Maritime Security Model Course PDF
Maritime Security Model Course PDF
Maritime Security Model Course PDF
Department of Transportation
Maritime Administration
Prepared by
December 2004
Contents
FOREWORD ............................................................................................................................... II
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ III
PART A: COURSE FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................... 1
PART B: COURSE OUTLINE ...................................................................................................... 6
PART C: DETAILED TEACHING SYLLABUS ................................................................................ 9
PART D: INSTRUCTOR MANUAL ............................................................................................. 14
PART E: EVALUATION ........................................................................................................... 28
Foreword
This course is one of a series developed by the U.S. Maritime Administration in fulfilment of its charge
under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA 2002). Section 109 of the Act required
the Secretary of Transportation to develop standards and curricula to allow for the certification of
maritime security professionals. This responsibility was delegated by the Secretary to MARAD and
subsequently assigned by me to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy for execution.
Through a collaborative effort with industry and other government agencies, the Academy created seven
model course frameworks in response to the training needs identified by the Congress and articulated in
the MTSA of 2002. These model course frameworks, and a discussion of key issues related to maritime
security education and training, are contained in MARADs Report to Congress titled Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002: Section 109 Implementation.
The MTSA project led to the creation by the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, in a joint effort with the
United States Coast Guard and the Directorate General of Shipping, Government of India, of three model
courses for the International Maritime Organization. The Ship Security Officer, Company Security
Officer, and Port Facility Security Officer courses have been published by the IMO and are now the
global benchmark for maritime security training in their respective areas.
In a style similar to the IMO model courses, the course that follows is one of four based on the MARAD
Report to Congress that provide training guidance for security personnel not addressed by the IMO model
courses. In addition to informing and helping to standardize maritime security training, this course is one
that will be used as a reference in the interim system of course approval and certification that has been
jointly established by MARAD and the U.S. Coast Guard. Organizations that wish to submit maritime
security courses for approval under this system should use this course, the others in the MTSA series, and
the three IMO model courses as the standard reference for the development and operation of courses in
this domain.
It is my hope that this course and the others like it will serve to harmonize and standardize port, maritime,
and intermodal transportation security education and training, and that this will enhance the security of
our Nation.
Maritime Administrator
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Introduction
This model course is intended as specific guidance upon which education and training providers can
immediately base instruction in maritime security matters. It is the result of a careful effort to ensure that
the requirements of relevant domestic legislation, international conventions, and other pertinent guidance
are addressed through standards of knowledge and the acquisition of specific understanding through
education and training. In addition, expert advice and public comment have been solicited and obtained
through a focused public outreach effort. Input thus received has helped to ensure that the model course
is fully consistent with applicable law enforcement, government, and industry standards.
This model course and others in the series of which it is a part constitute a base-level curriculum for
maritime security education and training that includes those subjects listed in MTSA Sec. 109 (b)(2). In
addition to delineating the duties and responsibilities of personnel in various categories and identifying
the subject areas that should be contained in education and training that are intended to be responsive to
these requirements, the curriculum suggests resources that can be employed in delivery of the material.
These resources include reports, regulations, conventions, books, videotapes, and other adjuncts to
education and training that will assist instructors in conducting the training envisioned in Sec. 109 (b)(2).
This course is also intended to serve as a comparison reference for courses that are submitted for approval
under the MARAD/USCG MTSA Section 109 course approval system. It should be noted in this
connection that U.S. domestic training courses for Vessel Security Officer, Company Security Officer,
and Facility Security Officer should use the IMO model courses for Ship Security Officer (Model Course
3.19), Company Security Officer (Model Course 3.20), and Port Facility Security Officer (Model Course
3.21), respectively, as standards for course content, schedule, and related matters.
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Objective
Those who successfully complete the course should be able to demonstrate sufficient knowledge to
undertake the duties assigned under the VSP. This knowledge shall include, but is not limited to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and vessel
stores.
Entry standards
It is assumed that those attending this course will be serving seafarers (or other vessel personnel)
and are likely to be assigned specific security duties in connection with the Vessel Security Plan.
Training providers must verify trainee identity and citizenship.
Course delivery
The outcome of this course may be achieved through various methods, including classroom
training, in-service training, distance learning, computer-based training or combinations of these
methods.
