C u r r e n t A n t h r o p o l o g y Volume 44, Number 4, AugustOctober 2003

2003 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved 0011-3204/2003/4404-0001$2.50

SIDNEY W. MINTZ LECTURE

FOR 2002

Anthropology,
Sociology, and Other
Dubious Disciplines
1

by Immanuel Wallerstein

The social construction of the disciplines as intellectual arenas

that was made in the 19th century has outlived its usefulness
and is today a major obstacle to serious intellectual work. Although the institutional framework of the disciplines remains
strong, there are cracks in the structures of knowledge that make
them less solid than most participants imagine. If the social sciences are to perform the social task demanded of themproviding wise counsel on the problems of the presentit is time
that we harvested the richness of each discipline for use in their
reconstruction. Some possible foundation stones for a reconstructed arena that might be called the historical social sciences
are here suggested.
i m m a n u e l w a l l e r s t e i n is Senior Research Scholar at Yale
University (P.O. Box 208265, New Haven, Conn. 06520-8265,
U.S.A. [[email protected]]). Born in 1930, he was
educated at Columbia University (B.A., 1951; M.A., 1954; Ph.D.,
1959). His research interests include structures of knowledge and
the political economy of the modern world-system. He is the author of The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press,
197489), The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science
for the 21st Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1999), and Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms (Cambridge: Polity/Blackwell, 1991).
The present paper was accepted 9 xii 02.

1. This paper was delivered, as the 2002 Sidney W. Mintz Lecture,

to the Department of Anthropology of The Johns Hopkins University on November 13, 2002.

The so-called disciplines are actually three things simultaneously. They are, of course, intellectual categoriesmodes of asserting that there exists a defined field
of study with some kind of boundaries, however disputed
or fuzzy, and some agreed-upon modes of legitimate research. In this sense they are social constructs whose
origins can be located in the dynamics of the historical
system within which they took form and whose definitions (usually asserted or assumed to be eternal) may
in fact change over time.
The disciplines are in addition institutional structures
that since the late 19th century have taken on ever more
elaborate forms. There are departments in universities
with disciplinary names. Students pursue degrees in specific disciplines, and professors have disciplinary titles.
There are scholarly journals with disciplinary names.
There are library categories, publishers lists, and bookstore shelvings with disciplinary names. There are prizes
and lecture series with disciplinary names. There are
national and international associations of scholars with
disciplinary names. The disciplines as institutions seem
to be everywhere.
Finally, the disciplines are cultures. The scholars who
claim membership in a disciplinary grouping share for
the most part certain experiences and exposures. They
have often read the same classic books. They participate in well-known traditional debates that are often
different from those of neighboring disciplines. The disciplines seem to favor certain styles of scholarship over
others, and members are rewarded for using the appropriate style. And while the culture can and does change
over time, at any given time there are modes of presentation that are more likely to be appreciated by those in
one discipline than by those in another. For example,
historians are taught to favor primary sources over secondary sources and therefore to admire archival work.
Archival work is not really an important activity in
many other social science disciplines. Indeed, the anthropologist who restricted fieldwork to culling what is
in archives would be unlikely to find a very friendly
reception within the disciplinary camp. I think of these
attitudes as cultural prejudices that are difficult to justify
intellectually but strongly rooted and that operate in the
real world of interaction among scholars.
As I am making my arguments within the framework
of a rubric entitled a lecture in anthropology, I thought
it would be appropriate to indulge myself in what I think
of, perhaps wrongly, as one of the prejudices of anthropologists. Similarly to historians but in contrast to most
other social scientists, anthropologists do not think it
amiss to begin an analysis with anecdotal material, snippets of the microworlds in which we all live. And since
this occasion is the Sidney W. Mintz Lecture, I shall
begin with an anecdote about Sidney W. Mintz.
In the founding year of the Fernand Braudel Center, I
invited Sid Mintz to come to Binghamton on February
2, 1977, and talk to a faculty seminar that met under our
auspices. He agreed to come. However, I went farther. I
gave him the title of his talk: Was the Plantation Slave
a Proletarian? He graciously agreed to talk on that spe453

454 F c u r r e n t a n t h ro p o l o g y Volume 44, Number 4, AugustOctober 2003

cific subject, and we later published the talk in Review

(Mintz 1978).2 What he did was to survey the successive
labor processes on Caribbean plantations over several
centuries and write a thoughtful, reflective article on the
limitations of the traditional ways in which the terms
slave and proletarian were defined in isolation
from each other. His response to the actual question was
nonetheless a cautious one.
There are two things to note about this. First of all, I
was violating a rather strong academic norm. One may
suggest to an invited speaker a thematic area, but it is
not considered appropriate to dictate the specific title.
Second, this is not a question one normally poses to
anthropologists and even less one that anthropologists
have often posed to themselves. Can you imagine Malinowski or Lucy Mair answering it? It was bad enough,
they might have thought, that this bizarre Mintz type
had actually believed that studying plantation slavery
was a legitimate task for anthropologists, but to use the
term proletarian was surely going too far. It was not
a term that one normally found in the canonic texts.
Economists (certain economists) might use it; historians
too, and maybe sociologists. But anthropologists? It implied crossing the line between the West and the rest.
And if this line seems now to have lost its salience somewhat in the anthropological community (but has it really?), that was not yet true in 1977.
My second anecdote is briefer. It concerns Hugh Gusterson, who teaches anthropology at MIT. In an interview
in the New York Times, Gusterson responds to the question how he had come to study the folkways and mores
of nuclear weapons scientists. He concludes his response
by saying: In 1984, it was unusual to be doing fieldwork
in your own culture. If you did it at all, you studied
downghetto residents, welfare mothers. Nowadays,
theres a fast-growing field, the anthropology of science
(Dreifus 2002:21).
My third anecdote concerns a historian. In a review of
a recent book by Richard D. E. Burton on violence in
Parisian political life between 1789 and 1945, David A.
Bell (2002:19) makes the following criticism: But by
posing as an anthropologistthe scientist who stands to
the side taking notes as the natives slaughter each
otherhe also falls into a trap that has ensnared many
others: failing to take seriously the reasons for which his
subjects believed they were fighting and dying.
It is always revealing, if sometimes disconcerting, to
know how your colleagues in neighboring departments
view you. I shall not take sides in this internecine sniping amongst the social sciences, but clearly Bell is referring to the different tonalities of the cultures of the
two communities, that of the anthropologists and that
of the historians. I believe the issue of taking notes as
the natives slaughter each other has recently been the
focus of a rather passionate debate within the American
2. Mintz inserted an opening footnote: I am grateful to Professor
Wallerstein for the opportunity to air my views and, indeed, for the
choice of topic to which he asked me to address myself.

Anthropological Association, one that has managed to

seep through into the nonscholarly media.
All of my anecdotes concern disciplines as disciplines.
What should they embrace as subject matter? How
should we approach the subject matter? Do the lines
matter, and, if so, for what and for whom? Let me start
by making my basic position clear. I believe that the
social construction of the disciplines as intellectual arenas that was made in the 19th century has outlived its
usefulness and is today a major obstacle to serious intellectual work. Further, I believe that the institutional
framework of the disciplines remains very strong, although there are important crevices in the overall structures of knowledgecrevices that are visible at the moment only to those who look for themthat render the
solidity of these institutions far less certain than most
participants imagine. And finally, I believe that there is
richness in each of the disciplinary cultures that should
be harvested, stripped of its chaff, and combined (or at
least utilized) in a reconstruction of the social sciences.
Let me deal with these three assertions successively.

