Atex 137 Ignition Hazard Assessment - Single Seal Pump

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The document discusses potential ignition sources for mechanical seals and justification for failure frequency values used in an ignition hazard assessment (IHA). Static electricity, lightning, electromagnetic waves and other external hazards are discussed but deemed not applicable or non-credible ignition sources. Measures like earthing and inspections are discussed to prevent ignition from static electricity.

Potential ignition sources discussed include loss of cooling flow, plugging of lines, wear of seal faces, misalignment during installation, and normal wear over time. Failure mechanisms, detection methods, and fault tolerances are evaluated for each.

Suitable earthing to prevent static electricity build up is discussed. The integrity of the earthing system should be checked regularly. Additional earthing connections are generally not required as long as equipment is properly grounded during construction.

Page 1

IHA Fans april 2005 versie 1.xls

ATEX 137 IGNITION HAZARD ASSESSMENT (prEN 15198:2005)


Equipment identification:
Design:
Function:
Operations (temporary/continuous):
Maintenance and inspection:
Actual/foreseeable ambient conditions:
IHA 01A

Failure effect
(EN 1127-1)

Generic Assessment For Zone 2/22


Identification Number:
2/22
Zone External:
Substance/Material:
Not specified
Gas Group:
IIB
Dust Safety Characterison temeperature >300 oC, Layer Ignition Temperat
T3 (200 oC)
Equipment Temperatur

Centrifugal Pump with single / double / tandem seal / stuffing box


To pump fluids
Continuous or intermittent
Outdoors

1. Ignition Hazard Identification

2. Ignition Hazard Estimation

Possible ignition sources

Assessment of effectiveness and likelihood of occurrence of potential ignition sources


(EUC, i.e. including existing control measures, but without maintenance & protective measures)

Part of equipment
and/or component
which is affected

Failure mechanism
(initiating event)

Failure causes:
- Mechanical failure
- Control failure
- Power failure
- Human failure
- External hazards

Frequency of effective
ignition source

Potential ignition source


during modes of use

Justification if ignition
source not effective

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

Coolant flow (own


medium) is clean. Orifice A2. expected malfunction
not likely to be clogging
(1x/100yr)
in one week

Frequency Justification or
Measures to be Implemented

Maximum duration of
effective ignition
source

4. Safety Measures
. Ignition Hazard Evaluatio
Criticality Level (IHA Matrix Possible protective measures from which one is required to acceptably reduce the likelihood and/or duration that the identified potential ignition source becomes

Duration Justification or Measures


to be Implemented

Failure detection
method

Equivalent Fault
Tolerance level without
additional protective
measures, suitable for
mentioned hazardous
zone.
Technical measures
With outcome FT -1,
additional measures shall
be described in next
columns

Operational measures Inspection/Maintenance

Standards/Notes

Evidence/Verification

No

Hot surface

Mechanical Seals
Loss of coolant flow to
seal faces through the
(Single mechanical
orifice in the flush line.
seal, product
lubricated, API flush
plan 11) considered to
be a machinery
element.
loss of function of heat
exchanger in the flush
line. (only if applicable)

Break up of seal faces


due to misalignment.

Mechanical Seals
(double, pressurised
mechanical seal, API
flush plan 53B),
considered to be a
machinery element.

Mechanical failure due to


clogging of the the flush
line and/or orifice

mechanical failure

Loss of coolant and


lubricating oil between
inboard and outboard
seal (dry run)

mechanical failure
(leakage of inboard or
outboard seal)

Stuffing box (only if


applicable)

n/a

Personnel on plant tours are NOT likely


to detect problem

n/a

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

install temperature
indicator and check
temperature during
regular operator rounds

n/a

Typical human error rate of 1 in 1000


for a routine activity . Installation to be 2. detection within 1
undertaken by competent supervised
shift (10hr)
personnel

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem

Human detection based


on sight and smell of
failure.

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

This scenario is not


relevant for zone 2
because it is a double
fault initiating event,
Normally misalignment
will start with
sealleakage.

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

normal wear leads to


higher seal leakage.
Cooling of sealfaces is
still available.

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

SABIC average MTBF 3,5-4 years


(2006)

2. detection within 1
shift (10hr)

Seal leakage will be detected during


operator rounds

Human detection based


on sight and smell of
failure.