Staff requirements
The instructor in charge of the course shall have had training and/or acceptable equivalent practical
experience in the subject matter of this course, including knowledge of vessel, facility, and port
operations, maritime security matters, and the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002, Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 as amended, the IMO ISPS Code, and relevant U.S. Coast
Guard regulations.
It is recommended that instructors should either have appropriate training in or be familiar with
instructional techniques and training methods.
Teaching aids
Course Framework (Part A of the course)
Instructor Manual (Part D of the course)
Audiovisual aids: video cassette player, TV, slide projector, overhead projector, etc.
Bibliography
The American Waterways Operators. (2002, April). AWO Model Vessel Security Plan.
Arlington, VA: AWO.
Fernandez, L., & Merzer, M. (2003). Janes Crisis Communications Handbook, (1st ed.).
Alexandria: Janes Information Group.
Hawkes, K. G. (1989). Maritime Security. Centreville: Cornell Maritime Press.
International Chamber of Shipping. (2001, November). Guidance for Shipowners, Ship Operators
and Masters on the Protection of Ships from Terrorism and Sabotage. London: ICS.
Republic of Liberia. (2002, April). Proposed Security Manual for Ships and Mobile Offshore
Drilling Units. MSC/Inf. 27. London: International Maritime Organization.
Sidell, F. R., et al. (2002). Janes Chem-Bio Handbook. (2nd ed.). Alexandria: Janes Information
Group.
Sullivan, J. P., et al. (2002). Janes Unconventional Weapons Response Handbook. (1st ed.).
Alexandria: Janes Information Group.
Viollis, P., et al. (2002). Janes Workplace Security Handbook. (1st ed.). Alexandria: Janes
Information Group.
Commandant, United States Coast Guard. (2002, April). Security for Passenger Vessels and
Passenger Terminals. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 4-02.
Commandant, United States Coast Guard. (2002, 21 October). Security Guidelines for Vessels.
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 10-02.
Commandant, United States Coast Guard. (2003, 13 January). Recommended Security
Guidelines for Facilities. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 11-02.
Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security. (2003, 22 October). 33 CFR (Navigation and
Navigable Waters), Chapter 1, Subchapter HMaritime Security, Parts 101, 103, 104, 105, 106.
United States Congress. (2002, 25 November). Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-295).
Textbooks
None recommended at this time.
Hours
Introduction
1.0
1.1
Course overview
1.2
Competences to be achieved
1.3
1.4
0.75
2.1
2.2
2.3
Definitions
2.4
Security Responsibilities
1.25
3.1
Contracting governments
3.2
3.3
The company
3.4
The vessel
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.11
Other personnel
Assessment tools
4.2
4.3
1.0
Security Equipment
0.75
5.1
5.2
5.3
1.25
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
0.75
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
8.2
Security Administration
9.1
0.5
Total:
8.0
Introduction
Course overview
Competences to be achieved
Current security threats and
patterns
1.4 Vessel and port operations and
conditions
2
Maritime Security Policy
2.1 Relevant international
conventions, codes, and
recommendations
2.2 Relevant government legislation
and regulations
2.3 Definitions
2.4 Handling sensitive securityrelated information and
communications
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
The company
The vessel
The port facility
Vessel Security Officer
Company Security Officer
Facility Security Officer
Vessel personnel with specific
security duties
3.10 Facility personnel with specific
security duties
3.11 Other personnel
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
5
Security Equipment
5.1 Security equipment and systems
5.2 Operational limitations of security
equipment and systems
5.3 Testing, calibration and
maintenance of security equipment
and systems
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
3
Security Responsibilities
3.1 Contracting governments
3.2 Recognized Security
Organizations
6.5
6.6
Threat Identification,
Recognition, and Response
Recognition and detection of
weapons, dangerous substances
and devices
Methods of physical searches and
non-intrusive inspections
Execution and coordination of
searches
Recognition, on a nondiscriminatory basis, of persons
posing potential security risks
Techniques used to circumvent
security measures
Crowd management and control
techniques
Learning Objectives
1.
2.