The Intellectual Justification of the

Disciplines
The first chapter of the report of an international commission that I chaired, the Gulbenkian Commission on
the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (1996; see also
Wallerstein 1995),3 deals with the historical construction of the social sciences, from the eighteenth century
to 1945. In it we argued that the intellectual lines of
the surviving disciplines (for one must think of disciplinary names as having survived a culling process that
went on for over a century) hinged around three axes:
the past (history) versus the present (economics, political
science, and sociology), the West (the previous four) and
the rest (anthropology and Oriental studies), and the
structuring of the nomothetic Western present around
the liberal distinction of the market (economics), the
state (political science), and civil society (sociology).
Because this is 2002, you can all see the limitations
of the presumed axes of distinction, and you are well
aware that massive numbers of social scientists have
begun in the past three decades to disregard these lines
in the sand. Furthermore, you are aware that many persons have sought to modify the intellectual premises of
the various disciplines in order to take these realities
into account and to transform what might have been
thought of as academic poaching into legitimate activities. But I can assure you that, when I was a graduate
student (which is only 50 years ago), these 19th-century
boundaries were not merely in place but very actively
asserted and defended in all the disciplines.
What happened? Very simple: the world changed. The
United States became a hegemonic power with global
responsibilities. The Third World became a political
3. The anthropologist member of the commission was MichelRolph Trouillot.

w a l l e r s t e i n Dubious Disciplines F 455

force. And there was a massive expansion worldwide of

university education, with a consequent massive increase in the number of social scientists doing research
and writing books. The first two changes meant that the
separation into disciplines for the West and disciplines
for the rest became untenable, and the third change led
to a quest for originality via academic poaching. These
days, as you also surely know, the names of the papers
at annual meetings of social science associations are extremely similar, except for the addition of the heading
anthropology of or sociology of or history of to
the same substantive phrase.
Do these papers given at different disciplinary conferences read differently? Up to a point, they do, and this
has to do with the cultures of the disciplines. But they
read less differently than one might think, and certainly
a social scientist coming from Mars might wonder
whether the degree of difference was worth the fuss.
Therefore I want to play with the following quixotic idea.
Suppose that we merged all the existing social science
disciplines into one gigantic new faculty called the historical social sciences.4 Now, when the fairy godmother
had left the room and we found that this miracle had
occurred, we would immediately feel that this structure
was too big and bulky for our own good. Many of us
(perhaps most of us) already find the existing departments too diffuse. A merger would compound the problem geometrically. But of course we know what would
happen. People would create corners in which they felt
comfortable, and sooner or later we would get new subdivisions, perhaps new departments. My guess is that, if
this happened, the new departments would probably
have quite different names from any we now know. This
is what happened when zoology and botany merged into
a single department of biology somewhere around
194555. We now have many, many subdepartments or
specialties within biology, but none to my knowledge is
called botany or zoology.
Let us speculate together on what the lines of intellectual division really are in world social science at the
present time. I think that there exist three main groupings of scholars. There is clearly a large camp of persons
who hold onto the classic nomothetic visionwho wish
to construct the most general laws possible about social
behavior via quasi-experimental designs, using data that
are presumably replicable and on the whole as quantitative as possible. They dominate departments of economics (in the United States at least, but not only) and
also, increasingly, departments of political science. They
are strong in departments of sociology and geography.
They can be found as well, albeit in smaller numbers,
in departments of history and anthropology. These persons share a lot of fundamental premises and even methodological preferences. For example, methodological in4. I would not include psychology in the mix, for two good reasons.
First, I think that the level of analysis is quite distinctive. Second,
most psychologists would prefer to be called biological scientists
rather than social scientists, and they would be right, in my judgment, given the kind of work that they are in fact doing.

dividualism is very popular in this camp. They talk to

each other already, and they might be happier to do that
full-time.
There is another camp that is in many ways heir to
the idiographic tradition. It favors dissecting the particular and the different. This is not a question of scale;
although many of these people greatly prefer to deal with
small-scale phenomena, some of them are quite willing
to venture into dissecting rather large-scale ones. The
point is that their backs go up any time one suggests
uniformities. As a result, they are not likely to seek out
quantitative data. They dont all necessarily reject such
data in every instanceits a question of what you do
with thembut they nonetheless use mostly so-called
qualitative data. They favor close, almost textual analyses. They empathize with the objects of their study, and
they denounce sympathizing with them because sympathy is an expression of power. Almost by definition,
they talk to each other primarily about what they dislike
about what people in the other camps do. But when they
present their own work, they find a lot of resistance even
in their own camp. They are a quarrelsome bunch. Still,
surrounded by nomothetists, they might wish to escape
into their own organizational universe. These people are
primarily to be found in departments of anthropology
and history and to an increasing extent in sociology.
There are in addition some political scientists, some geographers, and even a few economists to add to the
aggregation.
And then there are people who feel comfortable in
neither of these camps. These are the people who do not
deny that they wish to construct grand narratives in order to deal with what they think of as complex social
phenomena. Quite the contrary; they are proud of it. In
terms of data, they are catholic in their tastes, using
quantitative or qualitative data as they find them available and plausible. In the construction of these grand
narratives, however empirical they are in their practice
and their preferences, they abut on larger philosophical
questions, and some of them are quite willing to enter
into dialogue with those who technically define themselves as philosophers. They also abut on large political
questions, and some of them enter into dialogue with
those political scientists who call themselves specialists
in international relations. This group is found all over
the placein history, in sociology, in anthropology, in
geography, in economics (especially of course economic
history), and in political sciencebut always as a minority. They too talk to each other already, perhaps even
more than members of the other groupsthis being a
reflex, perhaps, of their belief that they are a persecuted
minority.
I would guess that social scientists, left to themselves
in a remolded faculty of historical social sciences, might
well create three such disciplines as intellectual constructs. And I suspect that such a configuration would
be an enormous improvement over anything we have
now or have had in the past. But will they be left to
themselves?

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The Institutional Framework of the

Disciplines
Disciplines are organizations. They have their turfs, and
they have no small number of members who will fight
to the death to defend those turfs against quixotic ideas
such as those Ive just set forth or any others that seem
to threaten the historic configurations in which they find
themselves. No amount of purely intellectual argument
is likely to sway the majority of the worlds social scientists, since these people have interests to defend and
probably the best way to do so is by preserving the status
quo. They are quite ready to give verbal or even substantive support to multi-, inter-, or transdisciplinary
projects/studies/even degrees. All these activities ultimately imply that the existing disciplines have specific
and special sets of knowledge that can be pieced together
to create a tapestry, if tapestry is what one wants. Ergo,
they do not undermine the disciplines as organizations.
Quite the contrary! They fortify them.
Let me identify what kinds of people defend the turf
most. Of course, there is a certain element of ideological
choice involved, but the issue is primarily generational.
The young are sometimes audacious or at least inquisitive and perhaps impulsive. They have to be restrained
from wandering off the reservation by the potential sanctions of their elders. The senior seniors are sometimes
reflective, tired of the nonsense they and others have
been spouting for oh, so many years, and it is hard to
sanction them. But it is not hard to ignore them and ship
them off into the never-never land of honorifics, where
prestige substitutes for power. No, the villains are those
4055 years of age who have become the full professors,
chairs of departments, presidents of associations, members of national committees, the jury in awards activities. They have suffered the ignominies of being a junior
professor (after the indignities of being a graduate student). They have worked hard to make their way up
through the ranks. They have achieved, most often rightfully, reputations among their colleagues (not merely locally but nationally and internationally). Can you blame
them for not wanting to cast all this aside by abolishing
their formal positions and placing themselves in a new
unstable boiling pot in which essentially they will have
to fight their way forward again, and without the familiar
tools that they have used so successfully? Of course not,
and they wont do it. There may be a courageous fool or
two, but not enough to make a difference. And remember, these are the people with the real power within the
disciplinary organizations.
I have not the slightest expectation that the petty bourgeoisie will commit suicide, as Amilcar Cabral (otherwise the most astute of analysts) hoped would happen
in movements of national liberation. They will fight
such reforms in every possible way, and the young and
the senior seniors will be no match for them. Nonetheless, the defenders of the status quo will probably lose,
for they may meet their match.
First of all, the intellectual anomalies are mounting

