G.R. No.

L-28949

June 23, 1969

JIBIN ARULA, petitioner,

vs.
Brigadier General ROMEO C. ESPINO, Members of the General Court-Martial, namely, CANDIDO B.
GAVINO, President, CRISOGONO T. MAKILAN, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, SEGUNDINO
S. QUINTANS, PEDRO FERNANDEZ, JOSE APOLINARIO, AVELINO MENEZ, EFRAIN MACLANG, and
MABINI BERNABE, LAW Member, respondents.
Gregorio M. Familar for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Col. Manuel V. Reyes (AFP
Judge Advocate General), Col. Primitivo D. Chingcuangco (AFP Deputy Judge Advocate General), Lt. Col.
Pedro Malit, Captain Ciriaco P. Cruz of the AFP, and Amelito Mutuc for respondents.
I. Preliminary Statement
The present original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction seeks the
annulment of Special Order 208 1 (issued on April 6, 1968 by the respondent Brigadier General Romeo C. Espino
as commanding general of the Philippine Army), which special order convenes a general court-martial and
appoints the members thereof, and to prohibit permanently the said court-martial, composed of the other
respondents, from taking cognizance of and proceeding with the trial of the case before it with respect to the
shooting and wounding of the petitioner Jibin Arula.
II. Facts
The petitioner Arula was on December 17, 1967 recruited by one Capt. Teodoro R. Facelo of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines at Simunul, Sulu, to undergo training. On January 3, he was taken to Corregidor island, and a
shooting incident occurred resulting in the infliction of serious physical injuries upon him. he filed a criminal
complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated murder against Capt. Alberto Soteco, Benjamin Munar
alias Lt. Baqui, Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, Eugenio Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara, 4 and nine others. the city
fiscal on March 29 sent subpoenas to these persons.
On April 2 the petitioner sent a letter to the commanding officer of the Philippine Army, informing the latter that he
was "not filing any charges" with the military authorities against these army personnel, for the reason that he had
"already filed the corresponding criminal complaint" with the city fiscal. On the following day, April 3, the date set
for the preliminary investigation, army lawyers headed by Capt. Jose Magsanoc appeared on behalf of the
respondents and requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation which, as a result of such request, was
reset for April 16.
Meanwhile, the respondent General Espino directed Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos of his command to conduct a pretrial investigation of the Corregidor incident to pinpoint responsibility therefor.
Capt. Pontejos submitted his written report. Appended thereto was an array of documents.
Capt. Pontejos submitted his pre-trial investigation report, the respondent General Espino issued Special Order
208, appointing a General court-martial, composed of the other respondents, to try the case against the army
personnel involved in the Corregidor incident.
At the hearing by the general court-martial on April 16, petitioner Arula adduced testimony to prove charge 1
(violation of the 94th article of war) which directly and squarely pertains to the shooting and wounding of the said
petitioner.
On April 19 the Armed Forces lawyers moved to dismiss the complaint filed with the city fiscal of Cavite upon the
ground that the civil courts had lost jurisdiction over the case because a court-martial had been convened.
It is here pertinent to note that on March 21 President Ferdinand Marcos (as Commander-in-Chief) ordered an
investigation of the reported killings of commando trainees on Corregidor Island, and, on the following day,
March 22, directed the creation of a court-martial to try whomsoever might be responsible for the reported
killings. So that before petitioner Arula filed his criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite, the President had
already ordered an investigation of the Corregidor incident and the convening of a court-martial relative thereto.