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describes that the person designated as Company Security Officer may act as Company
Security Officer for one or more vessels provided that it is clearly identified for which
vessels he is responsible
.3 indicates that the company may designate several persons as Company Security Officer
provided that it is clearly identified for which vessels each is responsible
.4 lists the duties and responsibilities of the Company Security Officer
3.8. Facility Security Officer
.1 states that the Facility Security Officer shall be designated for each facility
.2 states that a person may be designated as the Facility Security Officer for one or more
facilities
.3 lists the duties and responsibilities of the Facility Security Officer
3.9. Vessel personnel with specific security duties
.1 states that members of the vessels crew other than the VSO may be assigned security
duties in support of the Vessel Security Plan
3.10. Facility personnel with specific security duties
.1 states that facility personnel other than the FSO may be assigned security duties in support
of the Facility Security Plan
3.11. Other personnel
.1 states that other vessel and facility personnel may have a role in the enhancement of
maritime security
.2 states that personnel other than vessel or facility personnel may have a role in the
enhancement of maritime security
4.
11
6.
7.
12
9.
13
Introduction
Security Responsibilities
Security Equipment
Security Administration
The course outline and timetable provide guidance on the time allocation for the course material, but the
instructor is free to modify this if it is deemed necessary. The detailed teaching syllabus must be studied
carefully and, where appropriate, lesson plans or lecture notes compiled.
Preparation and planning are the most important criteria in effectively presenting this course. Availability
and proper use of course materials are also essential for maximum efficacy in conveying the subject to
trainees. The capabilities and limitations of the facilities in use may dictate that the learning objectives be
adjusted but it is suggested that this be kept to a minimum.
Where possible, lectures should be supported by written course materials, videos, and other media that
allow the trainee to embrace the material more fully. It will be necessary to prepare material for use with
overhead projectors or for distribution to trainees as handouts.
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Guidance Notes
1
Introduction
1.1
Course overview
The starting point should be a brief statement of the purpose of the course, a short review of the timeline,
an introduction of participants, determination of knowledge and experience levels, and a brief description
of the teaching facility.
1.2
Competences to be achieved
The aim of the course is stated, competences from Part C of the course are reviewed, and the outcome of
the learning objectives is made clear; namely, that the expected learning outcome is that the trainee
.............................
Instructors should emphasize that no one is being trained to fight or similarly respond to security threats
but rather that trainees should be able to identify, deter, or mitigate such actions through proper planning,
preparation, and coordination with various entities.
1.3
Current threats to maritime security should be summarized in order to provide a basis for understanding
of the recent conventions and legislation in this area and to fully grasp the importance of the training
provided by this course. Prospective security personnel receiving this training must clearly sense the
reality of todays security issues, which include piracy, terrorism, contraband smuggling, cargo theft, and
collateral damage. Some may have adopted a mindset that places the problem of security in the past or in
such a remote corner that it appears distant or irrelevant. Before continuing on with the course this
mindset should be identified and addressed.
Piracy and armed attacks continue to occur on an all too frequent basis. Attacks occur mostly in port
areas, whereas piracy, by definition, usually involves ships at sea. In fact, the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, Article 101, defines piracy as any of the following acts: illegal acts of violence or
detention or any act of depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
vessel or private aircraft and directed on the high seas against another vessel or aircraft or against persons
or property on board such vessel or aircraft. It also includes such acts against a vessel, aircraft, person or
property in a place outside of the jurisdiction of any State.
Terrorism usually involves violence, or the threat of violence, by extremist groups seeking to gain
political objectives by malicious means. A terrorist group may hope to make a statement by using various
types of bombs, making bomb threats or hijacking a vessel. Increasingly, terrorists are acting in
connection with extremist religious sects that promote suicidal behavior.
Contraband smuggling, a criminal activity, may result in large financial loss to the vessel owner whose
vessel is being used by the smugglers. Often, drugs are the commodity being smuggled and they may be
brought on board in a number of creative ways such as in luggage, stores, on or in a persons body, or in
electronic equipment. Weapons are also a frequent item associated with smuggling. Like drugs, weapons,
too, find their way on board in various ways, such as in cargo containers.
Cargo theft, an age-old problem, continues to plague the maritime industry and causes financial losses in
staggering amounts. Prevention is normally the most effective method of dealing with this security threat.
