EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998]

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRA
NCH 104, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed[1] the conviction of petitioner Leo Echega
ray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law s
pouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues
, and on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the fi
rst time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659[2] (the dea
th penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.
On February 7, 1998, this Court denied[3] petitioner's Motion for Reconsideratio
n and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly
complied with the requirements for the reimposition of the death penalty and the
refore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the
death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection,[4] and passed Republic Ac
t No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYI
NG OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PE
NAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.[5] Pursuant to the
provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and Regul
ations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules")[6] and directed
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manua
l.[7]
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition[8] for Prohibition, Injunction and
/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and D
irector of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injec
tion of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these are u
nconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a viola
tion of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under inter
national covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e
) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f
) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to resp
ondent Director.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of Court
[9] to Amend and Supplement Petition with the Amended and Supplemental Petition[
10] attached thereto, invoking the additional ground of violation of equal prote
ction, and impleading the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, in order t
o enjoin said public respondents from acting under the questioned rules by setti
ng a date for petitioner's execution.
On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition,
to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of
ten (10) days from notice, and directed the parties "to MAINTAIN the status quo
prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."
On March 10, 1998, the Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and

Supplement Petition, and required respondents to COMMENT thereon within ten (10)
days from notice.
On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion (1) To clarify Status Q
uo Order, and (2) For the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order expressly en
joining public respondents from taking any action to carry out petitioner's exec
ution until the petition is resolved.
On March 16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General[11] filed a Comment (On t
he Petition and the Amended Supplemental Petition)[12] stating that (1) this Cou
rt has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has re
peatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unus
ual punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No.
8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the mos
t modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electroc
ution or the gas chamber); (3) the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death pen
alty; (4) R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Direc
tor; and that (5) R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing
rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Correc
tions.
On March 17, 1998, the Court required the petitioner to file a REPLY thereto wit
hin a non-extendible period of ten days from notice.
On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights[13] filed a Motion for Leave o
f Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae[14] with the attached Petiti
on to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae[15] alleging that the death penal
ty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be implemented by R.A. No. 8177 is cr
uel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society standards, and further in
voking (a) Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights."; (b) Article III of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which sta
tes that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person," and A
rticle V thereof, which states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."; (c) The International Cov
enant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular, Article 6 thereof, and the S
econd Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rig
hts Aiming At The Abolition of the Death Penalty; (d) Amnesty International stat
istics showing that as of October 1996, 58 countries have abolished the death pe
nalty for all crimes, 15 countries have abolished the death penalty for ordinary
crimes, and 26 countries are abolitionists de facto, which means that they have
retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists
in practice that they have not executed anyone during the past ten (10) years o
r more, or in that they have made an international commitment not to carry out e
xecutions, for a total of 99 countries which are total abolitionists in law or p
ractice, and 95 countries as retentionists;[16] and (e) Pope John Paul II's ency
clical, "Evangelium Vitae." In a Resolution dated April 3, 1998, the Court duly
noted the motion.
On March 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Reply[17] stating that (1) this Court is n
ot barred from exercising judicial review over the death penalty per se, the dea
th penalty for rape and lethal injection as a mode of carrying out the death pen
alty; (2) capital punishment is a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment; (3) l
ethal injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, and that being the "
most modern" does not make it less cruel or more humane, and that the Solicitor
General's "aesthetic" criteria is short-sighted, and that the lethal injection i
s not risk free nor is it easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty violate
s the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights considering that the
Philippines participated in the deliberations of and voted for the Second Option

al Protocol.
After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition,
which it now resolves on the merits.
In the Amended and Supplemental Petition, petitioner assails the constitutionali
ty of the mode of carrying out his death sentence by lethal injection on the fol
lowing grounds:[18]
I.
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A CRUEL, DEGRADING AND I
NHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
II.
THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIG
HTS, WHICH IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.
III.
LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND THE QUESTIONED R
ULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS AN UNNECESSARY AND WANTON INFLICTION OF
PAIN ON A PERSON AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
IV.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 UNDULY DELEGATES LEGISLATIVE POWER TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
V.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS DELEGATED TO HI
M UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
VI.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8177 AND UNLAWFULLY USURPED THE POWER TO LEGISLATE IN PROMULGATING THE QUEST
IONED RULES.
VII.
SECTION 17 OF THE QUESTIONED RULES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY
AS WELL AS FOR BEING AN INVALID EXERCISE BY RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE.
VIII.
INJUCTION MUST ISSUE TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DAMAGE AND INJURY TO PETITIONER'S RI
GHTS BY REASON OF THE EXISTENCE, OPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTI
ONAL STATUTE AND EQUALLY INVALID AND IMPLEMENTING RULES.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules d
o not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscr
iption against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our inte
rnational treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power
, and (d) being discriminatory.
The Court shall now proceed to discuss these issues in seriatim.