III. Issues:
The petitioner avers that; .
1. the offense was committed outside a military reservation because Corregidor where the offense was
committed had been declared by President Ramon Magsaysay as a "national shrine";
2. he, the petitioner, is a civilian, not subject to military law because he had never enlisted in the Army
nor had he been formally inducted therein; and
3. the Court of First Instance of Cavite has already taken cognizance of the case, to the exclusion of the
general court-martial.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the general court-martial has jurisdiction over the offense
committed against the petitioner, to the exclusion of the Cavite CFI, because:
1. the petitioner, like all the persons accused before the general court-martial, is subject to military law:
2. the offense (shooting and wounding of the petitioner) was committed inside a military reservation by
persons subject to military law; and
3. the general court-martial acquired jurisdiction over the case ahead of any civil court with concurrent
jurisdiction.
The following issues are joined: (1) Does the petitioner have legal personality to institute and maintain the
present action for certiorari and prohibition to stop the general court-martial from proceeding with the hearing of
the case insofar as it concerns the injuries inflicted upon him?
(2) In the affirmative, does the general court-martial have jurisdiction over the case? This in turn depends on the
resolution of the sub-issues of (a) whether the petitioner is a person subject to military law; (b) if he is not,
whether Corregidor is a military reservation; and (c) whether the filing by the petitioner of a criminal complaint
with the city fiscal of Cavite City forthwith invested the CFI of Cavite Jurisdiction to try the case to the exclusion
of the general court-martial.
IV. Discussion
Of basic and immediate involvement is article of war 94 of Commonwealth Act 408, as amended by Republic Act
242, which provides in full as follows:
Various Crimes. Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law
or violation of municipal ordinance which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable
under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation when the offended party
(and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) in a person subject to military
law, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, Provided, That, in time of peace officers and
enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary shall not be triable by courts-martial for any felony,
crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances committed under this article. In imposing the
penalties for such offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such offenses provided in the penal
laws of the Philippines or such municipal ordinances shall be taken into consideration.
It places persons subject to military law 7 under the jurisdiction of courts-martial, concurrent with the jurisdiction of
the proper civil courts, when they commit any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinance
which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or
under municipal ordinances, (a) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (b) outside any
such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) is a
person subject to military law.
Whenever persons subject to military law commit offenses punishable under article of war 94 outside a military
reservation and the offended party (or any one of the offended parties it there be more than one) is not a person
subject to military law, they fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.

This article of war removes officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary entirely from the jurisdiction
of courts-martial when they commit offenses under this article in time of peace, notwithstanding that the said
offenses are committed within military reservations; or outside such reservations and the offended party (and
each one of the offended parties if there be more than one is a person subject to military law.
Nor is it disputed that the crime of frustrated murder, is embraced within the purview of article of war 94. That the
said accused are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are not officers or enlisted men of the
Philippine Constabulary is likewise conceded.

The divergence of opinion is to whether Corregidor was, on March 18, 1968 (the date when the offense was
allegedly committed), a military reservation, and, if it was not, as to whether the petitioner was at that time a
person subject to military law.
1. On May 31, 1948 President Elpidio Quirino issued Proclamation No. 69 8 declaring "Corregidor, including the
adjacent islands and detached rocks surrounding the same," a military reservation and placing it under the direct
supervision and control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The petitioner's insistence that Corregidor is no
longer a military reservation is anchored on Executive Order No. 58 issued on August 16, 1954 by President
Ramon Magsaysay, which declared "all battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan province" as national shrines
and "except such portions as may be temporarily needed for the storage of ammunition or deemed absolutely
essential for safeguarding the national security," opening them "to the public, accessible as tourist resorts and
attractions, as scenes of popular pilgrimages and as recreational centers," from which the petitioner argues that
Corregidor is no longer a military reservation because it has been converted into a national shrine and made
accessible to the public.
For several cogent reasons, it is our view that this argument is devoid of merit.
In the first place, EO 58 does not expressly repeal P-69. It cannot, therefore, be safely said that implied repeal of
P-69 was intended. Well-entrenched is the rule that implied repeals are not favored
In the second place, there is nothing in the language of EO 58 from which it can be reasonably inferred that the
declaration of certain areas in Corregidor island as battlefield areas or as national shrines necessarily divests
such areas or the entire island of Corregidor itself of their character as a military reservation and national
defense zone. Even if an area were actually declared as a "national shrine" or "battlefield area" or "historic site"
by the National Shrines Commission, its character as part of a national defense zone or military reservation
would not thereby be abated or impaired. A military reservation or national defense zone under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 321 10 can concurrently be used and developed as a national shrine without excluding it from
the operation of the said Act.
In the third place, if the President had intended to repeal P-69, he would have done so in an unequivocal
manner.
In the fourth place, admitting in gratia argumenti that the declaration of a certain area as a battlefield area under
EO 58 would have the effect of removing it from the Operation of P-69, the fact remains that the Corregidor
airstrip, where the shooting and wounding of the petitioner allegedly took place, has not been actually delimited
and officially declared as a national shrine. In its overall context as well as in its specific phraseology, EO 58
affects and opens to the public only those areas of Corregidor island to be selected, declared, delimited and
developed as historic sites by the National Shrines Commission.
In sum and substance, we do not discern any incompatibility or repugnance between P-69 and EO 58 as would
warrant the suggestion that the former has given way to the latter, or that the latter, in legal effect, has obliterated
the former.
2. We now proceed to assess the claim of the petitioner that the general court-martial is barred from asserting
and exercising jurisdiction because the Court of First Instance of Cavite a court of concurrent jurisdiction
first acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Let us initially examine the relevant facts.
On March 23 the petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated homicide
against those accused before the general court-martial.