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1.4
This section of the course should provide trainees with an understanding of the larger context in which
maritime operations occur. Familiarity with the complex transportation and logistics framework of the
maritime system will enable students to effectively undertake their security responsibilities. It is essential
for students to have a basic understanding of the general patterns and mechanisms of cargo and passenger
movement through international and intermodal transportation chains. The operational interface between
maritime and other modes of transportation is a central component of this segment of the course.
Trainees should also be exposed to the fundamentals of cargo tracking and related information systems in
the context of security.
2.1
Trainees should appreciate the attempts by international bodies to minimize, stop, or otherwise control
threats to security in maritime transportation. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted
a number of resolutions and conventions to this end. For example, Resolution A.545(13)--Measures To
Prevent Acts Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships was signed in 1983. In 1985 came IMO
Resolution A.584 (14)--Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Which Threaten Safety Of Ships And
Security Of Passengers (this was later reviewed in November of 2001 with IMO Resolution A.924(22)).
Then in 1986 the IMO approved MSC/Circ.443--Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers
And Crew On Board Ships. In 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) treaties aimed at ensuring that appropriate judicial action is taken
against persons committing unlawful acts against ships. Unlawful acts would include the seizure of
vessels by force, acts of violence against persons on board vessels, and placing devices on board a vessel
which are likely to destroy or damage it. The convention obliges contracting governments either to
extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. The SUA came into effect on March 1, 1992.
Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001 the twenty-second session of the IMO, in November
of 2001, unanimously agreed to incorporate security regulations. They approved the development of new
measures relating to the security of vessels and of port facilities for adoption by a Conference of
Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 in December
of 2002 (the Diplomatic Conference). This timetable of little more than a year represents a landmark
achievement for IMO. It provides a clear indication of the gravity of the situation as well as the intention
to protect world shipping against security incidents and threats.
The meeting of the Diplomatic Conference in December of 2002 resulted in amendments to SOLAS 74.
These amendments enter into force on July 1, 2004. A brief summary of these amendments should be
carried out with mention of changes to Chapter V but with emphasis on the changes to Chapter XI,
Regulations 3 and 5 and the new Chapter XI-2 Regulations 1-13 and the ISPS Code. Since portions of the
ISPS Code will be studied in more depth in later sections of the course, the summary here can be brief.
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2.2
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the maritime security regulations contained in 33 CFR
Chapter 1 Subchapter H, and other pertinent legislation and guidance should be summarized for trainees.
2.3
Definitions
Trainees will need a working knowledge of several terms found in SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1, in
the ISPS Code Part A section 2, and in 33 CFR Chapter 1 Subchapter H. These terms may well need
clarification from an experienced instructor in order for trainees to reach the necessary level of
understanding. For instance, it might require emphasis or other clarification by the instructor to establish
that the Vessel Security Officer is a person on board the vessel and in that sense it may be impossible for
a Company Security Officer to also act as the Vessel Security Officer.
2.4
Trainees should understand that certain information and communications will be considered security
sensitive and that the level of sensitivity may change, as do levels of security 1, 2, and 3. Seemingly
benign conversations, therefore, may result in disastrous consequences. All personnel will need to
appreciate the risk of security leaks through communication by improper methods or to the wrong
persons.
Security Responsibilities
This section is intended to give trainees a clear picture of the proportions of the maritime security system
conceived of by the IMO as implemented via the MTSA regulations and to show how the various entities
will work together to form an efficient and effective whole.
3.1
Contracting governments
Instructors should discuss the roles of contracting governments and their obligations in the international
scheme to enhance maritime security. A brief understanding of this subject will help trainees to
comprehend how and why the United States has acted and how they may experience port state control as
exercised by another government.
3.2
The trainee should understand that an RSO may take on the security-related activities of a contracting
government.
3.3
The company
The company is defined in 33 CFR Subchapter H and by SOLAS Chapter XI-1. Companies are given
numerous obligations under SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code and/or 33 CFR Subchapter H,
ranging from requirements for Continuous Synopsis Records to the maintenance of the International Ship
Security Certificate. Trainees will benefit greatly from a clear understanding of the role of the company
and the support that they should expect from the company.
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3.4
The vessel
The term vessel as used here means any and all vessels to which the provisions of 33 CFR Chapter 1
Subchapter H apply. Segments of Chapter XI and the ISPS Code pertain to some of these vessels and
discuss the persons, activities, plans, documentation and so forth that vessels subject to SOLAS will be
exposed to in a security context. All trainees will nevertheless need to understand the requirements
relating to the security of the vessel in its role as the cornerstone of the marine transportation system.