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

Not applicable. Single


seal mounted

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

best guess

0. not applicable

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem

Human detection based


on sight of failure (oil
level)

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

low pressure alarm can


be installed to detect oil
content of accumulator.

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

Not applicable. No heat


exchanger installed

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

best guess

0. not applicable

best guess

0. not applicable

mechanical failure
(leakage of outboard
seal)

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

SABIC average MTBF 3,5-4 years.


Normal seal leakage does normally no 2. detection within 1
lead to an ignition source. Seal leakage
shift (10hr)
can be detected.

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

Not applicable. Single


seal mounted

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

best guess

0. not applicable

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

Not applicable. No heat


exchanger installed

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

best guess

0. not applicable

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

n/a

3. foreseeable misuse,
during: installation,
operation, inspection or
maintenance

n/a

Personel on plant tours


shall check if the flush
line is still effective. By
temperature
measurement or feel
whether the flush line is
warm/cold.
Personel on plant tours
shall check if the flush
line is still effective. By
temperature
measurement (e.g. infra
red thermometer) or feel
wheter the flush line is
warm/cold.

n/a

Het seal zal langzaam vervuilen. Hierdoor zal de temp niet binnen een
week boven de T klasse stijgen. Hierop is de frequentie van een week
gebaseerd.

n/a

Seal shall be changed by


competent personnel. During operator rounds
Cartridge mechanical pumps shall be checked
on seal leakage.
seals are repaired by a
specialized company.

n/a

n/a

During operator rounds


pumps shall be checked
on seal leakage.

n/a

n/a

Personel shall check oil


content of seal oil
reservoir every operator
round

n/a

n/a/

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

mechanical failure at end


of the normal working life

Loss of cooling function plugging/clogging


heat exchanger (if
applicable)

normal wear

n/a

Not applicable. No heat


exchanger installed

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

Loss of coolant and


lubricating oil between
inboard and outboard
seal (dry run)

FT 0
Zone 2/22
IHF 2.10-3/yr

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown
Human error during
installation

Loss of cooling function plugging


heat exchanger

Mechanical Seals
(double, NON
pressurised
mechanical seal, API
flush plan 52),
considered to be a
machinery element.

n/a

plugging / clogging / loss


of cooling water

normal wear (including


wear due to high
vibration, start up
failures, fouling etc.)

normal wear

3. detection during
Personnel on plant tours are NOT likely
inspection
to detect problem
1x/week (100hr)

best guess

Human detection based


Personnel on plant tours are likely to on sight of failure (oil
level) and frequent need
detect problem
to refill

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

low pressure alarm can


be installed to detect oil
content of accumulator.

n/a

Personel shall check oil


content of seal oil
reservoir and monitor
refill time. Sealleakge
can be seen, droplets of
oil will come out of the
seal.

Human detection based


on sight of failure (oil
level)

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

low level alarm

n/a

Personel shall check oil


content of seal oil
reservoir and monitor
refill time

n/a

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

mechanical failure at end


ofthe normal working life

A2. expected malfunction Normal seal leakage does normally no 2. detection within 1 Personnel on plant tours are likely to on sight of failure (oil
detect problem
level) and frequent need
lead to an ignition source. Seal leakage
(1x/100yr)
shift (10hr)

Human detection based

FT 0
Zone 2/22
IHF 2.10-3/yr

low level alarm

n/a.

Personel shall check oil


content of seal oil
reservoir and monitor
refill time

n/a

Human detection based


on sight, stufing box
needs liquid leakage)

FT 0
Zone 2/22
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a.

Personel shall check


installation and
adjustment

a procedure for
adjustment and
installation shall be
available.

n/a

condition based:
operators to check
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department.

n/a

n/a

condition based:
operators to check
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department.

n/a

SABIC average MTBF 3,5-4 years.

can be detected.

to refill

wear and hot surface


stuffing box mounted too
due to installation failure. tight.

B3. related to TA
(1x/10yr)

Packing needs regular adjustment ( 2. detection within 1


average once every 2 weeks)
shift (10hr)

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem

Bearings

Normal wear

Mechanical failure at end


of the specified working
life

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

3. foreseeable misuse,
Human error during
during: installation,
Abnormal wear leads to installation, misalignment
bearing damage
between pump and
operation, inspection or
driver.
maintenance

n/a

n/a

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

If the bearing is properly selected,


L10h life time implies 10% of bearings
fail before the calculated lifetime. For 3. detection during
reliability reasons most bearings will be
inspection
exchanged before breakdown. It is
SABIC experience to find a breakdown 1x/week (100hr)
1 x/1000yr. Also see column
"evidence".