and becoming every day more visible, for one thing, to

the general public. How many times have you read in
the newspapers the complaint What use are economists
if they never predict correctly? No matter that this may
not be a reasonable complaint, it reflects a delegitimation
of the work of social scientists. And in the end social
science is dependent on being legitimated by the social
system of which it is a part. Otherwise, there is no respect and no money, and recruitment will in consequence dry up. The fact is that, after 150 years of an
amazing amount of work, world social science has much
too little to show for itself and is unable to perform the
social task that outsiders demand of itproviding wise
counsel about solving what are considered to be the
problems of the present.
This perceived failure will sooner or later become a
source of major concern to those whose function it is to
be the link between the university systems and other
structures of knowledge and the larger social system and
the money, power, and legitimacy that it confers on those
systems and structures. These people are the administratorsthe deans, the university presidents, and, in
most countries, the ministers of education. Their job is
not to preserve the organizational structure of the separate disciplines but to provide what is considered to be
the optimal societal output in the production and reproduction of knowledge. It is a political job every bit as
much as it is an intellectual one. We know that almost
all such administrators are ex-scholars, most no longer
able to devote themselves to serious new work or, often,
to keep up with the work of others even in their immediate fields of specialization. Slowly, over the years,
they have moved away from the chains that the disciplinary organizations have imposed on them.
Such administrators perceive the social sciences, on
the whole, with unhappy eyes. The social sciences do
not bring in a lot of money to the university, certainly
not in comparison with the biological and physical sciences. The heyday of their legitimacy is over. Administrators are daily made aware of the degree to which
disciplinary overlap exists. And yet, almost every week
people come into their offices proposing new centers (almost always touted as interdisciplinary), whole new instructional programs, even new formal departments.
And since many of these people are playing the game of
outside offers, administrators far too often feel the need
to yield and permit the creation of yet another epicycle
of the social science astronomical map.
Meanwhile, these same administrators are beset by
economic worries, and not short-term ones. Of course,
the money they have at their disposal varies year by year
with the rolling stock exchange, but the question is far
larger than this. The world university system greatly expanded between 1945 and 1970. But this was a time when
the world was economically flush. Some of us call this
a Kondratieff A-phase. Ever since then we have been in
a B-phase. The governments of the world have been less
flush, but the universities have continued to expand. A
larger percentage of high-school graduates throughout
the world seeks to enter the universities every year. They

w a l l e r s t e i n Dubious Disciplines F 457

do so because they think this will enhance their life

chances, and quite often governments and entrepreneurs
are happy to see them not enter the workforce yet, given
the comparative surfeit of older workers. More students
and less money equals chronic crisis. We have all been
living through that, and I see no reason to expect this
economic constraint to go away. True, we may have another A-phase, but we shall also see the further expansion of the world university system. For one thing, people
are living longer and therefore working longer, and the
authorities of the world-system will try even harder to
keep young people out of the job market. Keeping them
in the university system is a genuine social solution but
an expensive one.
If I were a university administrator, I would look
around to see if I could tighten the ship. One way would
be to get professors to teach more to more students. This
is what I call the high-school-ization of the universities, and it is going on apace. This of course makes some
of the most prestigious professors seek to escape into
permanent research institutions or even corporate research structures. From the point of view of the administrators, this is a prestige loss but a financial gain; they
get rid of some of their most expensive professors. Another way would be to merge departments. Why not?
They overlap. They dont teach enough. Students are
confused by the present situation. A new department
with a snazzy title might attract students and at the same
time achieve economies of scale. I could even tout it as
intellectual audacity. So when I say that the extremely
strong organizational structure of the disciplines has
cracks that are too little noticed, it is the potential intrusion of the administrators that I have primarily in
mind.
Who knows? The administrators might do a wonderful
job of reorganization. I have two fears, however. One is
that they will be driven more by budgetary concerns than
by purely intellectual ones. After all, administrators are
paid not to determine the best way of defining the tasks
of scholars but to find good people to be professors and
therewith to create a socially useful product. The socalled best universities might be willing to sustain small,
unpopular groupings that have some purely long-term
intellectual justification, but there will never be many
jobs for those who wish to teach Akkadian language and
culture. And reconstructions that are driven by budgetary analyses will too often be following the fads of the
moment or the poorly defined needs of the students prospective employers.
The second concern that I have is that administratorgenerated reconstructions will be done differently in
each locality. Local situations are of course always very
specific, and administrators do not have as strong as
transnational organizational structure as scholars in the
separate disciplines. The result could be, on a world
scale, quite diffuse and militate against the emergence
of the kinds of institutions that would facilitate the
maintenance of world communities of scholars.
This all may well be unfair to administrators, since (as
I am arguing) the scholar-teachers are not primed to do

such a marvelous job themselves. The point is that we

are heading into an era of chaos in the structures of the
disciplines and, while I believe that order always emerges
out of chaos (to echo Prigogine), the outcome is intrinsically uncertain (to take up another theme of Prigogine).
We will not navigate this era well if we do not keep a
sharp eye on what is actually happening.

Harvesting the Cultures of Social Science

Here I enter the most treacherous terrain. Harvesting
is an agricultural metaphor, referring to various products
of the soil that can be combined and transformed into
useful productsfood, clothing, and everything else we
need in everyday lifeand that may be better or less good
products according to how well we perform the operations, within the constraints imposed by the conditions
of the soil. Perhaps we ought rather to phrase the processes in terms of a different metaphor, that of the
painter mixing his colors in order to produce a work of
art on a canvas. I could then list for you my favorite
colors and the combinations that I thought to be interesting or beautiful and then design my picture in the
style I thought most meaningful to me, to you. The metaphor of the painter seems to give more autonomy to
the subjectconstrained, no doubt, but less constrained
perhaps than the farmer by external realities over which
he has no or little control. I do not want to get lost in
metaphors but merely to indicate my uncertainty on this
perennial issue of how much to emphasize agency or
even how much agency is a real issue in analyzing the
future of social science.
What I shall do therefore is to pick a series of cultural
prejudices that I think work better than their alternatives
and that I hope will serve as the foundation stones of
the putatively reconstructed arena I am calling the historical social sciences. Let us start with the very name
I am using for this new disciplinary construct. We cannot, I believe, talk about the real world in any way that
is not based on a claim to science, by which I mean the
assumption that the world is real and is potentially
knowable (if only perhaps in part). Every word we use in
speaking and writing involves a theory and a grand narrative. There is no way to escape this, however much
we try or claim to do so. At the same time, there is no
way to analyze or even describe the real world without
being historical, by which I mean that the context of any
given reality is constantly changing, evolving, and that
statements of truth are no longer true the moment after
they are uttered. The problem of social science (and probably of the natural sciences as well) is how to reconcile
the search for structural continuities (laws or hypotheses, if you like) and constant historical change. In other
words, the problem is to find modes of analysis or languages that can bridge this inherent contradiction of the
process of knowing.
Stating the issue in this manner is a way of denying
the usefulness of the Methodenstreit, of rejecting the
claims of both nomothetists and idiographers, of saying