3.5
The facility
The facility is defined in Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 as amended, the ISPS Code, and/or the U.S. Coast
Guard regulations contained in 33 CFR Chapter 1 Subchapter H. It is the location where the
vessel/facility interface takes place. As such, numerous duties and responsibilities are assigned to the
facility. All trainees should understand the role of the facility in maintaining the security of the maritime
transportation system.
3.6- 3.11 Vessel Security Officer, Company Security Officer, Facility Security Officer, Vessel
Personnel with Specific Security Duties, Facility Personnel with Specific Security Duties, and Other
Personnel
Trainees should understand the role of each of these various persons and know what to expect from each
in terms of authority and responsibility. 33 CFR Chapter 1 Subchapter H and/or Parts A and B of the
ISPS Code clearly delineate the functions, duties, and training requirements for each of these categories
of personnel. In the end these are the very people that will make security plans work and who are best
positioned to recognize areas for improvement. They will each need to appreciate their own role as well
as that played by the others.
4.1
Assessment tools
Trainees must be encouraged to adopt systematic and consistent approaches to the evaluation of security
conditions and vulnerabilities. Vessel personnel with specific security duties may be called upon to assist
in these evaluations. The use of checklists to perform assessments of security in day-to-day operations
should therefore be discussed, noting the inclusion of categories such as the following:
General layout of the vessel.
Location of areas that should have restricted access, such as the bridge, engine room, radio room,
etc.
Location and function of each actual or potential access point to the vessel.
Open deck arrangement including the height of the deck above water.
Emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services.
Numerical strength, reliability, and security duties of the vessels crew.
Existing security and safety equipment for protecting the passengers and crew.
Existing agreements with private security companies for providing vessel and waterside security
services.
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4.2
Trainees should be taught that the on-scene security survey is an integral part of any Vessel Security
Assessment. They should understand that the survey should fulfil the following functions:
identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations;
identification and evaluation of key vessel operations that it is important to protect;
identification of possible threats to the key vessel operations and the likelihood of their
occurrence, in order to establish and prioritize security measures; and
identification of weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies and
procedures.
It should be emphasized to course participants that the on-scene survey should examine and evaluate
existing vessel protective measures, procedures and operations for:
ensuring the performance of all security duties;
controlling access to the vessel, through the use of identification systems or otherwise;
controlling the embarkation of vessel personnel and other persons and their effects, including
personal effects and baggage whether accompanied or unaccompanied;
supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of vessel stores;
monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;
monitoring deck areas and areas surrounding the vessel; and
ensuring the ready availability of security communications, information, and equipment.
Security Equipment
5.1
Course participants should be familiar with the types of security equipment and systems that are useful in
enhancing maritime security, both ashore and afloat. Examples of such equipment include:
AIS
Vessel Security Alert System
Locks
Lighting
Handheld radios
GMDSS equipment
Closed Circuit Televisions
Automatic Intrusion Detection Device (Burglar Alarm)
Metal detectors
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5.2
The intent of this course segment is to communicate to trainees the functional limitations and operating
constraints of security equipment that they may encounter or be called upon to use. Issues such as
effective range, environmental sensitivities, and operator (human) error should be addressed as
appropriate.
5.3
Trainees should be familiar with methods for ensuring the continuing accuracy, efficiency, and
operational readiness of selected items of security equipment and associated systems.
6.1
The focus of this segment of the course is on the characteristics and potential effects of prohibited
weapons; explosives; chemical, biological, and radiological devices; substances and compounds that pose
a hazard to personnel, vessels, and facilities, and other related topics.
6.2
In this segment of the course, trainees will learn techniques used to conduct physical and non-intrusive
searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and vessel stores. Trainees should be informed
that, unless there are clear security grounds for doing so; members of the vessels crew should not be
required to search their colleagues or their personal effects. It should be conveyed that any such search
shall be undertaken in a manner that fully takes into account the human rights of the individual and
preserves his or her basic human dignity.
