prisoner, seeks

The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument

Petitioners application for a COA is therefore DENIED, and this matter is

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

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