458 F c u r r e n t a n t h ro p o l o g y Volume 44, Number 4, AugustOctober 2003

that we are all condemned to be both simultaneously at

all times and under all circumstances. Many, even most
present-day social scientists will probably feel quite uncomfortable about this reality, for it violates the cultures
within which they have been socialized. But we know
that cultures can and do changethat they are malleable, if sometimes with difficulty. And I can hope that by
2052, at the 59th Sidney W. Mintz Lecture in Anthropology (although this last term may not survive the
transformations), this Aufhebung will seem so natural
that it will not even be thought necessary to advert to
it.
In such a culture, what kind of work shall we be doing?
Empirical work, largely, I hope, but of a certain kind. Let
me start with what I think is social sciences most pervasive failing: Much of what we do is an elaborate explanation of some dependent variable without any real
empirical demonstration that the explicandum is in any
sense real. It is all too easy to assume that a credible
proposition is a reality. It is against this that Ranke insisted that history must concern itself only with wie es
eigentlich gewesen ist. Paul Lazarsfeld (1949) long ago
demonstrated that obvious facts are not so obvious once
one actually tries to provide evidence for them, and the
early ethnographers wrestled with imageries of strange,
assertedly savage behavior that seemed to be quite different when seen close at hand. Ranke used his warning
to argue that we must search for archival evidence. Lazarsfeld used his to argue the utility of public-opinion
polling. The ethnographers used theirs to insist on participant observation. The solutions, it turned out, were
many, all no doubt with their limitations. It is the recognition of the problem that is crucial.
Without a statement about a dependent variable that
has been reasonably demonstrated empirically, there can
be no analysis. This does not mean that the assertion is
correct. There can never be a definitive fact of any kind.
But between the definitive fact and the presumed but
undemonstrated reality lies a wide range of possibilities,
and it is in this murky middle groundthe world of what
has probably really happened in the worldthat the historical social sciences are called upon to work. Deductive
models serve us ill. Common knowledge is at best a
source of possibly correct perceptions and itself an object
of study. This is why fieldwork (in the loosest, broadest
sense of the term) is our eternal responsibility. Once we
have something to explain, we need concepts, variables,
and methods with which to explain it. And it is about
concepts, variables, and methods that we have long been
arguing with each otherarguing loudly and on the
whole not very fruitfully.
We all use concepts, and we all have a bag of concepts
in our mind, ones that we have learned in our continuing
education from childhood on. Some of them are as mundane as needs and interests, some as seemingly obvious as society and culture, some as seemingly specific and advanced as bourgeoisie and proletariat.
They are all challenged by some people sometimes, but
this doesnt stop others from invoking them. Therefore
it is good to remember the admonition of Lucien Febvre

(1962:481), writing about the concept of civilization,

that it is never a waste of time to write the history of
a word. This elementary truth, largely ignored, is what
those devoted to deconstruction have tried to reinvent.
We now have a whole Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte in
Germany of which I would guess most social scientists
are unaware.
Nor do most social scientists pay attention to the constraints of morphology. Listing multiple varieties of
some phenomenon tends to be a sort of mindless empiricism. Morphologies are ways of creating preliminary
order in the blooming, buzzing confusion of reality and
in effect are hidden causal hypotheses. They tend to be
worthless when there are too many categories; usually,
three or four are the limit. This suggests that what social
scientists need to do is to examine carefully and debate
their philosophical, epistemological premises. They do
not currently consider Begriffsgeschichte or the modes
of constructing morphologies as a foundation stone of
their own research or as a necessary part of graduate
education. Here is where their scientism leads to distinctly unscientific outcomes, without even the awareness that this is happening.
As we move from concepts to variables, once again
some simple truths are in order. To continue my metaphor, the prejudices of a minority need to be incorporated into the practice of all of us. First, virtually all
statements should be made in the past tense. To make
them in the present tense is to presume universality and
eternal reality. The argument should not be made by
grammatical sleight-of-hand. Anything that happened
yesterday is in the past. Generalizations about what happened yesterday are about the past. This is perhaps a
sensitive issue for some anthropologists (the famous
ethnographic present) and most mainstream economists and sociologists, but using the past tense serves
as a constant reminder of the historicity of our analyses
and the necessity for theoretical prudence.
I wish also to make a case for a culture of plurals. Most
concepts are plural conceptscivilizations, cultures,
economies, families, structures of knowledge, and so on.
It is not that we cannot proffer a definition for a word
and insist that what doesnt meet that definition should
not be described by that term. But, as we know only too
well, almost all conceptual terms are defined in multiple
ways, and it is not very helpful to scholarly debate to
assume away the debate by deduction from ones definition. Yet much of what we currently do is done in this
way, and we are even rewarded for doing it and quite
often penalized for not doing it. Failure to insist on a
narrow definition is often pilloried as journalism, eclecticism, or deviation from the truth.
And along with the past tense and plurals comes the
culture of multiple temporalities, multiple spatialities,
and multiple TimeSpaces. The Methodenstreit that has
governed most social science since the late 19th century
has polarized our community into a battleground
wherein we were all adjured to choose one side because
the other side was false, or irrelevant, or worse. Not only
was this forced conflict counterproductive but it led us

w a l l e r s t e i n Dubious Disciplines F 459

to ignore the existence and importance of other temporalities and spatialities, including Braudels longue duree, the necessary concept if reality is at once systemic
and historical. What we need in our historical social science is to consider what our reality looks like within
each of its possible temporalities and spatialities. And
this is of course necessary whether we are analyzing a
macrotopic such as the history of the modern worldsystem or a microtopic such as the introduction of some
new element into the life stream of some remote village.
Whatever our object of investigation, we need a great
deal more fluidity in our analyses as we move from one
arena to another, from what we like to call the economy
to what we like to call the polity to what we like to call
the society or the culture. There is no ceteris paribus,
for the other things are never equal. We may wish to
ignore for a moment elements other than the immediate
variables we are considering, since we may find it difficult to talk about everything at once. But we can never
do this on the assumption that the surrounding variables
do not impinge immediately on what we are studying.
The whole lesson of the sciences of complexity is that
if one changes the initial conditions ever so minutely
the outcome may be radically different, whatever the
truth of the equations we are using.
This then leads us to the question of methods and of
methodologies. In my own education, I was taught that
there was a radical distinction between what were called
in the jargon of my teachers small-m methods and
big-m methods. Small-m methods were all those practical techniques that we use and that in the past were
used to define disciplines: simulation, opinion polling,
archival research, participant observation, and so on. The
only attitude one can take to small-m methods is one of
complete catholicity. They are simply methods of estimating, capturing reality. They are worth what they are
worth in facing up to the ways in which the world makes
it difficult for researchers to find out anything about the
issues in which they are interested. Not only are none
of these methods intrinsically better than others but no
generally described research issue or site is necessarily
and permanently linked with any one of them. We all
need them all. They all have their virtues and their limitations. And graduate students would do well to become
acquainted with the widest range of these small-m methods. Since I have been discussing them within the framework of cultural prejudices, I call for setting aside our
prejudices. We will be the stronger for it.
But the real question is big-m methods. For example,
should we trust only quantitative or only qualitative
data? Here it is not a question of simply being eclectic
but one of deciding what kind of data is valid. I have
some simple rules that seem to me to cull our collective
wisdom. It is clear that almost all our statements are
quantitative, even when the statements use nothing
more than more or important in their formulations.
And it seems to me that it is always more interesting to
be quantitatively more than less exact. It follows, then,
that quantification is desirable whenever it is possible.
But that whenever encompasses a big caveat. If one