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that
Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above
on sound of failure or
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level.
detected or self revealed within one
shift

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

Typical human error rate of 1 in 50-100


for a routine activity (implies bearing
changed once per year). Because
installation is to be undertaken by
3. detection during
competent supervised personnel and
inspection
alignement is checked by aligning
1x/week (100hr)
instruments (optalign), the human
error rate for the use of this instrument
is also 1 in 50-100. Maximum
frequency is 1x/2500year

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that
Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above
on sound of failure or
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level.
detected or self revealed within one
shift

Page 1 of 3

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a

Paper "Ignition hazard assessment


on explosion-protected non-electrical equipment", Michael Beyer,
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), states bearing failure can
be taken as equivalent to rare malfunction (once initial ignition hazard
and
typical safety measures are taken into account) and that well maintained
bearings will normally meet zone 1 requirements

5. Residual Ignition Hazard

Resulting Fault Tolerance (FT)

Page 2

IHA Fans april 2005 versie 1.xls

ATEX 137 IGNITION HAZARD ASSESSMENT (prEN 15198:2005)


Equipment identification:
Design:
Function:
Operations (temporary/continuous):
Maintenance and inspection:
Actual/foreseeable ambient conditions:
IHA 01A

Failure effect
(EN 1127-1)

Generic Assessment For Zone 2/22


Identification Number:
2/22
Zone External:
Substance/Material:
Not specified
Gas Group:
IIB
Dust Safety Characterison temeperature >300 oC, Layer Ignition Temperat
T3 (200 oC)
Equipment Temperatur

Centrifugal Pump with single / double / tandem seal / stuffing box


To pump fluids
Continuous or intermittent
Outdoors

1. Ignition Hazard Identification

2. Ignition Hazard Estimation

Possible ignition sources

Assessment of effectiveness and likelihood of occurrence of potential ignition sources


(EUC, i.e. including existing control measures, but without maintenance & protective measures)

Part of equipment
and/or component
which is affected

Failure mechanism
(initiating event)

Failure causes:
- Mechanical failure
- Control failure
- Power failure
- Human failure
- External hazards

Potential ignition source


during modes of use

Justification if ignition
source not effective

Frequency of effective
ignition source

Frequency Justification or
Measures to be Implemented

Maximum duration of
effective ignition
source

4. Safety Measures
. Ignition Hazard Evaluatio
Criticality Level (IHA Matrix Possible protective measures from which one is required to acceptably reduce the likelihood and/or duration that the identified potential ignition source becomes

Duration Justification or Measures


to be Implemented

Failure detection
method

Equivalent Fault
Tolerance level without
additional protective
measures, suitable for
mentioned hazardous
zone.
Technical measures
With outcome FT -1,
additional measures shall
be described in next
columns

Operational measures Inspection/Maintenance

Standards/Notes

Evidence/Verification

No
Human error during
installation, wrong
interference fit between 3. foreseeable misuse,
during: installation,
Abnormal wear leads to bearing and shaft (shaft
out of tolerance), shaft operation, inspection or
bearing damage
bent, impeller unbalance
maintenance
causing vibrations during
operation.

Human error during


design results in
specifying incorrect
Abnormal wear leads to
bearing, excessive L/D
bearing damage
ratio, large overhung
span, causing vibration
during operation.

3. foreseeable misuse,
during: installation,
operation, inspection or
maintenance

Bearing damage due to


operation outside the
allowable operating
Abnormal wear leads to
window (e.g. cavitation,
bearing damage
operation far from BEP,
vibration)

3. foreseeable misuse,
during: installation,
operation, inspection or
maintenance

bearing failure due


Abnormal wear leads to
during stand still of the
bearing damage
pump (standriefen)

3. foreseeable misuse,
during: installation,
operation, inspection or
maintenance

Abnormal wear leads to


bearing damage

3. foreseeable misuse,
during: installation,
operation, inspection or
maintenance

Lack of bearing
lubrication

Lack of bearing
lubrication

bad quality bearing


supplied.