6.3
Trainees should be acquainted with the utility of check cards in conducting systematic searches. A
check card is a card that can be issued to each searcher specifying the route to follow and the areas to
be searched. These cards can be colour-coded for different areas of responsibility, for example blue for
deck, red for engine room. On completion of individual search tasks, the cards are returned to a central
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6.4
Instructors should explain suspicious patterns of behavior, while emphasizing the importance of avoiding
racial profiling and ethnic stereotyping. Examples of suspicious behaviours include:
Unknown persons photographing vessels or facilities.
Unknown persons attempting to gain access to vessels or facilities.
Individuals establishing businesses or roadside food stands either adjacent or in proximity to
facilities.
Unknown persons loitering in the vicinity of vessels or port facilities for extended periods of
time.
Vehicles with personnel in them loitering and perhaps taking photographs or creating diagrams of
vessels or facilities.
Small boats with personnel on board loitering and perhaps taking photographs or creating
diagrams of vessels or facilities.
General aviation aircraft operating in proximity to vessels or facilities.
Persons who may be carrying bombs or participating in suicide squad activities.
Unknown persons attempting to gain information about vessels or facilities by walking up to
personnel or their families and engaging them in a conversation.
Vendors attempting to sell merchandise.
Workmen trying to gain access to vessels to repair, replace, service, or install equipment.
E-mails attempting to obtain information regarding vessels, personnel, or standard operating
procedures.
Package drop-offs/attempted drop-offs.
Anti-national sentiments being expressed by employees or vendors.
Anti-national pamphlets or flyers distributed to employees or placed on windshields in parking
lots.
Out-of-the-ordinary phone calls.
Recreational boaters or persons aboard refugee craft posing as mariners in distress to attract
assistance from other vessels.
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6.5
Trainees should be cautioned that no security equipment or measure is infallible. They should be
apprised of the known techniques that can be employed to evade security systems and controls, such as
the disabling of alarm systems, picking of locks, jamming of radio signals, etc.
6.6
Course participants should be familiarized with the basic patterns of behavior of people in groups during
time of crisis. The critical importance of clear communication with vessel personnel, facility personnel,
passengers, and others involved should be underscored.
33 CFR Chapter 1 Subchapter H and Parts A and B of the ISPS Code will be helpful in organizing
material to be conveyed in this section of the course. Instructors should indicate that this section of the
course is where ideas, plans, and preparation turn into actions and procedures.
7.1
The instructor should convey the different types of security measures that should be considered for
vessels at sea and those in port as they respond to security incidents and the various security levels that
may be set. Trainees may benefit from the in-class creation of checklists detailing the appropriate generic
actions given various conditions. The importance of familiarization training involving the Vessel
Security Plan particular to each vessel should be emphasized.
7.2
The vessel/port interface determines the need for a Facility Security Plan and the interaction with the
Vessel Security Plan. Instructors should ensure that trainees are clear on the critical importance of the
interaction between the vessel security plan and that of the facility.
7.3
The Declaration of Security is defined in Regulation 1 of SOLAS Chapter XI-1 and in 33 CFR Chapter 1
Subchapter H. There is a sample Declaration of Security in Appendix 1 of Part B of the ISPS Code,
which may be helpful in explaining the nature and use of the Declaration of Security.
7.4
Building on the understanding gained from previous sections in this course, trainees should be ready to
synthesize the requirements and plans into actual procedures such as security inspections, controlling
access to the vessel, verifying and controlling the use of identification credentials, monitoring deck areas
and areas surrounding the vessel, and so forth.
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8.1
This portion of the course is concerned with the implementation of plans for a variety of contingencies
associated with terrorism and other criminal activities that may arise in the maritime setting. Possible
responses in the case of bomb threats, explosions, piracy, hijackings, and similar events should be
discussed.
8.2
It should be conveyed to course participants that the objective of drills and exercises is to ensure that
vessel personnel are proficient in all assigned security duties at all security levels and in the identification
of any security-related deficiencies that need to be addressed.