makes serious quantification an imperative and a priority, one risks ending up where the old joke sent us,
looking for the lost watch under the lamppost because
the light is better there.
But there is more to it than that. We have today a
leading mathematician warning us that the qualitative
approach is not a mere stand-in for quantitative methods.
It may lead to great theoretical advances, as in fluid dynamics. It has a significant advantage over quantitative
methods, namely, stability (Ekeland 1988:73). This goes
against one of the main social-science arguments for
quantification, that of reliability (or stability). And this
has to do with what I would call premature quantification. We can only usefully quantify when we are fairly
well advanced in the plausibility of our models and the
strength of our data. Quantification comes in toward the
end of a process, not at the beginning. Indeed, the beginning is preeminently the realm of ethnography and
other nonquantitative modes of analysis. These techniques enable us, in a complex situation (and all social
situations are complex situations), to tease out the issues
and then explore the explanatory connections.
It is qualitative data, not quantitative data, that are
simple. Simplicity, however, is not the goal of the scientific process but the starting point. Of course, one can
start with simple statistical correlations as well. Complexification is the name of the game, and ever more
complex is not necessarily ever more narrative. It may
quite well beand may even better bemore complicated equations, bringing in more and more variables in
a controlled fashion.
It is only at this point of relative complexity that we
can engage in real comparisons, ones that do not combine
the investigated situation of the strange or complicated
or exotic with the presumed truth of the situation we
think we know well. Arnold Feldman, one of the early
sociologists who studied what were in his time called
underdeveloped countries, used to say that, whenever
he gave a talk on the patterns he discerned in his work,
there was sure to be someone in the audience who would
rise and say, but not in Pago Pago. It may or may not
have been true that what Feldman had recounted was
not true in Pago Pago, but what is the relevance of this
caution? The critic may have intended to deny the possibility that patterns exist or can ever exist. But then
why study Pago Pago? Is it butterfly collecting? Or the
critic may have intended to say that Feldmans formulae
were too simple and needed further complexification if
they were to be useful. Or perhaps the critic merely felt
that the organizers should have invited him to lecture
rather than Feldman. Criticism is a crucial tool in the
historical social sciences, but mindless criticism is not.
And that brings me to narratives. Narratives are an
admirably understandable and attractive way of communicating perceptions of reality. To be sure, even the
harshest set of differential equations is a form of narrative, though not the most palatable form. Recently
there has been much attacking of macronarratives. I suppose these critics think that what they produce is micronarratives and micro is better than macro. But of

460 F c u r r e n t a n t h ro p o l o g y Volume 44, Number 4, AugustOctober 2003

course the micro is a setting in which the macro manifests itself and one that can never be understood without
reference to the macrosetting. There are in the end no
narratives that are not macronarratives. The only question we have before us is whether the macronarrative
we are putting forward is defensible.
The culture of the historical social sciences that I envisage will not be against theorizing or theories, but it
will be cautious about premature closures. Indeed, the
breadth of its data, of its methods, of its linkages to the
rest of the world of knowledge will be its principal characteristic. Vigorous analysis in a climate of tolerant and
skeptical debate will be what will aid it most. Of course,
I am also assuming that in the next 50 years we shall be
overcoming the relatively recent (only two centuries old)
but deeply rooted divorce between philosophy and sciencethe so-called two culturesand setting out on the
path of constructing a singular epistemology for all
knowledge. In this scenario, a reinvigorated social science, one that is both structural and historical, can provide the crucial link between the domains we classify
as the natural sciences and those we classify as the
humanities.
The adventure of the historical social sciences is still
in its infancy. The possibilities of enabling us to make
substantively rational choices in an intrinsically uncertain world lie before us and give us cause for hope amidst
what are now the gloomy times of a historical transition
from our world-system to the next onea transition that
is necessarily occurring in the structures of knowledge
as well. Let us at least try seriously to mend our collective ways and to search for more useful paths. Let us
make our disciplines less dubious.

Comments
syed farid alatas
Department of Sociology, National University of
Singapore, Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 119260
([email protected]). 18 iv 03
Wallersteins assessment of the current state of the social
sciences and his call for their reconstruction in terms of
what he calls the historical social sciences would find
widespread acceptance among many social scientists
around the world. Here I would like to highlight how
the assessment of the dubious nature of the social sciences and the prospects for reconstruction depend on
ones position in the global division of labour in the social sciences.
As Wallerstein puts it, the problem of the social sciences is the reconciliation of the search for structural
continuities with continuous historical change. This
would require rejecting the claims of both the nomotheticists and the idiographers concerning the understanding of concepts, variables, and methods in the social
sciences. But this is not the only reconciliation that is

needed. There is the need to reconcile the cultural specificity of concepts with the self-understanding of the peoples being studied. There is something of a cultural divide in the social sciences that can be seen in the very
concepts employed by the various disciplines. The nature of this cultural divide is as follows: Many concepts
in the social sciences originate from a Greco-Roman,
Latin Christian, and European tradition. This does not
pose a problem, as Wallerstein recognizes, if these concepts become universal or plural. A great many concepts
are, however, passed off as universal when in fact they
derive their characteristics from a particular cultural tradition. This wreaks havoc on our understanding of social
phenomena. For example, while religion is presented
as a universal concept, the understanding of what makes
up religion in phenomenological, historical, and sociological terms is often derived from Christianity, resulting
in what Joachim Matthes (2000:98), referring to Islam,
calls the hidden cultural Christianisation of the
Muslim world since it started to think of Islam as a
religion. This raises the interesting question of the
extent to which religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam have been intellectually reconstructed
after the image of Christianity because of the concepts
employed by the disciplines that study religions. Such
concepts include church, sect, denomination,
secularization, and religion itself. A case in point is
a table presenting statistics on church membership in
the United Kingdom in Anthony Giddenss Sociology
(2001:549, table 17.3). However, the religions included
are not just Christianity but Hinduism, Islam, Judaism,
Sikhism, and others, giving the impression that the temple, mosque, and synagogue are all, sociologically speaking, churches. The term church is generalized without the concepts being rendered universal or plural.
What should be considered is the possibility of other
concepts of religious organization that can be derived
from these other belief systems. As long as the study of
religion does not look at its objects as potential sources
of concepts rather than just data, it will remain backward, playing down the objects conceptualization of
themselves and denying the culturally plural origins of
ideas in the social sciences.
I agree with Wallersteins case for a culture of plural
concepts but would insist that the acculturation of concepts be made one of the major concerns of any effort to
reconstruct the social sciences. In many parts of the
world collectively termed the Third World, the
South, or developing societies, social science practitioners and institutions are highly dependent on their
counterparts in the United States, Britain, France, and a
few other nations for ideas, theories, and concepts, technologies of education, and aid and investment in education. This state of what we might call academic dependency is perpetuated by certain features of the global
division of labour in the social sciences: the division
between theoretical and empirical intellectual labour,
the division between other-country studies and owncountry studies, and the division between comparative
and single-case studies. As long as academics in the