Human error, failing to


renew lubrication in
bearings that require in
service renewal

Mechanical Failure of
seals that retain bearing
lubricant

3. foreseeable misuse,
during: installation,
operation, inspection or
maintenance

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

Typical human error rate of 1 in 50-100


for a routine activity (implies bearing
changed once per year). For reliability 3. detection during
reasons this bearing failure mode will
inspection
be detected before breakdown. It is
1x/week (100hr)
SABIC experience to find a breakdown
1 x/1000yr

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that
Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above
on sound of failure or
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level.
detected or self revealed within one
shift

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

Typical human error rate of 1 in 50-100


for a routine activity (implies bearing
changed once per year). Specification 3. detection during
of bearings to be undertaken by
inspection
competent supervised personnel,
1x/week (100hr)
supported by a QA system reduces
the human error rate by a factor 10

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that
Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above
on sound of failure or
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level.
detected or self revealed within one
shift

3. detection during
inspection
1x/week (100hr)

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that
Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above
on sound of failure or
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level.
detected or self revealed within one
shift

3. detection during
inspection
1x/week (100hr)

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that
Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above
on sound of failure or
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level.
detected or self revealed within one
shift

3. detection during
inspection
1x/week (100hr)

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that
Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above
on sound of failure or
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level.
detected or self revealed within one
shift

B2. during plant


operation (1x/100yr)

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

A2. expected malfunction


(1x/100yr)

best guess based on experience

best guess based on experience

Manufacturers QA system avoids


frequencies < 1x/1000yr

Typical human error rate of 1 in 50-100


for a routine activity. Because
regreasing is to be undertaken by
competent supervised personnel and 3. detection during
regreasing interval is checked by
inspection
running hours on hour counters, the
human error rate for the interpretation 1x/week (100hr)
of the regreasing list is also 1 in 50100. Maximum frequency is
1x/2500year

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above on sound of failure or
vibration level and oil
200 C, its break down will be
level/color
detected or self revealed within one
shift

3. detection during
inspection
1x/week (100hr)

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem; It is expected that Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above on sound of failure or
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level and oil
detected or self revealed within one
level/color
shift

best guess based on experience

n/a

condition based:
operators to check
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department.

n/a

n/a

condition based:
operators to check
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department.

n/a

n/a

condition based:
operators to check
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department.

n/a

stand by pump to be
turned every 1 - 4 weeks
or every 3 - 6 months,
depending on the
location in the plant

condition based:
operators to check
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department.

n/a

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

condition based:
operators to check
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department.

n/a

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

condition based:
operators to check oil
level, oil color and
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department. In case of
dark or white (milk
coloured) oil inform
technical department by
notification.

n/a

n/a

Predictive maintenance
programme such as
vibration checks or
monitoring
Preventive maintenance
to lubricate bearing
during normal life and
replace bearing before
end of working life
reached

n/a

Paper "Ignition hazard assessment


on explosion-protected non-electrical equipment", Michael Beyer,
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), states bearing failure can
be taken as equivalent to rare malfunction (once initial ignition hazard
and
typical safety measures are taken into account) and that well maintained
bearings will normally meet zone 1 requirements

n/a

condition based:
operators to check oil
level, oil color and
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department. In case of
dark or white (milk
coloured) oil inform
technical department by
notification.

n/a

Paper "Ignition hazard assessment


on explosion-protected non-electrical equipment", Michael Beyer,
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), states bearing failure can
be taken as equivalent to rare malfunction (once initial ignition hazard
and
typical safety measures are taken into account) and that well maintained
bearings will normally meet zone 1 requirements

n/a

condition based:
operators to check oil
level and vibration level
and noise of pump unit.
In case of doubt or
higher vibration level a
vibration measurement
should be carried out by
technical department.

n/a

Checking bearing
running temperatures Emergency maintenance
after detection of high
inspection and
seal gas pressure
replacement or bearing
peaks. Shut down or
grease following high
plan to if temperatures seal gas pressure peaks
high

n/a

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

FT 0
Zone 2/22
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a

n/a

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

FT 0
Zone 2/22
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


Lack of bearing
lubrication

lube oil
problems:contamination
of lube oil due to solids
(e.g. sand) and water.

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

n/a

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

best guess based on experience

detect problem; It is expected that


3. detection during
Human detection based
once the bearing temperature is above
on sound of failure or
inspection
200 C, its break down will be
vibration level.
1x/week (100hr)
detected or self revealed within one

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

shift

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


Lack of bearing
lubrication

lube oil problems: too


high or low oil level.