I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19

, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Articl
e III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition o
f "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. "The prohibition in the Philippine B
ill against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon safeguard against go
vernmental oppression of the subject, which made its first appearance in the rei
gn of William and Mary of England in 'An Act declaring the rights and liberties
of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown,' passed in the year 16
89. It has been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States (of Amer
ica) and into most constitutions of the various States in substantially the same
language as that used in the original statute. The exact language of the Consti
tution of the United States is used in the Philippine Bill."[19] "The counterpar
t of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall not b
e imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.' xxx In the 1973 Constitu
tion the phrase became 'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committ
ee of the 1986 Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiti
ng 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.' It was thus seen as an obstacle to
experimentation in penology. Consequently, the Committee reported out the presen
t text which prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonan
t with the meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject."[20]
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for t
he drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug t
o be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accus
ed; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of
the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execu
tion, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict;
and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering th
e drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of adm
inistering lethal injection is in order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and w
heeled into the execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a vei
n in the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline solution. At the
warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous
line. The deadly concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose
of sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of panc
uronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium chloride,
which stops the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are commonly used duri
ng surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in h
eart bypass surgery.[21]
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a c
ruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.[22] In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Di
rector of Prisons,[23] this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel when they i
nvolve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, w
ithin the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there som
ething inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of lif
e." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execu
tion by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Cour
t believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A
. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise o
f administrative officials.[24]
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16[25] of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "

court" will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and ti
me of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court
" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused, that is, after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the case[2
6] and has affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the procedure is
that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10
days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certifi
ed copy of the judgment for execution.[27] Neither is there any uncertainty as t
o the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of executio
n, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the las
t sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence
shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and e
xecutory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive cl
emency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of ei
ghteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
final and executory[28] wherein he can seek executive clemency[29] and attend to
all his temporal and spiritual affairs.[30]
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of poss
ible complications in the intravenous injection, considering and as petitioner c
laims, that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as t
he choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal in
jection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. Such supposition is highly sp
eculative and unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injecti
on required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and th
at the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective.[31] Petitioner simply
cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection all
egedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,[32] without an
y other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trai
ned prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public offic
ials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty (by lethal injection
) will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.[33]
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carryi
ng out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutiona
l proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited se
nse, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since p
unishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all puni
shments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for
this reason, is to go unpunished."[34] The cruelty against which the Constitutio
n protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not
the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life human
ely.[35] Numerous federal and state courts of the United States have been asked
to review whether lethal injections constitute cruel and unusual punishment. No
court has found lethal injections to implicate prisoner's Eighth Amendment right
s. In fact, most courts that have addressed the issue state in one or two senten
ces that lethal injection clearly is a constitutional form of execution.[36] A f
ew jurisdictions, however, have addressed the merits of the Eighth Amendment cla
ims. Without exception, these courts have found that lethal injection does not c
onstitute cruel and unusual punishment. After reviewing the medical evidence tha
t indicates that improper doses or improper administration of the drugs causes s
evere pain and that prison officials tend to have little training in the adminis
tration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few minutes of pain does no
t rise to a constitutional violation.[37]

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meani
ng as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matu
ring society."[38] Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts have focused on 'standards of
decency' finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that it
comports with contemporary norms."[39] the primary indicator of society's standa
rd of decency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the country's
legislatures to the sanction.[40] Hence, for as long as the death penalty remai
ns in our statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by th
e Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, wh
ose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We
find that the legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death p
enalty from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights
of petitioner herein.
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY
OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner assiduously argues that the reimposition of the death penalty law vio
lates our international obligations, in particular, the International Covenant o
n Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the U
nited Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines on De
cember 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986,[41] respectively.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
"1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protec
ted by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death ma
y be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in forc
e at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions
of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o
f the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a fina
l judgment rendered by a competent court." (emphasis supplied)
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood
that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Cove
nant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation
of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be
granted in all-cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition
of capital punishment by any State. Party to the present Covenant."
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life
. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital
punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the limi
tation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Pursuant to Article 28
of the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was established and under Article 40 o
f the Covenant, State parties to the Covenant are required to submit an initial
report to the Committee on the measures they have adopted which give effect to t
he rights recognized within the Covenant and on the progress made on the enjoyme