w a l l e r s t e i n Dubious Disciplines F 461

South continue to do predominantly empirical work that

is largely confined to single cases in their own countries
or localities and therefore lacks a comparative perspective, the prospects for theoretical or conceptual innovation are bleak. Even if the social sciences were to be
reconfigured as historical social sciences and to extricate
themselves from petty squabbles between the nomotheticists and idiographers, the global division of labour
as I have described it would remain intact and culturally
plural concepts and theories would remain the exception. Therefore, the reconstruction of the social sciences
must simultaneously be the dismantling of the current
global division of labour in the social sciences.
c h r i s t o p h b ru m a n n
Institut fur Volkerkunde, Universitat zu Koln, 50923
Koln, Germany ([email protected]).
17 iv 03
By and large, I support Wallersteins agenda. A number
of the exhortations are very general, and I would have
to see multiple temporalities and spatialities and the
plurality of concepts specified, but most other
pointsthe importance of empirical backing, the value
of using the past tense, the need for small-m methods
employed in nonideological ways, the dangers of premature quantification, and the virtues of maximal quantificationare commendable. The question, however, is
whether these points benefit from a merger of the social
sciences. Surely we will all profit from tearing down the
fences that hinder the inquisitive mind from foraging
freely. Yet suppose that the historical social sciences
had been instituted in my university. Surrounded by
throngs of new colleagues, many of them interesting people working on interesting topics, I would consider the
previous separation odd indeed. On getting to know my
new colleagues better, however, I would find a good number whose inclinations to sweeping armchair theorizing,
tenacious adherence to a specific master concept or
method, and reductionist modeling of human nature and
societys workings I considered unhealthy. And among
the others I would find a considerable number who were
simply not very interested in societies other than the
Euro-American ones they studied. Therefore, in forming
subgroups and specializations at some point I would still
gravitate to those who shared my belief in the value of
in-depth studies of exemplary cases, employed a systems
perspective, and took a broad and comparative interest
in the human condition. While those I would feel drawn
to would include practitioners of all the former disciplines and certainly also many sociologists, the number
of anthropologists would be large. Chances are that in
the end I would find myself more or less where I was
before.
Wallerstein suggests that there are more sensible ways
of subdividing, for instance, along the three grand theoretical orientations or, rather, scientific temperaments
that he outlines. Here he appears to be thinking of conditions in sociology, where the followers of, say, game

theory, social network analysis, Luhmannian systems

theory, or new institutional economics may pass entire
careers without being forced to leave their favourite paradigms. Taking anthropological research inspired by
Wallersteins own work as an example, however, I believe that studies based on such diverse approaches as
those of Bradley et al. (1990), Gewertz and Errington
(1991), and (to cover the middle range) Robinson (1986)
still belong together. There should be scholars who try
to keep abreast of all this work and integrate it into their
own perspectives. In anthropology, research experience
on a variety of topics and/or societies, approached from
a variety of positions on the nomothetic-idiographic continuum, continues to be a prerequisite for a successful
career, and this has kept anthropologists of different theoretical persuasions able to talk to one another and use
each others results with a realistic sense of their possible
worth and limitations.
Disciplines should be thematically, not methodologically or paradigmatically, defined; world systems studies would appear a more reasonable discipline to me
than idiographic studies. New insights and societal
changes have already led to the establishment of a number of such studies (cultural, gender, gay, lesbian, etc.),
demonstrating that the 19th-century framework of disciplines is not a straitjacket. Ideas also travel rather
freely. I therefore wonder whether the classic disciplinary boundaries really are a major obstacle. The potential for constructive exchange across disciplines is
not, of course, exhausted. Ceasing to ignore each others
methods would be an important first step, as Wallerstein
is right to emphasize. Certainly, too, the social sciences
are often not well organized. The customary faculty partners of social/cultural anthropology in the United States,
for examplephysical anthropology, archaeology, and
linguisticsare not necessarily closer to what most of
the disciplines practitioners are currently doing than,
for example, sociology or history. Rearranging the existing disciplines could therefore be fruitful.
To jump on the merger bandwagon, however, I would
need a clearer view of the course that would be followed
thereafter, given thatas Wallerstein points out and a
glance at the corporate world confirmsdownsizing is
the only consequence that is dead-certain. After all, the
classic disciplines are established brands, known by
many and not as compromised as Wallerstein argues.
Such disciplinary capital should not be wasted as the
balkanization that Wallerstein anticipates would be sure
to do. In any event, there is nothing to stop us from
thinking, talking, and publishing across the borders. I
take Wallersteins lecture as valuable encouragement in
this regard.
Two asides trouble me somewhat. First, Wallerstein
presents Bells insinuation that anthropologists tend to
fail to take their informants reasons seriously in a seemingly neutral way. For most anthropologists, however,
taking peoples reasons seriously is the whole point of
doing ethnographic fieldwork, and they tend to detach
themselves far less from the people they study than other
social scientists. Second, the passionate debate inside

462 F c u r r e n t a n t h ro p o l o g y Volume 44, Number 4, AugustOctober 2003

the American Anthropological Association was not

about whether taking notes as the natives slaughter
each other is a good thing but about whether specific
anthropologists actually performed specific unethical
acts (which remains contested [see the report of the
American Anthropological Associations El Dorado Task
Force at http://www.aaanet.org/edtf/index.htm]).
craig calhoun
Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Ave.,
New York, N.Y. 10019, U.S.A. ([email protected]).
23 iv 03
One of the many useful points Wallerstein makes is that
the famous categories of the Methodenstreit invoke a
false opposition. We are not condemned to choose between idiographic and nomothetic perspectives but can
use both at once.
Since this diagnosis is sound, it is somewhat surprising
that Wallersteins ultimate vision of how the social sciences might be reorganized incorporates a restatement
of the Methodenstreit categories. There will always be
those pursuing idiographic and nomothetic agendas, he
suggests, but let us make sure there is also a place for
those who seek to overcome them through the writing
of grand historical narratives. Indeed, I hope such a place
exists, but it is not the only valuable intellectual project
or style that spans the division of particular and
universal.
Ethnography, for a start, need not be a pursuit of the
radically particular; instead, it can be precisely an engagement with comparison and the development of generalizations. The comparisons will ideally be attentive
to context, and the generalizations will commonly be
limited. Context may include the kind of macrohistorical situations Wallersteins approach would help ethnographers to identify but might also situate particular
cases in relation to a range of other broader phenomena
from languages and religions to geography and ecology.
The limits on generalization may be clearly recognized
or left implicit, to be raised by the kind of statement
Wallerstein characterizes as but not in Pago Pago.
What is important is that asking questions like how matrilineal descent organization shapes the accumulation of
property is inherently generalizingeven when one
starts by asking it only in one placeand inherently open
to debate over the scope of application of any relationship
identified. This is a crucial reason anthropologists master a range of major ethnographies.
But of course ethnography, at least as most frequently
practiced, cannot reveal everything, and to claim it as
an exclusive research style is to put on blinders. The
upheaval wrought in anthropology a generation (or two)
ago by starting to take history, state structures, colonialism, and capitalism more seriously is evidence of this
(but not an argument for consigning ethnography to the
purely idiographic). Context matters, in other words, and
not only immediate context. Many of the most important intellectual disputes are about just what context is

most relevant for understanding specific phenomena.