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

n/a

detect problem; It is expected that Human detection based


3. detection during
A2. expected malfunction Level of lube oil systems are subject to
once the bearing temperature is above on sound of failure or
inspection
vibration level and oil
200 C, its break down will be
surveillance by operators.
(1x/100yr)
1x/week (100hr)
level/color
detected or self revealed within one

FT 0
Zone 2/22
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

FT 0
Zone 2/22
IHF 2.10-3/yr

Detection of high seal


gas pressure peaks

shift

Lack of bearing
lubrication

Control system failure.


Lubricant blown out of
bearing due to pressure
peaks and emission of
seal gas (Nitrogen),
where such seals are
adjacent to bearings

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

n/a

3. detection during
A2. expected malfunction frequency for control loop failure 1 per
50- 100 each year. Only around 10%
inspection
(1x/100yr)
of these are dangerous failures
1x/week (100hr)

Personnel on plant tours are likely to


detect problem

Page 2 of 3

Human detection based


on sound, sight and
smell of failure.
Increased power usage

Typical worst case 1 in 10 human error chance of personnel not


responding quickly and correctly to a high density of alarms. Gives at
least an order of magnitude protection against high seal gas pressure
peaks causing bearing failure

5. Residual Ignition Hazard

Resulting Fault Tolerance (FT)

Page 3

IHA Fans april 2005 versie 1.xls

ATEX 137 IGNITION HAZARD ASSESSMENT (prEN 15198:2005)


Equipment identification:
Design:
Function:
Operations (temporary/continuous):
Maintenance and inspection:
Actual/foreseeable ambient conditions:
IHA 01A

Failure effect
(EN 1127-1)

Generic Assessment For Zone 2/22


Identification Number:
2/22
Zone External:
Substance/Material:
Not specified
Gas Group:
IIB
Dust Safety Characterison temeperature >300 oC, Layer Ignition Temperat
T3 (200 oC)
Equipment Temperatur

Centrifugal Pump with single / double / tandem seal / stuffing box


To pump fluids
Continuous or intermittent
Outdoors

1. Ignition Hazard Identification

2. Ignition Hazard Estimation

Possible ignition sources

Assessment of effectiveness and likelihood of occurrence of potential ignition sources


(EUC, i.e. including existing control measures, but without maintenance & protective measures)

Part of equipment
and/or component
which is affected

Failure mechanism
(initiating event)

Failure causes:
- Mechanical failure
- Control failure
- Power failure
- Human failure
- External hazards

Potential ignition source


during modes of use

Justification if ignition
source not effective

Frequency of effective
ignition source

Frequency Justification or
Measures to be Implemented

Maximum duration of
effective ignition
source

4. Safety Measures
. Ignition Hazard Evaluatio
Criticality Level (IHA Matrix Possible protective measures from which one is required to acceptably reduce the likelihood and/or duration that the identified potential ignition source becomes

Duration Justification or Measures


to be Implemented

Failure detection
method

Equivalent Fault
Tolerance level without
additional protective
measures, suitable for
mentioned hazardous
zone.
Technical measures
With outcome FT -1,
additional measures shall
be described in next
columns

Operational measures Inspection/Maintenance

Standards/Notes

Evidence/Verification

n/a

Paper "Ignition hazard assessment


on explosion-protected non-electrical equipment", Michael Beyer,
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), states bearing failure can
be taken as equivalent to rare malfunction (once initial ignition hazard
and
typical safety measures are taken into account) and that well maintained
bearings will normally meet zone 1 requirements

5. Residual Ignition Hazard

Resulting Fault Tolerance (FT)

No

corrosion

Flames and hot gases


(including hot
particles)
None identified

None identified

corrosion occurs during


stand still of bearings
operated at high
temperatures, due to
condensation

FT 1
Zone 1/21
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a

condition based:
operators to check oil
level, oil color and
vibration level and noise
of pump unit. In case of
doubt or higher vibration
level a vibration
measurement should be
carried out by technical
department. In case of
dark or white (milk
coloured) oil inform
technical department by
notification.