Trainees should learn that effective implementation of the provisions of the Vessel Security Plan requires
that drills be conducted at least once every three months. In addition, in cases where more than 25 percent
of the vessels personnel have been changed, at any one time, with personnel that have not previously
participated in any drill on that vessel within the last 3 months, a drill should be conducted within one
week of the change. These drills should test individual elements of the plan such as:
damage to, or destruction of, the vessel or of a port facility, e.g. by explosive devices, arson,
sabotage or vandalism;
hijacking or seizure of the vessel or of persons on board;
tampering with cargo, essential vessel equipment, systems, or vessel stores;
unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways;
smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction;
use of the vessel to carry persons intending to cause a security incident, or their equipment;
use of the vessel itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction;
attacks from seaward while at berth or at anchor; and
attacks while at sea.
Various types of exercises involving participation of vessel security personnel should be carried out at
least once each calendar year with no more than 18 months between the exercises. These exercises should
test communications, coordination, resource availability, and response. These exercises may be:
full scale or live;
tabletop simulation or seminar; or
combined with other exercises held such as search and rescue or emergency response exercises.
Security Administration
9.1
Drawing on 33 CFR Chapter 1 Subchapter H and SOLAS Chapter XI-1 Regulation 5 and Chapter XI-2,
the instructor will find references to, and examples of, required documents as well as requirements for
record keeping. Record-keeping requirements associated with the Vessel Security Plan should be
summarized.
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Part E: Evaluation
Introduction
The effectiveness of any evaluation depends on the accuracy of the description of what is to be measured.
The learning objectives that are used in the detailed teaching syllabus will provide a sound base for the
construction of suitable tests for evaluating trainee progress.
Method of evaluation
The methods chosen to carry out an evaluation will depend upon what the trainee is expected to achieve
in terms of knowing, comprehending and applying the course content.
The methods used can range from a simple question-and-answer discussion with the trainees (either
individually or as a group) to prepared tests requiring the selection of correct or best responses from given
alternatives, the correct matching of given items, the supply of short answers or the supply of more
extensive written responses to prepared questions.
Where the course content is aimed at the acquisition of practical skills, the test would involve a practical
demonstration by the trainee making use of appropriate equipment, tools, etc.
The responses demanded may therefore consist of:
Validity
The evaluation must be based on clearly defined objectives, and it must truly represent what is to be
measured. There must be a reasonable balance between the subject topics involved and also in the testing
of trainees KNOWLEDGE, COMPREHENSION and APPLICATION of concepts.
The time allocated for the trainee to provide a response is very important. Each question or task must be
properly tested and validated before it is used to ensure that the test will provide a fair and valid
evaluation.
Reliability
To be reliable, an evaluation procedure should produce reasonably consistent results no matter which set
of papers or version of the test is used.
Subjective testing
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Objective testing
A variety of objective tests have been developed over the years. Their common feature is that the
evaluation does not require a judgement by the evaluator. The response is either right or wrong.
One type of objective test involves supplying an answer, generally a single word, to complete the missing
portion of a sentence. Another involves supplying a short answer of two or three words to a question.
Such tests are known as completion tests and short answer tests.
Another form of objective testing consists of selective response tests in which the correct, or best,
response must be selected from given alternatives. Such tests may consist of matching tests, in which
items contained in two separate lists must be matched, or they may be of the true/false type or of the
multiple-choice type.
The most flexible form of objective test is the multiple-choice test, which presents the trainee with a
problem and a list of alternative solutions, from which he must select the most appropriate.
Distracters
The incorrect alternatives in multiple-choice questions are called distracters, because their purpose is to
distract the uninformed trainee from the correct response. The distracter must be realistic and should be
based on misconceptions commonly held, or on mistakes commonly made.
The options none of the above or all of the above are used in some tests. These can be helpful, but
should be used sparingly.
Distracters should distract the uninformed, but they should not take the form of trick questions that
could mislead the knowledgeable trainee (for example, do not insert not into a correct response to make
it a distracter).
Guess factor
The guess factor with four alternative responses in a multiple-choice test would be 25%. The pass mark
chosen for all selective-response questions should take this into account.
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Scoring
In simple scoring of objective tests one mark may be allotted to each correct response and zero for a
wrong or nil response.
A more sophisticated scoring technique entails awarding one mark for a correct response, zero for a nil
response and minus one for an incorrect response. Where a multiple-choice test involves four alternatives,
this means that a totally uninformed guess involves a 25% chance of gaining one mark and a 75% chance
of losing one mark.
Scores can be weighted to reflect the relative importance of questions, or of sections of an evaluation.
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