Asking how valley states generally relate to mountain
tribes (possibly even producing them by driving some
people from richer to poorer land) thus transforms the
way one may look at social organization in any village
or region; relating this to ecology and agricultural technologies further interrelates the general and the particular. One can also situate this within the histories of
particular states or regions and within more global histories that shape the patterns of local and regional relations. As I think Wallerstein would agree, the issue is
not so much scale as the need to consider the multiple
relevant contexts.
This points back to why Wallersteins tripartite division of the social sciences worries me. Many of the most
productive questions arise from efforts to relate the
seemingly particular to the apparently general. I would
hope that any future organization of the social sciences
would perpetuate such arguments and provoke them in
newly creative ways by forcing researchers with different
perspectives and characteristic styles to confront each
others work more often. Put another way, part of the
problem with disciplines is precisely that they have developed characteristic styles of workthe methods
into which students are ritually initiatedand these
minimize the frequency of intellectually exciting challenges to conventional opinion and seemingly obvious
observations. Economists usually confront only other
economists and, at least in the United States, only ones
who accept a variety of background assumptions from
the neoclassical model (and from the high value placed
on mathematicization). Anthropologists too often confront only others who give primacy to face-to-face relationshipsunderstanding language from speech, all social relationships from interpersonal ones, all institutions from the local manifestations. Old ideals of the
four fields might be trotted out at this point to reassure
anthropologists that the discipline still tries to study humanity as a whole, but it is hard to make a realistic case
either that the interrelationships among the fields are as
the ideology suggests or that the four exhaust the relevant range of approaches. Surely sociology, political science, and economics are as important for a cultural anthropologist (let alone a social anthropologist) as physical
anthropology or archaeology.
Wallerstein is right that disciplines are more matters
of turf, careerism, and institutional inertia than intellectual principle. He is also right that external pressures
on the disciplinary structure are growing. It makes sense
for social scientists to seek out a better structure ourselves rather than only defend the existing one. But I
hope that whatever develops will be not merely a placement of like with like but a basis for creating fruitful
confrontations among different styles of research. These
could happen in projects defined around places, theories,
or clusters of intellectual problems that are illuminated
by several styles of research.

w a l l e r s t e i n Dubious Disciplines F 463

john r. hall
UC Davis Center for History, Society, and Culture,
University of California, Davis, Calif. 95616, U.S.A.
([email protected]). 18 iv 03
Wallerstein is to be commended for his continuing efforts to confront social scientists with the stark predicaments we face in organizing our collective activities,
and he is certainly right to point here to the uneven
developments across the intellectual, institutional, and
cultural axes that organize his discussion. Like him, I
am an optimist about developments in epistemology that
will bring each of us, no matter what our particular
methodological commitments, into broader conversations across what once seemed like unbreachable epistemological divides.1 And, like him, I am struck by the
impediments to intellectual work and education posed
by the institutional structures and, to a lesser degree, the
cultures of the disciplines. His utopian proposal to set
the faculty free to regroup under new disciplinary banners thus has a certain appeal.
Yet I am given to wonder whether either eliminating
or organizing disciplines is a promising solution. Consider the problem as one of social organization: Bureaucracy as a mode of organization is historically challenged
these days, and there are many scholarly analyses that
suggest the reasons and implications. Daniel Bells The
Coming of Postindustrial Society already pointed in
1973 to social relationships that would play out as
games between people rather than performance under
bureaucratic regimens. At the beginning of the 21st century, emergent social theories are predicated on concepts
of networks and relationality rather than bureaucracy.
From quite a different perspective, poststructuralists
would tell us, the attempt to create solid categories is
always going to produce anomalies that dont fit the classification scheme. As Derrida would have it, any structure will require a supplement. Transferred from the
realm of text per se to the textual structurations of disciplines, these perspectives suggest the limitations to
any solution predicated on trying to align disciplines
with intellectual coherence or cultural coherence. As
Guenther Roth remarked to me already in the 1970s,
sociology (in his example) is just a convenient umbrella
where scholars come to stand to keep out of the rain.
These brief allusions to the travails of bureaucracy and
classification and the implications of the network metaphor suggest that we need to recast the organization of
universities in fundamental ways. Yet when I look at the
balkanization that can occur in the humanities, beset as
they are by an erosion of coherent rationales of subject
matter and a proliferation of programs, the administrative and cultural benefits of relatively eclectic but somehow strong academic units (departments) in the conventional social sciences looks good by comparison.
Certainly their boundaries can and should shift as in1. In my account, affinities across seemingly disjoined methodologies constitute the domain of the human sciences as one of integrated disparity (see Hall 1999:chap. 9).

tellectual rationales change. But if Wallerstein is generally right in his assertions, neither methods nor subject
matter can be the basis for defining disciplines. For all
the tensions, then, I think there is something healthy
about circumstances that encourage people of diverse
methodological persuasions and substantive interests to
keep watch over one another within academic units
call them departments if you willfighting over hiring, promotions, and tenure.
How, then, to respond to the challenges and possibilities of scholarly networking under postclassificatory circumstances? I will not look at the longue duree, but in
the very near term, several precepts based on experiences
at the University of California, Davis, seem worth elaborating and considering:
1. Topical, theoretical, and methodological course
clusters should be grouped and coordinated across academic units, not within them.
2. Undergraduate majors may (typically) be administered within academic units, but any given department
might consider offering multiple majors.
3. Undergraduate major course requirements typically
should group courses drawn from diverse academic units
to form coherent packages, and the names for these majors need not be tied to academic unit names.
4. Doctoral graduate education should be based on
graduate group degree programs that are not necessarily tied to academic unit names and are subject to
periodic review and reconstitution.
5. Graduate students should be encouraged to complete at least one minor program that brings faculty and
students together from diverse graduate degree programs
according to shared substantive, theoretical, and methodological interests.
6. Graduate course offerings should be designed to encourage enrollment by students and participation by faculty from diverse degree programs.
7. Doctoral substantive examination and dissertation
committees generally should follow the model long practiced at some institutions of allowing committee composition in ways not restricted by program or disciplinary
boundaries.
This very brief sketch can be only suggestive, but I
hope that it advances my general point that academic
reform in the human sciences ought to proceed by encouraging new organizational and programmatic solutions that depend neither upon old binary efforts at classifying nor on efforts to rearrange or transcend disciplines.
t. n. madan
Institute of Economic Growth, A5, University of
Delhi, New Delhi 110007, India ([email protected].
in). 17 iv 03
Cultural-social anthropology is of course unremittingly
comparative in its approach. Considering it as a discipline in all three senses of the term that Wallerstein
outlines should, I believe, seem familiar, although in