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

#N/A

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

proper earthing

n/a

n/a

n/a

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

Suitable earthing to
prevent static electricity
build up.

n/a

check earthing system


integrity

n/a

General construction and bolting of equipment will normally be sufficient t


prevent static build up without additional earth connections. CLC/TR
50404 in 11.3.5 only requires special earthing connections for equipment
mounted on non-conductive supports or contamination which affects the
insulation could develop across a joint.

FT 0

FT 0
Zone 2/22
IHF 2.10-3/yr

Suitable earthing to
prevent static electricity
build up.

n/a

check earthing system


integrity

n/a

General construction and bolting of equipment will normally be sufficient t


prevent static build up without additional earth connections. CLC/TR
50404 in 11.3.5 only requires special earthing connections for equipment
mounted on non-conductive supports or contamination which affects the
insulation could develop across a joint.

FT 0

Personnel on plant tours are likely to

1. normal operation,
including start-up and
shutdown

n/a

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

best guess based on experience

detect problem; It is expected that Human detection based


3. detection during
once the bearing temperature is above on sound of failure or
inspection
vibration level and oil
200 C, its break down will be
1x/week (100hr)
level/color
detected or self revealed within one
shift

None identified

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

No credible sources of
this type were identified

A1. rare malfunction


(1x/1000yr)

0. not applicable

Mechanically
generated sparks

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

None identified

Static electricity

Outside of pump
casing

Isolated conductor
accumulates and
discharge a static
charge

Human Error. Failure to


specify or connect
appropriate earthing

Human Error. Failure to


main appropriate
earthing

10

Lightening

Radio frequency (RF)


electromagnetic waves
from 104 Hz to 3 x 1012
Hz
Electromagnetic
waves from 3 x 1011 Hz
to
3 x 1015 Hz
Ionising radiation

Loss of pump rotation will be become process disturbance and


immediately apparent
plant alarms

Not applicable

Stray electric currents

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source
6

0. not applicable

Not applicable

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

0. not applicable

In less than 1%
special earthing is
required. Human
error rate for failing
to specify and
connect earthing,
with two
independent checks
0. not considered as an
is less than
B1. during plant
effective ignition source
(1/50)^3=10-5.
operation (1x/1000yr)
Probability of earth
resistance > 10^6
Ohm reduces the
probability for
generating sparks to
less than 10-7. For
zone 1 and zone 2
this is acceptable.

0. not applicable

No credible sources of
this type were identified

Static Electricity is a low probability


event, as explained in column
"evidence"

3. foreseeable misuse,
during: installation,
operation, inspection or
maintenance

n/a

B2. during plant


operation (1x/100yr)

Typical human error rate for


failing to connect earhting is
3. detection during
ATEX trained plant personel will notice
1x/50-100. Only for those
inspection
loose earthing connections
cases where special earthing is 1x/week (100hr)
required

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

Item is shielded by
surrounding structures

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

0. not applicable

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

No credible sources of
this type were identified

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

0. not applicable

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

No credible sources of
this type were identified

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

0. not applicable

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

No credible sources of
this type were identified

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

0. not applicable

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

0. not applicable

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

0. not applicable

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable

11

Ultrasonics

Not applicable

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

No credible sources of
this type were identified

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

12

Adiabatic compression
and shock waves

Not applicable

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

No credible sources of
this type were identified

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

13

Exothermic reaction,
including self ignition
of dusts and/or dust
layers

Not applicable

0. not considered as an
effective ignition source

No credible sources of
this type were identified

B1. during plant


operation (1x/1000yr)

FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr
FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr
FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr
FT 2 (Cat.1**)
Zone 0/20
IHF 2.10-3/yr

0. not applicable

Values in IHA tables are justified in columns K, N and O and are based on case specific assessments or extracted from the SABIC equipment reliability method (economic assessment) summarised below.
These values presume a TurnAround at the given frequency (0,167 means overhaul after 6 years), because
malfunctioning is expected within the next operation period until the next TurnAround (after again 6 years)
This is not a chance of malfunctioning for a large population
For the ATEX IHA we assumed the frequency higher than or equal to 0,2 as normal operation including start-up
for that situation the freqency of effective ignition source is less than 1 times every year
frequency values less than 0,2 in the IER table are assumed to be less than 1 times every 10 years
figures not related to wear, shall be assessed, as they have only a chance to occur in the mentioned frequency,
due to external causes. The frequency for external causes will standard be set to less than 1 time every 100 years

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