nt of those rights one year of its entry into force for the State Party concerne
d and thereafter, after five years. On July 27, 1982, the Human Rights Committee
issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating tha
t "(while) it follows from Article 6 (2) to (6) that State parties are not oblig
ed to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and,
in particular, to abolish it for other than the 'most serious crimes.' According
ly, they ought to consider reviewing their criminal laws in this light and, in a
ny event, are obliged to restrict the application of the death penalty to the mo
st serious crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2 (2) and (6) that abol
ition is desirable. xxx The Committee is of the opinion that the expression 'mos
t serious crimes' must be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty shou
ld be a quite exceptional measure." Further, the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protect
ion of Those Facing the Death Penalty[42] adopted by the Economic and Social Cou
ncil of the United Nations declare that the ambit of the term 'most serious crim
es' should not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grav
e consequences.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right
s was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966
, and signed and ratified by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and August 22,
1989,[43] respectively. The Optional Protocol provides that the Human Rights Co
mmittee shall receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to b
e victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was ad
opted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither sign
ed nor ratified said document.[44] Evidently, petitioner's assertion of our obli
gation under the Second Optional Protocol is misplaced.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE S
ECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.
It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the framing
of our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
[45] Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-d
elegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delega
ted or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest."[46
] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article
VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Arti
cle VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[47]
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health
and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulatio
ns on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of legislative aut
hority to administrative bodies.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increas

ing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the grow
ing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems deman
ding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and create
d peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to
attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. O
n many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature may not have
the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegat
es, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.[48
]
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers
, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the polic
y to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate[49] - and (b) fix a
standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable - t
o which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[50]
Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the m
ode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.[51]
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative polic
y, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies whic
h will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purp
ose may be carried out.[52] R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "[t]he deat
h sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau o
f Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proc
eedings prior to the execution."[53] Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of C
orrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administer
ed is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict."[54] The legis
lature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of letha
l injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task."[55] The Cou
rt cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detai
l.[56] The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal
offense,[57] but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Cou
rts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of d
iscretion by the administrative officials concerned is, to use the words of Just
ice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion b
y the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under d
elegated legislative power is proper where standards are formulated for the guid
ance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are capable o
f reasonable application.[58]
It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code which originally
provided for the death penalty by electrocution was not subjected to attack on
the ground that it failed to provide for details such as the kind of chair to be
used, the amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place of attachment of elect
rodes on the death convict. Hence, petitioner's analogous argument with respect
to lethal injection must fail.
A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation
of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987

, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of Just

ice.[59] Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take cha
rge of the "administration of the correctional system."[60] Hence, the import of
the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise th
e Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Man
ual, in consultation with the Department of Health.[61]
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer ser
ious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears
missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides:
"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to, during and a
fter administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be pre
pared by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others, the se
quence of events before and after execution; procedures in setting up the intrav
enous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death;
and the removal of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to autho
rized prison personnel."
Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing
rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the
power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of th
e Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval ther
eof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of C
orrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of t
he administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authorit
y under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility r
enders the said paragraph invalid.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of con
fidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict undu
ly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire
, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of publ
ic concern "which the public may want to know, either because these directly aff
ect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of
an ordinary citizen."[62] Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution pro
vides:
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern sha
ll be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertai
ning to official acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to government resea
rch data used as a basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law."
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of
public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas a
nd information in a democracy.[63] In the same way that free discussion enables
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time,[64] access to info
rmation of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making[65] by
giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.[66
]
D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID
FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section of the implementing rules
which provides:

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal
injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next follo
wing the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over
seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be comm
uted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided
in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory
as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by responden
t Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the R
evised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
Article 83 f the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 n
ow reads as follows:
"ART. 83, Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.- The death sentence
shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) yea
r after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last ca
se, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua wi
th the accessory penalty provided in Article 40. x x x".
On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit. Wh
ile Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic A
ct No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is p
regnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing ru
les omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the dea
th sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer
found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three
-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's vie
w, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the o
mission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but
instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and impl
ement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither t
o supplant nor to modify, the law."[67] An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress.[68] In case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and
a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision p
revails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a
woman within the three (3) years next following the date of sentence finds no su
pports in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17 m
ust be declared invalid.
One member of the Court voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as unconstitutio
nal insofar as it delegates the power to make rules over the same subject matter
to two persons (the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corr
ections) and constitutes a violation of the international norm towards the aboli
tion of the death penalty. One member of the Court, consistent with his view in
People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682, 734-758 (1997) that the death penalty law (Re
public Act. No. 7659) is itself unconstitutional, believes that Republic Act No.
8177 which provides for the means of carrying out the death sentence, is likewi
se unconstitutional. Two other members of the court concurred in the aforesaid S
eparate Opinions in that the death penalty law (Republic Act No. 7659) together
with the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) are unconstitutional. In sum,
four members of the Court voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as unconstitut
ional. These Separate Opinions are hereto annexed, infra.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the ass
ailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar a

s Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 con
travenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the R
epublic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approva
l of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably
makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including
the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing
and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 o
f the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.