On March 29, the city fiscal of Cavite City sent subpoenas to the aforesaid accused, advising them that the
preliminary investigation would be conducted on April 3 at 9:00 a.m.
On April 2 the petitioner wrote to the Commanding Officer, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, informing the
latter that he was not filing charges with the military authorities against those responsible for his injuries,
because he had already filed the corresponding criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City.
On April 3 Army lawyers appeared before the city fiscal of Cavite City on behalf of those army personnel involved
in the shooting and wounding of the petitioner and requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation which
was, accordingly, reset for April 16.
On April 19 the same Army lawyers moved to dismiss Arula's complaint upon the ground that the civil courts had
lost jurisdiction because a court-martial had already been convened. This motion was rejected by the city fiscal.
On the other hand, the pertinent proceedings had by and before the military authorities may be summarized as
follows:
On March 21 the President of the Philippines (as Commander-in-Chief) ordered a full investigation of the
Corregidor incident, and, on the following day, March 22, directed the creation of a court-martial to try all officers
and enlisted men responsible for any crime or crimes committed in connection with the said incident.
On March 27 Major Eduardo Martelino, et al., were placed under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits.
On April 6 Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos, pre-trial investigator, submitted his pre-trial report recommending trial by
general court-martial of Major Eduardo Martelino, et al. Acting on this recommendation, General Espino, by
Special Order 208, appointed a general court-martial to try the case against the said Major Eduardo Martelino, et
al., for violation of the 94th and 97th articles of war, and forthwith the corresponding charges and specifications
were filed.
On April 14 the pre-trial investigator, Capt. Pontejos, submitted a supplemental report recommending trial by
general court-martial of Capt. Solferino Titong alias Capt. Mike, trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, and
trainee Eugenie Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara.
On April 16, the general court-martial "reconvened." 11 The first prosecution witness to testify on this day was the
petitioner himself. The court-martial then adjourned to meet again on April 19, 1968.
Although for infractions of the general penal laws, military courts and civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the
rule enunciated in Crisologo vs. People of the Philippines 12 accords to the court first acquiring jurisdiction over
the person of the accused by the filing of charges and having him in custody the preferential right to proceed
with the trial. Thus
As to the claim that the Military Court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known is the rule that when
several courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the
prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed (22
C.J.S., pp. 186-187). The record in the present case shows that the information for treason in the
People's Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yet been arrested or brought into the
custody of the Court the warrant of arrest had not been issued when the indictment for the same
offense was filed in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing
of the complaint in one court does not give that court priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being
necessary in addition that the court where the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant. (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine restated and re-affirmed in countless decisions of the Federal and States courts in the United
States is the same: jurisdiction to try a particular criminal case is vested in a court only when the appropriate
charge is filed with it AND when jurisdiction of the person is acquired by it through the arrest of the party charged
or by his voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.
The record in the present case discloses that on April 6 and thereafter, charges and specifications were
preferred against these military officers for violations of the 94th article of war. An order for their arrest and/or
custody was issued. Two of them were subsequently, that is, on April 16, placed under technical arrest. On the