464 F c u r r e n t a n t h ro p o l o g y Volume 44, Number 4, AugustOctober 2003

contrary ways, to someone (like myself) brought up in

the Hindu (Brahmanical) intellectual tradition and
trained as a social anthropologist in the British tradition
in the 1950s.
The exact equivalent of the term discipline in Sanskrit is shastra. Standard dictionaries gloss it as a noun
connoting (1) command, precept, rule, (2) teaching, instruction, and (3) a scholarly (religious or secular) treatise. Thus, we have the shastra or disciplines of dharma
(moral law), artha (rational pursuit of material ends), and
natya (dance and music). Corresponding to each shastra
is a corpus of texts often referred to by a generic name
and incorporating the work of one or more authors although attributed to a single authority: Manus Manavdharma Shastra (ca. 100300 c.e.), Kautilyas ArthaShastra (ca. 400 b.c.e.100 c.e.), and Bharatas
Natya-Shastra (ca. 100 b.c.e.100 c.e.) are well-known
examples. These disciplines do not, however, stand for
autonomous fields of thought and action. Dharma, artha, and kama (aesthetic/sexual enjoyment) as purushartha (goals of action/value orientations) are interdependent although arranged hierarchically, so that the
pursuit of a lower goal/value occurs within the ambit of
that/those placed above it. Stated conversely, a higher
goal/value includes those ranked below it without losing
its own priority. One can of course opt out of this goal/
value framework and of social life altogether through
renunciation (sannyasa, giving up everything). In
short, the concept of purushartha is holistic, and the
disciplines that ensue from it would not readily translate
into a structure of autonomous faculties in an institution
of learning. Obviously, the Brahmanical tradition did not
entertain the notion of specialized discourses, for this
would have amounted to fragmentation of knowledge,
which was anathema.
Post-graduate departments of social sciences at Indian
universities emerged early in the 20th century. The University of Lucknow (in North India) had departments of
history, political science, and economics and sociology
from its beginnings in 1921. The founding professor and
head of the last-named department, Radhakamal Mukerjee, who shaped its teaching and research programmes, had himself come to economics from history
and English literature (at Calcutta University). He sought
to hold together economics, sociology, and cultural anthropology, lecturing in all three areas (see Mukerjee
1925). Around the time of his retirement in 1951, he had
to witness the trifurcation of his department into independent departments of economics, anthropology, and
sociology. Even so, he reaffirmed in 1956 that a true
general theory of society is the corpus of theories, laws,
and explanations of social relations and structures derived from all the social sciences. . . . For society is not
divisible. Only the social sciences . . . are fractionalized
(p. 9).
So far as anthropology in India is concerned, the notion
that it studied other cultures was carried over from
British and American universities, and therefore Indian
anthropologists studied tribal, forest-dwelling communities. When I inquired in 1953 if I could study aspects

of my own (non-tribal) community (the Kashmiri Pandits

[see Madan 2002]), there was at first some reluctance on
the part of my teachers (at Lucknow) to allow it, but
eventually they agreed. An unexpected source of support
was the British social anthropologist S. F. Nadel, then at
the Australian National University, who agreed to supervise my research in the area of marriage and kinship
on the basis of fieldwork in a cluster of villages; I myself
had grown up in an urban neighbourhood. In the course
of time, I formulated my position as one of distanciation, of treating the familiar as strangein short, of
treating the other as a conceptual rather than an empirical category (see Madan 1994:chaps. 68).
An important influence in the closing if not the abolition of the gap between social anthropology and sociology in India was M. N. Srinivas (19161999), who held
doctorates in both sociology (Bombay) and social anthropology (Oxford). He resolutely opposed the ourselves-others dichotomy as colonial baggage (see Srinivas
2002), but his critics have argued that he only succeeded
in reducing sociology to social anthropology. It is true
that neither he nor many of his students engaged in largescale studies or handled quantitative data. Indian universities continue to treat sociology and anthropology as
separate disciplines.
The point of these comments is that the putatively
reconstructed arena of historical social sciences that
Wallerstein argues for may be more readily realizable in
certain intellectual settings, where it may find affinities
with an earlier holism, than in others, but its relevance
is today universal. The way to its constitution lies in the
bridging of a series of breaches, beginning with the dichotomy of nomothetic and idiographic sciences that
generated Diltheys famous nightmare about the academy torn asunder. This would be not an exercise in mechanical eclecticism but the serious effort of making our
disciplines (as Wallerstein recommends) less dubious.
Having said this, I must point out that the task of
dismantling disciplinary walls is not going to be easy.
Pitted against it are rigid institutional structures, set habits of mind, a disciplinary status system that privileges
methodological specialisms, scholarly egos, etc. Those
more forthcoming will argue that the best way to avoid
drift is to train students in particular disciplines and only
then guide them across the divides. This may be pragmatic, but the first thing to do is to recognize the validity
of Wallersteins argument.

Reply
immanuel wallerstein
New Haven, Conn., U.S.A. 31 v 03
I am pleased that the respondents all seem to share my
concerns. There is, however, a yes, but quality to these
responses. Calhoun regrets that my vision of the future
is a replication of the Methodenstreit categoriesa

w a l l e r s t e i n Dubious Disciplines F 465

world of social science divided three ways (nomothetists,

idiographers, and others). This is not my preferred vision
but my prediction of where people stand today and therefore how they would spontaneously opt if given the
choice. I did say that it would be an improvement to
separate the parties this way rather than continue to fight
over these issues within each department of each university. Some of the respondents seem to feel that these
fights are fruitful. I have never found them so.
So, are there alternatives? No doubt many. Calhoun
recommends confrontations among different styles of
research . . . in projects defined around places, theories,
or clusters of intellectual problems. This of course has
been tried, too. This is what area study programs or urban
programs or, indeed, womens studies programs are. I
have worked within this kind of structure too, and I am
not sure that the results are intellectually happier.
It may be, as Hall suggests, that no grouping of any
kind really works very well for very long and all of them
result in straitjackets on one kind or another. The concrete proposals he puts forth would lead to a lot of ad
hoc arrangements, which we often have already, and perhaps this is the best we can do. There remains the problem of graduate education, however, and students need
to get a credential that results in career possibilities.
Here is where the pressure returns for the more permanent structures. And what I hear Brumann saying is
that, given all these problems, he guesses he would probably continue to feel more comfortable in an anthropology department, perhaps slightly modified, than in
anything he sees coming out of mergers, reorganizations,
and other forms of fiddling with what we now have.
At this point, our two colleagues from Asia come in
to remind us of non-Western realities. Alatas points
toand bemoansthe inbuilt institutional inequalities
in the world of knowledge between institutions in the
North and those in the South. He also warns us, once
again, against the dangerously provincial character of our
most general concepts alleged to be universal. And Madan reminds us that we have systematically neglected
the social thought of the non-Western world and that
this thought may provide us with a fruitful basket of
concepts and modes of organizing knowledge of which
we have deprived ourselves. Of course they are both
right.
I continue to feel that our most urgent collective task
as scholars is to expose and reflect upon the very fragile
intellectual bases of our existing categorizations of
knowledge. I think that we must also soberly assess the
pluses and minuses of different modes of organizing
knowledge clusters. And I consider it urgent to push towards constructing a common culture of social science
based on the presumption that science and philosophy

are one rather than opposed modes of knowing. I have

no illusions of a smooth ride or even any guarantees that
we shall succeed in constructing something better. But
we are currently drifting in the open seas, and this is not
a very promising position in which to achieve anything
useful.

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