other hand, no indictment has yet been filed with the CFI of Cavite on the basis of the complaint lodged by the
petitioner with the City Fiscal's Office of Cavite City, the same being merely in the preliminary investigation
phase. The mere filing of a complaint with the prosecuting fiscal cannot have parity with the filing of such
complaint with the court. And even if there could be such parity, the criterion laid down in Crisologo is not the
mere filing of the complaint or information but the actual taking into custody of the accused under the process of
one court or the other.
Evidently, the general court-martial has acquired jurisdiction, which it acquired exclusively as against the CFI of
Cavite, not only as to the element of precedence in the filing of the charges, but also because it first acquired
custody or jurisdiction of the persons of the accused. Court-martial jurisdiction over the accused having properly
attached, such military jurisdiction continues throughout all phases of the proceedings, including appellate
review and execution of the sentence. 13
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court acquires jurisdiction to try a
criminal case only when the following requisites concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is by law
authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and
(3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought into its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of
arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court.
In the case at bar, while the first two requisites are indispensably present with respect to the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, the third requisite has not even become viable, because no information has been filed with
the court, nor have the accused persons been brought under its jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, all these three
requisites obtained, by the latest, as of April 16 in respect to the general court-martial. The charges and
specifications were before that day forwarded to the court-martial for trial; all the accused as of that day were
already under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits; the offense is one that is cognizable by the courtmartial under the authority of article of war 94; the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court-martial.
3. The petitioner insists that respondent General Espino acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion "in hastily constituting and convening a general court-martial to try the case involving Arula, without
the same being thoroughly investigated by the pre-trial investigator, resulting in the filing of charges against
persons without prima facie evidence in violation of the Constitution, existing laws, and Art. 71 14 of the Articles of
War."
We are not impressed by this contention.
It is our view that the respondent Espino acted well within the periphery of his authority as commanding general
of the Philippine Army in constituting and convening the general court-martial in question. In issuing Special
Order 208 for the purpose of constituting and convening the general court-martial, respondent Espino was
guided by the report and recommendation of the pre-trial investigating officer. The said report was accomplished
pursuant to the provisions of article of war 71. And so was his supplemental report of April 14 (annex 7).
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects
the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey vs. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure required by Article 70 15can property be
construed as an indispensible pre-requesiteto exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction. The
Article does serve important functions in the administration of the court-martial procedures and does
provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in
the absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial
pending the investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention,
reversing a court-martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an
accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70.
That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that
the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
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xxx

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Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that where
there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding
has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation
has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way affect
the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the
attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language
here under consideration. (Emphasis supplied)..
In the military, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to an accused by article of war 71 which requires that
when a person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confinement, immediate steps shall be taken to try the
person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him.
We thus ineluctably reach the following conclusions: (1) the airstrip on Corregidor island where the shooting and
wounding of the petitioner Arula allegedly took place has not been removed from the ambit of Proclamation No.
69, series of 1948, and is therefore to be properly considered a part of the military reservation that is Corregidor
island; (2) because the prime imputed to the accused, who are persons subject to military law, was committed in
a military reservation, the general court-martial has jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite to try the offense; and (3) the general court-martial having taken jurisdiction ahead of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, must be deemed to have acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of the latter court.
With the view that we take of this case, resolving the issue of whether the petitioner Arula is a person subject to
military law would be at best a purposeless exercise in exegesis if not altogether an exercise in futility.